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37TH CO NG RESS, } 
2d Session. 




MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
HousE OF REPRESEl>TATIVES, U. S , March 26, 1862. 
Re~olvtd, That fifteen hundred and fifty copies of Executive Document No. 243, 1st ses-
sion 24th Congress, Executive Document l\o. 206, 1st Eession 26th Congress, and Execu-
tive Document No. 5, 1st session 32d Congress, on fortifications, floating batteries, and 
other means of defence, be printed for the use of the Hom;e. 
HO. REPS., EX, DOC. No. 243, 24th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION. 
MESSAGE 
FRO)I 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
TO THE 
Senate of the United States, accompanied witli reports from the Secretaries of 
War and Navy, relative to tliemilitary and na,;al defences ef the country. 
APRlL 8, 183fi .-Read, and ord~red that it be printed; and that so much as relatee to the 
militar:v defences be referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, and so much as 
re1ate5 to the naval defences to the Committee on Naval Affairs. 
To tl1e Senate: 
I transmit herewith reports from the Secretaries of the War and Navy De-
partments, to whom were referred the resolutions ac1optec1 by the Senate on the 
18th of February last, requesting information of the probable amount of appro-
priations that would be necessary to place the land ancl naval defences of the 
country upon a __ proper footing of strength ancl respectability. 
In respect to that branch of the subject which falls more particularly under 
the notice of the Secretary of War, and in the consideration of which he has 
arrived at conclusions different from those contained in the report from the En-
gineer bureau, I think it proper to add my concurrence in the views expressed 
by the Secretary. 
ANDREW JACKSON. 
WASHINGTON, April 8, 1836. 
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DEPARTMENT OF WAR, April 7, 1836. 
Sm: In conformity with your instructions, I have the honor to transmit 
reports from the engineer and ordnance departments, furnishing so much of 
the information required by the resolution of the Senate of February 18, 1 36. 
as relates to the fortifications of the country, and to a supply of the munition, 
of war. , The former branch of this subject has required laborious investiga-
tions on the part of the officers charged with this duty, and their report h~ 
therefore been longer delayed than, under other circumstances, would have been 
proper; but the whole matter was too important to have the interests involved 
in it sacrificed to undue precipitancy. 
The engineer report was rnceived at the department on Friday last, and I 
have embraced such portions of the intervening time as other official calls and 
a sHght indisposition would allow me to devote to its examination. I did no: 
consider that any suggestions I could make would justify a further delay at thi-
advanced stage of the session, while, at the same time, I am aware that thi~ 
letter will need all the allowance which these circumstances can claim for it. 
It is obvious that, in the consideration of any general and permanent system oi 
national defence, comprehensive views are not only necessary, but professional 
experience and a knowledge of practical details; such information, in fact, a, 
must be obtained by long and careful attention to the various subjects which 
form the elements of this inquiry. Although, therefore, I do not concur iu all 
the suggestions contained in these reports, and more particularly in those which 
relate to the nature and extent of some of our preparations, still I have though'_ 
it proper to lay them before you, rather than to substitute any peculiar view'0l 
my own for them. Both furnish facts highly interesting to the community, and 
if they anticipate dangers which it may be thought are not likely to happen. 
and suggest prepa'rations which future exigencies will not probably require, t~ey 
are still valuable documents, presenting the necessary materials for the act10n 
of the legislature. The report from the engineer department, in partic~lar, 
evinces an accurate knowledge of the whole subject, while, at the same tune. 
its general views are sound and comprehensive. I consider it a very able doc-
ument. 
Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to submit some general 
remarks, explanatory of my own views, concerning a practical system of ~e-
fence, and which will show how far the plans and details are in confonmty 
with my opinion. I feel that this course is due to myself. 
I shall confine my observations to the maritime frontier. Our inland horde, 
rests, in the southwest and northeast, upon the possessions of civilized n~tion_E 
and requires defensive preparations to meet those contingencies only ~h:ch,_ rn 
the present state of society, we may reasonably anticipate. In the ex1stmg lll· 
tercourse of nations, hostilities, can scarcely overtake us so suddenly as not r, 
leave time to move the necessary force to any point upon these frontiers threatene,. 
with attack. I am not aware of any peculiar position upon either of the~i-
lines of separation which commands the approaches to the country, or who~, 
possession would give much superiority to an invading or defensive force. J;; 
fact, the division is, in both cases, an artificial line through much of its extem. 
and a portion of the natural boundary offers scarcely any impediment to military 
operations. Under such circumstances, it seems altogether inexpedient to cor;-
struct expensive fortifications, which would do little more than protect the P~\ 
under cover of their guns; which are not required as 1Jlaces of depot; wh:c\ 
guard no avenue of communication, and which would leave the surroundi11-
country penetrable in all directions. Without indulging in any improper "p -· 
ulations concerning the ultimate destiny of any portion of the country in jux- · 
position with us, or looking for security to any political change, we may "at't'.: 
anticipate that our own advance in all the elements of power will be at lea ' t eqr 
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to that of the people who adjoin us; n~r.does the most pr~dent forecast ~ictaie 
any precautions, founded upon the opimon that our relative strength :vill de-
crease and theirs increase. The lake frontier, indeed, presents some peculiar con-
sideration · and I think the views submitted by the engineer department, respect-
ing Lake Champlain, are entitled to much weight. This long, narrow sheet of nav-
igable water opens a direct communication into the _States of New York an~ 
Vermont, while its outlet is in a foreign country, and 1s commanded by a posi-
tion of great natural strength. It is also within a few miles of the most powe1:ful 
and populous portion of Canada, and open to all its resources an~ energies. 
With a view, perhaps, to possible rather than to pro~able_ e"."ents, it may be 
deemed expedient to construct a work at some proper site w1thm o_ur b_oundary, 
which shall close the entrance of the lake to all vessels ascendmg its outlet . 
.As such a work, however, would be an advanced post, and, from circu~stanc~s, 
peculiarly liable to attack, its extent and defences should be in proport10n to its 
exposure. 
There is already a considerable commercial marine upon the four great lakes, 
Ontario, Erie, Huron, and 1\Hchigan, which are open to the enterprise of our 
citizens. And this will increase with the augmenting population which is flowing 
in upon the regions washed by these internal seas. It is obvious that, from 
natural causes, the physical superiority will be found upon the southern shores 
of these lakes. The resolution of the Senate embraces the inquiry into the ex-
pediency of constructing permanent fortifications in this quarter. And this in-
q1:_1iry properly divides itself into two branches: . 
.--. 1st. The policy of fortifying the harbors on the lakes ; and, 
2d. The policy of commanding, by permanent works, the communications be-
tween them. 
Both of these measures presuppose that the naval superiority upon these 
waters may be doubtful. But it is difficult to foresee the probable existence of 
any circumstances which would give this ascendency to the other party. It is 
unnecessary to investigate the considerations which bear upon this subject, as 
they are too obvious to require examination. They are to be seen and felt in 
all those wonderful evidences of increase and improvement which are now in 
such active operation. A victorious fleet upon these lakes could disembark an 
army at almost any point. If a harbor were closed by fortifications they would 
only have to seek the nearest beach, and land their men from boats, so that no 
def enc es we could construct would secure. us against invasion ; and temporary 
block-houses and batteries would probably be found sufficiently powerful to 
repel the attacks of any vessels seeking to enter the narrow harbors upon the 
lakes, if we could foresee the existence of any circumstances which would in-
duce an enemy to endeavor to force an entrance into them. 
As to the communication between the lakes, the inquiry, from geoo·raphical 
causes, is necessarily restricted to that from Lake Erie to Lake Huro~, and to 
the straits of Michilimackinac. Of the former, almost sixty miles consist of two 
rivers, completely commanded from their opposite banks, while the entrance into 
one of these, the river St. Clair, is impeded by a bar, over which there are but 
a?out eig_ht feet of water. ~ o armed vessels co?-ld force their way up these 
rivers while the shores were man enemy's possess10n, who might construct bat-
teries at every proj ecting point, ancl who, in. fact, might in many places sweep 
the decks with musketry. As to the straits of Michilimackinac, they are too 
broad to be col!lmanded by stationary fortifications, even if any circumstances 
should lead to the construction and equipment of a hostile fleet upon the bleak 
and remote shores of Matchedask bay, in the northeastern extremity of Lake 
Huron. 
I am therefore of opinion that our lake frontier requires no permanent defences, 
and that we may safely rely for its security upon those resources, both in the 
personnel and materiel, which the extent and other advantages our country in-
sure to us, and which must give us the superiority in that quarter. 
4 MILITARY A~D NAVAL DEFENCES. 
It may, perhaps, be deemed expedient to establish a depot for the reception of 
munitions of war in some part of the peninsula of Michigan, and to strengthen 
it by such defences as will enable it to resist any coup de main which may be 
attempted. From the geographical features of the country, our possessions here 
recede from their natural points of support, and are placed in immediate contact 
with a fertile and populous part of the neighboring colony. In the event of 
disturbances the ordinary communications might be interrupted, and it would 
probably be advisable to have in deposit a supply of all the necessary means for 
offensive or defensive operations, and to place these beyond the reach of any en-
terprising officer who might be disposed, by a sudden movement, to gain posses-
sion of them. The expenditure for such an object would be comparatively un-
important, even should the· contingency be judged sufficiently probable to justify 
precautionary measures. 
I had the honor, in a communication to the chairman of the Committee on 
Military Affairs of the Senate, dated February 19, 1836, a copy of which wa~ 
sent to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives, to suggest the mode. best adapted, in my opinion, to secure our 
frontier against the depredations of the Indians. The basis of the plan was the 
establishment of a road from some point upon the upper Mississippi to Red 
river, passing west of Missouri and Arkansas, and the construction of posts in 
proper situations along it. I think the ordinary mode of construction ought not 
to be drparted from. Stockaded forts, with log block-houses, have been found 
fully sufficient for all the purposes of defence against Indians. They may be 
built speedily, with little expense, and, when necessary, by the labor of the 
troops. Our Indian boundary has heretofore been a receding·, not a stationary 
one, and much of it is yet of this character. And even where we have planted 
the Indians who have been removed, and guaranteed their permanent occupation 
of the possessions assigned to them, we may find it necessary, in the redemption 
of the pledge we have given to protect them, to establish posts upou their e~te-
rior boundary, and thus prevent collisions between them and the ruder indige-
nous tribes of that region. I think, therefore, that no works of a more permanent 
character than these should be constructed upon o-µr Indian frontier. A cordon 
established at proper distances upon such a road, with the requisite means of 
ope.ration deposited in the posts, and with competent garrisons to occupy them. 
would probably afford greater security to the advanced settlements than an! 
other measures in our power. The .. dragoons should be kept in motion along It 
during the ?pen season of the year, when Indian disturbances are most to be 
apprehended, and their presence and facility of movement would tend powerfully 
to restrain the predatory disposition of the Indians ; and if any sudden impttlae 
should operate or drive them into hostilities, the means of assembling a strong 
force, with all necessary supplies, would be at hand, and, as circumstances per-
mit, the posts in the Indian country now in the rear of this proposed line of 
operations should be abandoned and the g·arrisons transferred to it. 
But it is upon our maritime frontier that we are most exposed. Our coaSt 
for _three thousand miles is washed by the ocean, which separates us fro~n tho e 
~at10ns wh? have made the highest advances in all the arts, and part1cula1:Iy 
m tho"'e which minister to the operations of war, and with whom, from o~r.m· 
tcrcourtse and political relations, we are most liable to be drawn into col11s1on. 
If this great medium of communication, the element at the same time of ~cpa-
ration and of union, interposes peculiar obstacles to the progress of hostile cleruon-
tration, it also offers advantages which are not less obvious, aucl which, to b 
ucce._, fully resi."ted, require corresponding arrangements and exertions. TIH:·C 
advantage, depend on the economy and facility of transportation, on the cclc11ty 
of movement, and on the power of an enemy to threaten the whole ~hor,' 
spread out before him, and to , elect. hi, point of attack at pleasme. A powerful 
ho ·tile fl et upon the coast of the United States presents some of the featn " 
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of a war, where a heavy mass is brought to act against detachments which ~ay 
be cut up in detail, although their combined force _would exce_ed the assa1l~ng 
foe. Our points of exposure are so numerous and distant that !t would be im-
practicable to keep, at each of them, a force competent to resist the attack of 
an enemy, prepared by his naval ascendency, and his other arrangements, to 
make a sudden and vigorous inroad upon our shores. It becomes us, therefore, . 
to inquire how the consequences of this state of things are to be best met and 
averted. · 
The first and most obvious, and in every point of view the most proper, 
method of defence is an augmentation of our naval means to an extent propor-
tioned to the resources and the necessities of the nation. I do not mean the 
actual construction and equipment of vessels only. The number of those in 
service must depend on the state of the country at a given period: but I mean 
the collection of all such materials as may be preserved without injury, and a 
due encouragement of those branches of interest essential to the growth of a 
navy, and which may be properly nurtured by the government; so that, on the 
approach of danger, a fleet may put to sea, without delay, sufficiently powerful 
to meet any force which will probably be sent to our coast. 
Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought, and we shall gain nothing 
by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle, or to the exertions we shall 
find it necessary to make. All our institutions are essentially pacific, and every 
citizen feels that his share of the common interest is affected by the derange-
ment of business, by the enormous expense, and by the uncertain result, of a 
war. This feeling presses upon the community and the government, and is a 
sure guarantee that we shall never be precipitated into a contest, nor embark in 
one, unless imperiously required by ~hose considerations which leave no alterna-
tive between resistance and dishonor. Accordingly, all our history shows that 
we are more disposed to bear, while evils ought to be borne, than to seek re-
dress by appeals to arms; still, however, a contest must come, and it behooves 
us, while we have the means and the opportunity, to look forward to its attend-
ant circumstances, and to prepare for the consequences. 
It is no part of my object to enter into the details of a naval establishment. 
That duty will be much more appropriately and ably performed by the proper 
department; but as some of the views I shall present on the subject of our 
system of fortifications must be materially affected by any general plan of naval 
operations which, in the event of hostilities, might be adopted, I am necessarily 
led to s:nbmit a few remarks, not professional, but general, upon the extent and 
employment of our military marine. ' . 
There is as little need of inquiry now into our moral as into our physical 
capacity to maintain a navy, and to meet upon equal terms the ships and sea-
men of any other nation. Our extended commerce, creating and cr~ated by 
those resources which are essential to the building and equipment of fleets, re-
moves all doubt upon the one point, and tl,1e history of our naval enterprise, 
from the moment when the colors were :first hoisted upon the hastily-prepared 
vessels at the commencement of our revolutionary struggle to the last contest 
in which any of _our ships have been engaged, is equally satisfactory upon the 
other. The achievements of our navy have sta:r;nped its character with the 
country and the world. The simple recital of its exploits is the highest eulo-
gium which can be pronounced upon it. 
With ample means, therefore, . to meet upon tho ocean, by which they must 
approach us, any armaments that may be destined for our shores, we are called 
upon ?Y ev~ry prudential consideration to clo so. In the first place, though all . 
wars m which we may be engaged will probably be defensive in their character, . 
undertaken to repel or resent some injury, or to assert some right, and rendered 
necessary by the conduct of other nations, still the objects of the war can be 
best attained by its rigorous prosecution. Defensive in Jts causes, it should be 
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offensive in its character. The greater injury we can inflict upon our opponent, 
the sooner and the more satisfactory will be the redress we seek. Our principal 
belligerent measures should have for their aim, to attack our antagonist where 
he is most vulnerable. If we are to receive his assaults, we abandon the van-
tage ground, and endeavor, in effect, to compel him to do us justice by inviting 
his descent upon our shores, and by all those consequences which mark the 
progress of an invading force, whether for depredation or for conquest. By the 
ocean only -can we be seriously assailed, and by the ocean only can we seriously 
assail any power with which we are likely to be brought into collision. 
But, independently of the policy of making an adversary foel the calamities 
of war, it is obvious that, even in a defensive point of view alone, the ocean 
should be our great field of operations. No one would advocate the project of 
endeavoring to make our coast impervious to attack. Such a scheme would be 
utterly impracticable. A superior fleet, conveying the necessary troops, could 
effect a la,nJing at numerous points upon our shores, even if the best devised 
plan of fortifying them were consummated; and, from the nature of maritime 
operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particu-
lar position, and by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either 
anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land, and effect the object bef~re 
their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far super10r 
to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it upon any given point. 
These dangers and difficulties would be averted or avoided by the maintenance 
of a fleet competent to meet any hostile squadrons which might be detache~_to 
our seas. Our coast would thus be defended on the ocean, and the calamities 
of war would be as little felt as the circumstances of such a conflict would 
permit. 
As to the other advantages of a navy, in the protection of commerce, they 
do not come within the scope of my inquiries, and are not therefore ad~e1ied 
to; nor is it necessary, or indeed proper, that I should present those considera-
tions of distance, of exposure, and of station, which would render a fle~t nu-
merically inferior in the aggregate to that of the enemy, yet still sufficien~ly 
powerful, upon our own coasts, to meet and overcome any armament which 
could probably be sent here. 
It seems to me, therefore, that our first and best fortification is the nayy. Nor 
do I see any limit to our naval preparations, except that imposed by a ~~ere-
gard to the public revenues from time to time, and by the probable condit10~ of 
other maritime nations. Much of the mater£et employed in the construction 
and equipment of vessels is almost indestructible, or at any rate may b_e pre-
served for a long series of years ; and if ships can be thus kept without lilJlll:Y 
upon the stocks, by being built under cover, I do not see what should restram 
us from proceeding to build as many as may be deemed necessary, and ~s fast 
as a due regard to their economical and substantial construction will permit, an~ 
to collect and prepare for immediate use all the munitions of war, and other art1· 
clcs of equipment not liable to injury or decay by the lapse of time. Nor do I 
see that these preparations should be strictly graduated by the number of sea-
men who would probably enter the service at this time, or within any sh?rt 
period. 1'o build and equip vessels properly requires much time, as well w1th 
ref~rence to the execution of the work as to the proper condition of the ma-
ten~l e_mployed. And the costly experiment made by England, when ~he ~oo 
ha t1ly mcreased her fleet, about thirty years ago, by building ships with 1m· 
proper materials and bad workmanship, ought to furnish us with a profi!able 
le on. These vessels soon decayed, after rendering very little service. ~a:rnl 
m ans should therefore be provided at a period of leisure, to be ready for im-
mediate employment in a period of exigency; and a due regard to prudence 
dictates that these means should so far exceed the estimated demand of the 
ervice as to upply in the shortest time any loss occasioned by the hazard of 
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the ocean and the accidents of war. We may safely calculate that the number 
of seamen in the United States will increase in proportion to that rapid augmen-
tation which is going on in all the other branches of na~ional interest. ~f we 
assume that at a given period we may expect to embark m w:ar, our capacity _to 
man a fleet will exceed our present means by a ratio not difficult to ascert~m. 
And even then, by greater exertions and perhaps higher wages, a larger portion 
may be induc0d to enter the naval service, while no exertions can make a cor-
responding addition to the navy itself, but at a loss of time and expenae, and a 
sacrifice of its permanent interest. · 
But whatever arrangements we may make to overcome any naval armaments 
sent out to assail us, we are liable to be defeated and to be exposed to all the 
consequences resultino- from the ascendency of an enemy. And the practical 
question is, what shall be done with a view to such a state of things 1 .As I 
have already remarked, any attempt by fortifications to shut up our coast, so 
that an enterprising foe, with a victorious fleet, conveying a competent force, and 
disposed to encounter all the risk of such an expedition, could not make his 
descent upon the shore, would be useless in itself, and would expose to jnst cen-
sure those who should project such a scheme. .And, on the other hand, th_e 
government would, if possible, be still more censurable were our important mari-
time places left without any defensive works. Between these extremes is a 
practical medium, and to ascertain where it lies we must briefly look at the vari'-
ous considerations affecting the subject. 
W hat have we to apprehend in the event of a war 1 Is it within the limits of 
a reasonable calculation that any enemy will be able and disposed to debark 
upon our coast an army sufficiently powerful to lay siege to our fortifications 
and to endeavor, by this slow and uncertain process, to obtain possession of 
them 1 I put out of view the enormous expense attending such a plan ; the 
distance of the scene of operations from the points of supply and support, with 
the consequent difficulties and dangers, and the possibility that the convoying 
fleet might be overpowered by a superior force, and the whole expedition cap-
tured or destroyed. .All these are considerations which no prudent statesman, 
directing such an enterprise, will overlook. But beyond these is a question 
bearing still more directly upon the point under examination. Is there any ob-
ject to be attained sufficiently important to justify the risk of placing a body of 
land t roops before one of these works, too strong to be carried by a co1tp de 
main, and endeavoring to destroy the defence by a regular investment 1 I think 
there can be none. 
I tak e it for granted that no nation would embark in the quixotic enterprise 
of conquering this country. .Any army, therefore, thrown upon our coast would 
push forward with some definite object to be attained by a prompt movement 
and by vigorous exertions. Our experience, more than half a century ago, de-
monstrated that an invading force could command little more than the position 
it actually occupied. The system of fortifications adopted in Europe is not ap-
plicable to our condition. . There military movements must be made upon great 
avenues of communication, natural or artificial, and these are closed or defended 
by fortress~s constructed with all the skill that science and experience can sup-
ply, and with all the means that wealth and power can command. .An invading 
army must carry these positions by escalade or by siege, or leave sufficient de-
tachments to blockade them, or must turn them and move on with all the diffi-
culties attending the interruption of their communication, and with the dangers 
which such a force in their rear must necessarily occasion. Works of this 
character are keys to many of the European states, whose political safety de-
pends upon their preservation. Their possession enables their governments to 
meet the first shock of war, and to prepare their arrangements, political or mili-
tary, to resist or avert the coming storm. .And . although, during some of the 
wars which arose out of the French revolution, when, from causes which history 
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is now developing, the armies of France set at defiance the received maxims of 
military experience, and justifying their apparent rashness by success, reduced, 
with unexampled facility, or carried on their operations almost in contempt ot 
the strongest fortifications, tlie subjugation of each of which had been till then 
the work of a campaign, still the opinion is yet entertained by many that this 
system of defence is best adapted to the condition of the European community. 
'.rhere is also a striking difference between the political situation of those 
countries and that of ours, which gives to these-defensive preparations a character 
of importance which can never apply to the United States. 'fhe possession of 
a capital in the eastern hemisphere is too often the possession of the kingdom. 
Habits of feeling and opinion, political associations, mid other causes, combine 
to give to the metropolis an undue ascendency. Internal parties, contending 
for superiority, and external enemies, aiming at conquest, equally seek to gain 
possessi·on of the seat of g·overnment. And the most careless observer of the 
events of the last half century must be struck with the_ fact that the fate of the 
capitals and the kingdoms of modern Europe are closely connected together. 
Under such circumstances, it may be prudent, by powerful fortresses, to bar the 
approaches to these favored places, and frequently to construct works to defend 
them from external attack, or to maintain their occupation against internal 
violence. 
But there is nothing like this h1 our country, nor can there be till there is a 
total change in our institutions. Our seats of government are merely the places 
where the business of the proper departments is conducted, and have not them-
selves the slightest influence upon any course of measures, except what is due 
to public opinion and to their just share of it. If the machine itself were itiner-
ant, the result would be precisely the same. Or, if by any of the accidents of 
war or pestilence, the proper authorities were compelled to change their place of 
convocation, the change would be wholly unobserved, except by the few whose 
personal convenience would be affected by the measure. Nor have our com-
men~ial capitals any more preponderating influence than our political ones. And 
although their capture by an enemy, and the probable loss of property, and 
derangement of business, which would be the result, might seriously affect the 
community, yet it would not produce the slightest effect upon the soci~l or 
political systems of the country. The power belongs to all, and is exercised 
by all. 
It follows, therefore, that an enemy could have no inducement to hazard an 
expedition against any of our cities, under the expectation that their capture 
and possession ·would lead to political results favorable to them. vV ashing~on 
may indeed be taken again, and its fall would produce the same emotion wlnch 
was everywhere felt when its former capture was known. But an enemy woul~ 
retire from it with as few advantages as marked its first abandonment, and 1f 
his course were the same, with as few laurels as he won by its possession. I 
make these remarks, because it seems to me that some of the principles of the 
European system of fortifications may possibly be, transferred, to this country, 
without sufficient attention having been given to those circumstances, both geo-
grap!1~cal and political, which require a plan exclusively adapted to our own 
conchtion. 
I consider some of the existing and projected works larger than are now 
necessary,_ a:1d calculated for exigencies we ought not, with the prospects before 
us, to ant1c1pate. If such is the fact, the objection is not only to the expense . 
of their con truction and preservation, but aL~o to the greater difficulty of 
d fending them, and. the increased garri,·ons which must be provided and main-
tained. The hypothe,_i. upon which their extent has Leen determined i~, that 
they may be expo .. ecl to inve. tment, both seaward and. landward, and that they 
ouo-ht to be capable of re._isting . a comLined attack, or, in other words, that their 
MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 9 
water batteries should be sufficient to repel an assailing squadron, and that their 
land defences should be sufficient to resist a besieging army. 
It is certain that whatever works we erect should be so constructed as to be 
beyond the reach of any coup de -main that 'would probably be attempted ag~i:1st 
them ; and this capacity must depend upon their exposure and upon the fae1hty 
with which they can be relieved But this proposition is far different from one 
to construct them upon a scale of magnitude which presupposes they are to be 
formally invested by a powerful land force, and which provides for their ability 
to make a successful resistance. A dashing military or naval officer may be 
willing to risk something to get possession of au insulated post by a prompt 
movement, expecting to accomplish his enterprise before his adversary can be 
prepared, or succor obtained; and this, even when he looks to no other advan-
tage than the capture of the garrison, and the effect which a brilliant exploit is 
calculated to produce; and when he is awa1;e that he must abandon his conquest 
with as much celerity as he attained it. But formal investments of fortified 
places, with all their difficulties, and expense, and uncertainty, are only under-
taken when there is some object of corresponding importance to be expected. 
We have works constructed which it would require armies to reduce. Have 
we any reason to anticipate that they will be assailed by a force proportioned 
to their magnitude 1 
I have already remarked that a European power cannot expect to retain 
permanent possession of any part of this countrv. If, therefore, he succeed in 
overcoming or eluding our fleets, and is prepared with a respectable land force, 
and ready to ri?k its employment upon our territory, he can land at many points 
which we cannot close against him. His debarkation is not a question of 
practicability, but of expediency. If a safe harbor or roadstead offers itself, and 
there is no defensive work to prevent his approach, he will, of course, land at 
the nearest point to the object of his marauding enterprise. If there is such a 
work, it will be a question of calculation whether it is better to attack and carry 
it, or to seek another, though more distant, point of debarkation. I think there 
can be little doubt but there are few, if any, positions in our country which an 
enemy would not under such circumstances avoid. He would be aware of the 
facility of communication which our rivers, canals, and railroads afford, of the 
powerful use we should be prepared to make of steam in its various forms of 
application, and of the immense force which in a short time could be concentrated 
upon a given point; and it is scarcely within the limits of possibility that he 
would venture formally to besiege one of our forts, or if he did, that he would 
not repent his rashness. Neither the co-operation of his fleet, nor the nearer 
proximity of the place of landing to the object of attack, would induce him to 
seek these advantages at the cost which must attend the slow process of besieg-
ing a fort, when, by removing to another position, he would land in safety, and 
save in time, in promptness of movement, and in his escape from the perils of a 
doubtful contest, more than he would lose by the difference in distance. 
I am aw_are it ~ay be obje_cted that the weakness ·Of a work might tempt an 
enemy to attack 1t, and that 1t may be supposed the power of some of our forti-
fications to resist a siege may hereafter furnish the true reason why they may 
not be compelled to encounter one. Certainly the stronger a work is, the less 
will it be exposed to :-langer. But this would not furnish a sufficient reason for 
making its defences out of reasonable proportion to its exposure. rrhe true 
inqu_iry is! What_ circumst~nces will probably induce and enable an enemy to 
assail a given pomt, and with what force; and how can we best meet and repel 
him 1 And I believe a just consideration of this proposition will lead to the 
conclusion that .there are scarcely any positions in our country where an enemy 
would venture to set down before a work too strong to resist a coup de main. 
In the view, therefore, which I take of this whole subject, it will he perceived 
that I do not merely suppose an enemy will not invest our larger works, but 
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that they would not do so were these works much inferior to what they are, 
both in their dimensions and construction. 
What object would justify an enemy in attempting to land an army upon our 
coast 1 He would not expect to lay waste the country, for such a mode of war-
fare is not to be anticipated in the present state of society. All that, under the 
most favorable circumstances, he could accomplish, would he to_ gain sudden 
possession of a town and levy contributions, or to destroy a naval establishment, 
commercial or military, and precipitately retire to his ships before his operations 
could be prevented, or his retreat intercepted I cannot, therefore, concur in the 
suggestion made in the engineer report, that the first of the three great objects 
to be attained by the fortifications of the first class should be to " prevent an 
enemy from forming a permanent or even a momentary establishment in the 
country." It is not suited to the present and prospective situation of the United 
States. I understand the establishments herein contemplated are not the tem-
porary occupation of naval arsenals and cities for the purpose of destruction or 
plunder, because these objects are specially enumerated, but are lodgments 
where armies may be stationed, and whence they may issue to commit inroads 
into the country. 
I refer, in these remarks, to our maritime coast generally. There are, no 
doubt, certain points less equal to self-defence than others, and where the prep· 
aration must be greater. Of this class is the delta of the Mississippi, not only 
in consequence of its many avenues of approach, but because its great natural 
highway does not at present allow those lateral supplies of the personnel, which, 
from geographical formation, and from ihe stat~ of the settlements, can be 
speedily thrown upon most other points of the country. · 'I1hfa region, howev~r, 
is admirably adapted to the use of steam batteries, and they will form its prm-
cipal means of defence. , 
To apply these remarks to the plan of fortifications partly completed and 
partly projected. Fort Monroe, at Old Point Comfort, co-vers about sixty-three 
acres of ground, and requires, by the estimates of the engineer department, two 
thousand seven hundred men to garrison it in time of war. Its full arma~ent 
consists of 412 pieces of different descriptions and calibre. I have been deSll'ous 
of comparing its superficial extent with some of the European fortresses; but 
the necessary information could not be obtained within the short time that could 
be allowed for the inquiry. I understand from General Gratiot, however, that 
it is probably larger than almost any of the single works in Europe whic~ do 
not enclose towns within their circuit. Drinkwater, in his history of the siege 
of Gibraltar, states that 572 guns were mounted upon that fortress. 
. The object to be attained by :Fort Monroe, in conjunction with Fort Calhoun, 
mtended to mount 232 guns, is to prevent an enemy from entering Hampto_n 
roads, a safe and convenient roadstead. This object is important, because this 
bay is perfectly landlocked, and has suffioient depth of water for the largest 
vessels, and is, withal, so near the capes of the Chesapeake that it furnishes the 
best station which an enemy could occupy for annoying our commerce, and for 
committing depredations upon the shores of that extensive estuary. But these 
works do not command the entrance into the Chesapeake; nor is Hampton 
roads the only safe anchorage for a hostile fleet. Their possession, therefore, 
does not exclude an enemy from these waters though th~y will compel him to 
resort to less convenient positions from whence to carry on his enterprises. A 
ho tile squadron reaching the Chesapeake, and :finding the entrance into 
Hampton roads guarded by sufficient works, though much less extensive than 
tho c at i~ort Monroe, would necessarily consider whether the possession of that 
road tead is so important as to justify the debarkation of a large body of land 
troop , and to attempt to carry the works by regular approaches, and this in 
th face of the strenuou effort which would be made to relieve it by all the 
aids afforded by the mo t improved facilities of communication, and by the light 
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and heavy steam-batteries which, upon the approach of war, would be launched 
upon the Chesapeake, and which, during periods of calm, or in certain winds, 
could approach the hostile ships and drive them from their anchorage, or compel 
them to surrender, and most of which, from their draught of water, could take 
refuge in the inlets that other arined vessels could not enter. And even if the 
works were carried, they could not be maintained without the most enorm?us 
expense, nor in fact without efforts which no government three thousand miles 
off could well make, and all this, while Lynnhaven bay, York bay, the Rappa-
hannock, ,.rangier island, the mouth of the Potomac, and many other places, 
furnish secure anchorage, and are positions from which an enemy, having the 
superiority, could not be excluded, and while, in fact, a great part of the Ches-
apeake may be considered as affording good anchorage ground for large ships. 
Neither of them is equal to Hampton roads, but most or all of them furnish 
stations for occupation and observation which would render it unnecessary to 
purchase the superior advantages of Hampton roads by the sacrifice and hazard 
which would attend the effort. The occlusion of this roadstead does not secure 
Norfolk, important as it is from its commerce and navy yard. It only prevents 
the access of ships-of-war to it. And against these there is an interior line of 
defence, which may be considered as accessory to, and, if necessary, independent 
of, the other. And a land force, deeming the destruction of the navy yard at 
Norfolk a sufficient object to justify such an expedition, would not sit down be-
fore Fort Monroe, if its scale of defence were far inferior to what it now is, but 
would debark at Lynnhaven bay, whe•e there is no impediment, and march in 
five or six hours through an open country to Norfolk. 
New York is, in every point of view, our most important harbor, and its de-
fences should provide for every reasonable contingency. The engineer report 
recommends three classes of works : an interior one for the protection of the 
harbor ; an exterior one to shut up Raritan bay ; and a third to prevent a hos-
tile fleet from approaching the city through the sound nearer than the vicinity 
of Throg's Point. The importance of the first class cannot be doubted. 'That 
of the second depends on the value of Raritan bay to an enemy as an anchorage 
ground, and on the utility of excluding him from a landing at Gravesend bay, 
upon Long Island, whence an army could march, without obstruction, to Brook-
lyn and New York. The third is proposed to be· erected in order to bar his 
access to the lower part of the sound, or, more l;tCCurately speaking, to prevent 
his reaching Hell Gate, a natural barrier which no fleet could pass, and which 
is withi.t,_ ten miles of the city. Here, if his aim were New York, he would 
land, and would find no works to prevent his approach. The two forts pro-
posed to be erected at Throg's N eek and Wilkin's Point, eight miles further up 
the sound, would compel him to debark beyond the reach of their guns, and 
would thus add that distance to his march, while on the north shore Harlrem 
·river would be interposed between him and the city. On the Long Island side 
there would be no difference but that occasioned by the distance. 
I t is obvious then that, in the consideration of this plan involving an esti-
mated expenditure in the aggregate of $5,807,969, and efficient gafrisons in 
time of war of nine thousand men, a close investigation should be made into all 
the circumstances likely to influence the operations of an enemy. Is the an-
chorage ground between the Narrows and Sandy Hook of sufficient value to an 
enemy, looking to the risk of his occupation of the coast and to the doubts that 
may be reasonably entertained of the result of so great an experiment to be 
carried on, in fact, in the sea, to authorize the commencement of these works 
without a new examination 7 Or is the probability of the disembarkation of an 
army at Gravesend bay in preference to some other point upon the coast of 
Long I sland, if a convenient one exists, so great as to require these preparations 1 
'l'he same questions may be asked respecting Wilkin's Point. The work at 
'I'hrog's P oint is in the process of construction, and as the 1·iver is only about 
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three-fourths of a mile wide at this place I think its completion would be suffi. 
cient for this line of defence till the proposed general examination can take 
place. . · 
1:rhe situation of New York affords a fine theatre for the operation of floating 
batteries, and whether a sufficient number of them would secure it from the de-
signs of an enemy better than the full completion of the extensive system of 
permanent fortifications recommended is a question deserving investigation. 
Such an investigation I recommend, and after all the necessary facts and con-
siderations are presented the government should proceed to place this commercial 
metropolis of the country in a state of security. 
The workR at Newport cover about twenty acres and will mount 468 guns, 
and will need for their defence about two thousai1d four hundred men. I cannot 
myself foresee the existence of any circumstances which now call for a fortress 
of this magnitude in the very heart of New England; constructed not merely 
to command the harbor of Newport, but to resist a siege which would probably 
require nearly twenty thousand men to carry it on. I am at a loss to conjecture 
what adequate motive could induce a foreign government to detach a fleet and 
army upon this enterprise. The expense would be enormous. 1rhe French 
army that invaded Egypt was less than forty thousand men, and required for 
its protection and transportation between five and six hundred vessels. The 
army that conquered Algiers was about equal in force, and required, it is said, 
about four hundred transports besides the ships-of-war. This scale of prepara-
tion for enterprises against the shores of the Mediterranean may enable us to 
form some conception of the arrangem~nts that would · be necessary to send 
across the ocean to this country, in the present day of its power, an expedition 
strong enough to form an establishment upon our shores, and to furnish it with 
supplies necessary to its subsistence and operations. 
It has been supposed, indeed, by the board of engineers, that an enemy wo~d 
find sufficient reason for the occupation of Rhode Island in the considerat10n 
that it would afford a secure lodgement, whence expeditions could be sent to 
every part of our coast. But it is to be observed that no part of Narraganset 
bay is necessary for the safety of a hostile :fleet watching that part of our coast. 
Gardiner's bay in that vicinity is a most safe and convenient station, which was 
occupied by the British during almost the whole of the late war, and it is pretty 
clear that it cannot be defended by ·any stationary fortifications that can be 
constructed. If it can by floirting batteries, so may Narraganset bay, and ~he 
enemy thus prevented from occupying the latter also without these exteusrvc 
arrangements requiring·, after Fort Adams shall have been completed at.an ex-
pense of one million three hundred and twelve thousand dollars, four other forts 
and a sea-wall to be constructed, and eleven hundred and fifty-seven thousand 
dollars to be expended. . 
. I do not think that the most prudent forecast ought to lead to the apprehen· 
s1on that a force competent to seize such a position would be sent to our country, 
or that any circumstances could enable them to maintain it in the face of the 
vigorous efforts that would be made to recover it, and in the midst of a country 
abounding in all the means to give effect to their exertions. But perhaps the 
most triking objection to the completion of this extensive plan is that under 
no po,sible_ ci~·cumstance. can it effect the desired object. That object, if .r 
understand 1t, IS not the mere exclusion of an enemy from Rhode Island, but It 
i to prevent him from taking po .. session of a safe and convenient position, 
whence he coulcJ. detach his forces by means of his naval superiority to any other 
part of the coa t which would thus be exposed to his depredations. 
'I he value of Gardiner'.., bay a a place of naval rendezvous I have already 
de. cribed. Block i land, in its neighborhood, could be occupied by troops de-
irino- only a lodo-ement, and so could Nantucket ii:!land and l\fartha's Vineyard, 
and the e arc only a few hour;;' ail from Narragansct bay. Buzzard\, bay i~ 
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also a safe and capacious harbor which cannot be defended., and 1\1:a:-tha'.s Vine-
yard. sound afford& commodious places of anchorage. A fleet ridmg m these 
moorings would have under its command all the islands in this group, and co~lld 
secure its communications with its land forces encamped upon them, which 
would thus be enabled, at any proper time, to throw itself upon other parts of 
the coast. It may be doubted, if there were not a cannon mounted upon Rho~e 
Island, whether an enemy acquainted with the topography and resources of tlus 
country would select it as his place of arms, if I may so term it, when there are 
islands in the neighborhood which would answer this purpose nearly as well, 
and where he would be in perfect safety as lop.gas he coul~ maintain his naval 
ascendency, and longer than that he could not, under any circumstances, occupy 
Rhode Island. And if I rightly appreciate the strength and spirit of that part 
of the country, his tenure, in any event, would be short and difficult. I do not 
mean to convey the idea that Rhode Island should not be defended. I think it 
should be; but I do not think that precautions should be taken against events 
which are not likely to happen, As there is no naval establishment here, it is 
not necessary to enter into any question concerning defensive arrangements 
exclusively connected with tht object. 
It will be perceived also that it is proposed to fortify Mount Desert island, 
on the coast of Maine, and that the expense is estimated at five hundred thou-
sand dollars, and the number of the garrison competent to maintain it at one 
thousand men. This proposition is founded, not on the value of this harbor to 
us, for it possesses little, and is, in effect, unoccupied, but on account of its im-
portance to the enemy. Were there no other secure position they could occupy 
in that quarter, and which could not be defended, I should think the views 
submitted upon this branch of the subject entitled to great weight. But there 
are many indentations upon this coast, affording safe anchorage, and which are 
either not capable of being defended, or from their great number would involve 
an enormous expense, which no sound views of the subject could justify. An 
enemy, therefore, cannot be deprived of the means of stationing himself upon 
this coast. And before this expenditure at Mount Desert island is encountered, 
it ought to be clearly ascertained that the difference, in its practical advantages 
to an enemy, between the occupation of Mount Desert island and that of som~ 
of the other roadsteads in this quarter, incapable of defence, would be sufficiently 
great to warrant this measure. My present impression is that it' would not. 
And on the subject of roadsteads generally, with a few exceptions, depending 
on their local positions, I am inclined to the opihion that any attempt to fortify 
them would be injudicious. I do not speak of harbors and inlets which are 
occupied by cities and towns, but of mere anchorage grounds, deriving their 
value from the shelter they afford. If all could be defended, and an enemy 
excluded from them, the advantages would justify any reasonable expenditure. 
But this is impracticable, and I doubt whether the circumstances, in which most 
of them differ, give such marked superiority to those we can defend over those 
we cannot, as to lead to any attempt to fortify them, in the first instance, and 
to maintain garrisons in them during a war. 
I have adverted to these particular cases in order to present my views more 
distinctly than I could do by mere general observations. Certainly not from 
t~e remotest design of critic~sing the reports and the labors of the able profes-
s10nal men to whom the subJect has been referred, nor of pursuing the investi-
gation into any further detail. 
I consider the duty of the governme-µt to afford adequate protection to the 
sea-coast a subject of paramount obligation; and I believe we are called upon 
by every consideration of policy to push the necessary arrangements as rapidly 
as the circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the work will 
allow. I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemy 
should be defended by works, fixed or floating, suited to its local position, and 
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sufficiently extensive to resist such attempts as would probably be made against 
it. There will, of course, after laying down such a general rule, be much latitude 
of discretion in its application. Upon this branch of the subject I would ~ve 
to the opinion of the engineer officers great and almost controlling weight, after 
the proper limitations are established. These relate principally to the mag-
nitude of the works, and if I am correct in the views I have taken of this 
branch of the subject, a change in the system proposed is necessary. Works 
should not be projected upon the presumption that they are to be exposed to 
and must be capable of resisting the attacks of an European army, with its 
battering train, and all its preparations for a regular siege. Neither our relative 
circumstances, nor those of any nation with which we shall probably be brought 
into conflict, can justify us in such an anticir•ation. All the defences should be 
projected upon a scale proportioned to the importance of the place, and should 
be calculated to resist any naval attack, and any sudden assault that a body of 
land troops might make upon them. But further than this it appears to me we 
ought not to go. The results at Stonington, at Mobile Point, at Fort Jacksim, 
and at Baltimore, during· the late war, show that formidable armaments may be 
successfully resisted with apparently inferior means. These, indeed, do not 
furnish examples to be followed as to the scale of our preparations, but they 
show what stationary batteries have done in our country against ships-of-war. 
It is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a 
naval force from our harbors. 'l,his end they ·ought fully to answer, and in this 
problem there are two conditions to be fulfilled : 
1. That they be able to resist any naval batteries that will probably be 
placed against them ; and 
2. That they be also able to resist any coup de main or escalade which might 
be attempted by land. 
An open battery, under many circumstances, might fulfil the first condition 
but not the second, and therefore these works should be closed and regularly 
constructed. It is not to be denied that the proper boundary between the mag-
nitude and nature of the works necessary to attain the objects indicated,.and 
those required to resist successfully a formal investment, will sometII?es 
. become a matter of doubt; nor _that circumstances may not be stated which 
~ight in~uce an enemy to open his trenches against one of these wor~rs, beca~~e 
its capacity for defence was not greater. That capacity, however, with r~lat1on 
to the question under consideration, has a far more intimate connexion with the 
magnitude than with the form of the works, because, if unnecessarily larg~, 
they entail upon the country a serious evil in the increased means for the~ 
defence, independe~tly of the additional expense in their construction. It is 
principall:y:, therefore, in the latter point of view that I have presented the 
doubts which I have expressed upon this point. 
Among the hypothetical cases heretofore stated by the board of engineers 
was one which supposed that an army of twenty thousand men might be 
assembled upon. one of the flanks of our coast, and that we ought to be pre-
pared, at every important pointz to resist the first shock of such a force. I h~ve 
alr~ady_ glanced _at. the reaso~s, geog-raphical, political, financial, an~ prudentml, 
wh1;ch, m my opm_10n, leave httle room to expect that any enemy will, hereaft~r, 
:pro~ect an enterpnse of this magnitude, so certain in its expense, so uncertam 
m. its result, and so disproportioned to any object which could probably be at-
t~med. And. the suggestior.. which was made by. the board, of defending the 
city of_ ~ a hi~gton by works erected near the mouth of the Patuxent, proceed_s 
upon similar VIew . Our navy, our floatino- batteries our means of commun1· 
c~tion and concentratio~, seem to me far b~tter adapted to the defence of_ thi5 
city than fort at the distance of nearly fifty miles, whose principal effect, 1f an 
enemy :wer~ rcsolv~~ upon th~ enterprise, would be to compel him to make ~ 
detour m h1 expedition, or which would .. end him to some part of the coa~t ot 
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the bay between Patuxent and Annapolis, or into the Potomac, where his 
descent would be uninterrupted, and where he would be but little, if any, further 
from Washington than at the head of navigation of the Pa~u~ent. . 
Ev~m during the last war, when the navy of Great Bntam rode trrnmphant 
upon the ocean, but one serious attempt was made to force an. entrance mt? a 
fortified harbor, and that was unsuccessful. The greatest possible force wluch 
can be brought, and the greatest possible resistance which can be applied, do 
not constitute a practical rule for the construction of our fixed defences. Moral 
considerations must also have weight. Probabilities must be examined. The 
power of the permanent batteries is one of the elements of securitY:· So are t~e 
dangers of dispersion, and shipwreck, and all the hazards of a distant expedi- . 
tion, as these must operate on the councils of any country meditating such an 
enterprise, the efforts of our navy, the co-operation of the floating defences, and 
the troops which may be ready to meet the enemy upon his debarkation or 
march. 
In submitting these reflections, I am desirous only of discharging the duty 
confided to me. I am gratified that the whole subject will be presented for the 
consideration of Congress in a systematic form, and that the principles of its 
future prosecution can now be settled. r.rhe plan originally devised was recom-
mended upon great consideration, and, at the time its initiatory measures were 
adopted, was calculated for the state of the country. We had just come out of 
a severe struggle, and had felt the want of adequate preparation, and above all, 
we had seen and deplored the circumstances which gave the enemy undisturbed 
possession of the Chesapeake, and its disastrous consequences. And it was to 
be expected that our arrangements for future defence should be planned· upon 
the then existing state of things. I im~ine there were few who did not con-
cur in this sentiment. Because, therefore, some of our works, from the won-
derful advancement of the country in a_ll the elements of power, and from the 
development of new means of annoyance, are larger than are found necessary 
at this time, still this does not bring into question the wisdom of the original 
measure. And, as it is, they are most valuable and useful ; but the experience 
we have l:\,cquired may be profitably employed in re-examining the plans pro-
posed for the prosecution of the system, and in inquiring whether the change 
. which has taken place in the condition of the country will not justify a corre-
sponding change in the nature of our preparations, and whether we may not de-
pend more upon floating, and less upon stationary defences. 
During the period which has intervened since the last war we h~ve nearly 
doubled in our population, and all our other resources have probably increased 
in a still greater ratio. Certainly, some of the facilities and means of defence 
are augmented beyond any rational expectations. rrhe power of transporting 
troops and munitions of war has already opened new views upon this subject, 
and such is the progress and probable extent of the new system of intercom-
munication that the time will soon come when almost any amount of physical 
force may be thrown upon any point threatened by an enemy. Nashville may 
succor New Orleans in sixty hours-; Cincinnati may aid Charleston in about the 
same time; Pittsburg will require but twenty-four hours to relieve Baltimore, 
and troops from that city and from Boston may leave each place in the morn-
ing, and meet in New York in the evening. '.rhis wonderful capacity for move-
ment incr~ases,in effect, some of the most important elements of national power. 
It neutralizes one of the great advantages of an assailing force, choosing its 
point of attack, and possessing the necessary means of reaching it. Detach-
ments liable, under former circumstances, to be cut off in detail, may now be 
concentrated without delay, and most of the garrisons upon the seaboard may 
be brought together, and, after accomplishing the object of their concentration, 
be returned to their stations in time to repel any attack meditated against them. 
The improvements which are making in the application of steam have fur-
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nished another most important agent in the work of national protection. There 
can be but little doubt that floating batteries, propelled by this agent, will be 
among the most efficient means of coast defence. In our large estuaries, such 
as the bays of New York, of the Delaw'are, and of the Chesapeake, they will 
be found indispensable ; and one of the most important advantages to be anti-
cipated from the works at Old Point Comfort is the security they will afford to 
the floating batteries co-operating with them, and which will find a secure shel-
ter in Hampton roads. A hostile fleet about to enter the Chesapeake would 
certainly calculate the means of annoyance to which it would be exposed by 
these formidable vessels. During a calm they would take a distant position, 
insuring their own safety, while, with their heavy guns, they might cripple and 
destroy the enemy; and their power of motion would enable them, under almost 
all circumstances, to approach the fleet, and to retire, when necessary, where 
they could not be pursued. I think it doubtful whether a squadron would 
anchor in the Chesapeake, or proceed up it, if a competent number of these 
batteries were maintained and placed in proper positions. 
These considerations may well lead us to doubt the necessity of such extensive 
permanent works, while their non-existence at the time the system was adopted 
justifies the views which then prevailed ; and without advancing any rash con-
jecture, we may anticipate such improvements in this bmnch of the public ser-
vice as will make it the most efficient means of coast defence. These vessels, 
properly constructed, may become floating forts almost eq_ual to permanent forti-
fications in their power of annoyance and defence, and m other advantages far 
superior to them. Being transferable defences, they can be united upon any 
point, and a few of them be th us enabled to protect various places. We have 
been brought by circumstances to a more· rigid investigation of our means of 
defence, and to a re-examination of the whole subject. After an interval of 
twenty years of tranquillity, public sentiment and the attention of the govern-
ment were, by unexpected circumstances, more forcibly directed to this matter. 
'The result cannot fail to be advantageous. The whole subject can be now re-
examined by Congress, with all the benefits which much experience has brought, 
· and with the advantage of adapting a system to the advanced state of the 
country. 
There are two bills for fortifications now pending before Congress. One be-
fore the House, amounting to $2,180,000, and intended to prosecute works actu-
ally already commenced. 'l'he estimates for this bill may therefore be considered 
necessary in themselves, under any view of the general subject, and not unrea-
sonable in amount for the present year, because they include the operations of 
two years. The incidental expenses, however, may be safely reduced one-half, 
as it will not be necessary to make such extensive repairs as were considered 
requi&ite when the estimates were prepared. 
The bill pending before the Senate contains appropriations for nineteen new 
works, and f'lr the sum of $600,000 to be expended for steam batteries. The 
estimates on which this bill was founded were prepared at a time when prudence 
required that arrangements should be made for a different state of things from 
that which now ~xists; An examination of the general system of defence .wa 
not then expedrnnt; and the means of protecting the most exposed pomts, 
ag1:eeably to information previously collected, were asked of Congress. It wa' 
no time then ~o stop, and instead of prosecuting established plans vigorously, 
to lose th penod of action by surveys, examinations, and discussions. But the 
oppor~m1~ty i. now afforded, without danger to the public interest, of applying 
the prmc1]_lle,' cuggested to the works under consideration. 
It cannot be <loubted but that fortifications at the following places enumerated 
in thi. · bill will be necc , ary : 
At Pcnob:cot bay, for the protection of Bangor, &c. 
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At New Bedford. 
At New London. 
Upon Staten Island. 
At Sollers'is Flats. 
A redoubt on :Federal Point. 
For the Barrancas. 
17 
For Fort St. Philip. 
These proposed works all command the approach to places sufficiently im-
portant to justify their construction under any circumstances that will probably 
exist. I think, therefore, that the public interest would be promoted by the 
passage of the necessary appropriations for them. As soon as these are made, 
such of these positions as may appear to require it can be examined, and the 
form and extent of the works adapted to existing circumstances, if any change 
be desirable. The construction of those not needing examination can com-
mence immediately, and that of the others as soon as the plans are determined 
upon. By this proceeding, therefore, a season may be saved in the operations. 
The other works contained in this bill are: 
For Provincetown.-And this proposition may be safely submitted to another 
inquiry, as the practicability of excluding an enemy from any shelter in Massa-
chusetts bay, a matter of deep interest, and as a work at Provincetown, are 
closely connected. 
For Rhode Island, Narraganset hay.-This work may await the result of 
the views that may be eventually taken on the subject of fortifying this bay. 
For a work at the Delaware outlet of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal.-
This may be postponed without injury till next season; and in the mean time 
a project for the floating defences of the Delaware considered, and perhaps the 
size of the proposed work reduced. 
For a work at the Breakwater.-Until the effect of the deposits which are 
going on in this important artificial harbor are fully ascertained, I consider it 
injudicious to erect a permanent work for its defence. Another year will, per-
haps, settle the question, and if the result is favorable, an adequate fortification 
should be constructed here ~ithout delay. 
For a fort on the Patuxent river, and a fort at Cedar Point.-Both of thest 
works are liable to some of the objections stated, and I think they had better 
be postponed for more mature consideration. 
For fortifications at the mouth of tlie St. Mary's, Georgia.-This proposi-
tion may also be safely submitted to examination. 
The estimate for steam batteries may be reduced to $100,000. That sum can 
be profitably employed. 
If these appropriations are early made, most if not all of these works can be 
put i:n operation this season, and the money usefully applied, as fast as their 
progress will justify. And I think the measme would be expedient. But it 
is to be remembered that the power of the department to push them, during, the 
present year, will depend on the reorganization of the corps of engineers. If 
that corps is not increased, it will be unnecessary to make the appropriations in 
the bill before the Senate, as the objects contained in the other bill will be suffi-
cient to occupy the time of the present officers of the corps. 
Should it be deemed proper to re-examine the subject of the proposed fortifi-
cations generally, I would then recommend that an appropriation of $30,000 be 
made to defray the expenses of a board, including surveyors, &c. 
My Teflections upon the whole subject lead to the following practical sugges-
tions on the great subject of the measures for the defence of the country; 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--2 
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1. An augmentation of the navy, upon the principles before stated. 
2. The adoption of an efficient plan for the organization of the militia. 
Having already, in two of the annual reports I have had the honor to make 
to you, expressed my sentiments upon this subject, I have nothing new to lay 
before you, either with relation to its general importance, or to the necessary 
practical details. I consider it one of the most momentous topics that can en-
gage the attention of Congress; and the day that sees a plan of organization 
adopted, suited to the habits of our people and the nature of our institutions, 
and fitted to bring into action the physical strength of the country, with a com-
petent knowledge of their duty, and just ideas of discipl!ne and subordination, 
will see us the strongest nation, for the purposes of self-defence, on the face of 
the globe. Certainly such an object is worthy the attention of the legislature. 
3. '.rhe cultivation of military science, that we may keep pace with the im-
provements which are made in Europe, and not be compelled to enter into a 
contest with an adversary whose superior knowledge would give him pre-emi-
nent advantages. War is an advancing science. Many an original genius and 
many an acute intellect are at all times at work upon it; and the Europea_n 
communities have such a relation to one another that the profes.sfon of arms 1s 
peculiarly encouraged, and every effort made to place their military·establish-
ments, not at the highest numerical point, but in the best condition for efficient 
service, both with respect to its morale and materiel. It is not by the mere reading 
of professionR.l authors that the necessary instruction in this branch of knowledge 
can be obtained; there must be study and practice; a union of principles an_d 
details, which can best be obtained by a course of education directed to this 
object. This, I think, is one of the greatest advantages of the Military Acad-
emy. It cannot have escaped the recollection of those who were upon the the-
atre of action at the commencement of the last war, that the first year was 
almost spent in a series of disasters, which, however, brought their advantag~s. 
We were comparatively ignorant of the state of military science, and we did 
not fully recover our true position till we had received many severe lessons : at 
what an expense of life and treasure need not be stated. . . 
4. The skeleton of a regular establishment, to which any necessary additions 
may be made, securing, at the same time, economy, with a due power of ex~an-
sion, and the means of meeting a war with all the benefit of a regularly org·amz.ed 
force. This object is attained by our present arm~. 
5. The preparation and proper distribution of all the munitions of war, agree-
ably to the views hereinafter submitted. 
6. I think. all the defensive works now in the process of construction should 
be finished, agreeably to the plans upon which they have been projected 
7. Al: the harbors and inlets upon the coast, where there are cities or to:m5 
whose situation and importance create just apprehension of attack., and particu-
larly where we have public naval establishments, should be defended by work" 
propor~ioned to any exigency that may probably arise. . . 
Ilavmg already presented my general views upon this branch of the mqmry, 
I need not repeat the practical limitations which I propose for adoption. But 
before any expenditure is incurred for new works, I think an examination shoulJ 
b made, .in every case, in order to apply these principles to the propose~ plan 
of op 'ration~, ancl thus reduce the expense of construction where th1 can 
prop rly be clone, and, also, the eventual expense of maintaining garrison~ 
r quired to dc~cnd works disproportioned to the objects sought to be attained. 
I woulcl oro-amze a board for thi~ object, with special instructions for it" go,-
rnm nt. 
. . ro_vi. ion P~ould be mad for the necessary experiments, to test the supr-
nonty of the vanou,, plan . that may be offered for the construction and use of 
. t am batterie. ; I mean battericK to be employed as acccRsories in the dcfen 
of th harbors and inlet;, and in aid of the permanent fortifications. 
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The progressive improvement in the application of the power of steam renders 
it inexp edient, at any given time, to make extensive arrangements, c?nnected 
with this class of works, with a view to their future employment. The improve-
ment of to-day may be superseded by the experience of to-morrow;. and modes 
of application may be discovered before any exigency ar~ses rendei:mg_a reso:·t 
to th ese defences necessary, which may introduce an entire revolution mto tlus 
department of art and industry. Still, however, experiments should be made, 
and a small number of these vessels constructed. Their proper draught of water, 
their form and equipment, the situation and security of their machinery,. the 
number , calibre, and management of their guns, and the best form of the engmes 
to b e u sed, are questions requiring much . consideration, and which can only be 
determined by experience. And there can be little doubt that suitable rewards 
·would soon put in operation the inventive faculties of some of our countrymen, 
and lead to the te:q.der of plans practically suited to the circumstances. As we 
acquire confidence by our experience, arrangements could be made for collecting 
and preparing the indestructible materials for the construction and equipment of 
these vessels, as far as such a measure may not interfere with any probable 
change, which at the time may be anticipated in the application of the power of 
steam. 
9. I r ecommend a reconsideration of the project for fortifying the roaclsteads 
or open anchorage grounds, and its better adaptation to the probable future cir-
cumstances of the country. 1 
And I would suggest that the works which are determined on be pushed with 
all reasonable vigor, that our whole coast may be placed beyond the reach of 
injury or insult as soon as . a just regard to circumstances will permit. No 
objections can arise to this procedure on the ground of expense, because, whatever 
-.system may be approved by the legislature, nothing will be gained by delaying 
its completion beyond the time necessary to the proper execution of the work. 
In fact , the cost will be greater the longer we are employed in it, not only for 
obvious reasons, .arising out of general superintendence and other contingencies, 
but becau se accidents are liable to happen to unfinished works, and the business 
upon them is deranged by the winter, when they must be properly secured; and 
the season for resuming labor always finds some preparations necessary, which 
would not have been required had no interruption happened. 
But the political considerations which urge forward this great object are enti-
tled to much more weight. When once completed we should feel secure. There 
is probably not a man in the country who did not look with some solicitude . 
during the past season at our comparatively defenceless condition, when the 
issue of our discussions with France was uncertain, and who did not regret that 
our preparations, during the long interval of peace we had enjoyed, had not 
kept pace with our growth and importance. W e have now this lesson to add to 
our other experience. Adequate security is not only due from the government 
to the country, and the conviction of it is not only satisfactory, but the knowl-
edge of its existence cannot fail to produce an influence upon other nations, as 
well in the advent of war itself, as in the mode of conducting it. If we are 
prepared to attack and resist, the chances of being compelled to embark in hos-
tilities will be diminished much in proportion to our preparation. An unprotected 
commer~e, a defe~celess co~st, and a military mari~e wholly inadequate to the · 
wants of our service, would mdecd hold out strong mducements to other nations 
to convert trifling pretexts into serious causes of quarrel. 
There are two suggestions connected with the prosecution of our works which 
I venture to make : . 
First. That the corps of engineers should be increased. The reasons for this 
measure have been heretofore · submitted, and the proposition has. been recom-
mended by you to Congress. I will merely add, upon the present occasion, that 
the officers of this corps are not sufficiently numerous for the performance of the 
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duties committed to them; and that if an augmentation does not take place, the 
public interest will suffer in a degree far beyond the value of any pecuniary 
consideration connected with this increase. And, 
Secondly. I think that when the plan of a work has been approved by Con-
gress, and its construction authorized, the whole appropriation should be made 
at once, to be drawn from the treasury in annual instalments, to be fixed by the 
law. This mode of appropriation would remedy much of the inconvenience 
which has been felt for years in this branch of the public service. The uncer-
tainty respecting the appropriations annually deranges the business, and the 
delay which biennially takes place in the passage of the necessary law reduces 
the alternate season of operations to a comparatively short period. .A.n exact 
inquiry into the effect which the present system of making the appropriations 
has had upon the expense of the works would probably exhibit an amount far 
greater than is generally anticipated. 
The report from the ordnance department shows the quantity and nature of 
the munitions of war, estimated to be eventually necessary, and their probable 
cost, including new establishments necessary for their fabrication and preserva-
tion. The conjectural amount is $29,955,537. 
Believin~ it is not expedient, at present, to make any preparations upon_ a 
scale of this mag1iitude, I have deemed it proper to accompany this report with 
a brief statement of my own views, where I depart from the suggestions that 
are presented in this document. 
As our fortifications are constructed, their armaments should be provided; 
and the amount in depot should at all times exceed the anticipated demand, to 
meet the casualties of the service. We have now on hand 1,818 new cannon 
for sea-coast defence; and about 1,000 others, most of which are either useless 
or of doubtful character. 'The works actually finished, or so far completed as" 
to admit of a part of their armament being placed in them, requiTe about 2,0~0 
guns. They are calculated ultimately to mount about 600 more. Others ~ 
the process of construction will require about 1,400. So far we have certam 
data for our estimates; unless, indeed, which I am inclined to believe, it should 
not be found necessary ever to provide the full complement destined for the 
largest of these works. Beyond this, the subject is conjectural. .A.~d the 
quantity needed must depend upon the principles that may be adopted m the 
further progress of the system of fortifications. There are four private fo'.111· 
deries at which the public cannon are cast.' These, if their whole attention 
were devoted to the object, could manufacture from 1,200 to 1,500 annually. 
As to carriages and other supplies, the amount that could be procured within a 
reasonable period is almost jndefinite. Iron carriages are now ma.de for ~ll. ~he 
casemate batteries, and they have not only the advantage of indestruct1b1hty 
from the atmosphere, but, requiring no seasoned n;iaterials, they may be sup-
plied by the founderics through the country to almost any extent. 
We have two armories for the manufacture of small arms, and there are seven 
pr~vate establishments which fabricate arms for the government. All these ~p-
phes arc ?f the_ ~est description, and are submitted to a rigid inspection, which 
prevents 1mpos1t10n. The armories can at present turn out about 27,000 anm 
annuuliy, and probably 11,000 or 12,000 could be made at existing private 
e tabli ·h~ents. Should any exigency require larger supplies, the quantity can 
be much mcreased. We have now on hand about 700,000 small arms, and 
there have been issued to the States about 180,000 muskets, 25,000 rifles, 30,0 I( 
pi tols, and 378 field caunon and carriages, under the act for arming the militia. 
If 100,000 of these muskets and rifles are preserved, there are in the country 
00,000 of those species of arms belonging to the general or State govern· 
ment. 
·what may be considered a proper supply is a question admitting much dif· 
ference of opinion. It will be seen that the ordnance department fixc' th 
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amount at about 600,000, in addition to what are now on hand, and including 
the number necessary to arm the militia. We had, at the commencement of 
the last war, 240,000 muskets, and during its progress 60,000 more were made 
and purchased. At its termination there were but 20,000 at the va:ious arsen~ls. 
The residue were in the hands of the troops, or had bi:>en lost m the service. 
This consumption was greater, I think, than was p.ecessary, or than would 
probably again take place. A plan of accountability_ha.s bee~ introduced, _by 
which the men are charged with the arms they receive, and if these are im-
properly .lost or injured, the value is deducted from their pay. The paymasters 
cannot settle with them till this matter is adjusted. 
The stock of small arms in Great Britain, in depot, in 1817, was .. 





The number in depot in France, in 1811, was 60,000, not including the great 
number in service. 
My own impression, is that 1,000,000 small arms may be considernd a com-
petent supply for the United States; and if so, a large deductioB. may be made 
from the estimate of the ordnance department under this head of expenditure. 
Although the component materials of these arms are almost imperishable, still 
it is not expedient to keep a stock unnecessarily large on hand; because there 
is not only some risk and expense in their preservation, but because, like every 
other article manufactured by man, they are no doubt susceptible of great im-
provement. And it may be that those now made may be superseded by an 
improved model, which, once introduced, must be adopted, at whatever expense 
or inconvenience, by all nations. And the ingenious invention lately exhibited 
in this city, by which a series of balls, in separate charges, are brought by a 
rotary motion to a common place of discharge, suggests the possibility of a 
revolution in the form of our fire-arms. 
On the subject of depots for these arms, I accord with the general suggestions 
made by the colonel of ordnance. I think the number should be increased, 
and arms placed in every part of the country, ready to be used as circumstances 
may require. 
It will be observed that, in the estimate I have made, I confine myself to the 
armament for the public service, connected with the actual defence of the coun-
try, whether to be used by the army or militia in time-of war, but I do not 
extend my views to a supply for arming the militia, in order to discipline them 
in time of peace. The extent of this policy is a question not necessary in the 
consideration of the subject before me. 
As the arms in depot approach whatever number may be assumed as the 
proper maximum, the necessity for additional armories becomes less. When our 
stock is once completed, the present armories, without any aid from the private 
establishments, will be able to supply the annual consumption. I think, there-
fore, that two additional armories, as suggested by the ordnance department, 
are not wanted. And, indeed, although there are considerations attending the 
transportation of the rude and the manufactured article, and other circumstances 
which would justify the establishment of a new armory upon the western waters . 
at present, yet if the measure is not carried into effect soon its importance will 
annually diminish. 
But a national foundery for cannon, both for the military and naval service, 
and perhaps two in different sections of the country, should be erected without 
delay. rrhe best interests of the public require it. But I have nothing to add 
to the suggestions made upon this subject in my last annual report. 
As to field artillery, the extent to which it shall be provided must depend 
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upon the views of the legislature concerning the expediency of issuing it to the 
militia. If a more efficient organization does not take place I think the ex-
penditure on this account may well be saved to the public treasury. I consider 
all attempts to improve the condition of the militia upon the present plan as so 
nearly useless that the whole system has become a burden upon the public 
without any corresponding advantage. The principal benefit which result~ 
from the existing state of things is the power to call into service such portioru 
of the population as may be wanted. But this may be attained by a simple 
classification without the cumbrous machinery which at present creates expense 
and trouble, and which, while it promises little, performs still less. 
Very respectfully, sir, I have the honor to be, &c., 
The PRESIDENT ef the United States. 
LEWIS CASS. 
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, 
Washington, ll!J.arck 30, 1836. 
Sm : In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to submit here-
with the copy of a report prepared in fulfilment of the requirement of the first 
inquiry contained in the resolution of the Sehate of the 18th of February last. 
The views presented by Colonel r.rotten on the subject are full and explicit, and 
are consonant with the principles heretofore advocated by this department. 
The report is therefore respectfully submitted without any further comments. 
Very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant, 
C. GRATIOT, 
Chief Engineer. 
Hon. LEWIS CAss, Secretary ef War. 
WASHINGTON, Marek 29, 1836. 
Srn: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to hand in some re-
marks on the fortification of the frontier of the United States. 
And am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient, 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
Brig. Gen. CH. GRATIOT, 
Lt. Col. Eng. Br,.vet Colonel. 
Cliiif Engineer, Washi"ngton. 
In presen~in~ a s~mmary statement of the general system of defence of the 
country by fort1fi~at10ns, as proposed and in part executed, it is proper to refer 
for much mformat10n as to localities, as to particular projects, and for statem_ents 
and arguments somewhat elaborate, to communications made at different t1mes 
by the board of engineers for fortifications. 
rrhe~e communications, of a nature forbidding too great publicity, are to be 
found m the records of the War Department in the shape of reports of the 
board of engineers of 1817, 1819, J 820, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1824, and 1 25. 
Refore?-ce may also be ~ade with advantage to the revised report of the board 
of engmeers presented m 1826, and publisheed as document No. 153 of thr 
tate p~pers of the first session of the nineteenth Congress. The report rf 
1 26, Just refen-ed to, was drawn up by the undersigned, and was the work ot 
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much research and of mature deliberation ; and in giving it now a careful peru-
sal, he thinks that the information now called for by the Senate cannot b~ better 
afforded, at least by him, than by again presenting that report, o~cas10na~ly 
condensing, curtailing, or omitting portions of the argument and certam descrip-
tions, and addi'ng such new facts as may have been developed b:y further re-
search, or made more prominent and interesting by the progress of improvement 
in the country. . . 
'l'he elements going to make up the general system of maritime defence are a 
navy, fortifications, interior communications by land and water, and a regular 
army, and well organized militia. ,..- . 
Tlie navy must be provided with suitable establishments for construct10n and 
repair; stations, harbors of rendezvous, and ports of refuge. All t~~s~ must 
be cove;.'ed by fortifications having garrisons of regular troops an~ m1htia, an_d 
being supplied with men and materials through the lines of interior commurn-
cations. Not being required to remain in the harbors for their defence, the 
navy, pre-eminent as an offensive arm, will be prepared to transfer the war_ to 
distant oceans and to the shores of the enemy, and to act the great part which 
its early achievements have foretold, and to which its high destiny will lead. 
Fortifications should, 1st, close all important harbors against an enemy, and 
secure them to our military and commercial marine; 
2d. Should deprive an enemy of all strong positions where, protected by naval 
superiority, he might maintain himself during the war, keeping the whole fron-
tier in constant alarm; 
3d. Must cover the great naval establishments from attack; 
4th. Must protect the great cities; 
5th. Must prevent, as far as possible, the. great avenues of interior navigation 
from being blockaded at their entrances to the ocean ; 
6th. Must cover the coastwise and interior navigation, by closing the harbors 
and the -several inlets which intersect the lines of interior communication, thereby 
further aiding the navy in protecting the navigation of the country; and 
7th. Must shelter the smaller towns along the coast, and also all their com-
mercial and manufacturing establishments which are of a nature to invite the 
enterprise or cupidity of an enemy. 
Interior communications will conduct, with certainty, the necessary supplies 
of all sorts to the stations, harbors of rendezvous and refuge, and the establish-
ments of construction and repair for the use both of the fortifications and of the 
navy; will greatly facilitate and expedite the concentration of military fo;rce, 
and the transfer of troops from one point to another; will insure to these 
troops supplies of every description, and will preserve, unimpaired, the inter-
change of domestic commerce, even during periods of the most active external 
wa1fare. 
The arrny and militia, together with the personnel of the marine, constitute 
the vital principle of the system. 
It is important to notice the reciprocal relation of these elements of national 
defence; one element is scarcely more d·ependent on another, than the whole 
syst~m is on each one. Withdraw the navy, and the defence becomes merely 
passive; we expose ourselves the more to suffer the evils of war, at the time 
that we deprive ourselves of all means of inflicting them. Withdraw interior 
communication, and the nai,y will often be greatly embarrassed for want of 
supplies, while the fortifications will be unable to offer full resistance for want 
of timely re-enforcements. ·withdraw fortifications, and the interior communi-
cations are broken up, and the na1.,y is left entirely without collateral aid. 
That element in the system of defence, which is now to be attended to, is the 
fortifi~ation of the frontier. It may I).Ot be unprofitable here to go somewhat 
more mto detail, as to the relation of this with the other members of the system; 
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the rather, as the reasons for some conclusions hereafter to be announced will 
be the more apparent. 
In considering the relation of fortifications, and of the navy, to the defence of 
the country, it will appear that the functions of the latter are not less appropri-
ately offensive than those of the former are necessarily defensive; the latter 
loses much of its efficiency as a member of the system the moment it becomes 
passive, and should in no case (referring now to the navy proper) be relied on 
as a substitute for fortifications. 
The position, it is thought, may be easily established. 
If our navy be inferior to that of the enemy, it can offer, of course, without 
collateral aids, but a feeble resistance, single ships being assailed by fleets or 
squadrons. Having numerous points along our extended frontier to protect, all 
of which must be simultaneously guarded, because ignorant of the selected 
points of attack, the separate squadrons or vessels may be captured in detail, 
although the naval force be, in the aggregate, equal or superior to the enemy's. 
Should we in such a case venture to concentrate, under the idea that the partic-
ular object of the adversary was foreseen, he could not fail to push his forces 
upon the places thus left without protection. 'rhis mode of defence is liable to 
the further objection of being exposed to fatal disasters, independent of assaults 
of an enemy, and of leaving the issue of conflicts to be determined sometimes 
by accident, in spite of all the efforts of courage and skill. If it were attempted 
to improve upon this mode, by combining with it temporary batteries and field-
works, it would be found that, besides being weak and inadequate from their 
nature, the most suita~le positions for these works must often be neglected, ~-
der the unavoidable condition of security to the ships themselves. If the ships 
take no part in the contest, the defence is of course relinquished to the tempo-
rary batteries; if the ships unite in the defence, the batteries must be at hand 
to sustain them, or the ships must strike to the superior adversary. Placing 
these batteries in better position, and giving them greater strength, is at once 
resorting to defence by fortifications; and the resort will be the more effectual, 
as the positions are better chosen, and the works better adapted to the circum-
stances. 
On the great comparative expense of such a mode of defence, which will ?e 
quite apparent after a little reflection, only one or two very ~rief remarks will 
be made, viz: ~rhe expense incurred by the nation defending itself on this plan 
will, from the first, greatly exceed that incurred by the attacking party; because, 
to resist a single fleet threatening the coast, there must be provided as many 
equal fleets as there are important objects inviting the attack of the enemy, ~d 
even with this costly preparation, all lesser objects are thrown upon his forbear-
ance. 'I1hese defences, moreover, being perishable in their nature, will need 
frequent removal and repafr. . 
. ?n the other hand, the proper fortification of the coast, preventing the poss1-
b1hty of a blockade so strict as not to afford frequent opportunities for our naYy 
to leave the ~arbors, our ships, no longer needed for passive defence, wi_ll move 
out upon the1r _proper theatre of action, though inferior to the enemy, w1!h con-
fi~ence; knovnng that, whether victorious, whether suffering from the v10le~ce 
of tempests, or whether endangered by the vicinity or the pursuit of a supenor 
force, they can strike the extended coast of their country ( avoiding the more 
rmp_ortant outlets, whe_re alone a considerable blockading force may be supposed 
to be) at numerous pomts where shelter and relief await them; hovering around 
the. flanks and ~n the rear of blockading fleets, and recapturing their prizes; 
fallmg upon 1)ort1011s of these fleets, separnted for minor objects, or by stress of 
weather; watc~ing the· movements of convoys, in order to pick up straggling 
vess~l. ; breakmg up or restraining the enemy's commerce in distant sea ; 
meetmg by concert at remote points and falling in mass upon his smaller quad-
ron , or upon hi colonial possessions, and even levying contributions in his un-
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protected ports; blockading for a time the narrow seas, and. l1arassi:1g the 
coasting commerce of the enemy's own shores. These are obJects which our 
own history shows may be accomplished, although conten~ing, by means of a 
navy as to numbers apparently insignificant, against a marme wh~se force and 
efficiency have never been paralleled. Our own history shows, besides, that the 
Teason why our infant navy did not accomplish still more, was that the enemy, 
possessing himself of unfortified harbors, was enabled to enforc.e a bl~ckade so 
strict as to confine a portion of it within our waters. r.rhat tlus port10n, how-
ever, indeed, that all was not captured, can be attributed only to respec_t---:--so 
misplaced that it could be the result of ignorance only-for the then exist~ng 
fortifications; a result amply compensating the nation for the cost of those Im-
perfect works. It would be difficult, nay, impossible, to estimate the full value 
of the results following the career of our navy, when it shall have attained its 
state of manhood, under the favorable conditions lrnretofore indicated. The 
blockade of many and distant parts of our coast will then be impossible, or, 
rather, can then be effected only at enormous cost, and under the risk of the 
several squadrons being successively captured or dispersed; the commerce of 
our adversary must be nearly withdrawn from the ocean, or it must be convoyed, 
not by a few vessels, but by powerful fleets. In fine, the war, instead of result-
ing in the pillage and conflagration of our cities and towns, in the destruction 
of our scattered and embayed navy, and of the expensive establishments per-
taining to it, in the interruption of all commercial intercourse between the sev-
eral portions of the maritime frontier, in the frequent harassing, and expensive 
assemblage of militia forces, thereby greatly lessening the products of industry, 
and infusing among this most valuable portion of our population the fatal 
diseases and the demoralizing habits of a camp life; instead of these and innumera-
ble other evils attendant upon a conflict along and within our borders, we should 
find the war and all its more serious evils shut out from our territory by our 
fortresses, and transferred by our navy to the bosom of the ocean, or even to 
the country of the enemy, should he, relying on a different system, have 
neglected to defend the avenues by which he is assailable. 
Our wars, thus becoming maritime, will be less costly in men and money, and 
at the same time more in unison with our institutions-fOTging no weapon for 
defence capable of being turned, under other circumstances, against the life of 
the State; and keeping our domestic industry and relations, under our internal 
financial resources, beyond the reach of assault from without. 
It is an incontestible principle in military science, and one fully illustrated 
by military history, that the worst mode of waging war, although strictly a de-
fensive one in its origin and its object, is to permit its field of action to lie within 
our own borders; and that the best mode is that which longest sustains an 
offensive attitude. In our own case, war can be excluded from our territory 
o:1ly by forti~cations ; and we can assume the offensive, with the greatest por-
tion of mankmd, only through our navy. The construction of the former secures 
the means of creating, equipp\ng, and repairing the latter, and leaves it unen-
cumbered. with duties which it imperfectly performs, to the full exercise of its 
great and appr?priate functions. _In accordance with these principles, what, in 
general terms, IS the extent to which the government may be called on to pre-
pare ~tself ~ fortifyin~ the coast and in building up the navy 1 
. It 1s not m hu~an forecast to decide upon t~1e station of the latter a genera-
tion hence. . Political events may foi'ce the n~tion to place herself more nearly 
on a level w1tJi some of th~ greatest of mantime powers, or the prevalence of 
peaceful rela~10ns may restnct the growth of the navy to that demanded by the 
mcrease, rapid and extensive, of our commercial interests. But whatever may 
be the amount of enlargement of the naval force, whether greater or less ; or 
~b~teYer the. m?d.e, whether progressive and regular, or by sudden expansion, 
its mcrease will mvolve no corresponding extension in the number or strength 
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of the fortifications, because these must be adequate to their object of them. 
selves, and must consequently be, with some exceptions, as numerous and a-
strong while the navy ·is small, as when the navy shall have attained its IIlllxi-
mum. A considerable enlargement of the naval force might build up new nay~ 
establishments, thereby, in raising the importance of certain positions, callin~ 
for stronger defences. 
The growth of the country in wealth and numbers will convert certain place.. 
now presenting no inducements . to the enterprise of an enemy, into rich an,: 
populous cities. But, with the exception of these cases, and such as these, i: 
may be assumed that a good system of fortifications applied now to the maritime 
frontier will be equal to its object in all future times. 
Conceiving it unnecessary to enlarge further on this part of the subject, a 
few remarks will be offered on the correlative influence of.fortifications and i11· 
terior communications. 
The most important of these communications, in reference to a sys(~Jll~f de-
fence, are, first, such as serve to sustain, in all its activity, that port1on of do-
mestic commerce which, without their aid, would be interrupted by a state o'. 
war ; and second, such as serve, besides their great original purposes, to conduc: 
from the interior to the theatre of war necessary supplies and timely relie1. 
The first, which are among the most important national concerns ot this nature 
lie parallel to, and not far from, the coast; the second, which, when they crot: 
the great natural partition-wall between the east and the west, are equally im: 
portant, lie more remote from the coast, and sometimes nearly or quite parall,1 
to it, but generally fall, nearly at right angles to the line of the seaboard, int· 
the great estuaries, where, iu some cases, their products are arrested, or whenct 
in others, they flow or mingle with those of the first. To fulfil the object r,: 
the first-mentioned lines of communication, it is obviously necessary to preveD" 
an enemy from reaching them through any of the numerous inlets from the s_r: 
which they traverse, including, of course, the great inlets wherein these um 
with the communications coming from the interior. The security of the coast· 
~vise line, therefore, involves the security of the other, and is, in a great measur,, 
mdispensable to it. From such considerations as have been already presenta 
it is inferred that, for the security here required, we must, as in the. case r: 
cities, harbors, naval establishments, &c., look to fortifications. But it fortu· 
nately happens, as will appear in the sequel, that wherever both objects es.!='' 
the works necessary for the one may often, if not always, be made to acco~1ph~~ 
both. In reference to a system of defence for the protection of these line~ L 
communication, it must be observed that, from the facility with which they may 
be bro~en up, and the serious evils consequent thereon, they offer to th~ en~m .. 
great mducements to enterprises of that nature. An aqueduct, an rnchnb 
plane, a tide-lock, a dam, an embankment blown up, is the work of an hour, 
and yet would interrupt the navigation perhaps for months. 
Th~ necessity of a regular army, even in tµne of peace, is a princi~l_e_we~ 
~st~bh heel by our legislation. The importance of a well-organized m1htrn ·-
mc1dent to the nature of our institutions, well understood by the peop!e, ~uly 
appreciated by the government, and finely illustrated in our histor~. _1 othlll-_ 
therefore, need be said on these subjects, considered as general prmc1ples. I 
may, however, in a succeeding part of this communication, be deemed pr?per_ · 
hazard a conjecture or two touching the expediency of a peculiar orgamzanr ... 
of the latter. 
Before going further, it is proper to be more explicit as to the sense in whi · 
the tenn "navy " and "fortifications" have been employed. . 
By the term nary, only that portion of our military marine which is ca_pnl:. 
of moving in , afcty u1JOn the ocean, and transferring itself speedily to di,t •. 
point , i meant. Floating batteries, gunboats, steam batteries, &c., these ~n 
mdeed, all other modes of defence which are restricted in their sphere of act. ::: 
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tied down to local defence, and are produced chiefly in cases where the loca~ities ' 
deny to fortifications their best action, are regarded as auxiliary to fortificat10ns, 
2nd as falling within the same category. Under the term "fortification_s," used 
as expressive of security afforded thereby to the seaboard, have been mcluded 
J>ermanent and temporary fortifications, the auxiliaries just mentioned, and both 
-.fixed and floating obstructions to channels. 
'l'he circumstances which must govern in framing a system of fortifications 
are-
lst. The importance of the objects to be defended. Great naval establish-
ments, great cities, &c., invite to greater preparation on the part of an eneP1y, 
and demand corresponding means of resistance. . . . . 
2d. The natural advantage,s or disadvantages of the position to be fortified. 
It will often happen· that the defence of a position of great consequence can be 
effected with smaller works, and at less expense, than a place of much less 
value. It will not follow, therefore, that the expense of fortifications will be 
proportionate to the importance of the object, though it is indispensable that the 
strength should be. . 
3d. The species of attack to which the place is liable. Some places will be 
exposed only to capture by assault; others by siege; others · to reduction by 
cannonade, bombardment, or blockade ; and some to a combination of any or-all 
these modes. If the enemy against which we fortify be unprovided with artil-
lery, the mode of fortifying becomes peculiar. 
4th. ,Vhatever may be the circumstances, it is of vital importance tbat all the 
works should be fully adequate to the object, and that they should, even with a 
small garrison, be perfectly safe from a coup de main. 
Proceeding now to a concise description of the maritime frontier, considered 
as a whole, the several sections will be afterwards separately examined, apply-
ing as we go to the several positions the works already projected, and pointing 
out as far as practicable such as remain to be planned. 'l'he sea-coast of the 
United States is comprised within the 24th and 46th degrees of north latitude, 
and spreads over 27 degrees of longitude. '.I.1he. general direction of that part 
which lies on the Atlantic, north of the peninsula of Florida, is N.NE. and 
S.SW. This peninsula stretches out from the continent in a direction a little 
east of south; while that part which lies on the Gulf of Mexico corresponds 
nearly with the 30th parallel of north latitude. 
Without estimating any of its indentations not properly belonging to its. out-
line, and carrying our measure from point to point wherever the breaks are at 
all abrupt, the line of coast may be stated to be 3,300 miles in length. 
Nearly parallel with the Atlaptic coast extends a chain of mountains sepa-
rating the sources of rivers flowing, on the one hand, directly into the ocean 
from those which run into the Gulf of St. Lawrence or the Gulf of Mexico. 
Even in the most lohy portion of this chain numerous gaps afford facilities for 
crossing by roads or railways. 
Occasional expansions, at high elevations, present sufficient surface to afford 
the water required for crossing by canals ; and, in other places, the rivers them-
selves have severed the chain, leaving no impediments to communications of 
either kind. On both sides of these mountains the country offers numerous 
natural means of intercommunication, and facilities and inducements for the 
creation of artificial ones in endless combination. 
l!'rom this general description it may be deduced that, notwithstanding the 
great extent of our seaboard, the safety of each section of it is a matter not 
devoid of interest to every portion of the people, however remote geographically, 
at least so long as the nation shall continue her commercial relations with the 
rest of the world ; and, indeed, until she t1hall find it her interest to interdict the 
circulation of domestic commerce through the avenues which nature or art may 
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have created-a commerce of inestimable value at all times, and becoming more 
necessary, as well as more valuable, on every interruption of foreign traffic. 
As lying closely connected with the coast, it will be convenient to describe 
briefly in this place that line of interior communication on which, in time 0 
war, reliance must be placed as a substitute, in part, for the exterior coasting 
navigation of peace. 
Beginning in the great bay to the north of Cape Cod, it passes overland 
either into N arraganset roads or Buzzard's bay; thence through Long Island 
sound to the harbor of New York; thence up the Raritan, overland to the Dela-
ware, down this river some distance, overland to the Chesapeake, down the 
Chesapeake, up Hampton roads and Elizabeth river, through the Dismal swamp 
to Albemarle sound; thence through the low lands, swamps, or sounds of the 
Carolinas and Georgia to the head of the peninsula of Florida; thence overland 
to the Gulf of Mexico ; thence through the interior sounds and bays 1o New 
Orleans, and thence through low lands, swamps, and bayous to the western 
boundary. Some of the few and brief natural interruptions of this extensiw 
line have already been removed; some are rapidly disappearing before the 
energy of local or State enterprise, and to the residue the public attention is 
directed with an earnestness which leaves no reason to fear that they will not 
in due time be overcome. In all cases where this line becomes much exposed 
to an enemy from the difficulty of fortifying broad waters, communications more 
inland are even now afforded, or are in progress by canals or railroads, which 
will be perfectly safe. 
Proceeding now to a more minute examination of the coast, it will be come-
nient to divide it into four distinct parts, namely: the northeastern, extending 
from the English province of New Brunswick to Cape Cod; the middle, from 
Cape Cod to Cape Hatteras; the southern, from Cape Hatteras to Cape Sable; 
and the Gulf of Mexico frontier from Cape Sable to the Mexican borders. 
They will be taken up in the order in which they stand above. 
THE NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF THE COAST. 
The northeastern section is characterized by its ·serrated outline and its 
numerous harbors ; and, though differing in these respects entirely from the 
other sections, is not less distinguished in its climate than by the prevalence,. at 
certain seasons, of dense and lasting fogs. 'I1he extent of this section, meas~g 
from point to point wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is about fi,e 
hundred miles, while a straight line from Cape Cod to Quoddy Head is hardly 
half that distance. The eastern half of this coast is singularly indented by 
deep bays, the shores being universally rocky, and having numerous islands 
surrounded by deep water, which not only add to the number of harbors, but, 
afford, besides, an interior navigation well understood by the hardy coasters ot 
this section, and measurably secured by its intricacies and the other dangers of 
this foggy and boisterous region from interruption by an enemy. The western 
half, though it has two very prominent capes and a few deep bays, is much le.:-5 
broken in its outline than the eastern. It is covered by few islands, in com-
parison, but contains, nevertheless, several excellent harbors. 
The eastern harbors of Maine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They are 
not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near to public estab-
lishments of the greatest maritime powers ; they are, moreover, as yet, backed 
by a parse population only, and are consequently both weak and exposed. The 
time cannot be very di tant, however, when, becoming wealthy and popnlou~. 
they will be the objects of a full portion of the public solicitude. "\York:s ck-
Figned for the e harbors must therefore be calculated for the future-must l e 
founded on the principle that they are to defend places much more irnport~u-
than any now existing there ; that, being very near the possessions of a foreio-n 
power, they will be, in a particular manner, liable to sudden and to repeated 
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attacks ; and that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they can be only tardily 
succored. The works erected on this part of the coast should be so strong as 
to resist escalade, and to hold out long enough for the arrival of relief. Feebler 
works than these might be more injurious than beneficial; their weakness wo_uld, 
in the first place, invite attack, and it being a great advantage t_o occupy fortified 
places in an adversary's territory, the enemy would prepare himself to remedy 
the military deficiencies of these forts by adding temporary works, by the force 
of his garrisons and the aid of his vessels. . 
No surveys have been made of these harbors and no plans formed for then· 
defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence is 
not asked for the mere conjectures presented below as to the number and cost of 
the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been 
surveyed. In some cases there will be mistakes as to the number of for_ts 
needed, and in others the errors will be in the estimated cost, but the errors will 
probably as often lie on one side as on the other, so that the sum total may be a 
sufficient approximation to the truth. 
'l'his is the place to state, also, that the early estimates furnished for the _pr~-
j ected works require considerable augmentation. The explanation of this 1s 
easy. In preparing those estimates the board of engineers obtained lists of 
prices from different sections of the country, and adopted them as accurate. 
Whether the lists thus furnished referred to materials and workmanship of in-
ferior quality, or because they were drawn up at a period of unusually low 
prices, it has been found by experience that these prices were almost all too low. 
The board calculated with great care and labor, and with perfect honesty of pur-
pose, applying the prices just mentioned to all the quantities susceptible of mea-
surement and calculation; and they applied themselves with no less diligence 
and good faith to the estimate of expenses of a contingent nature, and, for the 
greater part, not to be foreseen with accuracy, either as to amount or kind. 
Having no experience in large constructions, these last were at least but conjec-
tures ; and, as the history of constructions on several parts of the coast has since 
shown, they were much too small. In consideration of these defici~ncies, of the 
present great elevation of prices, and of the liability to great increase of cost 
from occasional interruptions of progress and breaking up of systems of opera-
tions, it is thought that about fifty per centum shoula be added to the amounts 
given in the estimates. 
Eastport and Macliias may be brought forward as places that will unques-
tionably be thougJ1t to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative 
importance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There 
a:e several small towns e~stward of Mount Desert island that may, at that pe-
riod, deserve equal attent10n. At present, ho~vever, the places named above will 
be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost of 
each. 
Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, and centrally as 
regards the Kennebec and St. Croix rivers, having a capacious and safe road-
stead, affording anch~rage for the highest class of vessel~, and easily accessible 
from sea, offers a stat10n for the navy of an enemy supenor to any other on this 
por~ion of the c_oas~. From this point his cruis~rs might act with great effect 
agamst the nav1gat10n of the eastern coast, especially that of Maine and his en-
terpr~ses of every kind could ?e cor_iducted with great rapidity agai~st any point 
he IDight select. These cons1derat10ns, added to the advantages which would 
result _in certain politi~al events from our occupying so advanced a station, whence 
we m1ght act offensively, together with the propriety of providing places of 
suc~or ~n a part of the ~o_ast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their 
nav1gat10n by the preva1lmg fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in 
a strong manner, of this roadstead, is highly necessary. A survey of this island 
was begun many years ago, but the party being called off to other duties, it was 
• 
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never completed; the project of defensive works has not been formed. The 
entire cost may be, as assumed by the engineer department, $500,000. 
Castine.-It would seem to be impossible on this coast to deprive an enem,
1 
enjoying naval superiority, of harbors, or to prevent his using them as statio~. 
during the war, insular situations, which his vessels would render unapproach-
able, being so numerous ; but it seems proper that those positions of this nature, 
which are at the same time the sites of towns, should be secured against hi, 
visitations. During the last war the English held the position of Castine for 
some time, and left it at their own pleasure. It is probable that a work costin11 
about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of this position. 
Penobscot bay.-U pon this bay, and upon the river of the same name flowing 
into it, are several :flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which in-
tersect this coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number 
of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed, a large portion of these 
harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable com-
merce of the bay and river must be covered, and to afford a secure retreat for 
such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under protection of the works 
to the east or west of the bay, the passage ,of the river must be defended. The 
lowest point at which this can be done, without great expense, is at the narro'1s 
opposite Buck.sport. A project has been given in for a fort at that position, now 
estimated at $160,000. • 
West of the Penobscot comes St. George's bay, Broad hay, Damariscotta, 
and Slieepscot, all deep indentations, and leading to towns, villages, and variom 
establishments of industry and enterprise of greater or less present value and 
future promise. 'l1hese have not been surveyed, and, of course, no plans ha'1e 
been formed for their defence; $400,000 are assigned to the fortification of these 
waters. 'l1he Sheepscot is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every 
class. 
l(ennebec river.-This river, one of the largest in the eastern States,. enters 
the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Cro1x. It 
rises near the source of the Chaudierre, a tributary of the St. Lawrence, and 
has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and ex-
tent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several 
very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the h~r-
bor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. Surveys m-
complete-estimated cost of defences, as formed by the engineer department, 
$300,000. . 
Portland liarbor.-A little to the northwest of Cape Elizabeth is the ha1:bor 
of Portland. 'rhe protection of the town, of the merchantmen, and of the sh1p~-
of-war that may be stationed there to guard the coast or that may enter for 
shelter, all of them important objects, may be secured, as an inspection of the 
map of the town and harbor will show, by occupying Fort Preble Point, Hou~e 
island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish Point. At the same time, if the two channel~ 
to the west and east of Hog Island ledge can be obstructed at small expen~1'-
which is hardly a matter of doubt, although some final surveys are necessary 
to cl<'cide this point, there will be no necessity for a battery on the ledge; and 
}-,i~h Point need be occupied only by such works as may be thrown up in time 
of war. 'I he expense, as now estimated, of the works plannecl for the defence--
not iucludiug the defence of Hog If:land channel, of which the mode ha$ not 
been settled-will be . '155,000 for Fort Preble, and $48,000 for House i:-:lanJ. 
]for Hog I. land channel, i:;ay $135,000. 
The moutlts of the Saco, Ifonnebunk, and York.-Comparatively small work-
will, it i, thought, adequately cover these places, and $75,000 is a::;:4umed •:: 
their aggl'(•gate co t. 
Portsmoutlt Ifarbor.-Thc only gord road. toad, or good harbor, between a 
Elizabeth ancl Cape Ann, i::; Portsmouth harbor, within the mouth of Piscat:H1u3 
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river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend this river ~s hi~h as Fox Po~nt, sev:en 
m iles above the town of Portsmouth. Between tlns pomt a?d Shootmg ~ou~t 
is a branch of the river communicating with Great bay. 'I.1his branch, which IS 
one-third of a mile wide, presents, for two miles in length, an excellent cover 
for all sorts of vessels. 'I1his situation, sufficiently commodious for a secondary 
depot, designed to repair vessels of war seeking an asylum in this river, is too 
near the sea for a great naval depot; and, in other respects, does not poss~ss the 
advantages of Boston, as was shown in the report of th~ board of ~n~·11;1-ee:s, 
1820. Still, as Portsmouth is an excellent harbor and station, and as it is mdis-
pensable that some, at least, of these stations be provided with the necessary 
establishments for repairs, the depot in this river should be maintained. It is _to 
be regretted that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as the site 
of the navy yard instead of Fernal's island. Being where it is, it will be ~eces-
sary, in time of war, to make some particular dispositions for the protection of 
the yard from an attack from the north shore of the river. 
'I'he position of Fort Constitution must certainly, and that of Fort McCleary 
may possibly, be occupied by these defences; though the works themselves, 
especially the first named, must give place to such as will better fulfil the ob-
ject. The other positions for forts are Gerrish's Point, -- island, and Clark's 
island; some, if not all, of which must be occupied. Some final surveys must 
be made before the necessary works can be accurately determined on, and be-
fore estimates can be made; but there is reason for believing that the entire ex-
pense of fortifying this harbor will not fall short of $500,000. 
Newburyport harbor.-This is the next port south of Portsmouth. The 
l\Ierrimack river, the mouth of which forms this harbor, is obstructed at its junc-
tion with the sea by a bar, on which there was formerly but six or seven feet of 
·water at low tide. This entrance has since, however, been thought to be essen-
tially important, and, at any rate, it leads to a beautiful, prosperous, and wealthy 
city. The points forming the mouth of the river are continually changing their 
form and position ; near the middle of the present channel is said to be the spot 
once occupied by a fort. Under such circumstances, it seems advisable to rely, 
for the defence of this harbor, on forts to be thrown up on the approach of war, 
unless the works of harbor improvement now in progress shall be found to give 
stability to the points in question. It is thought that $100,000 would defend 
this entrance adequately. 
Gloucester lwrbor.-The position of this harbor, near the extremity of Cape 
Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts bay, 
and gives it an importance beyond what would be assigned to it on account of 
its local interests. No surveys have yet been made, but'it is believed that suffi-
cient defences may be provided for $200,000. 
B everly liarbor.-This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the 
works designed for Salem; $50,000, in addition, will secure it. 
_Salem liarbor.-The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, 
be1_ng separated therefrom by a J?eninsnla. 1:he o~cupation of the extremity of 
Wmter ISland, (where are the rums of Fort Pickermg,) on one side, and of :N"au-
gus H ead on the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been 
presented for this defence, now estimated at $225,000. 
JYiarblehcad ltarbor.-Besides covering, in some measure, the establishment 
at Bos_ton, the harbors of Marblehead and Salem possess an important commerce 
of thell' own, and also afford shelter for vessels prevented by certain winds from 
entering Boston or pursuing their course eastward . 'l~he mode of defending 
~Iarblehead h~rbor, pro.Posed by_ the board of engineers, consists in occupying, 
o~ the north side, the hillock which commands the present l!.,ort Sewall, (which 
,v1ll be superseded by the new work,) and on the south, the position of Jack's 
Point. 'l'he two works will cost $318,000. 
Boston harbor.-We come now to the most important harbor in the eastern 
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section of the coast, and, considering its relation to general commerce and the 
interests of the navy, one of the most important in the Union. After a careful 
examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problem, the board of 
naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gave this harbor a 
preference over all other positions to the east, and, inclusive of New York bay 
and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot. For reasons, at 
large, for this selection, reference is made to the report of 1820. But, even 
should the recommendation therein contained remain unsanctioned, still Boston 
is a city of great wealth; possesses an extensive and active commerce, and con-
tains already within its harbor an establishment on which great reliance i~ 
placed to give growth and energy to our navy. The present forts in Boet-0n 
harbor defend merely the interior basin from attacks by water, but as it often 
happens that vessels enter N antasket roads with a wind too scant to pass the 
narrows, or are detained in President roads by light winds or an adverse tide; 
as the former, especially, is a very convenient anchorage, from whence to pro-
ceed to sea; and above all, as N antasket roads afford the best possible station 
for a blockading squadron, it was deemed indispensable to place permanent de-
fences at the mouth of the harbor. The project of the defence regards the ex-
isting works, with the neces::,ary repairs and modifications, as constituting a sec-
ond . ·barrier ; contemplates placing a permanent fort on George's island! 
another at N antasket Head, having two advanced works on the head and one on 
Hog island ; reducing the latitude of Gallop island, in order to destroy its com-
mand over George's island; and filling up the Btoad Sound channel, so a to 
leave no passage, in that direction, for ships-of-war. rrhese are estimated to 
cost $2,337,000. · Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be new-
sary, in the beginning of a war, to erect several temporary works in the lower 
part of the harbor, in order to make that defence more perfect, and also on cer-
tain lateral approaches to the navy yard. 
Plymouth, and Provincetown harbors.-These are the only harbors on the 
northeastern section of the coast south of Boston. They have a commerce of 
some consequence of their own; but they are particularly interesting in refer-
ence to the port of Boston, and to the transition from the middle to the eastern 
section of the coast, in which respect they would become still more important 
should the proposed canal from Buzzard's to Barnstable bay ever be executed. 
While these harbors are undefended, an enemy's squadron blockading M:ass~-
chusetts bay will have ports of refuge under his lee of which he would not fail 
to avail himself to maintain his blockade, even throughout the most stormy sea-
sons, knowing that the wind which would compel him to seek shelter would _be 
adverse to outward-bound, and fatal, should they venture near the cape, tom-
ward-bound vessels. While in possession of, these harbors, an enemy would 
have constantly under his eye the harbor of Boston, the passage round C~pe 
Cod, and that through the canal. 'l'o these considerations, going to estahli;;h 
the necessity of securing these harbors by proper defences, it must be added 
that, being thus deprived of the shelter afforded by these ports, an enemy would 
be unable to enforce a rigorous investment. In the first place, he would be often 
deterred from taking a station near the land, lest he should be caught embayecl 
by the violent easterly winds prevailing at certain seasons; in the next place, he 
would always take a good offing on every distinct indication of these wind:3, 
!hereby l~aving a clear coast to be profited of by our own vessels at the fir~-
~nstant ?f a ch,~nge of weather. Our own vessels, corning in from sea, and :fin~-
mg au cuemy rnterpo ed between them and Boston, or being turned from thcu 
coun;c by aclver e wind , would, in case of the defence of 1he,:;e harbors, find to 
th· :'~Jntl~ of B?ston a shelter equivalen t to that provided to the north by the 
fort1fieat10ns of )Iarblehcad, S uem, GlouccstC'r, and Portsmouth. 
'l'hc .-urvey;· of the ·c harbors have not Leen haudcd iu, and no plan::: ha,-e 
been 'urmecl for their ctefouce. Plymouth harbor may be suitably defend d · -
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is thought, by the occupation of Gurnet Point, a1:d at no great expense; while 
it is thought that, to fortify Provincetown ha:hor m sue~ a way as to cover ves-
sels taking shelter therein, and at the same time to depnve an enemy ?fall safe 
anchorages, will involve considerable expense, pro_bably no nearer estu~1ate can 
be formed at present than that offered by the engmeer department, which gave 
$100,000 to Plymouth and $600,000 to Provincetown. 
Should the canal above mentioned be executed, it will be necessary to place a 
small work at each of its outlets, to prevent the destruction of th~ means by 
which the transit of vessels in and out of the canal must be accomplished. 
MIDDLE SECTION OF THE COAST. 
The coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern 
section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great por-
tion of sandy shore, wherein it resembles the southern section; in its milder cli-
mate and its clearer atmosphere; and it differs from all the other portions in the 
depth and magnitude of its interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to 
which deep tide navigation extends up its numero1,1.s large rivers. 
The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the g-reat bays, measures 
650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named capes to the other 
measures about 520 miles. 
Ma1·tka's Vineyard sound.-rr'o the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of°Nan-
tucket and Martha's Vineyard, which with several smaller islands on the south, 
and the proje"ction of Cape Malabar on the e_ast, enclose Martha's Vineyard 
sound. r.rhe channels through· this sound being sufficient for merchant vessels, 
and one of them allowing the passage even of small frigates, are not only the 
constant track of coasting vessels, but owing to the relative situation of Long 
I sland sound and Narraganset roads, and to the existence of two tolerably safe 
harbors at convenient distances east of Gayhead, namely, rr'arpaulin sound and 
H olmes's Hole, the sound is generally aimed at by all eastern vessels arriving 
from foreign voyages in the tempestuous months. rr'here are certain.,difficulties, 
however, attending the navigation of this sound, arising from the want of a har-
bor near the eastern extremity, which have suggested the project of an artificial 
harbor at the northeast point of Nantucket island. Besides these harbors on 
the direct route through the sound, there are the harbors of Nantucket, Edgar-
town, and Falmouth. 
In addition to the many thousand vessels which pass this water annually, of 
which there are sometimes forty or fifty, a portion containing the most valuable 
cargoes, to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed 
to be at least 40,000 tons of shipping owned in the towns of this sound, and 
employed in the whale fishery. If this portion of the coast is to be defended 
at all, it must be by fortifications, for there is no population SC'lrcely, except that 
of the towns, and this is believed to be entirely without military organization. 
A privateer might run into either of these harbors and capture, destroy, or levy 
contributions at pleasure; $250,000 may perhaps suffice for the defence of all 
these places against the kind of enterprises to which they are exposed. · 
Buzzard's bay.-Interposed between the island of Martha's Vineyard and 
the main are the Elizabeth islands, bounding Buzzard's bay on the south. '.rhis 
bay, although of importance as leading to the proposed can.al to Barnstable bay, 
as covering the flourishing town of New Bedford, and as being one of the natu-
ral harbors to be used by an enemy in forcing the blockade of N arraganset 
roads, cannot be defended by fortifications, owing to its great breadth. 
New B edford and Fairhaven liarbor.-No survey has been made of this har-
bor, which covers two of the most flourishing towns. It is certainly defensible, 
and probably for the amount assumed by the engin~er department, namely, 
~300,000. 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--3 
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Narraganset bay.-The properties of this great roadstead will be here ad-
verted to very briefly; more minute information may be obtained by reference 
to reports of 1820 and 1821. 
It is the only harbor on the coast accessible with a northwest wind, which i3 
the most common and violent of the most inclement season; and as winds from 
N.NW. to S.SW. round by the east serve for entering both Boston and Xew 
York harbors, while this harbor can be entered with all winds from northwest 
to east round by the w0st, it follows that, while we possess this harbor, vessels 
may be certain of making shelter on this part of the coast with any wind that 
can blow, exeepting only between N.NW. and NW. From this station the 
navigation of Long Island sound, and especially the communication between that 
sound and Buzzard's bay or Martha's vineyard sound, may be well protected. 
The blockade of the excellent harbor and naval station of New London will be 
rendered difficult. From this station the navy will command southwardly, as from 
Hampton roads northwardly, the great inward curve of the coast between Cape 
Cod and Cape Hatteras; the influence of which commq,nd over the blockading 
operations of an enemy will be apparent, when it is considered that the only 
harbors of refuge he can have will be the Delaware, Gardiner's, and Buzzard's 
bays, and that it is far from certain that improvements in the auxiliaries of for-
tifications may not dep.rive him of these also. 
If N arraganset bay were without defence, an enemy would occupy it without 
difficulty, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgement in Rhode Island 
for the war. Occupying the island alone, or connecting therewith the position 
of Tiverton H eights, opposite the northern extremity of the island, a position 
which is of narrow front, easy to secure, and impossible to turn, he might defy 
all the forces of the eastern States, drive the United States to vast expense of 
blood and treasure, and while this position of his troops would keep in alarm 
and motion all the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York, 
through Long Island sound, or against more southern cities, would equally alarm 
the country in that direction; and thus, although he might do no more than 
menace, it is difficult to estimate the embarrassment and expense into which he 
would drive the government. 
Of old forts, some of which were never finished, Fort Wolcott and Fort 
Green are the only ones retained in the projected system of defence. 
The project of defence proposed by the board of engineers contemplates ~or 
the middle channel, on Brenton's Point, a strong fort, (now well advanced,) with 
outworks; another strong fort and outworks on the Dumplings; a smaller fort 
on Rose island, and the repair and modification of :Fort Wolcott and Fort 
Green. The eastern passage is already shut by the permanent bridge at Row-
land's Ferry. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves: 1st, 
reducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as, while the passage shall 
be as free as now for merchant vessels, to prevent the passage of ships-of-war ; 
2d, relying on fortifications alone to· close the channel; or, 3d, resortiug in p_art 
to one and in part to the other mode just mentioned. Being the least expensn-e 
and most certain, the estimate was founded on the first. 
The total cost of the N arraganset defences are estimated at $2,050,000. 
Gardiner'~ bay.-This most valuable harbor to an enemy investing this part 
of the coast 1s probably not defensible by fortifications alone. It has not b_een 
surveyed, however, and at no distant day it will be an interesting que~t1on, 
wLether by steam batteries, or _some similar means, under the protection of and 
aid~d ?Y fort~fications ,_ its defence may not be accomplished. The neces...ity for 
forufymg tlns bay will be more evident, should the railroad through Long 
11:l1anc1, in contrmplation, (perhaps in progress,) be constructed. 
The engineer department has assumed the probable cost of the works a· 
$400,000. 
Sag Harbor, lt ... ew York, and Etonington, Connecticut.-N either of these have 
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been. surveyed with reference to defence. The first is possessed of a consider~-
ble tonnage; and the second, besides being largely engaged in commerce, IS 
about to be the termination of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be as-
signed to the first, and $200,000 to the other. · 
New .London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sou_nd; 
and as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, very rarely fr~ezmg, 
and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It IS also 
valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a 
blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. In the plan of defence, the present 
Forts 'l'rumbull and Griswold give place to more efficient works, whereof the 
expense is estimated at $314,515. 
Mouth of Connecticut river.-This river has been shown to be subject to the 
expeditions of an enemy. It has not been surveyed in order to deterrµine on 
the mode of defending it; and $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural 
cost. 
New Haven harbor.-It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and 
enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slig·ht redoubt erected 
during the last war, called Fort Wooster. 'rhe expense of both may be stated 
at $90,000. 
There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides 
of the sound; none of them are very large as yet, though most, if not all, are 
prosperous and rapidly increasing. Although, in their present condition, con-
sidering their local situation, it might not be deemed necessary to apply auy 
money to permanent defences, yet, as part of the present object is to ascertain, 
as near as may be, the ultimate cost of completely fortifying the coast, it seems 
proper to look forward to the time, perhaps not remote, when some of these 
towns may become objects of considerable predatory enterprise. Bearing in 
mind the increase of population in the mean time, and the manner in which the 
places generally are situated, it is thought that $200,000 will be enough to de-
fend them all. 
New York harbor.-The object, of the projected works for the vicinity of 
New York are to cover the city against an attack by land or sea; to protect its 
numerous shipping; to prevent, as much as possible, the blockade of this great 
port, which will have progressively added to the immense wealth of its 
own rivers, greater and greater amounts of the productions of the boundless 
regions on the lakes ; and to cover the interior communication uniting· the Rar-
itan with the Delaware. In the present .condition of the defences of this har-
bor an enemy would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack was 
made by land or water. Coming by the sound, he might land within ten miles 
of the city, upon the main, upon Long Island, or upon both; and, coming into 
the lower harbor, he might, while the works on Staten Island are in their 
present condition, risk forciJ?,g the passage of the Narrows, as well as the upper 
works, anchoring in the Hudson or in the East river; or he might land in 
Gravesend bay, eight miles from the city, and march directly to Brooklyn, 
where he would find the navy yard lying at his mercy, and whence·he might 
levy a contribi1tion or destroy half the city. The only mode of resistance 
would be the expensive, harassing, and uncertain one of arraying a large body 
of milit~a upon Harlaem and Brooklyn H eights, and this could be resorted to 
on1y in the event, by no means certain, of receiving timely intelligence of his 
design. 
If we fortify Throg' s Ner.k and Wilkin' s Point, on the East river, and if we 
complete the works at the Narrows, making them all too strong to be car-
ried by a coup de main, we shall secure the means of transferring the neigh-
boring militia upon the flanks and rear of an enemy should he march upon 
Brooklyn; while we shall secure the same advantage should he pmsue the-
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route by Harlaem, besides increasing the length of his march to twenty miles 
through an intersected country. 
'This arrangement of defensive works, necessary as it is, still leaves the lower 
harbor open to an enemy's vessels; in which harbor, safe at all seasons, he 
could enforce the strictest blockade; cut off the lines of interior communication 
by the Raritan, and avail himself at any moment of a landing place in danger-
ous proximity to the city and navy yard. In view of these considerations, the 
board of engineers projected additional works: one for the East Bank, and 
another for the Middle Ground, which would perfect tlie defences of the harbor: 
compelling an enemy attacking on this side to land upon a dangerous coast, near 
thirty miles from his object, and to enforce his blockade by riding on the open sea, 
with a dangerous coast on either hand. Before determining on the works last 
mentioned, the board went into much research in order to ascertain whetherthe 
sand banks mentioned were unchangeable; and it was thought to have been 
very fully proved that there had been no material change in more than sixty 
years. 'rhis apparent stability of the shoals encouraged them to de,ise the 
projects referred to. 
Recent surveys, it has been said, have discovered a new channel. If this be 
so, it may not be prudent to resort to the project, and it may become necessary 
to devise other means; but whatever they may be, they must, from the nature 
of the case, be very expensive; and there will be no great error, probably, in 
~king the estimated cost of the projected batteries as the cost of such mode 
of defence as may be finally resolved on. The cost of the complete defence of 
New York remaining to be incurred is, according to the estimates, $5,369,824. 
Delaware bay and city ef P Jii'ladelphia.-The coast, from the mouth of the 
Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the south side of Long Island, is 
low, sandy, covered by numerous sandy islands lying near and parallel to the coast, 
and having, besides the Delaware, many inlets and interior basins, but none, 
excepting the one named, affording water enough for sea-going vessels. The 
Delaware bay itself, being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and 
being much obstructed by ice at certain seasons, affords no very good natural har-
bor within a reasonable distance of the sea. The artificial harbor now in course 
of construction near Cape Henlopen will, it is hoped, fully realize the expec· 
tations of its projectors, in which event it must be securely fortified. No plans 
have, however, as yet been made with that object; and as to the probable co~t, 
nothing better can now be done than to assume the conjectural estimate of the 
engineer department, namely, $600,000. 
The lowest point at which Philadelphia is defensible is at Pea Patch island, 
about forty-five miles below that city. A fort on that island, to replace the one 
destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware shore ; 
a temporary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement 
of war. and floating obstructions placed in the channel, under the fire of the~e 
works, will effectually cover Philadelphia, the other important places on the 
river, and the outlet of the canal connecting the Delaware and Chesapeake 
bays. The plans and estimates for a fort to replace Fort Delaware are not 
completed. Taking the expense thereof at $600,000, the expense of the Y5• 
tern, inclusive of temporary works, will be $1,121,000. . 
Cltesapeal(,e bay.-The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted m 
the election of sites for great northern and southern naval depots, recommended, 
in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, Burwell's bay, on James river, for the 
one, and Charle town, near Boston, for the other. 'rl1ey also recommenderL 
Bo ton harbor and Narraganset bay, at the north, and Hampton road' , at th 
outh, a chief naval rendezvous. In those reports the commission entered a· 
at large into the con ideration of all the matters of these important object ; an· 
r fer nee i. now made to those reports for many very interesting detail . 
Hampton, roads, James river, and Noifolk.-'rhe works projected for h 
defence of these are, 1st, a fort and advanced lunette at Old Point Comfort· :J • 
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a casemated battery on the Rip Rap shoals; and 3d, a line of floating obstruc-
tions extending across the channel, between these works. In the even! of a 
great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ulti1:1~tely be desITab~e 
to provide additional strength, by adding works on the pos1t10ns of Newport s 
News, Nasaway shoals, and Craney Island fiats. Exclusive of these, the cost 
of completing the works is estimated at $723,188. . 
The existing fort, viz : Fort Norfolk, will aid in the defence of the city of 
Norfolk and of the navy yard. It is a small and inefficient work, but may 
be made useful as an accessory to the general defensive operations. 
Harbor ef St. Mary's.-The central situation, as regards the Chesapeake, 
of this fine basin; its relation to the Potomac; its depth of water, and the fa-
cility with which it may be defended, indicates its fitness as a harbor of reft~ge 
for the commerce of the bay, and as an occasional if not constant station dt~nng 
war, for a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but no proJects 
have been formed. The engineer department has conjectured that the cost 
may be $300,000. 
Patuxent ri·ver.-The more effectually to protect the city of Washington 
from a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation of the Patux-
ent, and to provide an additional shelter for vessels, a fort has been planned to 
occupy Point Patience, and another to occupy 'l'homas's Point, both about six 
miles from the Chesapeake. rrheir expense will be $505,000. 
Annapolis liarbor.-No surveys or plans of defence have been made. The 
existing works are very inefficient. '11he estimate made by the engineer depart-
ment, viz : $250,000, is adopted. 
Harbor ef Baltimore.-'l'he proximity of Baltimore to the bay places that 
city in a dangerous situation. In the present ,.state of things, an enemy, in a 
few hours' march, after an easy landing, without being exposed to a separation 
from his fleet, can make himself master of that great commercial emporium. 
Baltimore requires for its security two forts in the Patapsco: one at Haw kin's 
Point, and the other at the extreme end of the flat, off Sollers's Point. Besides 
the advantages whieh will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater 
distance, thereby delaying his march, gaining time for the arrival of militia, and 
preventing his turning the defensive positions our troops might occupy, it will 
be impossible for him to endanger the ·city or its shippi.ng by a direct attack by 
water. The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery, 
should be retained as a second barrier. Allowing $150,000 for putting these 
in a more efficient state, the expense will be $1,517,000. 
Mouth, ef Elk river.-The completion of the line of communication from the 
Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it necessary to place a fort 
somewhere near the mouth of the Elk, in order to prevent an enemy from 
destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works connecting these communications 
with the river. 'l'here have been no surveys made with a view to establish such 
protection, but the engineer department estimates the cost of a suitable fort at 
$300,000. 
City qf lVasliington, Georgetown, and Alexandria.-Fort Washington covers 
these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land at some 
£.~teen or eighteen mile_s from Alexandria, should. that city be his object. It 
w:11 ~l~o se~e the_ very 1m.portant purpose of covermg the troops crossing from 
V1rgm1a, with a view to fall on the flanks of an enemy moving against the 
capital. All these objects would have been bAtter fulfilled had the work been 
placed at lower Cedar Point. As it is, however, the forts in the Patuxent being 
constructed, and the militia of the surrounding country in a due state of prepa-
ration, an enterprise against these cities would be one of great hazard. Still, a 
work on Cedar Point should on no account be omitted. rl'he department esti-
mates its cost at $300,000. 
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From the mouth of the Chesapeake to Cape Hatteras there occurs no in1 
navigable by sea-going vessels. 
SOUTHERN SECTION OF THE ATLAN'rIC COAST. 
'rhis coast is invariably low, and, for the greater part, sandy, much resemb!inz 
the coast from Cape Hatteras to Montaug Point. A ridge of sand, here anQ 
there interrupted by the alluvion of the rivers, extends through its whole length 
this ridge, in certain portions, lies on the main land, while in others it is divided 
therefrom by basins or sounds of various , width and depth, and is cut up ino 
islands by numerous channels of greater or less depth, connecting these interior 
waters with the sea. Wherever this sand ridge is broken, its place is occupied 
by low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal and the many lesser outle ~ 
of the rivers. 
The nature of the country through which the rivers of this coast fl.ow, after 
leaving the mountains, is such that the banks being easily abraded by the cur-
rent, the waters are always turbid, and are continually transporting new supplies 
for the formation of alluvion and the maintenance of extensive submarine bank5, 
shoals, and bars ; that these do not rapidly increase is owing to the force of the 
current, the action of the sea, and the mobility of the particles of matter. l; 
is to the same cause, namely, the wearing away of the shores of the rivers. 
that is to be attributed the want, on this coast, of harbors unobstructed by bm. 
and which, as a coast, particularly distinguish this and the Gulf of Mexico 
frontier (where similar operations have been going on) from the more northern 
and eastern portions. 
Ocracock inlet.-The shallowness of the water on the bars at Ocracock 
effectually excludes all vessels-of-war from the harbor within. But as this i5 
now an outlet of an extensive commerce, and through this opening attempt~ 
might be made in small vessels, or in boats, to interrupt the line of interior 
communication, whereon so much might depend in time of war, timely prepa-
ration must be made of temporary works equal to defence of it against all such 
minor enterprises. 
Beaefort harbor, North Carolina.-W ork completed. 
Mouth ef Cape Fear river.-The defence of the main channel of Cape Fear 
river requires, in addition to the work nearly completed on Oak island, another 
fort on Baldhead, and the defence of the smaller channel will require a redoub: 
o~ Federal Point. ,..rhe battery, magazine, block-house, quarters, &c., at Smith-
ville, should remain as accessories. 'I'he cost is set down at $258,000. 
. Ge~rgetown harbor.-'.rhe first inlet of any consequence south of Ca~e F~ 
nver is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers, forIIl.lilf 
G~orgetown harbor, which is a commodious and capacious bay, having snt-
ficient water within and upon the bar, near the mouth, for merchant vessel anl 
small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor, begun many years a_go, haE 
never been completed, and no projects of defence have been made. It 1s pr~b-
.able that a work placed near Moscheto creek or on Winyaw Point would grn: 
adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000. 
Santee river and Bull's bay.-About ten miles south from Geo:getown 
~ntrance are the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Ca1:olina. · I: 
1 not known whether the bars at the mouths of this river have sufficient wa~a 
for ea-:-roing vessels; the same uncertainty exists as to the depth into B · 
bay. It may be well, however, to consider them, and the other inlets betvee 
G org town _and Charleston, as calling for small works capable of re:::is · ~ 
oa~ enter~n es! and to assign to them $100,000. Should they prove to 
nav1gable for pnvateer, they will need a larger expenditnre. 
'll~rleston! Sout!i Carolina.-The city, ituated at the junction of ,he:-
and oopcr nvers, is about five miles, in a direct line, from the sea. Betw~ 
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it and the ocean is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon 
the bar, lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only 
water enough for the smaller frigates and for large slooJ>s-of-war. On the sou_th-
west side of the harbor is J ames's island, through which are several serpentme 
passages, more or less navigable for boats and barges; some of them commu-
nicate directly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly 
passage from Stono to Charleston harbor, enters ~shl_ey riv~r opposite the 
middle of the city. Interior natural water commumcations exist also to the 
southwest of Stono river, connecting this with North Edisto river, the latter 
with South Edisto and St. Helena's sound; this again with Brnad river, and, 
finally, this last with Savannah river. On the north ~ide of the harbor ~f 
Charleston lies Sullivan's island, separated from the mam by a channel navi-
gable to small craft. 'ro the northeast of Sullivan's island an interior water 
communication extends to Bull's bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of George-
town. 
From this sketch, it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences to 
the principal entrance to the harbor. The lateral avenues must also be shut. 
A.nd it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show that the 
best mode of defending the latter will be by works at or near the mouths of the 
inlets, as the enemy will be kept thereby at a greater distance from the city; 
the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be secured, and the line of interior 
communication will be inaccessible from the sea. 
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor can 
be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's island. 
This is at present occupied by Fort Moultrie, a work of some strength, but by 
no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak, and the scarp so low as 
to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by modification 
of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a better defence of the harbor, 
cannot now be determined. 
On a shoal nearly opposite Fort Moultrie the foundation of a fort has been 
begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie. It is presumed 
that about $800;000 would put these works in a complete state. 
Stono, Nortlz Edisto, and Soutli Edisto.-A.ll these must be fortified, at least 
in such a manner as to secure them from enterprises . in boats or small vessels. 
To that end $50,000 may be assigned to each. 
St. H elena sound.-The proper defences cannot be pointed out till this sound 
shall have been surveyed. 
Although there is supposed to be no great depth of water on the bar, it is 
known to be navigable by the smaller class of merchantmen, and to have a navi~ 
gabl~ coi:nmunic~tio~ with the head of Broad river, or Port Royal_, intersecting 
the mtenor nav1gat10n between Charleston and Savannah. 'I1lus sound will 
require defence, even should it not be of much use as a harbor of refuge for ex-
terior commerce. $150,000 may be the cost of the defences. 
Broad River or Port Royal roads.-'I1he value of this capacious road.stead, 
as a harbor of refuge, depends on the depth which can be carried over the bar, 
on the distance of this bar outside of the line of coast, and on the means which 
may be applicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. This is supposed to 
be the deepest bar of the southern coast. Should there prove to be water 
enough for frigates, and by light-houses on the shore, and lights, or other distinct 
guides, on the bar, should it be practicable to make the passage of the bar safe 
and easy, this road, situated within sixty miles of Charleston and twenty of 
Savannah river, intersecting the interior navigation between these great cities, 
thereby securing the arrival of supplies of every kind, would possess a very high 
degree of importance, not only as a harbor of refuge, but as a naval station also. 
The survey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made with 
the greatest care, and all possible minuteness. It is only when this shall have 
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been done that the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast can be known. 
and on this relation the position and mag·nitude of the required defences vi 
depend. ]tor the present, the estimate made by the engineer department i: 
adopted, namely, $300,000. 
Savannah and moutli ef Savannali river.-Mention has been made of th• 
natural interior water communication along the coast of South Carolina. .A siJn. 
ilar communication extends south from the Savannah river, as far as St. John'-
in East Florida. Owing to these passages, the city of Savannah, like Charle~ 
ton, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor or river; ana 
its defences must consequently have relation to these lesser as well as the prin-
cipal channels. 
'l'he distance from the mouth of W assaw sound, or even Ossabaw sound, (both 
to the southwest of Savannah river,) to the city, is not much greater than from 
the mouth of the river; and an enterprise may be conducted the whole distance 
by water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either or both. 
As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, it cannot now 
be determined where they can be defended most advantageously. It is to be 
hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed near the 
outlets of the sounds; because the defences thus placed will serve the ~oub!e 
purpose of guarding the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, m 
time of war, cannot but be very useful. 
The defence of Savannah river is by no means difficult. A fort on Oockspnr 
island, lying just within the mouth, and perhaps, for additional security'. anot~er 
on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the junction of the mer with 
the ocean, would effectually prevent the passage of vessels up the c~a~nel, and 
cover the anchorage lying between Tybee and Cockspur. The ~xis\mg Fort 
Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, should be mamta~ned as a 
second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the passages which come 
into the river from the south; which last would not at all be controlled byworb 
on Cockspur or rl'ybee. A fort projected for Cockspur island is estimated at 
$470,000. To defend Tybee island may require $150,000, and $50,000 would 
put Fort Jackson in an efficient state, making a total of $670,000. South of the 
Savannah are Wassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, !St. Catharine's sound, at the 
mouth of the Medway river; Sapelo sound, Doby inlet, Altamaha sound, at the. 
mouth of the great river Gf the same name; St. Simond' s sound, at the mout~ of 
Buffalo creek; St. Andrew's sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla 
rivers; and Cumberland sound, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river .. All t~eEe 
communications with the ocean are highly important, as regards the lme of mte-
rior navigation, and several of them as affording acces~ to excellent harbo~. 
The last, especially, is known to be navigable by the largest sloops-o~-war _and 
merchantmen; and two or three of the others are believed to be but little, if at 
all inferior, ~ither a:s regards depth of bar or safety of anchorage., ,· 
All these mlets are yet to be surveyed. Some of them are probably eatily 
defeu ible by forts, and others may require the aid of floating defences. .An 
important principle in relation to the defensive system of the whole southern coa~r. 
namely, that, on a coast possessing a few harbors, it is at the same time th~ more 
necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and the more easy to depnve an 
enemy of that shelter which is nearly indispensable to a continuous and clo~e 
blockade. This principle is enforced as touching this particular part of t~~ 
southern coast by the two following weighty considerations: its remoten.e:::: 
fr?m tl~e nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is ?n a ~ ean o~O 
miles di tant, and to leeward, both as to wind and cmrent; and its bemg cl~e 
upon the larboard hand, as they enter the Atlantic, of the great concour e ct 
ve. el passing at all seasons through the Florida channel. 
"While, thm efore, this part of the coast from the concentration of vessels here 
is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only 
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with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a superior 
enemy. . 
Accurate and minute surveys which will enable our vessels, whether dr1ven 
by an enemy or by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which beset the navi-
gation of these harbors. and properly arranged defences to co-~er them when 
arrived, seem to be indispensable. It is worthy of remark, besides, that when 
these harbors shall be fortified the operation of investing· the coast and watch-
ing the great outlet of commerce through Florida passage will be a difficult and 
hazardous one to an enemy, on whose part no perseverance or sk~ll can avail ~o 
maintain an uninterrupted blockade, or to avoid the occasional shipwreck of his 
cruisers; while on the part of our small vessels-of-war and privateers the same 
sort of supervision will at all times be easy and safe. 
Nothing better can be now done than to assume $200,000 as the average cost 
of defending each of the nine entrances, giving a total of $1,800,000. 
The board of engineers have not examined the coast from the mouth of the 
St. Mary's to Pensacola, but in order that the chain of defence for the coast 
may be here exhibited unbroken, the estimates of the engineer department for 
the places and positions intermediate between Cumberland sound and Pensacola 
will be inserted. St. Augustine, $50,000; Key West and Tortugas, $3,000,000; 
Charlotte harbor, Espiritu Santa bay, Apalachicola, Apalache bay, St. Joseph's 
bay, St. Rosa bay, together, $1,000,000. 
GULF OF MEXICO FRONTIER. 
The resemblance of this part of the coast to that which we have denominated 
the southern section is striking. We may, indeed, refer to the description herein 
given of the principal features of the latter as a true delineation of this. In 
respect to the relation of the coast to the interior, there is, however, the greatest 
difference between these two portions of the maritime frontier; for while about 
eight-tenths of the whole territory of the United States is in one sense tributary 
to a part only' of the Gulf of Mexico portion, in the southern section of the 
coast not more than one-tenth is connected with the seaboard by any natural 
ties. This fact, which shows the very deep interest which a large portion of 
the people and the government have in the security of this portion, is related to 
other facts which hardly leave an alternative as to the mode of attaining that 
security. 
From the relative geographical position of this part of the coast, and the 
country interested in its safety; from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature 
of the adjacent country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some 
time before that portion, within supporting distance, whose welfare may be en-
dangered by an enemy will, from peculiar circumstances, be competent of itself 
to sustain the assaults of an exterior foe. Upon the Atlantic seaboard the 
Alleghanies crowd the people upon the coast, and surround every alarm post of 
the frontier with a more and more dense population i' and the ocean and the 
interior parallel communication transmit rapid aid to the right and left, while 
the coast of the Gulf, weak in itself and remote from succor from behind, is 
almost inaccessible to lateral assistance. 
'l'hose reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, 
a permanent, and a. timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the 
United States (some of which were advanced in the commencement of this com-
munication) will apply to this part of it with a peculiar force so long as any 
portion of its system of defence is incomplete. 
It has already been observed that the board of engineers have made no ex-
amination between Cumberland sound, in Georgia, and Pensacola. Thel'e are, 
however, along that shore and in the Florida reef several very important har-
bors which must be accurately surveyed. 
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Pensacola bay.-The upper arms of this considerable bay receive th0 Yellow-
water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river; and while the tributaries 
of the last, interlocking with branches of the Alabama and the 0hattahoochie, 
seem to mark the courses whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a 
part of the products of these rivers to Pensacola, the face of the whole re~on 
is remarkably adapted to the application of railroads. 
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward from the lower part of this bay into 
Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile 
bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of 
cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last-named bay, 
and thence through an existing interior water communication to the city of Kew 
Orleans. 
Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is accessible to the largest 
class of sloops-of-war and to small frigates, and under favorable circumstances 
will admit even large frigates ; and there is reason to hope that the bar may be 
permanently deepened. 
The bar is near the coast, and the channel through it is straight and easily hit. 
The harbor is perfectly land-locked, and the roadstead very capacious. There 
are excellent positions within it for repairing, building, and launching vessels, 
and for docks and dock-yards, in healthy situations. The supply of good water 
is abundant. It is perfectly defensible. These properties, in connexion with 
the position of the harbor as regards the coast, have induced the government t-0 
fix upon it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repairs. 
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing. to 
form the scheme of defence, while no other objects were sought than the secu11ty 
of the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as a naval station and place of 
rendezvous and repairs, further surveys, extending a greater distance from the 
shores, delineating· accurately the face of the country and showing the se~eral 
avenues by land and water are found to be necessary. 
The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly completed, $210,000 
being asked to finish them. A further water defence at the position of the 
Barrancas, and the works that are indispensable to cover the navy yard from a 
lateral attack through the western bays-the latter requiring the further surveys 
above mentioned-are not yet planned. The Barrancas work may be taken at 
$100,000, and the others at $300,000, making a total for Pensacola of $610,0~0. 
P erdido bay.-This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and to Mobile 
bays, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully 
surveyed, with a view to these objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may 
be $200,000. 
~Ylobile _bay.-The plan of defence for this bay comprised a fort at Mobile 
Pomt, which has been finished; another on Dauphin island, and a tower at the 
Pass au Heron. The estimates for the two last named amount to $905,000. 
New (!rl~ans and the delta ef the Mississippi.-The most northern water 
comm~mcat1on between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage c~lled 
the R1golets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next IB by 
the pass of Che~ Menteur, also connecting these lakes. Through these pas~ages 
an enemy entermg Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he mter-
cepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach 
New Orlean from the southern shore of the lake, or might continue onward 
through Lake Maurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching th~ 
Mis i, ippi at the head of the delta; or, landing within the mouths of Chef 
Mentcur, he might move against the city along the ridge of the Gentilly road. 
To the outhwe t of Chef l\Ienteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou 
Bienvenu, a navigable channel, (the one pursued by the English army in the 
la t war,) not running into the Mis is ippi, but possessing shores of such a na~ure 
a to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city. A little 
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to the south of this is Bayon Dupre, also affording easy access to the city. rrhe 
avenues just named are defended by a fort at the Rigolets ; another at Chef 
Menteur; another at Bayou Bienvenu, and a tower aJ Bayou Dupre. . . 
The defences of the river are placed at the Plaquemme turn, the lowest pos1t~~n 
which can be occupied. Fort Jackson is ·on the right shore, and Fort St. Ph1hp 
a little lower down, on the left: this last work must be repaired or renewed. 
The expense is estimated at $117,000. . . . . . 
The only permanent work required at present, west of the M1ss1ss1pp1, 1s a 
fort to occupy Grand Terre island, for the purp?se of defending_ the entranc~ to 
Barrataria bay, an excellent harbor for a fl.oatmg force guar_dmg the coa~t1~g 
trade on that side, and whence there are several r,assages leadmg to the M1ss1s-
sippi, near New Orleans. The estimate for this work is $400,000. 
Before leaving this part of the subject, it is necessary to advert to the 
important uses which may be made of movable floating defences in aid of 
fortifications. 
The applications of this auxiliary force along the coast of the United States 
may be very numerous, and, as has been before remarked, would, in certain 
cases, be requisite to attain full security for all the objects needing protection. 
In the case we have just been considering, for example, fortifications will enable 
us to protect New Orleans, even from the most serious and determined efforts of 
an enemy; but, owing to the great width of the passages, we cannot, by fortifica-
tions alone, deprive an enemy of good exterior anchorages, especially the very 
excellent one west of Ohandeleur island, nor entirely cover the interior water 
communications between the Rigolets and Mobile. We must, therefore, either 
quietly submit to all the annoyance and injury which an enemy in possession of 
these passages may inflict, or avert them by the timely preparation of a floating 
force, adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the favorable 
shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive 
or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the enemy. 
As these means of defence are, however, secondary to fortifications, in every 
sense ; as the extent to which they may be needed must depend on the relation 
of our naval force to that of other powers-a relation continually varying· as the 
shapes which these auxiliaries are to assume-the materials of which they are 
to be formed, the weapons they are to use, the agent which is to give them 
power, are points on which every ten years of this age of rapid improvement in 
the aTts may effect complete revolutions, it is considered premature to go into 
details, and premature to go into expense. 
From the preceding sketch of the system projected for the defence of the 
seaboard of the United States, it appears that all the fortifications proposed are 
not of the same pressing necessity, nor of like importance. Some are required 
immediately, while the commencement of others may be postponed. In pro-
ceeding to class them, it must be observed that the works of the first class are 
those destined to prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even a 
momentary establishment in the country, those which will defend the great 
naval arsenals, and those which will cover the chief cities and towns. 
In the second class will be placed the works which are to defend those naval 
stations and those cities of a secondary rank, which, either from natural or 
artificial defences, existing works, &c., are not entirely without protection, and 
may, therefore, wait until the more important points are secured against a first 
attack_; and in the third class will we anayed the works which complete the 
defensive system in all its parts, but of which the construction may, without 
great danger, be deferred until the frontier shall have received all the successive 
degrees of strength resulting from a gradual erection of the forts of the first and 
second classes. A fourth class is added,_ containing such works as will be 
necessary only conditionally. 
T able A, joined to this report, contains the first class, and shows that the 
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works of this class will cost $11,609,444; will require 2,585 men to garrison 
them in time of peace, and 30,966 in case of siege. 
Table B contains the works of the second class, showing that they will cos 
$5,873,000; will require 975 men to garrison them in time of peace, and 10,680 
in case of siege. 
Table O contains-works belonging to the third class, showing that their cost 
will be $14,078,824; that their garrisons in time of peace will amount to 2,3 0 
men, and in time of siege to 21, 7 45 men; showing, also, that the total future 
expense of fortifying the maritime frontier will amount to $31,561,268; the 
troops necessary to guard these fortifications in time of peace to 5,940 men, and 
63,391 men in time of war, supposing them all (which cannot happen) besieged 
at once. 
r_{'he time required to construct the whole system must depend upon the annual 
appropriation which the nation may grant to this branch of the public service. 
All that need be said on the subject is, that in an undertaking necessarily involv-
ing so much time, and of such vital importance to the safety, prosperity, and 
greatness of the Union, there should be no relaxation of effort and persever-
ance. An undertaking of such magnitude must, with every effort, be the work 
of years. But it may be too much hurried as well as too much delayed. There 
is a rate of progress at which it will be executed in the best manner and at the 
minimum cost. If more hurried, it will be defective in quality and more costly 
if delayed. 
France was, at least, fifty years completing her maritime and interior defen~es. 
Some remarks will now be offered on the subject of the expense of erectmg 
a system of defensive works, and garrisoning them for war, comp~ring_it with 
the expense. of defending· the coast without fortifications. To simplify the 
proposition, the defence of Portsmouth, Boston, Narraganset roads, New York, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans, only, 
will be taken. 
Supposing an enemy had concentrated 20,000 men at Halifax or_ B~rrnuda; 
the government must,· on hearing of this force, at once prepare to resist i~ at all 
the points mentioned above As it will be impossible to foresee on which the 
first blow will be struck, it will be necessary to have troops encamped at each; 
and to meet the attack with a force not less numerically than that of the 
assailant, the troops kept constantly under arms must, at least, equal one-half of 
the hostile expedition, w bile as many more, ready for instant service, must be 
within call. r_{'hese points are so immediately accessible in some cases, and so 
remote from succor in others, that, after the point of attack is announced by 
the appearance of the enemy before it, there will be no time for re-enforcements 
to come from the interior. 
By manceuvring in front of any of these places the enemy would induce us 
to concentrate forces there; when, suddenly profiting of a favorable breeze, h_e 
would sail to another, which he would reach in a few hours, and would not fail 
to seize if a force were not stationed there likewise, at least, equal to his own. 
No re-enforcement can, in this case, arrive from the interior in time, for all _the 
tro_ops under march would have taken up a direction upon the point he has JU~t 
quitted. 
Our whole coast from Maine to Louisiana would thus be kept in alarm by a 
single expedition; and such is the extent and exposure of the seaboard that an 
enemy might ruin us by a war of mere threatenings. If the cities and other 
~Teat establi hill:ents are not garrisoned, they will become a prey at o~ce; and 
if they are gaITisoned, the trea ury will be gradually emptied; the credit of the 
gover~rn~nt exhausted; the weary and starving militia will desert to theis homes; 
nor ,rill 1t be ea y to avert the consummation of tribute, pillage, and conflagra-
tion. 
The table E, joined to this report, shows that, to be in readiness on each of 
the e vulnerable points, it will be requisite to maintain 107,000 men encamped 
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and under arms at the ten places mentioned, and 93,000 men ready to march 
and within call. 
This number is, in fact, below that which would be required; for these points 
being, according to our hypothesis, exposed to an attack from 20,000 regular 
and disciplined troops, 20,000 militia would not be able to r~pel t~em unless 
aided by entrenchments, requiring a time to construct them, whi?h might n~t be 
allowed, and iavolving expenses which are not included in the estnnate. Besides, 
to have 20,000 men, especially new levies, .under arms, it will be n~cessa:-y, 
considering the epidemics that always assail such troops, to carry the formation 
of these corps to at least 25,000 men. 
The State of Louisiana, being remote from succor, requires a larg~r force 
under arms than the other points; this force is fixed at 17,000, supposmg that 
the State may supply 3,000 within call. 
All expenses being reckoned, 1,000 regular troops, including officers, cost 
$300,000 per annum, or $150 per man, for a campaign of six months. 1,000 
militia, including officers, cost $400,000 per annum, or $200 per man, for a six 
months' campaign. But, taking into consideration the diseases which invariably 
attack men unaccustomed to military life, and the consequent expense of 
hospital establishments; the frequent movement of detachments from the camp 
to their homes, and from the interior to the camp; and the cost of camping 
furniture, utensils, accoutrements, &c., which is the same for a short campaign 
as for a year; regarding all these things, the cost of militiamen cannot be 
reckoned at less than $250 per man for six months. 
The 107,000 militiamen necessary to guard the above-mentioned points, the 
maritime frontier being without defence, will therefore cost, in a campaign of 
six months, $26,750,000. In strict justice there should be added to this expense, 
which is believed to be much understated. amongst other things, the loss of time, 
and the diminution of valuable products resulting from drawing off so consid-
erable a portion of efficient labor from its most profitable pursuits. This, besides 
being a heavy tax on individuals, is a real loss to the .nation. 
It would be utterly vain to attempt an estimate of the loss to the nation from 
the dreadful mortality which rages in the camps of men suddenly exposed to the 
fatigues and privations of a military life. 
rrhe total expense of constructing the fortifications at the ten places before 
mentioned will amount to $21, 767,656.-(See table E.) 
The garrisons of these fortifications may consist of the same number of regu-
lar troops in time of war as in time of peace ; the remainder being furnished by 
the militia held in readiness to throw themselves into the forts on the first 
appearance of an enemy. By this arrangement 3,010 regulars and 32,076 
militia, either within the works or in small corps on advantageous positions, 
making iu all 35,086 men, would suffice; 64,914 men being kept in readiness to 
march when called upon. 
We should, therefore, have only 35,086 to pay and support instead of 107,000, 
and the expense would be $8,430,500 instead of $26,750,000. rrhe difference, 
namely, $18,319,500, being only $3,448,156 less than the whole cost of these 
defences. It follows that the expense of their erection would be nearly com-
pens~ted by the saving they would cause in a single campaign of six months. 
It 1s proper to add that, although the expense of these works will be great, 
that expense is never to be renewed ; while with troops, on the contrary, the 
expense is annually repeated, if not increased, until the end of the war. Besides, 
the disbursements for fortifications are made in time of peace, slowly and to an 
extent exactly correspondent with the financial resources of the country. 
Armies are most wanted, and must be paid, in periods of the greatest emer-
gency, when the ordinary sources of revenue are dried up, and when the trea-
sury can only be supplied by a resort to means the most burdensome and disa-
greeable to the people. 
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'I1he defence of the maritime frontier by permanent fortifications, and the cfu. 
bursements for their ~onstru.?tion, will thus tend to a real and_ positive economy. 
The vulnerable pomts bemg reduced to a small number, mstead of waiting 
an attack on every point, and holding ourselves everywhere in readiness to 
repel it, we shall force an enemy to direct his assaults against those few which, 
being well understood by us, will, of course, have received timely preparation, 
There can be no doubt that such a state of things will make an adversary more 
reluctant to risk his expeditions; and, therefore, that we shall not only be better 
able to resist, but also less frequently called on to do so. 
Some prominent military writers have opposed the principle of fortifying an 
extensive land frontier, but none have ever disputed the necessity of fortifying 
a maritime border; the practice of every nation, ancient and modern, has been 
the same in this respect. On a land frontier a good, experienced, and numerous 
infantry may, in some cases, dispense with fortifications, but though disciplined 
troops may cover a frontier without the aid of fortifications, undisciplined troops 
cannot. On a maritime frontier, however, no description of troops can supply 
the place of strong batteries disposed upon the vulnerable points. The uncer-
tainty of the point on which an enemy may direct his attack, the suddennes 
with which he may reach it, and the powerful masses which he can concentrate 
at a distance out of our reach and knowledge, or suddenly, and at the ve7 
moment of attack require that every important post be prepared to repel his 
attempt, or retard it until re-enforcements can arrive and adequate means of re-
sistance be organized. By land we are acquainted with the motions of an enemy, 
but the ocean is a vast plain, without obstacle, where his movements are made 
out of our sight, where no trace is left of his path, and where we know nothing 
of his approach until he is within reach of the eye. In a word, unless the vul-
nerable points of a seaboard are covered by fortifications their only chance of 
safety must depend on the issue of a battle, always uncertain, even when the 
best disciplined, most experienced, and best appointed troops have made all 
possible preparation for the combat. 
As for the garrisons which these forts will require in time of war, a small 
portion, about equal in number to the peace garrisons, should be of regular 
troops, the remainder of militia, practiced in the manreuvres and drill of great 
guns; it being indispensable that the greatest part of the troops required for the 
defence and service· of the sea-coast fortifications should be of artillery. 
This brings us to a suggestion or two in relation to the organization of t~e 
militia forces. Instead of the present small proportion of artillery allowed m 
the militia organization, the States might, with great advantage, increase the 
proportion of that force in the vicinity of each of the exposed parts of th~ co~st, 
so as to be equivalent to the exigencies and armament of the works; substJtut~nO' 
for the usual field exercises as infantry actual drill and practice in the battene5• 
The number of militia artillery in each case would be determined by the number 
of guns applied to the defence of that particular place. As soon as a m~vement 
on the part of the enemy should threaten the frontier of the State this fo:ce 
should throw itself into the forts, and there remain so long as the precise pomt 
of ~ttack should be undetermined. In most parts of the seaboard it would_ be 
adn able to have also a considerable body of militia horse artillery, as _bem O' 
a Y?ry u ~ful arm in all cases, and as affording a defence always applicable 
agam ·t mmor and predatory enterprises. This force might, in part, be drawn 
from th~ ordinary proportion of cavalry. . 
If, with our general system of permanent fortifications and naval estabh~h-
ment , we connect a system of interior communication by land and water, adapted 
both to the d fence and to the commercial relations of the country; if t? t~e~e 
we aclcl a well con tituted regular army, and a militia perfect in its orgamzatJO~-
the nation will not only secure its territory from invasion and in ult, but w 
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preserve its institutions from those violent shocks and revolutions which have so 
frequently, in every age and in every country, been incident to a state of war. 
Tables A, B, C, and D, following, contain the works constituting the proposed 
defensive system for the maritime frontier, arranged in four classes: . 
Table E exhibits a comparison of the cost of defending certam Important 
parts of the coast without fortifications, and with the aid of the projected works. 
Table F shows a possible concentration of militia forces in eleven days at 
Boston, Newport, R. I., New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charles-
ton, S. C., Savannah, Geor,gia, and New Orleans. 
NORTHERN FRONTIER. 
Not having been the subject of particular care and study, it is with diffidence 
that a few words are thrown out on the subject of the defence of the frontier 
which separates the United States from the English possessions. 
The first questions that arise are these: Is the political condition of the coun-
try lying on the other side . of the country in question, viz : the condition of 
colonies of a trans-Atlantic power to remain altered 7 Or are these colonies to 
become independent nations 7 Or is any other important change to be wrought 
in their political relations 7 These questions bear directly upon the matter in 
hand. A generation hence and there may be no more room for jealousy and 
watchfulness along that line than there now is along the imaginary lines which 
separate our contiguous States. ·within the same period the Canadas may have 
assumed the attitude of independent and separate States; and, although the 
United States may recognize in these northern neighbors a youth of much 
promise and vigor, the period when the relative increase shall have been such 
as to make their proximity a source of much precaution and solicitude will not, 
probably, be near at hand. But though it may be possible that the colonial 
relations may be thrown off within the period for which .it is our duty now to 
provide; and although in any other relation the United States might rely for 
security, at any moment, on the greater power which she might at any moment 
develop, can it be distinctly foreseen that the existing political connexion is to 
be soon dissolved 7 If not, if there be uncertainty on this point, does it become 
the duty of the United States to proceed at once to the task of securing herself 
on this frontier, regarding it as separating her from one of the most powerful em-
pires of the earth 7 Or, finally, may she wait and watch, relying on her sagacity 
t? give due notice of impending danger, and on her resomces to supply her, in 
time, with appropriate armor 7 If it be, indeed, possible to apply, within a brief 
state of time, all the defences that can be needed on this frontier, the course last 
suggested would appear to be the best. What, therefore, is like to be the na-
ture of the danger, and what the nature of the defence 7 
Along the St. Croix river only local establishments could require to be cov-
ere~, as the~e ar~ no objects of consequence to be reached by an enemy pene-
tratmg our mtenor from that border. Then comes the disputed territory and 
the great unsettled regions along the northern margins of New Hampshire and 
Vermont. 
Upon all this extent of frontier the exact location of future establishments, of 
cons~q_uence, cannot be foreseen with the certainty warranting their being now 
provided for by permanent defensive works. This region is to become populous 
and wealthy ; the natural means of communication are to be improved, and nu-
m~rous artificial means of communication are to be opened by roads, canals, and 
railways; but while this growth in wealth may invite aggression, the growth in 
numbers, . and the increase4 facilities of intercommunication, the increased power 
of rendering mutual succor, and of drawing aid from the interior, would, in a still 
greater degree, make aggression difficult and improbable. 
Lake Champlain penetrates the territory in such a way that an enemy, having 
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the naval mastery, might make a deep inroad and greatly harass the count!'I' 
along the shores, although no enterprise, even in the present state of populatio~ 
could be carried far into the interior. Were it only to relieve a long line of fron-
tier from predatory incursions, access to this lake from the north should be de-
nied. But there are other very strong reasons for this exclusion. By closing 
the lake at its northern extremity, an expensive and uncertain strife for naral 
superiority on this lake would be avoided, and the whole lake would remain in 
our possession, serving as the best possible military line of communication, in 
case the United States should assume offensive operations against the weake1: 
point of the Canadian frontier. 
From the northern end of this lake the forces of the United States should 
march into Canada and intercept the communication by the St. Lawrence, either 
at or near the mouth of the Richelieu river, at Montreal island, at some point 
where the ship channel of the river could be commanded, intermediate between 
these places, or at any two or at all these places, according to circumstancea. 
Maintaining any or all these positions would limit the defence in the province 
above to the consumption of the means then in store, and would completely par· 
alyze its offensive power. Although no other object were in view than the de-
fence of the frontier upon the upper lakes, no effort necessary to secure and 
maintain this position should be spared, because it is only thus that the contest 
for naval superiority on the lakes, which, if once suffered to begin, is both ex-
hausting and interminable, can be avoided. 
Without aid from abroad, Canada cannot contest such a question with the 
United States; and, so long as the United States possess that superiority, the 
defence of the upper portion of the frontier will be complete. . . . 
l!''rom being the most _expensive of all modes of defence, naval supenonty m 
our hands may thus become the cheapest; two or three small armed vesseb on 
each lake, employed as convoys to the ordinary navigation, and to the transporti 
bearing troops and munitions being all that would be needed. . 
Military enterprises would, in this way, be warded off from the numerous rich 
and populous cities and towns now embellishing our border, which it woul_d not 
be easy to protect from · the calamities of war by mere military works, without 
running into great expense, were the enemy's naval means to allow his approach-
ing them at his pleasure. . . 
In the case of the offensive movement supposed above, the fortified positi~n 
of Isle Aux N oix, and any other upon the Richelieu, should be at first left m 
rear, being reached or mastered by suitable bodies of troops, and should be sub· 
jected to immediate investment and vigorous attack, so as to be speedily reduced. 
and to open the navigable water communication within twenty miles of Montreal. 
If the preceding remarks be well founded, it would appear that the peace and 
safety of the parts of the frontier extending along the river St. Lawrence, Lake-
Ontario, Eric, Huron, and Superior, mio-ht be made to fl.ow from military op~ra· 
tions carried on against Canada, by the
0 
line of Lake Champlain and the nnr 
Richelieu; and in order to this military operation being always practi~al, and t 
be taken up at pleasure, nothing more is necessary than the fortification of th~ 
outlet of Lake Champlain. It might have been before remarked that the offen-
sive movement in question is not deemed to be difficult or hazardous, nor wouJ.. 
it b~ nece., ~rily re tricted to holding positions on the St. Lawrence; acti:·e op· 
eration agamst Quebec, to which this is the most convenient roa<l., followmg a-
a matter of course upon these first successes. . . 
The ecurity, therefore, that may be obtained for the upper frontier by mi!:· 
tary operations on the lower, may at least justify these upper portions in w,u·-
ing the proo-rc of event . , 
The une.·ampled increa e of population upon these very borders, the hundrect 
n w way alr acly fini -heel or in hand, of connecting these borders with the_ bl':lr. 
of the country, may ·o elevate the military re .. ources of the region that, m the 
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event of war, it will matter little in which of the political conditions first. 
supposed the opposite territory may be found-a resistless torrent sweeping it 
from end to end; and, although it might not be prudent to rely in such a matter· 
on the mere spread of wealth and numbers, we may be certain that there will 
exist ample resources to create all such artificial military aids as the circum~ 
stances may call for, and we may infer that the application of these aids would 
now be premature. 
'l'he military consequences of the occupation of the outlet of Lak,e Champlain 
a re so obvious that it must not be supposed they are not perfectly under-
stood by our neighbor across the border. As it would consequently be a great, 
object with him to avert the consequences alluded to, he would, in the event of · 
war, ( often breaking out suddenly,) be first, if possible, in taking such a position 
as would prevent our commanding the issue of the lake; and hence it is that, in 
the preparation of the only permanent military work now recommended for the 
northern frontier, it seems advisable to admit no unnecessary delay. 
A position for closing the lake, selected during the last war, and of which the 
fortification was begun soon after the peace, was found, after some progress had 
been made, not to lie within our territory, and was abandoned. 'l'here is, how-
ever, a position equally good close at hand, and in all respects admirably adapted 
to the obj ect in view. 
The fortification of this outlet will probably cost about $600,000. 
All of which is respectfully submitted. 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--,! 
TABLE A.-FIRST CLASS, 
Comprising works first to he exec·uted, as covering partially or entirely great cities and important towns, naval establisliments, roads ef 
rendezvous, places and ltarbors that an enemy miglit occupy, outlets ef valuable commerce, ~-,· arranged in geograpliical order. 
Designation of works. 
THESE WORKS ARE IN PROGRESS. 
Fort Independence, Boston harbm.· ................................... · .. · 
Fort ,V arren, Boston harbor ........................................... . 
Fort Adams, N arraganset roads .......................... - - ............• -
Fort Schuyler, New York harbor ....................................... . 
Fort Columbus, New York harbor ....................................... . 
Fort Delaware, D elaware bay .......................................... . 
Fort l\Ionroe, Hampton roads ........................................... . 
Fort Calhoun, Hampton 1·oads ............. . ............................ . 
Fort Caswell, Cape Fear river .................................... . ..... . 
},ort in Charleston harbor, South Carolina ........................... - .... . 
Fort Pulaski, Savannah river ........................................... . 
Fort Pickens, Pensacola harbor .............................. - .......... . 
Fort on Foster's bank, Pensacola harbor .... .... ............... - ....... - - . 
Maine. 
l•'orl al 1 h<' 1\111TOWR of Penobscot ................................. - - - · · · · · 
l1'i1rt 111 tl1(' 111ollth ol' tl1P l(l·n1wlwc, not projl'<'L('(l .. - ........ · · .. · - · · · · · - · · · · 


































































































Works in Portsmouth harbor, not projected .................... , .• ......... ) 1501 I 1, 500 1 I 3001 I 1500,000 
Massacliusetts. 
Fort Pickering·, Salem harbor ............................................ 50 250 50 174,000 
Fort Winthrop, repairs, &c., Boston harbor ................................ 10 250 50 50,000 
Works at Provincetown, not projected .................................... 50? 1, 5001 300? ?600,000 ~ 
Works at New Bedford, not projected ..................................... 501 7501 1501 1300,000 H t-t 
H 
1-3 
Rliode Island. P> ~ 
~ 
Fort on Rose island, N arraganset roads ....... . ........................... 25 580 96 123,000 ~ 
Connecticut. 
0 
" . z 





New York. I I 
0 
Fort on Wilkins's Point, New York harbor ................................ 
l:zj 
50 1,336 184 686,000 1-:i:j 







vVork:s to cover the Delaware Breakwater harbor, not projected ............... 1001 1,1251 2251 ?600,000 
:E'ort opposite Fort Delaware, on right bank ................................ 50 760 112 521,000 
Maryland. 
Fort on Elk river, to cover the debouche of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal 
I I and railroad ..... - .............. - .... - ...............•............ I 50 760 112 300,000 °' f-1-
TABLE A.-FmsT CLASS, comprising worlcs.first to be executed, 'Yc.-Continued. 
Garrison. 
Designation of works. 
Cl) ..5 (.) 
Of) Cl.I 
<l) -~ ~ w. -
Maryland. 
Fort on Sollers's Point flats, below Baltimore ...... ; ; ... . .................. 100 835 Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent riv.er ............ .. ............ _ ....... _ . 50 400 
West Florida. 
Works to protect the navy yard at Pensacola from lateral attack. through the 
bays, not projected .................. _ ................. - ........... 501 1,0001 Fort at Barrancas, Pensacola, not projected .............. _ ... _ ............. 50 2501 
Louisiana. 
Fort St. Philip, Mississippi river ......................................... 50 400 Fort at Grand Terre, Barrataria island .................................... 50 400 
'l'otal ................. ; ... __ . ___________ . __________________ 2,585 30,966 
. -





501 1100, 000 






















'rABLE B.-SEcoNn Cr.Ass, 
Comprising works to be constructed next after tlwse ef tlw first, the works limJing simdar objects to defend as tlwse ef tlte first class, and 
being generally suc/1, as are necessary to complete tlie defence begun by tlie works if the.first class; arranged in geographical order. 
Garrison . 
Designation of works. 
Cl) Cl) 
Q 
~ bl) . 


















































TABLE B.-SECOND CLASS, comprising works to be executed next after tliose ef tliefirst, (fC.-Continuecl, 
Designation of works. 
Maryland. 
Fort on Ilnwkins's Point, below Baltimore ................... _ ..... - ...... . 
Fort Mclleury, Covington battery, Redoubt Wood, repairs, &c., renewals .... .. . 
Fort on 'l'homas's Point, Patuxent river .................................. . 
Fort on Cedar Point, Potomac river, not projected ......................... . 
Soutli Carolina. 
Works in Port Royal roads, not proj ectecl ................................ . 
Georgia. 
Fort on '.I.1ybec island, not projected ..................................... . 
Repairs on ~.,ort .Jackson, Savannah river, not planned ...................... . 
vV orks to command the entrance to Cumberland sound, mouth of St. Mary's river, 
Georgia, not projected ............................................. . 
Alabama. 
l!'ort, on Dauphin island, Mobile bay ..................................... . 
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'rABLE 0.-Trnrw CLASS, 
Coniprising tlte defence ef all towns, ltarbors, inlets, ere,, not included in tlw first two classe'tJ; arranged i'n geographical order. 
Garrison. 
Designation of works. Guns, &c. Cost to com-




25 250 50 $100,000 
25 250 50 100,000 
50 1,000 200 500,000 
10 125 25 50,000 
100 1,000 200 400,000 
............... -- ...... - .... - - ..... - ......... - - ..... 135,000 
25 100 30 75,000 
25 250 50 100,000 
10 125 25 50,000 
25 150 21 43,000 
... -- .... - .. -- ..... - - - - .. - .... -- -· -- . - ... 210,000 
-- ......... -- -- - .. - .. - .. - - - ... ... - -- .... - .. - .. 3,00C 
50 625 125 250,00C 
50 250 45 80, 00( 
............... -- 50 8 20,00( 























HIRD CLASS, comprising the defence ef all towns, harbors, inlets, q-c.-Oontinued. 
Garrison. 
Designation of works. 
Guns, &c. 
Cl) Cl) 
0 00 ce 
<l) <l) 
p., w 
..... 1 50 750 150 
..... 1 25 250 50 
. - ... 1 25 225 45 
...... 1 25 100 14 
' - . - . -- . 100 1,760 342 
- . - . - . - 100 1,760 332 
....•• 1 25 r 250 50 
' ... - .. - ... 10 220 30 
' -- - - -- .. 10 155 16 
nd New 
.•.... 1 50 500 100 
•....• 1 50 550 llO 
...... 1 50 500 100 
50 450 90 
,1 : 1 - - - - - - .. -








































,v orlcs at Georgetown harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 
"\Yorks ut the mouth of the Santee, at Bull's bay, and other inlets between 
Georgetown and Charleston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
vV orks at Stono iulet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
.. Works at North Edisto inlet ... . ........................... ... ........ 1 
1Vorks at South Edisto inlet ..................... . . .. ............ . .... 1 
Works at St. Helena sound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Georgia. 
vV orks at W assaw sound. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Works at Ossabaw sound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Works at St. Catharine's sound ............................ ·. . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Works at Sapelo sound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Works at Doby inlet ................................................ 1 
Works at Altamaha sound. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Works at St. Simond's sound ......................................... 1 
Works at St. Andre·ws's sound ........................................ 1 
East and liVest F1orida. 
vVorks at St. Augustine, (estimate of engineer department) ................ - 1 
·works at Key West and Tortugas, ( estimate of engineer department) . . . . . . . . 1 
Works at Charlotte harbor, Espiritu Santa bay, Apalachicola, Apalache bay, St. 
Joseph's bay, and St. Rosa bay, ( estimate of engineer department) ....... 1 
Alabama. 
Works at Perdido bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Tower at Pass au Heron, projected .................. __ .................. . 










































































































Recapitulation qj Tables A, B, ancl C. 
Garrison. 
Designation of works. Guns, &c. Cost to com-





Pin;t clmif4, from table A ................................................ 2,585 30,966 5,729 $11,609,444 
Second class, from table B .............................................. 975 10,680 2,030 5,873,000 
'l1hirc1 class, from table C ............................................... 2,380 21,745 4,283 14,078,824 
Total ....................................................... 5,940 63,391 12,042 31,561,268 
-----
TABLE D.-FOURTH CLASS, 
Comprising conditional works, tlie necessity for wliiclt will depend on the creation ef artificial harbors, canals, great na1Jal depots, g-c./ 
arranged in geographical order. 
Works on Barnstable bay to cover Cape Cod canal. 
Works on Buzzard's bay to cover Cape Coc1 canal. 
Works to cover artificial harbor in Martha's Vineyard sound. 
Works on Newport News, on Craney island, and on Nasaway 
shoals, to cover naval depot in Burwell's bay. 

























£ ,:dt ibit h, o· t /1,(' co8t rf certain projected fortifications Jor tlie sea-coast defence,· tlte .forces nccessar!J to protect tlwn on tlie supposition 
tltat tll~·e were no fortifications,· the forces necessary for 1mfect security with tlw aid ef tlic projected defences,- and tlte expense 
ef the troops in botli cases. 
] 
0 
Comparison of the forces necessary to defend the places 




0 (I ;:, . 
Expenses of the troops kept under 
pay with the proposed works. 
Piaces. 
Portsmouth . •• ________ _ 
Boston ____________ . __ _ 
Narraganset roads . _. __ . 
New York ____________ _ 
Philaddphfa _________ _ 
Baltimore _ . •. _. ______ _ 
Norfolk ___________ . __ _ 
Charleston .. __________ _ 
Savannah ...•. _ •• ____ . 




















2 123 575 




3 869 025 
, 824-: 426 
732,367 
961,529 



























































































































a) -..c: (f) ..... ..c: ......... 
0 0 
55 S . 
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101, ooo I 93, ooo 3,010 I 32,076 I 35,086 I 64,914 I 26,750,000 
------1 i---------1----1----1----1--- I 
Total -----------1 21,767, 656 --------,------451,500 7,9i9,ooo I 8,430,500 
Total number of troops neceseary without fortifications------------------------------------ 200,000 
Total number of troops required with the projected works ••.• - -- - - -- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - . -- • 100, OCO 
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'l'ABLE E, exliibiting tlie cost ef certain projected fortifications, 'fC,-Oontinu ~ 
Expense of defending the above-mentioned points during a cam-
paign of six months without fortifications ................ _ $26,750, 011 
With the projected forts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 430, 5, 
Difference ..................................... . 
Total cost of the projected works .................. . 
Difference . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. . 
18, 319, 5C 
21, 767, 65( 
3, 44 , }.:if 
- ----
N. B.-In one campaign of six months the difference of expense between tht 
two systems will amount to within $3,448,156 of the whole cost of the projected 
works. The expense of the troops as above supposes the regular soldier to co~t 
$300 per annum, and the militia soldiei:$500, officers included in both. No esti-
mate can be made of the enormous contingent expenses in assembling, organiz-
ing, and providing militia forces, of hospitals, waste of property, loss of time, &c. 
This estimate is undoubtedly below the truth. The forces under pay nece~m: 
for defence, with the proposed works, consist of peace garrisons, increased by a 
proportion of militja, the residue of militia under pay being stationed upon the 
line of approach of the enemy. 
'rABLE Ji', 
E xltibitiug th e mnount r!f militia force th at may be concentrated at Boston, Newport, New York, P ltilculelpltia, N oljo' llc, Baltimore, 
Charleston, Savannalt, and N ew Orleans, successively , Jrom tlw 1st to tlte ll tlt day ; eaclt day's niarcli being coniputed at fift een 
mi"les; founded on tlw census ef 1830. · 
0 
H .-0 ui d u.i -~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ,..q > oS ~ ..cl' § ::-, ~ £ 
Q.) - 0 ~ ::-, c:i ~ ::-, 0 rn ~ d 0 ~ ""O s Q.) 0 
00 0 P-< ~ ~ •.-< ~ fJ >-. - ~ ::: :-;:::: ...., ~ rn ::-, ~ ~ ~ 0 Q.) Q.) ,..q 0 ,..q Q.) 
q ~ z z ~ z ~ 0 w z 
1 ...... 5,422 1,397 20,218 26,132 1,864 10,046 2,513 1,173 3,032 
2 ...... 28,351 2,373 28,131 26,521 2,880 18,042 7,160 3,960 7,836 
3 ...... 34,138 12,340 44,123 35,450 4, 416 21,266 9,475 5,948 8,716 
4 ...... 39,561 17,143 57,925 69,101 7,608 27,916 14,601 6,588 12,499 
5 ...... 49,127 33,221 59,438 70,806 11, 101 31,897 18,443 9,263 14,474 
6 ...... 59,893 42,,807 81,252 127,666 14, 511 49,648 22,490 19,725 17,339 
7 ...... 81,867 61,335 104,180 154,036 20,699 65,382 24,393 21,903 17,906 
8 ...... 97,697 65,583 137,048 167,703 28,039 77,543 2.9, 416 25,220 22,561 
9 ...... 111,655 83, 111 152,841 195,265 32,562 78,164 40,835 36,630 26,433 
10 ...... 125,326 109,268 164, 116 219,983 36,446 87,520 45,582 41,345 28,140 
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ORDNANCE OFFICE, Wasliington, Marek 8, 1836. 
Sm: The resolution of the Senate referred, on the 25th ultimo, to this office. 
has been duly considered, and, in answer, I have the honor to transmit the fol-
lowing report : 
1. IN RELATION TO ARMORIES. 
}..,or reasons fully set forth in the letter to you from this office of December 
28, 1832, (and as will also appear on reference to the report of Hon. R. ~I.John-
son, chairman of the military committee, of March 18, 1834,) it is the opinion of 
this department that, with a view to keep pace in some measure with the rapid 
increase of the militia, and the consequent demand for arms, there should bf 
established at least one additional armory, to be located at the most eligible 
point west of the Alleghany mountains. 
In a country like the United States, where the population is spread over a 
territory of great extent, the delay necessarily attending the transportation of 
arms to distant sections may at times materially affect the public interest; it i~ 
therefore suggested that, if two additional armories are deemed necessary to 
meet the exigencies of the country, one should be provided in the west and one 
in the south Atlantic States. Including those now at Springfield and Harper's 
Ferry, there would then be four national armories, two for the Atlantic States 
and two for the west; that is, if Harper's Ferry may be considered sufficiently 
near the western States to furnish their supplies by means of the proposed 
extension of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. · 
Two additional armories are therefore estimated for, at $525,000 each-
$1,0.50, 000. 
This estimate is based on the report of the commissioners, dated January 12, 
1825, who were appointed under the authority of an act of Congress, passed 
March 3, 1823, entitled "An act to establish a national armory on the western 
waters," and directed to explore tlie western country with a view to the selec-
tion of a suitable site. · 
2. IN RELATION TO ARSENALS. 
It has been urged upon the department by many whose opinions demand co~-
sideration, that every State should have an arsenal or depot of arms and mu_m-
tions within its territorial limits. Should this opinion prevail, and be earned 
into effect by legislative authority, it would be necessary to construct fourt.een 
arsenals or depots, including the one proposed for the State of North Carolina .  
for which a bill has been reported by the military committee of the House nt 
Representatives. 
A_pro1;0inent advantage to the p11blic interest in the establir.:hing of these depot-
consists m their use for the safe-keeping of arms issued to the States, ~~~er,,tb~ 
law of Congress, passed in 1808, "for arming the whole body of the militia, 1." 
be_ held subject to_ the orders of their several governors, which would insure tbeJT 
bemg always available in any emergency. 
S01:1-e additio_ns may be required, from time to time, at the arsenal. a:ready 
csfabh. hed, which, with the cost of the fourteen above mentioned, are estmrnted 
at $1,746,000. 
Thi. stimatc is founded on the supposition that the new arsenal::; are to · 
on an average, of a medium extent, when considered in relation to those already 
e, tabli..,hed, which are divided into four classes, as may be seen by reference t'l a 
tabula~· exhibit presented herewith. It would be proper to arrange enry Ill'~ 
d pot m , uch manner as to admit of its increa. e or extension in ca. e the puhhe 
rvice .:hould rcquir it. It could then be passed from one cla s to a higher by 
the addition of uch buildings, tools, or machinery as the case might demand. 
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3. IN RELATION TO FIELD ARTILLERY. 
It is estimated that an adequate supply of :field artillery for arming the militia 
and for troops in service, to be provided within ten years, will amount to 926 
pieces, which, with their carriages, implements, and equipments, will cost about 
$576,175. 
This estimate is basecl on the principle stated in the report before mentioned, 
and contemplates a supply proportionate to the ratio of the increase of the militia, 
one piece of artillery being allotted to every 2,000 men. 
4. IN RELATION TO ORDNANCE AND ORDNANCE STORES REQUIRED FOR ARMING 
THE FORTIFICATIONS. 
Agreeably to data derived from two statements received from the engineer 
department on the 11th of January and 27th of February last, it is estimated 
that the expense of procuring the necessary ordnance and ordnance stores for 
the full and entire armament of the forts which are erected, together with those 
now building, and others which are contemplated to be built hereafter, embracing· 
cannon, carriages, implements, and equipments complete, and ammunition, after 
deducting therefrom the quantity of similar munitions now on hand, will amount 
to about $17,840,249. 
This estimate is founded on the supposition that 12,116 pieces of cannon, with 
200 rounds of ammunition for each gun, will be ultimately required when all the 
forts projected shall have been completed. 
It should be stated, however, that this sum may be considered partly conjec-
tural, the plans for the defence of many of the harbors being not yet matured by 
the board of engineers, as it appears by a letter from the chief of that depart-
ment, dated February 27 last. There are likewise many other points along the 
coast which may require defences, the cost of the armament for which has not 
been embraced in this estimate, nor does it co11tain any item for the defence of 
the Mexican frontier. 
5. IN RELATION TO SMALL ARMS. 
To progress with the arming of the militia to a reasonable extent, in accord-
ance with the settled policy of the country and its civil institutions, a consider-
able addition should be made to the number of arms on hand. Having reference 
to the annual increase of citizens who may be called to bear arms, there will be 
required for the next ten years an expenditure of $7,721,233 for muskets, rifles, 
and pistoli!, and $321,880 for swords-total, $8,043,113. 
This last sum is found by allotting :five swords to every one hundred muskets, 
or their equivalent in other fire-arms. 
6. IN RELATION TO ACCOUTREMENTS FOR SMALL ARMS. 
Fifty thousand sets of accoutrements would cost $200,000. 
This number distributed among the several arsenals would afford an adequate 
s~pply for any emergency ; and being in some degree perishable, it is not con-
sidered advisable to provide a greater quantity, as they can be made at short 
notice, or as occasion may require. 
7. IN RELATION TO FIELD AivIMUNITIO~ OF ALL KINDS. 
The expense of providing a supply of gunpowder, cartridge paper, and other 
mate1ials for field service, is estimated at $200,000. 
. 'l1his amount would afford at all times a supply of ammunition for 30,000 men 
in each of the principal divisions of the country. 
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The foregoing statements comprise all the estimates for the ordnance depart-
ment, except for a national foundery. 'The amount required for such an estab-
lishment will not exceed $300,000, which sum includes the cost of materials to 
be consumed in casting guns during the first year after commencing operations. 
The period of ten years is taken as a suitable time within which the foregoing 
expenditures may be completed. 
The disbursements for the various objects embraced in the resolution which 
pertain to the ordnance department are now, annually, little short of $1,000,000. 
If a period of fifteen years is assumed for the acco_mplishment of these purposes, 
the annual expenditure will be only double what it is at present, and it is believed 
that such an increase could be made with much advantage to the service. Indeed, 
that portion of expense which pertains to the manufacture of cannon and projec-
tiles could annually be more than quadrupled with safety and a due regard to 
economy. 
Recapitulation. 
2 national armories ..................................... . 
14 arsenals ........................................... . 
926 pieces of field artillery, with caniages, &c .............. . 
Ordnance and ordnance stores, and ammunition for fortifications. 
Small arms and accoutrements ............ _  ............... . 
Ammunition for field service ............ ................. . 
A national foundery .................................... . 
The resolution of the Senate is returned herewith. 










GEO. BOMFORD, Colonel of Ordnana. 
Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary ef War. 
:-<111t1·111tn l '!l tlt1· ('()s/ r!,/'.frmr c/((ssrs ef arsenals, rxclusire ef c{dcrior 1w11s,fenccs, gales, roads, tools, macltinery, wharves, (fC. 




Names. No. 0f 
buildings. 
t; 
g Arsenals .............. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · · / 2 
~ Great magazine ................ " . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
l-..:)
1 
Officers' quarters ................... - - - - - - - - 1 
Barracks ........................ - ....... - 1 
Gun-carriage shed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
<:.J1 Office............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Small magazine for fixed ammunition. . . . . . . . . . 1 
Connecting· walls ..... __ ~ ... ___ .. ____ .. _ .......... . 
Land-~5 acres at least.-(See note 1) .............. . . 
Graduating and levelling the site proper, making 
drains, culverts, &c.. . . . . . . ............... , ....... . 
Size. 
120 by 40 feet, and 47 feet high ....... ___ ._ . 
To contain from 2,500 to 3,000 bbls. powder .. 
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high ............. . 
100, by 36 feet, and 35 feet high ............ . 
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high ............ . 
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high ............. . 
30 by 20 feet, and 14 feet high ...... ' ....... . 
.. .. .... . .. - - ... - . - .. --· - ......... - .......... - - ..... - ....... ... 
Estimated at $40 per acre ...•...... _ ...... . 













































Statement ef tlte cost qJ four classes ef arsenals, ~c.-Continuod. 





Ar:::rnal _ - . _. ___ __ . ___ .. _. ____ . _. _. ___ . _ _ _ 2 
(hrat nrngnzinr ______________________ _____ . 1 
Officrrs' qun.rters ______ . ________ . __________ . 1 
lfarracks - _ - - . __________ . _______________ . _ 1 
Gnn-carringe shed __________ . _ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 
Smiths' shop _ ... ____ . __ . __ .. ___ . __ . __ . __ . 1 
Office . _ .. __ ......... __ ...... __ . _ ... _ . . . . . 1 
Carriage-makers' shop .. _ . _ . _ .. _ . _ ..... _ . . . . 1 
Armorers' and turners' shop ......... _ .. _. __ .. 1 
Painters' shop . __ .. _ . _ ... _ ..... ___ . ______ . . 1 
Lnboratory, viz : 
~-ri~in~ and :filling shop - _ ........... _ . ___ . . . 1 
:U 1111i-\hrng room.;_._ ... _ ... __ ..... _ ... _.... 1 
Small magazine for fixed ammunition. . . . . . . . . . 1 
Connecting· wall . _ .... _ .. _ .. __ ... _ ....... - . - .. - - - . 
Lnncl-25 acres a.t lrn.st.-(Sec note) ...... _. - ... - ... - . 
Gmdnnting and levelling the site proper, making 
drains, culverts, &c ............ .......... , ....... -
_ _ _ ___ I I 
Size. • 
120 by 40 feet, and 4 7 feet high .. ...... _ . _ . . 
'ro contain from 2,500 to 3,000 bbls. powder .. . 
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high . . ........... . 
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high_ ... _ .. _. __ .. 
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high .... _ ....... . 
25 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high ............. . 
25 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ......... __ . _. 
50 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
20 by 14 feet, and 14 feet hig·h ... : .... _ .... _ 
. 25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ...... _ .... _._ 
25 by ;25 feet, and 14 feet high . ..... .... . .. 
30 by 20 feet, and 14 feet high .. _ .......... . 














• - - ~ ......... • ............. • .. - • • .. - ................... • • • .. • • • - r .... • • • ...... • .. 
Estimated at $40 per acre .......... _ . _ ..... , . __ ... - .. . 














































,' talcmenl rj ' the r·ost 1ffcur c7ass('S rif arsenals, ..yr·.-Oontinuccl. 
THIRD CLA SS-DEPOT AND PLA CE OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAITI, WITHOUT WATER OR STEAM POWER. 
Na.mes. No. of 
buildings. 
Size. Cost of each. I . Total. 
Arsenal ................................. . 
Great magazine ........................... . 
Officen,' quarters .......................... . 
Barrack:s ................................ . 
Gun-carriage sheds ........................ . 
Smiths' shop .................... · ......... . 
Timber sheds ............................ . 
Office ................................... . 
Carpenters' and carriage-makl:rs' shop ......... . 
Armorers' and turners' shop ................. . 
Tinners' and casting shop .................. . 
Painters' shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ _ .... . 















120 by 40 feet, and 4 7 feet high ............ . 
To contain from 2, 500 to 3, 000 bbls. powder .. 
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high ............. . 
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high ............ . 
100 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high ..........•.. 
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high ............ . 
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high ............. . 
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high ....... ., ..... . 
50 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
40 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
Driving and filling· shop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
Finishing room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high .............. . 

















945 Guard room ... - - .... - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
£~~~ec~~g~::~l ~t- ie~~t.~(S~~ ~-ot~)-:::::::::: : : : : : : : : · E~ti~~t~~l ~t $40. p~1: ~~1:e·:::::::::::::::::: I: : : : : : : : : : 
Graduating and levelling the site proper, making 
Oo~~t~~s:~
1














































Statement ef the cost ef four classes if arsenals, o/c.-Oontinued. 
FOURTH C'LASS-IH<; POT AND PLACE OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR, WITH WATER OR STEAM POWER. 
Names. 
Arsenal ........ ... . ..................... . 
Great magazine ........................... . 
Officers' quarters .......................... . 
Barracks ..... ... ................... _ .. _ . _ 
Gun-carriage sheds ........................ . 
Smiths' shop ............................. . 
Timber sheds ............................. . 
Office .................................. :. 
Carpenters' and carriage-makers' shop ......... . 
Steam engine, or horse for "'1-ater power ....... . 
Armorers' shop ........................... . 
'l'inners' and casting shop ................... · 
Painters' shop ............................ . 


















120 by 40 feet, and 4 7 feet high ............ . 
~ro contain from 2,500 to 3,000 bbls. powder .. . 
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high ............. . 
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high ............ . 
100 by 30 feet, and 10 feet hig·h ........... ~. 
80 by 35 feet, and 1 4 feet high ............. . 
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high ............ . 
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high ............. . 
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
100 by 40 feet, and 18 feet high ............ . 
50 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
40 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. . 














945 Laboratory, viz: 
Driving and filling shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 787 
}.,inishing room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 787 
Small magazine for fixed ammunition.......... 1 30 by 20 feet, and 14 feet high.............. 756 
Guard r?om. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 




















Lancl-25 acres at least.-( See note.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimated at $40 per acre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 
Grncluatinp; and levelling the site proper, making r-o 




























NoTE 1. Twenty-five ncrcR of land, at least, are necessary at each class of the arsenals, in order to be enabled to prove powder; wliich operation rc-
q11ircs a space of 3;50 to 400 yards. 
2. It is perceived that the expense of the first class may be reduced $20,000, if only one arsenal building be required in that class. ~rhe same remark 
applies to the other classes. 
~ 'l here are times when several companies of troops may ue required, temporarily at least, at each class of the arsenals. 'l'be barracks a.re there-
fore, made of the same size at efl.ch of the classes, and large enough to accommodate the companies as well as the troops of the ordn:rnce proper. ' There 
has always been a deficiency at the arsenals in barracks, when they have been occupied by troops. 
4. The above includes everything connected with the buildings and site proper, nothing more. The expenses of the apparatus and tools, utemils, 
engines, &c , which may be neces-ary to put the severitl classes into operation, am not included. 
5. The extent of the site occupied by each of the classes may be the same; and thus any one class may be enlarged into its next adjacent class, without 
other expense than is required by the additional buildings. 
6. Tne estimated expenditures in these statements are founded on the prices paid iu the vicinity of Philadelphia, and are sufficiently near the truth, 
it is believed, for all positions which are not in Florida, Louisiana, or Alabama. 
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REPORT FROM THE NAVY DEPAR'l'MEN'r. 
NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 31, 1836. 
Sm : In answer to so much of the resolutions of the Senate of the United 
States, of the 18th ultimo, as required information as to the probable amount of 
appropriations that may be necessary to supply the United States with ord-
nance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to self-defence would 
require to be always on hand, and the probable amount that would be necessary 
to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of the 
navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or :floating batteries) upon the footing 
of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the 
Union, I have the honor to lay before you a report of the board of navy com-
missioners, of the 2d instant, which contains the best information upon the sub-
jects referred to in possession of this department, which is respectfully sub-
mitted. 
MARLON DICKERSON". 
The PRESIDENT ef tlie United States. 
rn THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
January 21, 1836, 
The following resolutions were ordered to be postponed to Monday next: 
Resolved, That so much of the revenue of the United States, and the din-
dends of stock receivable from the Bank of the United States, as may be neces-
sary for the purpose, oug·ht to be set apart and applied to the general defence 
and permanent security of the country. 
Resolved, 'I,hat the President be requested to cause the Senate to be informe~: 
1. 'I,he probable amount that would be necessary for fortifying the lake, m3:11· 
time, and Gulf frontier of the United States, and such points of the land fronner 
as may require permanent fortifications. 
2. 'l1he probable amount that would be necessary to construct an adequate 
number of armories and arsenals in the United States, and to supply the State~ 
with field artillery ( especially brass field pieces) for their militia, and with side-
arms and pistols for their cavalry. 
3. The probable amount that would be necessary to supply the United Stat 
with the ordnance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to selt-
defence would require to be always on hand. 
4. The probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defence-
of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock 
ya!~s, and_ ste~m or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respect· 
ability winch 1s due to the security and to the welfare of the Union. 
Passed February 18, 1836. 
NAVY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, Jiarcli 2, l 36. 
SIR: The board of navy commissioners have the honor to acknowledge h. 
receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, requesting a "report on the probab!t: 
amount that would be neces..,ary to upply the United States with the ordnanc · 
arm , and_ munitions of war ( ·o far as may be wanted for the purpo..,e~ of th 
navy) which a proper r gard to self-defence would require to be always on hand: 
and on the probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defenc ·: 
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of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock y~r~ls, 
and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability 
which is due to the security and welfare of the Union." . 
In conformity to these instructions the board respectfully state, with respect 
to the ordnance for the navy, that after a careful examination of the subject, 
taking into consideration the ordnance and ordnance stores now on hand, and 
the extent of force for which it may be expedient to make early provision, they 
are of opinion that the sum of one million eight hundred thousand two ~1:mdred 
and fifty dollars will be required to supply the ordnance, arms, and mumt10ns of 
war which may be wanted for the use of the navy, and which a proper regard 
to self-defence would require to have prepared ready for use.-(See paper A 
annexed for the detail.) 
The board beg leave- respectfully to observe, that for the vessels _which ~re 
now built, or have been specially authorized, armaments may be provided, with 
some partial exceptions, from the cannon and carronades already provided, and 
the deficient ordnance, arms, and other ordnance stores will be principally 
required for the vessels which are yet to be authorized or built. It is therefore 
respectfully recommended that any appropriation for this purpose, instead of 
being special or separate, should be included in an appropriation for "building 
and Tepairing vessels, and for the purchase of materials and stores for the navy." 
The second object of inquiry, as to "the probable amount that would be neces-
sary to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of 
the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the 
footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare 
of the Union," embraces a wide range, requires an examination of several sub-
. jects of great importance, and the expression of opinions upon which differences 
of opinion may and probably will exist. Before any estimate can be formed of 
the probable amount that would be necessary for the purposes proposed an 
examination must be had, and an opinion formed of the nature and extent of the 
naval force which is "necessary to place the naval defences of the United States 
upon the footing of strength and respectability which is clue to the security ancl 
welfare of the Union," and the time within which it ought to be, or might be, 
advantageously prepared. . 
Taking into view the geographical position of the United States, with reference 
to other nations with whom we are most likely to be brought into future collision; 
the great extent of our maritime frontier, and the extreme importance of securing 
the communications of the whole valley of the Mississippi, though the Gulf of 
)Iexico, and the intercourse between all parts of the coast; the efficient protection 
of our widely extended and extremely valuable commerce, under all circumstances; 
and the great naval and fiscal resources of the country, the board consider the 
proper limit for the extent of the naval force to be that which can be properly 
manned when the country may be involved in a maritime war. 
In estimating this extent it is assumed that about ninety thousand seamen 
are employed in the foreign and coasting trade and fisheries. As the navigation 
has been generally increasing, there is little reason to apprehend any immediate 
diminution during peace. In any war which would require the employment of 
all our naval force, it is believed that such interruptions would occur to our 
commerce as would enable the navy to obtain without difficulty at least thirty 
thousand seamen and ordinary seamen; and if it should continue long, it is prob-
a~le that a larger number might be engaged. The number of thirty thousand, 
with the landsmen who may be safely combined with them, will therefore be 
assumed as the number for which vessels ought to be prepared for the com-
mencement of a state of hostilities. 
With respect to the nature of the force which it would be most advantageous 
to prepare, there will undoubtedly be differences of opinion. The materials for 
the larger vessels, as ships of the line and frigates, would be obtained with great 
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difficulty, under circumstances which would interfere with our coasting trade. 
whilst sloops of war and smaller vessels could be built with greater comparatin: 
facility under such circumstances. 
The preparation of a considerable number of steam vessels, ready to defend 
our great estuaries, to aid in the operations of our other naval force, and in the 
concentration or . movements of the military force, as circumstances might re-
quire, is believed to demand serious and early attention. 
Having due regard to these and other considerations, the board propose that 
the force to be prepared, ready for use when circumstances may require it, shall 
consist of 15 ships of the line, 25 frigates, 25 sloops of war, 25 steamers, and 
25 smaller vessels, and that the frames and other timber, the copper, ordnance, 
tanks, and chain cables shall also be prepared for 10 ships of the line and 10 
frigates. 
'The force proposed to be prepared, ready for use, will employ and can be 
manned by the 30,000 seamen and others which have been considered available 
in a state of war. The materials for the ten ships of the line and ten frigates 
will constitute a necessary reserve for increasing the number of those vessels, 
should they be required, or for supplying losses from decay or caeualties. 
'To estimate the amount necessary to prepare this force it is proposed to as-, 
certain the whole probable cost, including ordnance, by the average cost ol 
similar vessels already built, (steam vessels excepted,) and of materials already 
procured, and then to deduct the value of the present force, and all other pre,.,<>.ent 
available means. 
Total cost of 15 ships of the line ......................... . 
25 frigates ........................... - - - - - -
25 sloops ................................. . 
25 steamers ........................... - . - - -
'"r25 smaller vessels ..................... - .. - - -
Total for vessels .................................... - - - -
For the proposed materials, as a reserve ................... . 
Total amount required ............................ - - - - · - · 
D educt from this sum the value of the present force and avail-
able means, as follows : 
In vessels afloat, valued at llo of original value, 
about ................................... . 
In vessels building, at actual cost ............. . 
In materials collected for building do ........... . 





For three years' appropriation, "gradual improve-
ment," when due . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 500, 000 
Total of present value and available means ................. . 











In presenting any estimate for the amounts which may be necessary to placP 
the different navy yards in a proper situation, the board can do no more tha~ 
give very general opinionf4, as the objects of expenditure are foreign to therr 
own pro±e ional pur uits, and they have no civil engineer to whom they can 
r fer for the nece._;4ary detailed mformation. 
} rom a knowledge of the co t of works hitherto completed or in pro~·:"· 
and of the want at the re pective yard for the proper preservation of mat_en~i-. 
and for extending the means for building, pre c1Ting, repairing, and eqmppm-= 
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vessels, they are satisfied, however, that. the public interests would be _gr~atly 
promoted, and, in fact, absolutely require an average annual expenditure of 
$500,000 for years to come upon the different yards. . 
In New York the necessity for a dry dock is severely felt ~lrea~y, ~nd its 
importance will increase with any increase of the navy. '.rhis, wi!h its de-
pendencies, will require nearly a million of dollars. ~t Pensa~ola, which nat~re 
has designated as one of the naval keys ~f !h~ G~lf of Mexico, a_nd of th_e 1111-
mense commerce of the valley of the Mississippi, large expenditures will be 
necessary to secure adequate means for repairing a_nd su?sisting a naval force 
upon that station, and thus prevent the many evils wluch would be s~vcrely 
felt in a state of war, if the vessels were obliged to resort to the Atlantic ~orts 
for ordinary repairs or supplies of any kind. In other yards there are objects 
of great and urgent importance. . . 
Generally the proposed arrangements for the preservation of all matenals 
and vessels should precede their collection or construction. Whilst, therefore, 
the board propose $500,~00 as the ave~ge annual appropriation, until ~he_ yards 
should be placed in proper order, they would also state that appropnat10ns of 
$700,000, annually, for the next four or five years, and a less sum than $500,000 
afterwards, would, in their opinion, be most judicious. 
The next subject for consideration is the nature and extent of force proper to 
be kept employed in a time of peace for the protection of our commercial in-
terests, and to prepare the officers and others for the efficient management of the 
force proposed for a state of war. 
Our commerce is spread over every ocean; our tonnage is second only to that 
of Great Britain, and the value of articles embarked is believed by many to be 
fully equal to those transported by the ships of that nation. In the safety and 
prosperity of this commerce all the other interests of the United States are 
deeply interested. It is liable to be disturbed and injured in various modes, 
unless the power of the country, exerted through its naval force, is ready to 
protect it. It is therefore proposed that small squadrons should be employed 
upon different stations, subject at all times, however, to such modifications as 
circumstances may require. . 
Of these squadrons, one might be employed in the Mediterranean, and attend 
to our interests on the west coasts of Spain and Portugal, and southward to the 
western coast of Morocco and Madeira. 
One in the Indian ocean to visit, successively, the most important commercial 
points east of the Cape of Good Hope, to China, then to cross the Pacific, visit 
the northern whaling stations and islands, cruise some time upon the west coast 
of America, and return by way of Cape Horn, the coast of Brazil, and the 
Windward West India islands. 
One in the Pacific ocean to attend to our interests upon the west coast of 
America; keeping one or more vessels at or near the Sandwich and other islands 
which are frequented by our whale ships and other vessels, and, in succession, 
cross the Pacific, visiting the islands and southern whaling stations, China, and 
otheT commercial places, and return, by the way of the Cape of Good Hope, to 
the United States. 
A squadron upon the coast ef Brazil, or east coast of South America, might 
be charged with attention to our interests on the whole of that coast, and upon 
the north coast so far as to include the Orinoco. If a ship of the line should 
be employed on this station, it might be occasionally sent round to the Pacific. 
A squadron in the West Indies and Gulf ef Mexico will be necessary for, 
and may be charged with, attention to the protection of our commerce amongst 
the West India islands and along the coast of South America, from the Orinoco 
round to the Gulf of Mexico. 
A small_ coast squadron upon our Atlantic coast might be very advantageously 
employed m making our officers familia1·ly and thoroughly acquainted with all 
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our ports and harbors, which would be very useful in a state of war. The ve~ 
sels would also be ready for any unexpected service, either to transmit informa 
tion or orders ; to reinforce other squadrons, or to visit our eastern fisheries. 
Besides this cruising force, it is recommended that a ship of the line be kept in 
a state of readiness for service, men excepted, at Boston, New York, and Koifolk 
and used as receiving ships for the recruits as they are collected; this would 
give the means of furnishing a considerable increase of force with a very small 
addition to the current expense. 
For the nature and distribution of this force, the following is proposed: 
Line. Frigates. Sloops I Steamern Smal!e,. 1 Total. 
Mediterranean ........... 1 2 2 ... - ........ 2 7 
Indian ocean ............ .. .. .. .. . -i 2 .......... 1 4 
Pacific ................. - - . --- 2 3 .. -- ....... 2 7 
Brazil ................. _ 1 1 2 - .... --·-· 2 6 
West Indies - .. - .. -- - - .. - .... - - .. - -- 1 4 1 2 8 
Home .................. *3 1 2 3 1 10 
Total - - .... -·. - - - ... -- 5 8 15 4 1~1---;-
,:; As receiving ships. 
Considering this force with reference to its power of giving experience to the 
officers, and qualifying them for the management of the force proposed. for war, 
it appears that for the force proposed to be actually employed at sea, m peace 
and in war, the peace force will require and employ about two-thirds the number 
of commanders of squadrons; about one-third of the captains and forty one-hun-
dredths of the commanders and lieutenants and masters, which the proposed war 
force would demand, and midshipmen sufficient to supply the additional number 
of theRe last classes which a change to a state of war would require. . . 
Supposing the foregoing force to be that which is to be kept in com~ission, 
the next question is, what force will be necessary to keep afloat, to provide ~he 
necessary reliefs ? The board believe that this force should be the least which 
will answer the object proposed, as every vessel when launched is ex~osed t~ a 
decay which is much more rapid than when left under the cover of a tight hip-
house. 
We have already six ships of the line afloat, which will be fu11y equal to our 
present wants, when they are repaired. A reserve of three frigates _may be re-
quired, but only to be launched when the necessity for it shall anse; for the 
sloops-of-war and smaller vessels, it will probably be sufficient to merely keep 
u~ the cruising force as proposed, except some extraordinary demand "ho_ulJ 
anJe. 'I,he force of steam vessels proposed, when distributed at Boston, 1 ew 
York, Norfolk, and Pensacola, would probably meet all the demands of a tat 
of peace, and furnish useful schools for officers, to prepare them for the proper 
rnanag ment of others, when they are required. The force to be kept afloat. 
then, will be a . umccl at six ships of the line, eleven fr:ig·ates, fifteen .Joop~-ot-
war, four t amer , and ten smaller vessels. The annual amount necesflary t 
keep thi, force in a state of repair, and to supply the wear and tear of ,tore;:, i 
crni:inO' ve:;: L, is e timated at ·950,000. 
'lh . timat d expense of the force which is proposed to be kept in commi~-
. i n, :x:clusive of the r pair a above tated, and for the pay of officers at ua.y 
yard , r nd ·zvou", rec iYinO' ve .., 1 , of , uperintendent., and ciYil offic r.-._at all 
the shore e tabli ... hment ·, and at the pre ent cost of tho e e ·tablishment,, 1.::: 
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For pay of officers and seamen in commission, superintendents and 
civil officers, and all others, at all the establishments, about .... $2, 500, 000 
For provisions .................... ·....................... 750,000 
For medicines and hospital stores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60, 000 
For oi·dnance stores, powder, &c.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120, 000 
For contingencies of all kinds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390, 000 
Total for the navy branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 850, 000 
=-::::-~----_ -_ -_ --
If the marines are continued as a part of the naval establishment, instead of 
substituting ordinary seamen and landsmen for them in Yessels, and watchmen 
in navy yardB, and transferring the marines to the army as artillery, as has 
sometimes been suggested, the sum of about $400,000 annually will be required 
for that corps. 
To determine the annual amount which it may be necessary to appropriate to 
prepare the vessels and reserve frames and other 'materials which have been 
proposed, some time must be assumed within which they shall be prepared. 
Believing that reference to the ability of the treasury to meet the probable de-
mands upon it, for all the purposes of the government, must necessarily be con-
sidered in determining what amount may be allotted to the navy, the board have 
examined the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury, and respectfully propose 
to establish the ordinary annual appropriation for the navy, including the ord-
nance, at seven millions of dollars. 
The operation of such annual appropriations may be seen by the following 
recapitulation of the proposed heads of expenditure : 
For the force in commission and its dependencies, as before stated $3, 850, 000 
'l1he average appropriation for navy yards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500, 000 
For the rnpairs and wear and tear of vessels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950, 000 
For building vessels and purchase of materials.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 300, 000 
Total for the navy proper ............................ . 




By tbe adoption of this gross sum for the navy and its dependencies, and the 
other items as proposed, $1,300,000 would be annually applied to increasing the 
number of our V'essels and the purchase of materials; and, with this annual ex-
penditure, the deficiency of $17,760,000 would not be supplied sooner than 
between thirteen and fourteen years, or at about the year 1850. The board 
consider this as the most remote period at which the proposed force ought to be 
ready, and are of opinion that it might be prepared much sooner, should Con-
gress deem it necessary or advisable to make larger appropriations than have 
been suggested. 
The board have expressed the opinion that no more vessels should be launched 
than are absolutely necessary to meet the demands for the force to be kept in 
com.~ission; but, as a necessary consequence, they recommend that the other 
add1t1on~l force shoul~ be in such a state of readiness that it may be launched 
and eqmpped by the time that men could be obtained for it . . This arrangement 
renders an early attention to the completion of all the building-slips, ship-houBes, 
and launching ways at the different yards, so that the ships may be built, and 
that our docks, wharves, workshops, and storehouses should be finished; that 
our ships may be equipped with the greatest economy and despatch whenever 
they may be required. 
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Before concluding this report, the board would respectfully offer some re-
marks upon the form of the appropriations, and suggest some attention to ex-
isting acts of Congress. 
By the separate acts for the gradual increase of the navy; for the gradual 
improvement of the navy; for building and rebuilding different vessels, al-
together seven in number; each appropriation is rendered separate and distinct, 
although the general object is the same, and requires the use of the same kinds 
of materials. It is necessary, in conformity to the law of the 3d of March, 
1809, that the vouchers, receipts, expenditures, and accounts of each should be 
kept separately; and, in strictness, no article purchased for one can be applied 
to the use of another, however desirable or economical such use may be. 
It is suggested, therefore, for consideration, whether it might not be very ad-
vantageous for Congress to determine, by some general act or resolution, the 
number and classes of vessels which the President might be authorized to ha-re 
built, or for which materials might be procured, and then appropriate specially 
the amounts which might be devoted to those objects, and for keeping the force 
afloat in repair, under the general head of "For building and repairing vessels, 
and for purchase of materials and stores.'' 
The adoption of some such plan, and removing the special restrictions which 
now exist, and requiring, as at present, detailed estimates for the current repairs 
and reports of proceedings in building vessels and for purchase of materials, 
would, it is believed, greatly simplify and diminish the number of accounts at 
the r.rreasury Department and in all the navy yards, without infringing in any 
degree the principle of special appropriations; would furnish to Congress 
all the information they now receive, and would enable us at all times to use 
those materials which are best prepared and most appropriate for the different 
objects for which they might be wanted. . 
The board beg leave, also, respectfully to state their opinion of the necessity 
for th~ services of a competent civil engineer for the navy to furnish pla_ne and 
estimates for all hydraulic and civil objects, and to have a general supermt~nd-
ence of their construction under the direction of the department. The particu-
lar character of these works requires the supervision of such a person, not l~ss 
from motives of economy in the ordinary expenditures than from the more nn-
portant consideration of their proper arrangement, solidity of construction, and 
durability. 
All which is respectfully submitted. 
JNO. RODGERS. 
Hon. M. DICKERSON, Secretary if tlie Navy. 
A. 
Upon the supposition that, the naval force to be so prepared that it might be 
equipped for sea at short notice shall consist of 15 ships of the line, 25 frigate:::, 
25 sloops-of-war, 25 steamers, and 25 smaller vessels; and that the frames and 
other durable materials shall be provided for 10 ships of the line and 10 frigates 
a a re ·erve. The following statement shows the total number and character of 
the armaments which the whole force will require, the number which can be 
furni, hed from the ordnance on hand, and the number which will be still re-
quired: 
For sLips of line. Frigates. Sloops. Steamers. ,-. 
Total number required. __ ....... 25 35 25 25 25 
n hand for ................... ll 22 16 00 1:2 
Deficient ............... - . 14 13 9 25 13 
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Besides the bomb-cannon, guns, and carronades for these armaments, there 
would be required shot, shells, small arms, pistols, and cutlasses, and a supply 
of powder sufficient for equipping a strong force in case of a sudden emergency. 
The cost of these objects may be estimated as follows: 
Armaments for 14 ships of the line, at $45,000 each ........... . 
Armaments for 13 frigates, at $16,500 each ................... . 
Armaments for 9 sloops, at $6,000 each ...... ~ .............. . 
Armaments for 25 steamers, at $3,000 each ................... . 
Armaments for 13 smaller vessels, at $1,500 each .............. . 
Fo~ guns, bomb-cannon, and ca1Tonades, 100 shot to each gun, and 
200 shells to each bomb-cannon, and shells for guns ......... . 
8,000 muskets ........................................... . 
3,500 pairs of pistols ..................................... . 
8,000 cutlasses .......................................... , 
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IIO. REPS., EX. DOC. No. 206, 26th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION, 
LETTER 
FROM 
THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 
TRANSMI'l'TING, 
ln compliance witli the resolution ef the CJtlt ultirno, a system, of national 
defence and the establishment ef national founderies. 
MAY 15, 184-0,.:_So much as rcla 1;es to national founderies referred to a select committee 
on the subject, and the residue to the Committee on Military Affairs. 
WAR DEPARTMENT, May 12, 1840. 
Sm: In reply to so much of the resolution of the House of Representatives 
of the 9th ultimo, req nesting the Department bf War "to lay before this House, 
as soon as practicable, a report of a full and connected system of national de-
fence, embracing steam and other vessels of war, and ':floating batteries' for 
coast and harbor defence, and national founderies, and the internal means, aux-
iliary to these, for transportation and other warlike uses, by land, and that he 
be requested to furnish this House with the reports submitted to his department 
at any time by Major General Edmund P. Gaines, or other person or persons 
of professional experience, of their 'plans of defence,' if any such have been 
submitted, with the views of the Secretary of War thereon; and that the 
Secretary furnish an estimate of the expenses of his own and other plans he 
may report, distinguishing such parts of plans as ought to be immediat~ly 
adopted and prosecuted, with the probable cost and time of their prosecution 
and completion :" I have the honor to transmit the accompanying reports of a 
board of officers, assembled to examine the subject, and to present a connected 
plan of defence for the maritime and inland frontiers of the United States. 
On submitting these reports, I should have considered my duty discharged, 
had not the resolution required me to give an opinion with regard to the several 
plans of national defence presented to the department, and to furnish a compar-
ative statement of the cost of each. 'l'he plan presented to Congress by Major 
General Gaines, which will be found in the accompanyiug printed document, 
and that now submitted from the board of officers, are the only ones that have 
h 'en brou 0 ·ht to the notice of the department. On the subject of the former, I 
beg 1 a:ve to state that, with every respect for the experience of the gallant 
author, I am con, trained to differ from him when he proposes to abandon the 
ooJ• tern of pcrmanrnt defences as obsolete, and to rely entirely upou the expe-
dient: of Ya. t floating bn.tterie. and extensive lines of railroad" . 'l'he accom-
1mnyin0' report of the board of navy commissioners and the chief topographical 
en()'inecr exhibit the prolmble cost of carrying out the general' plan:-:, which 
far ·xcrcd:-: that of con~trnctin°· permanent work. of defence, without being iu 
any mumcr ·o well calculatcc.l to protect the country. 
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After a careful and anxious investigation of a subject involving in so high a 
degree the safety and honor of the country, I fully concur in the opinions ex-
pressed by the board of the superiority of permanent works of defence ov~r a~l 
other expedients that have yet been devised, and of their a?solute ne~essity if 
we would avoid the danger of defeat and disgrace-a necessity rather mcreased 
than diminished by the introduction of steam batteries and _the use ~f hollow 
shot. It would, in my opinion, prove a most fatal error to dispense with them, 
and to rely upolil. our navy alone, aided by the number, strength, and valoi: of 
the people to protect the country against the attacks of an enem_y P?ssessmg 
great naval means. To defend a line of coast of three thousand m1les m extent, 
and effectually to guard all the avenues to our great commercial cities an~ im-
portant naval depots, the navy of the United States must be very snper10r to 
the means of attack of the most powerful naval power in the world, wh~ch will 
occasion an annual expense this country is not now able to bear; and this large 
naval armament, instead of perfoi·ming its proper function as the sword of the state 
in time of war, and sweeping the enemy's commerce from the seas, must be 
chained to the coast or kept within the harbors. 
It has been clearly demonstrated that the expense of employing a sufficient 
body of troops, either regulars or militia, for a period of even six months, for the 
purpose of defending the coast against attacks and feints that might be made by 
an enemy's fleet, would exceed the cost of erecting all the permanent works deemed 
necessary for the defence of the coast. One hundred thousand men divided 
into four columns, would not be more than sufficient to guard the vulnerable 
points of our maritime frontier, if not covered by fortifications. An amount of 
force against an expedition of 20,000 men, which, if composed of regulars would 
cost the nation $30,000,000 per annum, and if militia, about $40,000,000; and, 
supposing only one-half the force to be required to defend the coast with the 
aid of forts properly situated and judiciously constructed, the difference of ex-
pense for six months would enable the government to erect all the most neces-
sary works. This calculation is independent of the loss to the nation by ab-
stracting so large an amount of labor from the productive industry of the coun-
try, and the fearful waste of life likely to result from such a costly, hazardous, 
and harassing system of defence. 
It must be recollected, too, that we are not called upon to try a new system, 
but to persevere in the execution of one that has been adopted after mature de-
liberation, and that is still practiced in Europe on a much more extensive scale 
than is deemed necessary here; so much more so, that there exist there single 
fortresses, each of which comprises more extensive and stronger works than is 
here proposed for the whole line of our maritime frontier. We must bear in 
mind, also, thaL the destruction of some of the important points on that frontier 
would alone cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole 
line would amount- to, while the temporary occupation of others would drive us 
into expenses far surpassing those of the projected works of defence. 
The organization of permanent defences proposed by the board for our fron-
tiers is not upon military and naval considerations alone, but is calculated to 
protect th~ internal navigation of the country. 'The fortifications proposed, at 
the same time that they protect our coast from the danger of invasion, and de-
fend the principal commercial avenues and naval establishments, cover the 
whole line of internal navigation, which, in time of war, will contribute in so 
e3senti8:l a manner to the def~nce of the country by furnishing prompt and 
economical means of transportat10n; so that, while the main arteries which con-
~uct our produce to the ocean are defended at their outlets, the interior naviga-
t1011, parallel to the coast, is protected, and a free communication kept up be-
tween every part of the Union. . 
Although this department is folly aware of the importance of affording per-
manent and as perfect protection as may be possible to the whole coast, it 
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regards that section embraced by the shores of the Gulf of Mexico as the most 
exposed and the most important. It is true that the coast to the eastward of 
Cape H atteras possesses points that may attract the attention of an enemy, arid 
that, in the present state of things, the chances of success would justify a hostile 
enterprise, and are much greater than a wise provision would allow to exiRt. It 
is equally so, that, however. difficult of access the coast may be from Cape Hat-
teras to Florida, the nature of a part of its population, and the facility afforded 
to an enemy by its present neglected condition to blockade and annoy the prin-
cipal outlets of the valuable exports of that important portion of our country, 
require our early attention; still, the means of defence from Maine to Florida 
may be united together, and the parts may afford mutual succor to each other. 
But the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, on the contrary, is insulated and apart, and 
must depend altogether upon its own resources. It coristitutes the maritime 
frontier not only of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and of West Florida, but 
of Arkansas, 'I1ennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, and Illinois, and 
the T erritories of Wisconsin and Io,va, embracing nearly three-fourths of the 
territory of the United States ; and it must be borne in mind that the enls 
which would result from the temporary occupation of the delta of the Missis-
sippi, or from a successful blockade of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, would 
not only injure the prosperity of these States, but would deeply affect the in-
terests of the whole Union; and no reasonable expense, therefore, ought to be 
spared to guard against such a casualty. 
Although it ·would appear, on a superficial view, to be a gigantic and almost 
impracticable project to fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of the 
U nitcd States, and difficult, if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to 
garrison and defend the works necessary for that purpose, yet the statements 
contained in the reports of the board remove these objections entir_ely. 1:he 
coast of the United States throug·hout its vast extent has but few pomt~ which 
require to be defended against a regular and powerful attack. A considerable 
portion of it is inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depreda-
tions of parties in boats and small vessels-of-war; against which inferi_o7· ?or~s 
and the combination of the same means and a well-organized local militia will 
afford sufficient protection. The only portions which require to be defended ?Y 
permanent works of some strength are the avenues to the great c?mmercrnl 
cities and naval and military establishments, the destruction of which w~uld 
prove a serious loss to the country, and be regarded by an enemy as an eqm,a-
lent for the expense of a great armament. It is shown, also, that the number 
of men required, on the largest scale, for the defence of these forts, wl~en_ com-
pared with the movable force that would be necessary without them, 1s 1~con-
sfrlerable. The local militia, aided by a few regulars, and directed by _engme~r 
and artillery officers, may, with previous training, be safely intrusted w1th their 
defence in time of war. 
It ca~not be too earnestly urged that a much smaller number_of tr~ops will 
be reqmred to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that 1s entirely un-
protected, and that such a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our 
imititution,·, to employ the militia effectually for the defence of the country. It 
i. no reproach to this description of force, and no imputation on their courage, to 
tatc what the experience of two wars has demonstrated-that they cannot 
stand the steady charge of regular forces, and are disordered by their manrelH"TC~ 
in the open field; whereas, their :fire is more deadly from behind rampart-:. 
The principlrs of defence recommended by the board for the maritime fron-
ti r of the United State:-; arc applicable to the northern or lake frontier an_cl to 
that of thew ·..:t. Some few sites arc recommended to be occupied by fortdica-
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tions, both to afford protection to places fast growing up into important cities, and 
to furnish a refuge and rallying point for our naval and land forces. 
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 
J. R. POINSETT. 
Hon. R. M. rr. HUNTER, 
Speaker ef the House ef Representatives. 
WASHINGTON, May 10, 1840. 
Sm : The board of officers to whom the subject of the military defences of 
the country was committed have the honor to submit the following report, viz: 
1st. Report on the defence of the Atlantic frontier, from Passamaquoddy to 
the Sabine. T'his is divided into two distinct portions, viz: the coast from Pas-
samaquoddy to Cape Florida, and the coast from Cape Florida to the Sabine bay. 
2d. Report on the defence of the northern frontier, from Lake Superior to 
Passamaquoddy bay. 
3d. Report on the western frontier, from the Sabine bay to Lake Superior. 
Connected with these reports are tabular statements, showing the "permanent 
defence commenced, completed, projected, or deemed necessary;" with conjectu-
ral estimates of "the probable expense of constructing or completing such works 
as may not yet have been completed or commenced." 
4th. Reports " on the armories, arsenals, magazines, and founderies, either 
constructea or deemed necessary; with a conjectural estimate of the expense of 
constructing such of said establishments as may not yet be completed or com-
menced, but which may be deemed necessary." 
Hon. J. R. POINSETT, 
Secretary ef War. 
REPORT ON THE DEFENCE m"' THE ATLANTIC FRONTIER, 
FROM PASSAMAQUODDY TO T'HE SABINE. 
So entirely does this board concur in the views presented on several occa-
sions, within the last twenty years, by joint commissions of naval and military 
officers, by the board of engineers for fortifications, and by individual officers 
who have at various times been called on to treat the same subject, that in quoting 
their opinions we should, for the greater part, express our own. But though 
these reports are, some of them, comprehensive and elaborate, we suppose that 
au explicit statement of our views, at least as to the great principles on which 
the system of defence should be erected, is expected from us, especially as the 
system now in progress has been the subject of a criticism which, considering 
the high official source whence it emanated, may be supposed to have disturbed 
the confidence of the public therein. 
The nature and source of that criticism, attacking as it does fundamental 
p1~ciples, and inculcating doctrines which we believe to be highly dangerous, 
will lead us at times into amplifications that we fear may prove tedious. This, 
however, we must risk, trusting to the importance of the subject for excuse, if 
not for justification. 
The princiJ:>al errors, as we conceive, in the document* referred to are-
1. rrhat for the defence of the coast the chief reliance should be on the navy. 
2. That, in preference to fortifications, floating batteries should be introduced 
wherever they can be used. 
0 See Senate document No. 293, vol. 4, p. 1, 24th Congress, 1st session. 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--6 
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3. That we are not in danger from large expeditions; and, consequently, 
4. That the system of the board of engineers comprises works which are 
unnecessarily large for the purpose~ they have to fulfil. 
On these topics, tog·ether with other errors of the same nature, we shall feel 
constrained to enlarge. 
The first question that presents itself is this : T,Vhat, in general terms, sliall 
be tlie means ef defence ? 
We have a seacoast line of more than three thousand miles in extent, alon" 
which lie scattered all the great cities, all the depots of commerce, all the estab-
blishments of naval construction, outfit, and repair, and towns, villages, and 
establishments of private enterprise without number. From this line of seacoast 
navigable bays, estuaries, and rivers, the shores of which are similarly occu-
pied, penetrate deep into the heart of the country. 
How are the important points along this extended line to be secured from 
hostile expeditions, especially since one of the prominent causes of the prosperity 
of these various establishments, namely, facility of access from the ocean, is, as 
regards danger from an enemy, the chief cause of weakness ? 
S liall the d~f ence be by a navy exclusively ? 
The opinion that the navy is tlie true defence ef the country is so acceptable 
and popular, and is sustained by such high authority, that it demands a careful 
examination. 
Before going into this examination we will premise that by the term "nary" 
is here meant, we suppose, line-of-battle ships, frigates, smaller ~ailing vessels, 
and armed steamships, omitting vessels constructed for local uses merely, , uch 
as :floating batteries. 
For the purpose of first considering this proposition in its simplest terms, ,~e 
will begin by supposing the nation to possess but a single seaport, and that this 
is to be defended by a fleet alone. 
By remaining constantly within this port our fleet would be certain of meet-
ing the enemy, should he assail it. But if inferior to the enemy, there would 
be no reason to look for a successful defence ; and as there could be no escape 
for the defeated vessels, the presence of the fleet, instead of averting the issue, 
would only render it the more calamitous. 
Should our fleet be equal to the enemy's, the defence might be complete, and 
it probably would be so. Still, hazard-some of the many mishaps liable to 
attend contests of this nature-mig11t decide against us; and, in that even!, _the 
consequences would be even more disastrous than on the preceding suppos1t10u. 
In this case the chances of victory to the two parties would be equal, but the 
consequences very unequal. It might be the enemy's fate to lose his whole 
fleet, but he could lose nothing more; while we, in a similar attempt, would lo:-:e 
not only the whole fleet, but also the object that the fleet was designed. to 
protect. 
If superior to the enemy, the defence of the port would in all respects l)f 
complete. But, instead of making an attack, the enemy would, in such ca.-<', 
employ himself in cutting up our commerce on the ocean; and nothing could 
be don to protect this commerce without leaving the port in a condition to te 
ucce sfully as ailed. 
In ith r of the above cases the fleet might await the enemy in front of th 1 
harbor, in. teall of lying within. But no advantage is apparent from uch an 
arran r rnent, and there would be upcradded the risk of being injured by tem-
p ·, ts, and th ·r ,by di qualified for the duty of defence, or of being driven off 
th con thy gal·, of wind; thus, for a time, removino· all oppo ition. 
In th ;amc ·a~ . , al..:o, c. p cially when equal or , uperior to the enemy, our 
fl t, d p •ndin..,. on having cone t and timely notice a to the po 'ition and :3tat 
of pr parntion of th n ·my'· force·, might think proper to meet him at t_b 
utl ·t of hi::i own port, or interc pt him on the way, in tead of awaiting him 
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within or off our own harbor. Here it · must be noticed that the enemy, like 
omselves, is supposed to possess a single harbor only; but ha:ing prote_cted it 
by other means, that his navy is disposable for offensive operat10ns. If it ':ere 
attempted thus to shut him within his own port, he, in any case but tha~ of decided 
inferiority, would not hesitate to come out and risk a battle; because, 1f defeated, 
he could retire, under shelter of his defences, to refit, and, if successful, he could 
proceed with a small portion of his force-even a single vessel would suffice-to 
the capture of our port, now defenceless; while, with the remainder, he would 
follow up his advantage over our defeated vessels, not failing to pursue them 
into their harbor, should they return thither. . 
Actual superiority on our part would keep the_ e~emy from :olunt_een~1g a 
battle; but it would be indispensable that the supenonty be steadily mamtamed, 
and that the superior fleet be constantly present. If driven off by tempests, or 
absent from any other cause, the blockaded fleet would escape, when it would 
be necessary for our fleet to fly back to the defence of its own port. Experience 
abundantly proves, moreover, that it is in vain to attempt to shut a hostile 
squadron in port for any length of time. It seems, then, that whether we de-
fend by remaining at home, or by shutting the enemy's fleet within his own 
harbor, actual superiority in vessels is indispensable to the security of our port. 
With this superiority the defence will be complete, provided our fleet remain 
within its harbor. But then all the commerce of the country upon the ocean 
must be left to its fate ; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon 
the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleet within 
his port, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the escape 
of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor. 
Let us next see what will be the state of the question on the supposition of 
numerous important ports on either side, instead of a single one ; relying, on our 
part, still, exclusively on a navy. 
In order to examine this question, we will suppose our adversary to be forti-
fied in all his harbors, and possessed of available naval means equal to our own. 
This is certainly a fair supposition; because what is assumed as regards his 
harbors is true of all maritime nations, except the United States ; and as re-
gards naval means, it is elevating our own strength considerably above its pre-
sent measure, and above that it is likely to attain for years. 
Being thus relatively situated, the first difference that strikes us is that the 
enemy, believing all his ports to be safe, without the presence of his vessels, 
sets at once about making our seas and shores the theatre of operations, while 
we are left without choice in the matter ; fo.r if he think proper to come, and 
we are not present, he attains his object without resistance. 
The next difference is, that while the enemy (saving only the opposition of 
Providence) is certain to fall upon the single point, or the many points he may 
have selected, there will exist no previous indications of his particular choice, 
and, consequently, no reason for preparing our defence on one point rather than 
another; so that the chances of not being present and ready on his arrival are 
directly in proportion to the number of our ports, that is to say, the greater the 
number of ports the greater the chances that he will meet no opposition whatever. 
Another difference is, that the enemy can choose the mode of warfare, as well 
a~ the plan of operations, leaving as little option to us in the one case as in the 
other. It will be necessary for us to act, in the first instance, on the supposition 
that an assault will be made with his entire fleet ; because, should we act other-
wise, his coming in that array would involve both fleet and coast in inevitable 
defeat and ruin. Being in this state of concentration, then, should the enemy 
have any apprehensions as to the result of a general engagement ; should he be 
unwilling to put any thing at hazard ; or should he, for any other reason, prefer 
acting by detachments, he can, on approaching the coast, disperse his force into 
~mall quadrons and single ships, and make simultaneous attacks on numerous 
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points. 'These enterprises would be speedily consummated; because, a the 
single point occupied by our fleet would be avoided, all the detachments would 
be unopposed ; and after a few hours devoted to burning shipping, or public 
establishments, and taking in spoil, the several expeditions would leave the 
coast for some convenient rendezvous, whence they might return, either in fleet 
or in detachments, to visit other portions with the scourge. 
Is it insisted that our fleet might, notwithstanding, be so arranged as to meet 
these enterprises? 
As it cannot be denied that the enemy may select his point of attack out of 
the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot? 
And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall al-
ways place our f:leet in the path of the advancing foe? Suppose we attempt to 
cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length 1-
a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from 
his coast to ours. Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic? 
or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy? Shall we cover the southern cities, 
or give them up also? We must, unquestionably, do one of two things: either 
relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only, 
or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be 
out of the question. 
On the practicability of covering even a small extent of coast by cruising in 
front of it-or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's opera-
tions; discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse, and 
hear uo tidings; and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the 
ocean-it may be well to consult experience. -
The rroulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of line-of-battle 
ships and frigates, about twenty smaller vessels-of-war, and nearly two hun~red 
transports, conveying the army of Egypt, slipped out of port and surpnsed 
Malta. It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were 
bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria. 
The French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage, so 
that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them; and, not finding them there, re-
turned, by the way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his adversary 
in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the French fl_eet at 
anchor in Aboukir bay; and, attacking them, achieved the memorable victory 
of the Nile. 
When we consider the narrowness of this sea ; the very numerous vessels in 
the French fleet ; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and 
that _Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, ~~ hear 
nothmg of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability of 
wa7,laying our adversary on the broad Atlantic. . . 
lh e:--capeof another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them m th~ l\Iedi-
t. rrancan_ by the same able officer; the pursuit in the 1V est Indies ; then· en-
1011 of 1nm among·st the islands ; the return to Europe ; his vain effort .,,sub~c-
qucntly, along the coast of Portugal, in the Bay of Biscay, and off the EnO'b:-h 
·ham~ ·l; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar-brought about only becau e t_he 
~omlnn cl fl ·ctF-, ~rusting to the superiority that the accession of sev_eral rem-
fo.rccm nt · had g1v n, were willing to try the is ue of battle : thei-e arc mstanc ' , 
?f many that might be cited, to F-how how small is the probability of en~ow1ter-
mcr, on tl_1. oc au, an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting; and how little t~ 
mo ·t. untmng z<'al, the mo;5t rcstlr s activity, the mo:'lt exalted profe~ ional ~kill 
ancl Jndrrmcnt, can do to lc:--:--cn the adverse chance:::. For more than a Y ar 
..1. T I. on mo1-t cloflcly watchecl hi: n •my, who sc ms to have got out of po~t ' 
, 0011 a: h' wa.· fully pr pnrcd to clo ,.o, and without attracting the notic oi an:-
of th• hl?ckaclincr :--quadron. "\Yh n out, r" .. el on, p rfoctly in the dark~: to th 
c ur,_ · V1llen 'UY had tak n, .:oucrht for him in vain on the coast of Ecryp · 
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Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in ':I.1oulon ; whence it 
again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. 
On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment acceded on all hands to belong, 
in a pre-eminent degree, to the naval profession in this country, this system of 
defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance 
so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible. It dema1;1-ds 
of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which to do at all seems u~-
possible. The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, m 
spite of distance and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these 
purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the 
purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of storms, 
the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in 
spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness. Finally, 
after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished, 
and all difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal 
terms, the fate of the war, having no resource or hope beyond. 
It may here be alleged that the term navy, as applied to the defence of the 
country, means more than the sea-going vessels we have enumerated; that it 
means, also, gunboats, floating batteries, and steam batteries; and that the true 
sy stem of defence for the coast requires us to provide all our harbors with some 
or all of these vessels, according to local circumstances; leaving to the sea-going 
vessels the duty of destroying the enemy's commerce, carrying the war into the 
enemy's seas, and contending for the mastery of the ocean. 
But such a proposition is totally distinct from that we have been considering. 
'I1his is one that we regard as, in part, perfectly so-q.nd; as containing, though 
not true throughout, the great principle on which the present glory of the navy 
proper has been built, and its future glory will depend. 
We are aware that some of our ships have been blockaded within our harbors, 
but we .are not aware that any of the high distinction achieved by that service 
has been gained in these blockaded ships. 
On the other hand, we know that, instead of lying in harbor and contenting 
themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them 
than their own number-instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed 
enjoyment of the sea, and our own commerce without countenance or aid-they 
scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most 
remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the ene-
my's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of enemy's 
property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, and in 
the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels-ships, 
evaded if superior, and beaten if equal-they rendered benefits a thousand fold 
greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation and the char-
acter they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted fron.1 a state of 
passiveness within the harbors. 
Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy 
proper, we doubt not that it will, in the future, be acted on as it has been in the 
past, and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded 
commensurately with its own enlargement. 
In order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active 
and energetic deportment in offensive operations, which is at the same time so 
consistent with its functions and so consonant with its ·spirit, we have shown 
that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence. 
But if the navy is to be relieved from this home duty some other Teliance 
mu t be substituted ; the navy itself Tequiring, for its own establishments, not 
le · than the towns and haTbors, that the defence be complete. And this bTings 
u to consider whether the floating defences mentioned above, namely, gun-
boats, floating batteries, and steam batteries, constitute the best reliance. 
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After considering these defensive means, we will examine the propertie' of 
forts and land batteries, these being the only other well-tried resort; and, that a 
comparison may be instituted, we will confine ourselves to cases where the latter 
are properly applicable. 
There are, doubtless, situations where it may be necessary for us to present a 
defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be im-
practicable; and it is not, therefore, prejudging the question we are about to 
examine; it is neither underrating fortifications, nor overrating these :floating 
defences, to say that these last are, some or all of them, indispensable in such 
positions. 
Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance 
from the shores greater than effective gun range, and where no insular spot, 
natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of shipti, will pre-
sent such a situation; and we may take some of our great bays as examples. 
Broad sounds and wide roadsteads, affording secure anchorage beyond good 
gun rang·e from the shores, will afford examples of another sort; and harbor 
with very wide entrances and large surface exhibit examples of still another 
kind. 
As, in all such cases, fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and, nevertheless, 
recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a 
recommendation in the several reports on the defence of the coast, since l 1 , 
that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate :floating de-
fences. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution 
in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be 
resorted to; not, however, because they are means intrinsically good, or suitable 
under other circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable. 
In the circumstances just referred to there is no alternative, and therefore no 
point to be discussed. The remaining question is, whether these floating de-
fences arc to be relied on in cases that admit of defence by fortifications. 
And, first, as to gunboats. Although of undoubted use in peculiar circu~-
stances, it will hardly be contended that gunboats afford a safe reliance m 
harbors that can be entered by vessels of magnitude. Ships becalmed or 
aground might be sorely har::tssed, if not destroyed, by a spirited attack from 
this force, and there are other situations wherein it would be Yery effective. 
But harbors defended by gunboats will not be attacked in calms nor with ad-
verse winds; and it is not easy to believe that any probable array of these craft 
would impede or hinder for a moment the advance of a hostile fleet. Nelson, 
at _Trafalgar, bore down in two divisions upon the combined fleet, each division 
bemg exposed to a raking fire; and, although suffering considerably fr?m that 
~r , he wa: able, notwithstanding·, to break the hostile line and defeat hi ?Pe· 
nor aclv r:-:ary. vVhat, comparatively with the raking· fire of the combmed 
fleet, ·would br the fire of a fleet of gunboats? Opposiug no effectual obstacle 
to approach or entrance, these small vessels, scattered and driven upon the 
shoal::-, wonld be kept, by the broadside of a few active vessels, at too great a 
cli:-tancr to produce auy erious effect upon the main attack by their desultory 
fire. 
Alth~ngh thry might afford useful means of annoyance during a protracted 
oecupahon by the enemy of harbors that contained exten ive shoal grounds and 
, hallo)V ha;-' and inletR, thry would be nearly useless in resisting the fir t _a-.-
;,;ault, and m pr Yentino- the hrief operation of levying contributions, or burnmg-
or :poilincr na6onal e:-:tabli:-hm nti-. 
Th· tru · r a. on of thi._ f, ·hlr def nee mu t not, however, be mi 'lmdcr ·tood. 
It i.- not that th hoatR do not C'arry guns nouo·h or men nouo·h for the obje · 
l ut it i. h cau:e, from th comparativ w akn , of tl1e ve, ... 
0
1 ·, th gun· and 
th men cannot be kept in an rff ctfre position. 
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There are, moreover, many harbors requiring defence in which there are no 
shoals whereon these boats could take refuge, and in such their capture or de-
struction would be inevitable should there be, at the same time, no river up 
which they might fly, or lateral issue through which they could escape to a safe 
distance. 
Floating batteries, of which good use might be sometimes made in peculiar 
situations, would, we suppose, differ from gunboats, in being larger, containing 
many guns, and in being stronger-that is to say, having thicker sides or bul-
warks ; and it has sometimes even been proposed to construct them with ball 
proof parapets, and with platforms open above, like, in these respects, batteries 
upon the shore. But, in whatever way formed, it is necessarily a part of the 
idea that they be strong and massive; and, consequently, that they be unwieldy, 
incapable of sudden change of place, and incapacitated either to advance upon 
a defeated foe or to evade a victorious one. We are not, of course, now speak-
ing of batteries moved by steam. 
Being denied the power of locomotion, at least for any purpose of manreuver-
ing in face of the enemy, we are to consider these batteries as moored in position 
and awaiting his advance. Should the batteries be large, requiring deep water 
to float them, or should they be placed across or near the channel for the sake 
of proximity to the track of ships, the enemy would engage them at close 
quarters. All advantages of mobility-of concentrating his whole fleet upon 
one or two points, to which, under these circumstances, no relief can be sent-of 
greater elevation and command, would be on the side of the assailant ; with no 
countervailing advantage to the batteries, but greater thickness of bulkwarks. 
Whether this excess of thickness should be considered a material advantage, 
~ince the introduction of large bomb-cannon into .the armament of ships, is a 
doubtful matter. The batteries, if anchored across the channel, would have the 
further advantage of a raking fire : but we have seen that the raking fire of one 
squadron of ships upon another advancing is by no means decisive. The power 
of throwing the whole assailing force upon one or two points, of pouring upon 
the decks of the batteries a greatly superior force of boarders, would, of them-
selves, seem to leave little room to doubt as to the issue. 
If now we suppose these floating batteries to be smaller, so that, having a 
lighter draught, they might be placed near the shores or upon the shoals, they 
might certainly be thereby saved from the kind of attack which would prove so 
fatal if anchored more boldly in deep water; but they would, at the same time, 
lose much of their efficiency from their remoteness ; and positions wherein they 
would be secure from being laid alongside, while they would be in a proper atti-
tude to contribute materially to the defence of the harbor, are afforded but rarely. 
It is doubtful whether, as a general rule, these smaller floating batteries, not-
withstanding their greater capability of endurance, would afford a better defence, 
gun for gun, than gunboats ; or, in other words, whether this capability of en-
durance in the one would be more than a compensation for the power of loco-
motion in the other. 
But whether near the shore or in the channel, whether large or small, this 
description of defence, owing to its fixedness, connected with the destructibility 
of the material of which it must be made, will be exposed to attacks analogous 
to those made by gunboats on ships aground. The enemy, knowing of what 
the ~efensive arrangements consist, will come provided with the requisite number 
of sa1lmg or steam vessels, armed with bomb-cannon, against which the thicker 
bulwarks of the floating batteries would avail nothing. He would, besides, 
hardly fail to provide himself with bomb-ketches armed with heavy sea-mortars; 
and, a. there could be no guarding against the effects of the long ranges of these, 
a few such Ycssels would, with great certainty, constrain the floating batteries 
to quit their position, abandoning every disposition approaching to a concen-
trated array. Not to mention other modes of attack which would seem to leave 
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the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed that this kind of de-
fence, whether by gunboats or floating batteries, has the same intrinsic faL' 
that an inactive defence by the navy proper has; that is to say, the enemy h · 
it in his power to bring to the attack a force of the same nature, and at lea~t as 
efficacious, as that relied on for defence; hence the necessity not of me 
equality, but of superiority, on the part of the defence at every point liahle t 
be attacked; and hence, also, the necessity of having an aggregate force · 
many times larg·er than that disposable by the enemy as we have importan• 
places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten such places, and the enen:~ 
threaten us with twenty ships of the line, we must have in all these place an 
aggregate of gunboats and floating batteries more than equivalent to two hun-
dred ships of the line ; for it will hardly be contended that these defence can 
be transported from one place to another as they may be respectively in danger. 
But what will be the relative state of the parties if, instead of gunboat ' or 
floating batteries, we resort to steam batteries ? Although much has been said 
of late of the great advantage that defence is to derive from this description of 
force, we have not been able to discover the ad vantages ; nor do we see that 
sea-coast defence has been benefited in any particular by the recent improvement 
in steam vessels, except that, in the case before adverted to, where, from the 
breadth of the waters, defence from the shore would be unavailing, a more acti,e 
and formidable floating defence than by gunboats and floating batteries is pro-
vided. It must be remembered that by far the greatest improvement in steam 
vessels consists in having adapted them to ocean navigation; and one inevitable 
consequence of this improvement will be that, if the defence of harbors by 
steam batteries be regarded as securing them from the attacks of ships ?f the 
line and frigates, or, at least, of placing· the defence quite above that kmd of 
attack, they will no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vesseb, 
similar in all warlike properties to those relied on for defence. · 
Not only is there no impediment to transferring these vessels acros~ _the 
ocean, but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enJOID a 
state of the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times, and also a com-
plete independence of arrangement at each particular point; both the state of 
preparation and the independence of arrangement being much more impor!ant 
than when the enemy's motions were governed by the uncertain favor of wmd5 
and weather. 
It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging t_o ste~ 
batteries acting defensively that the attacking steam vessels may not brmg ,nth 
them, or, at least, may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon_th 
coast, unless it should be thought proper to give to the former a greater thick-
ness of bulwark than would be admissible in sea-going vessels. . 
. But the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the facility of mo,,ng 
with promptitude and rapidity; and any attempts to strengthen the harbor Yf.;· 
sel. .~Y thickening their bulwarks considerably would unavoidably lessen their 
D;1obil~ty! thereby partially neutralizing the advantage sought. At the ::,am 
tIT?-e, it 1_ extremely doubtful whether any benefit would be derived from th 
thicker s1cl • It is probable that the best kind of bulwark for these ve:;.;i•l, 
and all oth r i that which will be just proof ag·ainst grape and canister sho 
fired from moderate distances; because, with such bulwarb, a shell fired from 
a Lomb-cannon_ within a reasonable di tance would pierce both ide ; tha! i:- • 
:ay, would go m on on~ . icle of the ship and out at the opposite, producm~ :. 
gr at r fli ·ct than a solid shot of the ame calibre while with thickened :iI L' 
cvr.r • :,;h ·11 wm~lcl lo~ge in the ~ill1:bers, and produc~ terrible ravages by bu~:-~n!!. 
In th • prachc~ w1tl~ these rm. ·1lc. in this country it ha. been found difficult 
to lod<rr, a :,;h ·11 m thm targ tti, ven when the load of the o·un wa so reduced 
a.- to in r a.· · ~ate_rially t~1c uncertainty of aim. A, it i 1Jrobable, therefore 
that the 1n·otect1on from ,·ohcl :,;hot afforded by ma iv bulwark would be mo 
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than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal shells would inflict ~y 
means of these bulwarks, we may conclude that the harbor steam battery will 
not differ in this respect materially from the attacking steamships, and, if they 
do differ in having more solid and impervious bulwarks, that no advantage over 
the enemy will result therefrom. We come, therefore, to the same result as 
when considering the application of the other kinds of floating force to the de-
fence of harbors; and this result is, that there is no way of placing the coast in 
a condition of reasonable security but by having at any point the enemy may 
happen to select a force in perfect readiness which shall be superior to that 
brought to the attack. 
The reason of this coincidence of result is, that no peculiarity in form or de-
tails can disguise the difficulties or essentially modify the conditions inseparable 
from the nature of a floating force. 
Buoyancy is a condition necessary to every variety of the force, and to ob-
serve this condition a common material must be used in each-a material that is 
combustible, weak, and penetrable to missiles. If the weakness and penetra-
bility be in part remedied by an increase of the quantity of the material, it 
must be at the sacrifice of buoyancy, activity, and speed-properties of great 
value. If a small draught of water be desired, it can only be obtained at the 
expense of that concentration of power which is a great and almost character-
istic quality of naval armament. 
It might not be strictly true to say that as much would be lost in one respect 
as would be gained in another ; but, though modifications of this floating force, 
made with a view to adapt it to peculiar services, will somewhat disturb the 
equilibrium of the several kinds, there will still be no great disparity when 
acting in their appropriate way, and a little superadded force to the weaker 
party will restore the balance. None of these modifications, it should be ob-
served, touch, on the one hand, the means whereby injury is inflicted, nor, on 
the other, the susceEtibility to injury. All are still timber structures, carrying 
a common armament. 
The necessity of having at each point a force at least equal to the attacking 
force will require large preparations on any supposition. With the navy proper, 
however, with gunboats and floating batteries, something has already been 
done; the existing navy will be an important contribution. Small 'vessels sup-
plied by commerce would afford tolerable substitutes for gunboats, and from 
the class of merchant ships many vessels might be drawn for service as floating 
batteries ; still there will remain great efforts to be made and great amounts to 
be expended, to complete the defensive array. But a reliance on steam batteries 
would lead to expenditure vastly greater, because with them all has yet to be 
provided. Having at present no force of this kind on hand, ( or next to none,) 
the preparation by the enemy of (say) twenty steam frigates would require the 
c?nstruction of two hundred of equal force on our part, supposing that we de-
sign to cover but ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy. 
Having shown that steam batteries cannot be substituted for shore defences, 
~e will here add that they will, on the other ~iand, in certain cases necessarily 
mcrease the number of these defences, and m other cases augment their force. 
Channels which admitted only small vessels-of-war would, in peculiar positions, 
need no defence; in other positions their defence might be safely trusted to 
work of moderate force. The introduction of these vessels of small draught 
and great power requires, however, that these passages should be defended and 
defended adequately. 
We_ hould not have gon~ so much at length into a branch of our subject 
wherem the general conclus10ns appear to be so obvious ancl incontrovertible, 
b~t for the prevalence of ~pinions which we consider not erroneous merely, but 
highly dangerous, and which, we think, must give way before a full exhibition 
of the truth. We do not anticipate any formidable objections to the positions 
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assumed nor to the illustrations; but even should all these, in the form we have 
presented them, be objected to, we may still challenge opposition to the follow-
ing broad propositions, namely : 
1st. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the de-
fensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at lea t equal 
in power to the attacking force. 
2d. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting an 
attack on one of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring 
our state of preparation from one to another after an attack has been declared, 
each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means ; and, 
3d. Consequently this system demands a power in the defence as many times 
greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered. 
Believing that a well-digested system of fortifications will save the country 
from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and the in-
tolerable expense of a full provision of those means, we will now endeavor to 
show that such a system is worthy of all reliance. 
There has been but one practice among nations as to the defence of ports and 
harbors ; and that has been a resort to fortifications . All the experience that 
history exhibits is on one side only; it is the opposition of forts, or other works 
comprehended by the term fortification, to attacks by vessels ; and although 
history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, we see that 
the resort is still the same. No . nation omits covering the exposed points upon 
her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates in confiding in them. 
In opposition to this mode of defence much stress is laid on certain successful 
attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed strong. VJ e have no 
doubt that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent 
of the naked question of relative streng·th; but at any rate, when carefully con-
sidered, how little do these results prove, in comparison with numeroua other 
instances, in which there was an immense disparity of force in favor of vesse!E 
that have been signally defeated. These latter instances are those that should 
be received as a test of the actual relation between the two kinds of force; not 
certainly because they were successful, but because the smaller the work, it-
armament, its garrison, the less the probability that any extraneous i~~uence 
has been in operation. A single gun behind a parapet, provided its pos1t10D; be 
a fair one, and the parapet be proof, need, as regards its contest with ship~. 
owe nothing else to the art of fortification ; and its effect will be the same 
whether the battery were fresh from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age, 
or were erected at the dawn of the art. The gun is in a position to be used 
with effect; the men are as fully protected by the parapet as the service of the 
gun will allow; they are brave and skilful, and there iti nothing to prevent 
their doing their duty to the utmost. These are all conditions easily fulfill!~· 
and therefore likely to be so. The state of things is not less just and fair 
toward the vessel; she chooses her time and opportunity; the battery goe no 
to the ship, but the ship to the battery; taking the wind, the tide, the ea-all, 
a. sh would have them ; her condition and discipline are perfect, and her crew 
~our~geous ancl adroit. Nothing, under such circumstances, can prevent. the 
JU.'t 1s,"ue of battle but some extraordinary accident-possible, indeed, to either 
party, but ea. ily recognized wl1cn occurring. 
The: contc ·t b_etween larger works and heavy . quadrons may be much more 
complicated affa1rs, the cau e of di. a. ter to the former being often traceable t 
potent, though not alway obviou,, influences. The fortification may ha, 
be 11 absurdly plan11 cl originally or badly executed, for there ha at all time~ 
b ·n in thi.: profession, a. in oth rs, much scope given to quackery; they may 
have be 11 ·r t d at a timr when th hip. -of-war, again .. t which they we 
~rovid d, w r v ry differ nt thino- from th lofty line-of-battle hip of modem 
tim , · a long p ace or long impunity may have left them in a tate wholly un-
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p repared for the sudden use of their strength ; the command may have been 
intrusted to persons ignorant alike of the amount of power in their hands and 
of the mode of exercising it; the garrison may have been undisciplined or mu-
tinous- the populace discontented or disloyal; the clamor of frightened citizens 
may have caused a premature surrender : all these, or any of them, may have 
produced the issue, leaving the question of relative power untouched. 
While there can be no doubt that these and other deteriorating influences 
niay have occasionally operated to the prejudice of fortifications, and that these 
-were likely to be more numerous and more controlling as the works were more 
extensive, it is certain that there can be no influence acting in a reverse direction 
1.1pon them; that is to say, none making them stronger and more efficient than 
they ought to be. There can be no favorable influence of such a nature, for 
example, as to make the simple one-gun battery before mentioned equivalent to 
a battery (say) ten times as large. 
It must not be supposed, from what we have said in relation to larger fortifi-
cations, that their magnitude necessarily involves imperfection or ·weakness ; 
nor, because we have considered sma:ll and simple works as affording the best 
solution to the question of relative force, must it be inferred that small works 
are suited to all circumstances. We speak here in reference merely to the 
judgment we are entitled to form of the relative power of these antagonist 
forces from their contests as exhibited in history. In instances of the latter 
sort, there cannot, from the nature of the case, be any important influence ope-
rating of which we are ignorant, or for which we cannot make due allowances; 
-while, in examples of the former kind, we may be in the dark as to many vital 
matters. 
These observations have been deemed necessary, because, in judging of this 
matter, it might not be so obvious that certain brilliant and striking results 
should not be adopted as affording the true test of relative power. It would be 
more natural to turn to Copenhag·en and Algiers, as indicating where the power 
lies, than to Charleston and Stonington ; and yet these latter, as indices, would 
be true, and the former false. 
We will now turn to certain examples: 
"The name of Martello tower was adopted in consequence of the good de-
fence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in the 
year 1794, which, although armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two 
British ships-of-war without sustaining any material injury from their fire. But 
this circumstance ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on 
shore must always, in certain situations, possess over those of shipping, no mat-
ter whether the former are mounted on a tower or not. '!'hat this is a just de-
cision will perhaps be readily allowed by all who are acquainted with the fol-
lowing equally remarkable, but less generally known fact, which occurred about 
twelve years afterwards in the same part of the world."* 
. "Sir Sidney S~ith, in the Pompee, an eighty-gun ship, the Hydra, of thirty-
mght guns, Captam Manby, and another frigate, anchored about eight hundred 
yards from a battery of two guns, situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa, and 
protected from assault by a tower in which were five and twenty French soldiers, 
commanded by a lieutenant. 
"The line-of-battle ship and the frigates fired successive broadsides till their 
ammunition was nearly expended; the battery continually replying with a slow 
but destru~tive effect. The Pompee, at which ship alone it directed its fire, had 
forty shot m her hull; her mizen topmast carried away; a lieutenant, midship-
~' and five m~n. killedi and thirty men wounded. At length force proving 
meffectnal, negotiat10n was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer, 
t.:, Pasley's Course, vol. iii. 
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a Corsican, and relative of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that t 
carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun 
subsequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrazure; so that in fact :Ii, 
attack of an eighty-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a ~in~' 
piece of ordnance."-(Jomnal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.) 
" The Corsican tower above mentioned, which had, in like manner, completdy 
baffled a naval cannonade, was very soon found to surrender when attacked by 
land; not, however, before a small battery had been made [ erected] to redu 
it."-(Pasley's Cou,rse, vol. iii.) 
Here are two examples : 
1st. A single heavy gun, mounted on a tower, beat off one or two British ship, 
2d. A barbette battery, containing two guns, beat off a British eighty-gun shi1 
supported by two frigates. · 
It would seem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance, i'..' 
trials of relative power. There is no complication of circumstances on one cid, 
or the other; nothing to confuse or mislead; all is perfectly simple and plain. 
A small body of artillery, judiciously posted on the shore, is attacked by armed 
vessels bearing forty or :fifty times as. many guns; and the ships, unable to pr;,. 
duce any effect in consequence, are beaten off with loss. 
The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side of the batteries either a'. 
regards position or quality; for both works were immediately reduced by alan~ 
attack; that which the eighty-gun ship and two frigates were unable to effec. 
being immediately accomplished by landing two field-pieces, with a very mall 
portion of the crew of one of the vessels. 
On the other hand, there was no peculiar disadvantage on the part of thE 
ships, as the time and mode of attack were of their own choice. 
In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessel_s, in t~ 
manner of representing the affairs, the language of British military writers (tht 
ships being British) has been exactly quoted.- (See Pasley's Course of Elemen-
tary Fortifications, vol. ii., and Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones. 
Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victoriol~S part~. 
the result would have appeared still more to the disadvantage of the sl:1ps. ., 
The circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, m Apru 
1801, seem to have been the following: 
_On the northeast side of the city (the only side exposed to attack from hem:: 
ships) there lies a shoal spreading outward from the walls, about three-quarttr· 
of a mile in the narrowest part. Through this shoal there runs, in a northe:i-: 
and by north direction, a narrow channel connecting the basin, in the heart 0 
the city, with deep water. Were it not for this shoal, vessels might appr?3:-
even to the walls of the city, on a length of about one and a half mile;_ a· 1~ ,_ 
they can &'et no nearer, in any place, than about three-quarters of a ~1le, "'1 th· 
out followmg the channel just mentioned. As the edge of the shoal he nearl; 
nort_h and south, and the channel passes through it in a northeast-by_-north di· 
rection, the great mass of the shoal is to the southward, or on the nght ban 
. .ide of the channel. · We will call this the southern shoal. The " Three-cro 
battery" is situated upon this southern shoal and near the channel. 
'l'he Dani. h defences cousisted-
bt. f the fortifications on this side of the city, including the 'l'hree-cro 
b~ttcry; N cl.-011 e timated the batteries supporting the Danish vessels at a 
nm ty guns. 
2d. Of four sail of the line, mountino- 282 guns and one fribo-ate and two ;:;loo -
. b ' b mountmo- 76 gun. ; making 35 guns. All these vessel' lying in the c ann 
before mcntionccl, and some of them near its mouth; they constituted the le 
!h Dani:-h floating d fence .. , and were thus posted to defend the entrance to 
um r harbor or ba,:in. 
3d. f a line of floating d fence,_ , of various kinds, moored near the edge f · 
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southern shoal. They were eighteen in number, as follows, cot~nting from the 
right or southern extremity: 1st, a block-shjp of 56 guns; 2d, a block-ship of 
48 guns; 3d, a praam of 20 guns ; 4th, a praam of 20 guns; 5th, a block-ship of 
48 guns ; 6th, a raft of 20 guns; 7th, a block-ship of 22 guns ; 8th, a raft of 20 
guns ; 9th, a block-ship of 62 guns ; 10th, a sma~ vessel o~ 6 guns; 11th, a raft 
of 24 guns; 12th, a praam of 20 g·uns; 13th, a ship of the hne of 7 4 guns; 14th, 
a block-ship of 26 guns; 15th, a raft of 18 guns; 16th, a ship of the line of 60 
guns; 17th, a block-ship of 64 guns ; 18th, a "frigate" of 20 guns; total in 
this line 628 guns. These vessels were moored in a line extending south from 
a point outside and a little to the southward of the Three-crown battery ; and 
the part of the line nearest the walls was not less than three-quarters of a mile 
di tant. 
Lord Nelson carried to the attack the Elephant, 7 4 guns; Defiance, 7 4 ; 
)fonarch, 7 4; Bellona, 7 4; Edgar, 7 4; Russell, 7 4 ; Ganges, 7 4; Glutton, 54; 
Isis, 50; Agamemnon, 64; Polyphemus, 7 4; Ardent, 64; Amazon, 38 ; De-
siree, 38 ; Blanche, 36; Alcmene, 32; Dart, 30; Arrow, 18; Cruiser, 18 ; 
Harpy, 18; Zephyr, 14; Otter, 14; Discovery, 16; Sulphur, 10; Hecla, 10; 
Explosion, 8; Zebra, 16; Terror, 10; Volcano, 8; making a total of 1,074. 
guns, besides a few in gunboats. The Agamemnon did not get into action; 
which reduces the force employed to 1,010 guns. The Bellona and Russell 
gTOunded; but Lord Nelson says, "although not in the situation assigned them, 
yet they were so placed as to be of good service." 
With this force Lord Nelson engaged the line of floating defences that was 
moored near the edge of the southern shoal. He approached from the south, 
with a fair wind ; and as his leading vessel got abreast of the most southern of 
the Danish line she anchored by the stern. The second English vessel passed 
on until she had reached the next position, when she anchored, also, in the same 
way; and thus, inverting his line as he extended it, he brought his whole force 
against the outer and southern part of the Danish force. His line did not reach 
as far northward as the Three-crown battery, and mouth of the channel; for, he 
ays, in speaking of the grounding of the Bellona, Russell, and Agamemnon: 
"'rhese accidents prevented the extension of our line by the three ships before 
mentioned, who would, I am confident, have silenced the Crown islands, ('J111ree-
crown battery,) the outer ships in the harbor's mouth, and prevented the heavy 
loss in the Defiance and Monarch." 
Concentrating, as he dicl, the force of 1,010 guns upon a portion of the Danish 
array, not only inferior to him by 382 guns, but so situated as to be beyond the 
scope of succor, and without a chance of escape, Lord Nelson had no reason to 
doubt that signal success would crown his able arrangement. Every vessel in 
this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two smaller vessels, 
which cut and ran in under shelter of the fortifications. 
The vessels lying in the narrow channel could participate in no material 
degree in the action, because the British line did not reach abreast of them; and 
because, not being advanced beyond the general _direction of the Danish line, 
but, on the contrary, retired behind it, they could not act upon any of the 
Briti h vessels, except, perhaps, obliquely upon two or three of the most northern 
ships. But had all the Danish vessels that were lying in the narrow channel 
been mingled, from the first, with the line that was destroyed, the result would 
probably have been still more to the advantage of the assailants; that is to say, 
these vessels, also, would have been captured or destroyed; because, not only 
would the aggregate Danish force of 986 guns have been inferior to the 1,010 
guns of the Bi-itish, but it would also have been without the ability to counter-
act the_ power of concentration possessed by the latter, whereby the whole force 
would have acted on parts of the Danish line in succession. 
For the same reason that the squadron which lay in the narrow channel could 
not materially aid in resisting the attack made on the line of floating defences 
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anchored along the edge of the shoal, the action of the Three-crown battm,an 
the guns on the shore must have been greatly restricted. Situated up~il 1 
shoal, the Three-crown battery was behind the Danish line, which conseqU(·n ly 
masked it, and also the shore batteries, from a view of the English line. (nd 
such circumstances it is not conceivable that the batteries could be used wi 
effect; and the commander of the Danish forces says expressly that the Thn:.--
crown battery " did not come at all into action;" and a chronicler of the tim 
states that the fortifications of the town "were ef no service wliile tlie actii1 
lasted; they began to fire when tlze enemy took possession ef the abandoned sliip 
but it was at tlie same time that the parley appeared." In proportion a: t!: 
Danish vessels passed into the hands of the Eng·lish, as some were burnt, arr 
others blown up, the scope of the batteries would enlarge, and their power ~ 
felt; but just as all impediment of this sort had been removed, Lord Xebt,J 
himself proposed the cessation of hostilities, and the action ceased. It might 1 
profitable to discuss the probable consequences of a continuance of the action 
to inquire why it was that Lord Nelson, after he had conquered two-th.irch . 
the 986 floating guns opposed to him, did not pursue his advantage, and concen-
trate his 1,010 guns upon the 358 guns, which were all that remained of the 
:floating defences of the Danes, especially as the wind was in favor of such a 
manreuvre. But having already devoted too much space to this particular con-
test, we will suppose some dictate of policy, perhaps of humanity, induced him 
to close the contest, relying on the severe blow he had already inflicted, and !h• 
commanding tone it enabled him to assume for such a termination of the pendin~ 
negotiation as the interest or policy of Great Britain demanded. 
It is important, however, yet to notice that, as soon as the negotiation opene~. 
Lord Nelson's vessels passed out of the reach of the Three-crown battery as far 
as they could be withdrawn. Lord Nelson himself states that this battery wa: 
not silenced. 
A British writer, speaking of this crisis, says: "It must not, however, be C"Il· 
cealed that Lord Nelson, at the time he dictated this note to the Dane, "~ 
placed in rather awkward and difficult circumstances; the principal batterie~, ~ 
well as the ships which were stationed at the mouth of the harbor, were~ 
unconquered; two of his own vessels were aground~ and exposed to a hea:: 
fire; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate; whil 
he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the? 
of the batteries. These considerations, undoubtedly, influenced him in resolnng 
to endeavor to put a stop to hostilities, in addition to the instructions he ha~. 
Rpare the Danes, and the respect he might have felt for their brave defence. -
(Campbell's Naval History, vol. vii, p. 203.) 
The circumstances above detailed show clearly: 
1st. That the battle of Copenhagen was fought between an English fl 
mounting 1,010 guns, and a Danish line of :floating defences, mounting 628 111•• 
and that all the latter were conquered. . 
2d. That the Danish line was attacked in such a manner that none ot h 
fixed ba~teries in the system· of defence could participate in the contest, whir 
wa earned on up to the surrender of the Danish line, almost exclusively betw 
vcs. 1:- . It appears that a few of the smaller vessels, under Captain Ri, 
ccupying the northern extremity of the English line, were under the :fire of 
'l'hr -crown battery. The lo s being very severe, he was obliged to retreat. 
3cl. That a oon a. th battcrie were unmasked and began to act the b 
wa' clo. c1, by Lord ,.. 1 on opening a parley. 
4th. 'I hat, con cqucntly, it wa in no . cnsc a contest between ship::- • 
batt ·rie , or a triumph of ship ov r batteric'° , and afford no ground for judgin-
of th ir r lativ pow r. 
5th. That it illu trat s, trikinO'ly, th advantage that a fleet po se..,:-:e~ -v 
a , tationary lin of floatir1g defonc . Lord el on wa ..,uperior to the whoi 
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his adversary's floating force; but not being disposed to run any unnecessary 
hazaTd he directed all his force upon a part of the Danish line, which was, of 
course, defeated; and had there been no other than a floating force present, so 
of course would have been the remainder, had it been of twice the strength it 
"3S. This example fully confirms what we have before urged on this topic. 
In estimating the respective forces above, we have set down the vessels of 
both parties at their rate: that is to say, a ship called a seventy-four we have 
reckoned at 7 4 guns. 
We now proceed to examine a great instance of naval success, in which there 
is no room to doubt the extent to which fortifications were engaged; this instance 
is the attack on AlgieTS in 181G. 
The attack was made by the combined English and Dutch fleets, mounting 
about one thousand guns, under the command of Lord Ex.mouth. 
In the fortifications that looked towards the water, there are enumerated in a 
plan, supposed to be authentic, 320 guns; but not more than 200 of these could 
act upon the fleet as it lay. 'J..1he ratio of the forces . engaged, therefore, as ex-
pres ed by the number of guns, (saying nothing of the calibres, of which we 
know nothing,) was about as 5 to 2. '.rhe action continued from a quarter before 
three until nine, without intermission, and did not cease altogether until half-
past eleven. 
It is very certain that the effects of the fire upon the Algerine shipping and 
town were very severe, because we know that all the shipping was destroyed, 
excepting some small vessels; and we know also that Lord Exmouth dictated 
the terms of the treaty that followed. 
Honorable as this result was to the combined fleets, and happy as it was for 
the cause of humanity, there are, nevertheless, technical circumstances connected 
with it that excite doubts as to how much of the final result was due to physi-
cal chastisement, to moral effect, to inherent defects in the defences, and to 
ignorance in the use of these defences, such as they ,vere. That the loss in 
killed and wounded in the city and works was great is probable, because we 
are informed that a very great addition had been made to the garrison, in pre-
:paration for the attack, under some impression, no doubt, that a landing would 
be attempted. For the service of the guns there were needed but 3,000 or 4,000 
men, at the utmost. An accumulation beyond that number would add nothing 
to the vigor of defence, while, by causing an increase of the casualties, it would 
heighten the terrors of the combat. 'rl1e depressing effect of this loss of life in 
the batteries, and of the burning of buildings within the town and about the 
mole, was of course increased by the .entire destruction of the Algerine fleet, an-
chored within the mole. 
We have no means of judging of the actual condition of the works ; nor of 
their fitness for the task of contending with the heavy ships of modern times. 
The forts and batteries on the shore were probably too elevated to be com-
manded even by the largest of the assailing ships; and, provided these guns 
were covered with a proof parapet, they may be regarded as being well situated. 
But more than half of the guns engaged were in the Mole-head battery; and 
the mode of attack adopted, especially by the Queen Charlotte, of 110 guns, was 
calculated to test, in the severest manner, the principles on which this work had 
been planned. She so placed herself within "fifty yards" of the extremity of 
this battery, that she could either rake or take in reverse every part of it. If 
,.he, at the same time, commanded the battery-that is to say, if, from her spar 
deck, she could look down upon its platform-then she must at once, with her 
grape and canister, have driven the garrison from that platform, leaving only 
the lower and covered tier of guns, if there were such a tier, for service. With 
om· imperfect knowledge of the fortifications, all this mus~, however, be left to 
conjectuTe. 
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But there are matters connected with the service of the batteries which 'lr 
not conjecture. Not a shot was fired until the Queen Charlotte had anchor· a. 
What a different vessel, when she anchored, might not this ship hm lJee 
if the Mole-head battery had employed its fire of more than 100 guns in rakin_ 
her, from the time she arrived within a mile and a half until she had ancho 
within fifty yards 1 How different might have been the condition of the flee. 
generally, if they had been subjected, during the approach, and while assumii. 
their stations, to the raking fire of all the 200 guns ? 
It does not appear that a single hot shot was fired from the batteries. 
We might almost rest on this fact, and assert that a defence which had failed 
to provide itself with this auxiliary means, must have been carried on in disre-
gard, if not in violation, of all rules, all knowledge, and all experience; that i• 
was probably without plan or combination, and, not less probable, withOU' 
preparation in other particulars of importance, scarcely inferior. 
Before leaving this example it may be well to inquire what, after all, "ll-a" thr 
effect of these batteries upon the ships, compared with the effect of ships upon 
ships. 
In the battle of the Nile, the French fleet, rated at 1,190 guns, caused a lo--
in Nelson's fleet of 895 killed and wounded; which is in the proportion of ten 
French guns to less than eight Englishmen killed and wounded. In the battle 
of Trafalgar the French fleet carried not less than 3,000 guns, and they cau~ed 
a loss to the English of 1,587 killed and wounded ; which is in the proporti,J 
of ten guns to less than six killed ancl wounded. In this_ affair of Algiers, "i 
a force not exceeding 200 guns, the batteries caused a loss of 883 killed ~nd 
wounded, being in the proportion of 1 0 guns to 44 men; and, if we take mm 
account every gun that was pointed upon the bay, (say 350 guns,) the propor-
tion will be 10 guns to 25 men; being an effect more than three times as great 
as that produced by the French ships at the battle of the Nile, and more than 
four times as great as that produced by the · ships of the same nation at Tra· 
falgar. . . 
While reflecting on the circumstances of this battle the mind is not sah~fied 
with any reasons that present themselves for the withdrawal of Lord Exmou!h· 
the moment the land wind enabled him to do so. On the supposition of e~M 
success on his part, it is not understood why he should feel the great anx1et?" 
he states himself to have been under that this wind should spring up. "Pr~n-
cl~nce at this interval," (be~ween 10 and 11 at night,) "gave to m~ anxi · 
wishes the usual land wind, common in this bay ; and my expectat10ns wer 
completed. We were all hands employed warping and towing off, and, by, th 
help of the light air, the whole were under sail, and came to anchor out oft~ 
reach of shells about two in the morning, after twelve hoTirs of incessant labor. 
Now, if anything had been decided by the action, it must have been one 
two things : either the ships were victorious, or the batteries were so. If th 
ships were completely victorious, it would seem to have been judicious for th ID 
to remain where they were, in order, if there was to be any more fightinO': to 
ready to press their advantage; and, especially, in order to maint~m t 
a. ccndeucy, by preventing the remounting of guns, repairing of batter1e::. nn 
re. npplyi1w them munitions, &c. · 
Had the people possessed the inflexibility report ascribed to the D_ey, ~ud h _ 
they ,.ct zealously about the work of preparation for a new contest, 1t might n 
have be u caHy for Lord Exmouth, in the condition to which hi:-3 ,hipii , 1 · 
· knowlcc1gcc1, by authentic accounts, to have been reduced, to enforce hi;-; dem, n _-
J ti.· not undcrRtood, ther fore, why, if he had been so succes:-ful a'-' to he 
that hiH end wa. attained, he should be so anxious to <TCt out of gunshot. · 
by :o cloino-, he involv cl the i ue in more or less doubt and hazard. 
II relied on the ffi ct produced on the people by his dreadful cannon 
and the re...,ult proves that he was right; but his anxiety to clear the v " -
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from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, ·which he 
thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city, 
than keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was 
this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries 1 
The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury 
done on the one side or the other-particularly as there was, on the one side, a 
city to suffer, as well as the batteries--as the relative efficiency of the parties 
when the battle closed at about eleven o'clock. _All political agitation and popu-
lar clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been continued, 
or e\'en had Lord Exmouth renewed it next morning 1 
These are questions that can be answenid only on conjecture; but the manner 
the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had the subse-
quent demands of LOTd Exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power to enforce 
them by his ships: whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he would not 
have been signally defeated. 
On the whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands preeminent 
as an example of naval success over batteries, presents any arguments to ~hake 
the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, 
deserve, as the defences of a seaboard. 
GIBRALTAR. 
rr'he attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar in September, 1782, by the 
French and Spanish _floating batteries, is a well known instance of the power of 
guns on shore. 
rr'hese floating batteries had been rendered, as was supposed, shot-proof and 
shell-proof, by several additional thicknesses of timber to the sides, and by 
coveTing the decks with a roof of sloping timbers. 
They mounted 142 guns on the engaged side, with 70 in reserve to replace 
any that might be dismounted. r.rhey were anchored at the distance of about 
1,000 yards from the walls, and were opposed by about 85 guns. 
After ~ protracted cannonade, nine of the floating batteries were burnt by hot 
shot from the shore, and the tenth, having been taken possession of by the victors, 
was set on fire by them. · 
No material injury was done to the works of the town by their fire; and only 
eighty-five men and officers were killed and wounded by the fire from these 
vessels, together with a very violent cannonade and bombardment from the 
siege batteries. 
BATTLE OF ALGESIRAS. 
On the 6th July, 1801, the French Admiral Lenois was lying at anchor off 
the town of Algesiras with two ships of SO guns, one of 7 4 guns, and one frigate. 
To the south of him, on a small island, was a battery called the Green Island 
battery, mounting seven 18 and 24-pounders; and to the north of him, on the 
main, another battery called St. J aques's battery, mounting five IS-pounders. 
There were, besides, fourteen Spanish gunboats anchored near, making a total 
of 306 guns afloat and 12 guns in battery-altogether, 318 guns. 
Sir James Saumarez, hearing that Lenois was in this position, advanced 
against him from Cadiz with two ships of SO guns, fout of 7 4 guns, one frigate, . 
and a lugger-in all, 502 guus. On his approach, Lenois, who was anchored in 
a line nearly north ancl south, at some distance from the shote, cut his cables 
and ran into shoal water, to prevent being doubled upon by· the British line; 
thi manceuvre, at the same time, entirely unmasked the fire of the batteries. 
The Hannibal, one of the British 74's, in.attempting to close with the French 
admiral, touched the ground and could not be floated off. She, however, con-
H. Ex. Doc. 92--7 
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tinned the fight with great obstinacy, even for a considerable time after ~he ~ 
deserted by her consorts. Not being able to double upon the French line, an 
attempt was made to assault the Green Isle battery, which, being badly ~en-ed 
by the Spaniards, l1ad nearly ceased firing. But this attempt was anticipated 
by the arrival at the island of a party sent from the French frigate lying near. 
and the assault was defeated, with the loss to the English of one boat sunk and 
another taken, the Frenchmen renewing with vigor the fire of the battery. },: 
the north end of the line the French admiral was aided by seven gunboat-
which took so active a part in the fight that five of them were sunk or rendered 
unserviceable. The St. Jaques battery being, however, served sluggishly by 
the Spaniards, the French sent a party from tl1e Dessaix to impart greattr 
activity and effect. 
After the combat had continued about six hours, the British squadron drew 
off greatly damaged, leaving the Hannibal 7 4 alone and aground; mild she, after 
suffering great loss, was obliged to strike. The French insist that the Pomptt. 
an English ship of 80 guns, had struck her colors, but, as they could not take 
J)ossession, she drifted off and was then towed away; it is believed she wa~ 
entirely dismasted. 
·we do not know the loss in the J!'rench squadron, but the killed, wounded, 
and missing in the English fleet amounted to 375 men, being more than tweh-e 
men for every ten guns against them, and being twice as great, in proportion, a~ 
the English loss in the battle of 'l\·afalgar. 
In this battle of Algesiras there were 502 English guns afloat, acting again~t 
306 French guns afloat. As the English chose their own time for the attack. 
and had the wind, it is only reasonable to suppose that 306 of the English gun~ 
were a match for the 306 guns in the French vessels. This will leave 196 
E11glish guns afloat opposea to the 12 guns in the batteries, or, reckoning one 
side only of each ship, it shows 98 guns in the British fleet to have been over-
matched by the twelve guns in the batteries. . 
There never was a more signal and complete discomfiture; and it will ad~ 
of no other explanation than that just given, namely, that the two small battenef. 
one of 5 and the other of 7 guns, partly 18 and partly 24-pounders, more than 
compensated for the difference in favor of the British fleet of 196 guns. . 
'l,he Hannibal got aground, it is true, but she continued to use her gun~ m~ 
the best effect until she surrendered; and, even on the supposition that th1 ~hip 
was useless after she grounded, the British had still an excess of 122 guns o-n:r 
the French fleet and batteries. · 
'1.1hese batteries were well placed, and probably well planned and constructed. 
but there was nothing extraordinary about them; their condition before the fighi 
was complained of by Admiral Lenois; and they were badly fought in the e~rly 
part of the action; still the 12 guns on shore were found to be more than ccp1Jn1• 
lent for two seventy-fours and one frigate. 
BATTLE OF FUENTERABIA. 
Thi. · recent affair introduces steam batteries to our notice. 
' n tlw 11th July, 1 36, six armed steamers, together with two Briti;-:h an 
, ·Yeral ~ 'pani:--h rrunboats, attacked the little town of Ituenterabia. The pla 
i~ m-rou:1ded only by an old wall; ancl two guns of small calibre, to which. on 
th · CY nmg of the attack, a third o-un of laro·er calibre wa added, formed t 
eutir · o.f it:- artillery. 'l'he s~1uadron cannonaded this pla.ce during a whol d, Y 
aucl ,ft •ckd ab,_.olutcly notlmi 0 • beyond unroofin<>· and dcrnoli:-ihing a few r 
ancl paltr • hon.;c;5, not ""·orth pc·rlrnp the ammunition wa ted in the attack. 
Yhat max have be nth mnnucr of' •·un.., and weio·ht of metal which the a" ·1. 
a.\t. Lrou,rht i unknown; though the uperiority~ independent of the ..:u1 ri 
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weight of metal, must have been at least ten to one; but not the slig·htest military 
result was obtained.-(See United Service Journal, August, 1836, page 531.) 
We will now turn to affairs of a similar character on our own coast. 
In June, 1776, Sir Peter Parker, commanding a squadron of two ships of 50 
guns, four of 28 guns, two of 20 guns, and a bomb-ketch-in all (according to 
their rate) 252 guns-attacked Fort Moultrie, in , Charleston harbor, South 
Carolina. 
It is stated that the fort mounted "about thirty pieces of heavy artillery." 
Three of the smaller vessels were aground for a time during the action; and one 
of them could. not be floated off, and was in consequence burnt by the English. 
Deducting this vessel as not contributing to the attack, and supposing that the 
other two were engaged but half the time, the English force may be estimated 
at 200 guns ; or, reckoning one broadside only, at 100 guns against 30 guns. 
rrhe English were defeated with great loss o.f life, and injury to the vessels ; 
while the fort suffered in no material degree, and lost but 30 men. The killed 
and wounded in the squadron were reported by the commodore to be 205; being· 
for every ten guns employed against them more than 68 men killed and wounded; 
a loss more than eleven times as great, in proportion to the opposing force, as 
the loss at the battle of Trafalgar. 
In September, 1814, a squadron of small vessels, consisting of two ships and 
two brigs, mounting about 90 guns, attacked Fort Boyer, at the mouth of Mo-
bile bay. A false attack was at the same time made by a party of marines, 
artillery, and Indians, on the land side. The fort was very small, and could 
not have mounted more than twenty guns on all sides, nor more than fifteen guns 
on the water fronts. The action continued between two and three hours, when 
one of the ships being so injured as to be unmanageable, drifted ashore under 
the guns, and ·was abandonecl and burnt by the English; the other vessels re-
treated after suffering severely. There were ten men killed and wounded in the 
fort ; the loss on the other part is not known. 
The affair of Stonington during the last war affords another instance of sue-- ~ 
cessful defence by a battery. In this case there were only two guns, ( eighteen-
pounders,) in a battery which was only three feet high and without embrasures .. 
'fhe battery, being manned exclusively by citizen volunteers from the town, 
repelled a persevering attack of a sloop-of-war, causing serious loss and damage, 
but suffering none. . 
'rhe only other instance we will adduce is that of the late attack on the castle 
of St. Juan de Ulloa. Having before us a plan of this work, made on the spot 
after the surrender, by a l!-,rench engineer officer who was one of the expedition; 
having also his official account of the affair, as well as narratives by several eye-
witne::ises, we can fully understand the circumstances attending the operations, . 
ancl are liable to no material errors. 
On the 27th of November, 1838, Admiral Baudin anchored at the distance of 
about seven-eighths of a mile in a northeast direction from the castle, with the 
frigate~ La ~ereide, of 52 _gun~, La ~loire, of 52 ~t~ns, ancl L'Iphigenie, of 60 guns, 
~nd, after bemg a short time m act10n, he was JOmed by La Creole, of 24 guns;: 
1n all, 188 gun~, according to the rate of the ships. In a position nearly north 
from the castle, and at a distance of more than a mile, two bomb-ketches, carry-
ing each two large mortars, were anchored. The wind being adverse, all the 
vessels were towed into position by two armed steamboats belonging to the 
squadron. "It was lucky for us," says the reporter, "that the Mexicans did 
not di, turb this operation, which lasted near two hours, and that they permitted 
u::; to commence the fire." H e further-says: "We were exposed to the fire of 
one 24-pounder, five 16-pounders, seven 12-pounders, one 8-pounder, and five 
IS-pounder carronades-in all, 19 pieces only." In order the better to judge of 
of these batteries, we will convert them, in proportion to the weight of balls, into 
24-pounders ; and we find these 19 guns equivalent to less than 12 guns of that 
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calibre. But we must remark, that, although this simplifies the expression of 
force, it presents it greatly exaggerated; it represents, for example, three 
8-pounders as equivalent to one 24-pounder; whereas, at the distance the parties 
were engaged, (an efficient distance for a 24-pounder,) the 8-pounders would be 
nearly harmless. It represents also the 18-pounder carronades as posse ing 
each three-fourths the power of a long 24-pounder; whereas at that distance 
they would not be better than the 8-pounders, if so good. Although the above 
estimate of the force of the batteries is too great by full one-third, we will, 
nevertheless, let it stand as representing that force. 
'.rhere were, then, twelve 24-pounclers engaged against 94 guns (estimating 
for one broadside only of each ship) and 4 sea-mortars. During the action a 
shell caused the magazine in the cavalier to explode, whereby three of the nine-
teen guns were destroyed, reducing the force to about ten 24-pounders. 
Considering the manner in which this work was defended, it would not have 
been surprising if the ships had prevailed by mere dint of their guns; but our 
author states, expressly, that though the accid~nt just mentioned completely ex-
tinguished the fire of the cavalier, still "the greater part of the other piece" 
which could see the ships, to the number of sixteen, continued to fire till the 
end of the action." They were not dismounted, therefore, and the loss of life 
at them could not have been great. vVhat; then, was the cause of the surrender 
of the castle ? 
Much h~1s been said of the great use made by the ships of horizontal she11E, 
or shells fired at low angles from large guns; and it is a prevailing idea that the 
work was torn to pieces, or greatly dilapidated by these missiles. This en~ineer 
,officer states that, on visiting the castle after the cannonade, he found "1t h~d 
been more injured by the Frend1 balls' and shells than he had expected; still 
• .the casemates in the curtains, serving as barracks for the troops, were intact." 
"Of 187 guns found in the fort, 102 were still serviceable; 29 only had been 
dismounted by the French fire. The heaviest injury was sustained by the 
.cavalier" (where a magazine exploded) "in bastion No. 2; in battery No. 5," 
(where another magazine was blown up,) "and the officers' quarters." rrhe! 
found in the castle twenty-five men whose wounds were too severe to perIIllt 
.their removal with the rest of the garrison. , 
Of the twenty-nine guns dismounted, five were thrown down with the cava-
lier; the remaining twenty-four guns were no doubt situated in parts of the work 
opposite to the attack, being· pointed in other directions, and were s!ruck by 
shots or shells that had passed over the walls facing the ships 'rhere 1s reason 
to suppose that of the remaining sixteen guns pointed at the French, none were 
-dismounted; ancl we know that most of them continued to fire till the end of 
the actjon. 
The two explosions may certainly have been caused by shells fired at low 
angles from Paixhan guns. But it is much more likely they were caused by 
• hells from the sea-mortars, because these last were much -larger, and therefore 
more likely to break through the masonry; because, being fired at high angleE, 
th 'Y would. fall vertically upoIJ. the magazines, which were less protected on 
the top than on the . iues; and. because there were more of the:;e large shellE 
fired. than of the o.omall ones, in the ratio of 302 to 117. 
But, con iderin°· ~hat the cannonade and. Lombardment lasted about six hour5. 
and that ,250 hot and shells were fired. by the :F'rench, it is extraordinary 
!h_at th r were no more than two explo;;ions of magazines and that no 0 Teat_'f 
lllJury wa done the fort, . iuce it is certain that there were no le~' than ,ix 
-Other . imilar mao-azinc, ·ituat d on the rampart, jn different part of the work. 
not one f wl11ch wa . hell-proof. The : urrender, after these explosion~ w.1-= 
~ v r · natural ,y 'nt, with a gov rnor and. garrison who ecm to have known a 
httl abou the proper pr paration for uch conte ts a about the mode of con-
ducting them. The econ<l. explo::;ion mu ·t have satisfied them, if the fin;t di 
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not, that they had introduced within their own precincts much more formidable 
means of de;::;truction than any it was in the power of the French to seud from 
gun or mortar. , 
'The important points to be noticed in this contest are these: 
1. The French took such a position that their 94 guns were opposed by the 
equivalent of 10 or 12 guns only. . 
2. In proof of the inefficiency of the Mexican guns generally, 1t may be 
stated that although the three French frigates were struck in their hulls about 
three hundred times, they lost but thirty-three men in killed and woun§ed. 
The Iphio·enie was hulled 160 times, and yet had but thirtee11 men hurt. Very 
few, ther~fore, of these 160 balls could have passed through her sides. 
3. It appears that very few, if any, of the guns exposed to the direct action 
of the French broadsides were dismounted or silenced by their fire. 
4. The narratives of the day contain exaggerated statements of injury inflicted 
on the walls by shells fired from guns ; the professional report, above quoted, 
of the chief engineer of the expedition, neither speaks of nor alludes to any 
such inj nry. After deducting from the parts of the work said to be most 
injured-the cavalier and also battery No. 5, in each of which a magazine 
exploded-there remain, as having suffered most, the quarters of the officers and 
bas tion No. 2. As to the first, if it was elevated above the walls, as is probable, 
it would of course suffer severely, because the walls of mere barracks or quar-
ters are never made of a thickness to resist shot or shells of any kind; and if 
not elevated above the walls, but covered by them, the injury resulted, most 
probably , from shells fired at high angles from the sea-mortars, and not from 
shells fired nearly horizontally from the Paixhan guns. Whether tlie injury 
sustained by bastion No. 2 was the effect of shot and shells upon the face of 
the walls, or of shells falling vertically within the basfrm, is not stated. It was 
probably due in part to both. If there had been any extraordinary damage 
done by the horizontal shells, we rnay reasonably suppose special mention 
would have been made of it, because it was the first time that this missile had 
been tried, in a large way, in actual warfare. 'l'hat anything like a breach 
could have been effected with solid shot, at that distance and in that time, we 
know to be impossible; but it is neither unreasonable to suppose, nor unlikely, 
that many of the heavy vertical shells may have fallen in the bastion and 
caused much injury. ·whatever may have been the cause of the damage, or 
its amount, it did not, we have reason to believe, extinguish the fire of any of 
the five 16-pounders that were pointed from the bastion against the ships. 
5. So far as effects were produced by the direct action of the French arma-
ment, whether guns, bomb-cannon, or sea-mortars, it does not appear that there, 
was the slightest reason for the submission of the fort. '.rhere is little doubt 
that the 8,250 shot and shells fired at the castle must have greatly marred the 
surface of the walls, and it is not unlikely that three or four striking near each 
other may have made deep indentations, especially as the stone is soft, beyond 
any mater ial applied to building in any part of the United States. But these 
arc not injuries of material consequence, however they may appear to the inex-
perienced eye, and we should risk little in asserting that, abstracting the effects 
of the cxplo, ion, the castle was as inaccessible to assault after the cannonade 
as before it; that, so far as regards the levelling of obstacles lying in the way 
of a sword in hand attack, the 8,250 shot and shells might as well have been 
fired in th e oppo::iite direction. 
~- T!ie explosion, however, of two deposits of powder in the castle, one of 
which 1::; reported to have buried sixty men in its ruins, showed the defenders 
that, although they might evade the vertical fire, and their works might cover 
them from the horizontal fire of the ]Trench, there was no protection against, no 
evasion of, the dreadful ravage::; of exploding magazines. With this min around 
them, and a sixfold greater ruin likely, at every moment, to burst upon their 
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heads, it is not surprising that a garrison, found in circumstances so unmilitary. 
doubted their power of protracted resistance. 
7. It must be borne in mind that these explosions have nothing to do either 
with the question of relative strength or with the peculiarities of the French 
attack. No defences, with such management, can be eflective, ancl no attack 
can fail. 'The l!..,rench, not dreaming·. of such culpable, such inconceinLle 
n egligence on a point always receiving the most careful attention, entered upon 
the cannonade with no other purpose, as is avowed, than that of somewhat 
weakening the defences and dispiriting and fatiguing the garrison, before pro-
ceeding to an assault, which was to have followed at night, and for which all 
preparations had been made. Had the :Mexicans thrown all the powder of 
these eight magazines into the sea, or had they transported it to their barrack:'. 
and every man, making a pillow of a keg, slept through the whole cannonade. 
as might have been done safely, in their quarters in the curtain casematee, the 
castle of St. Juan de Ulloa would, we doubt not, have been as competent to 
resist the projected assault as it was when the French :first arrived before it. . 
8. 'I'he number of killed and wounded in the French vessels, in proportion 
to the guns acting against them was, for ten guns, more than twenty -"e':en 
men, being upwards of four times as great as the loss sustained by _the Engfuh 
at the battle of Trafalgar. 
In concluding thiB reference to facts in military Mstory, we will add that 1\'C' 
do not see how it is possible to avoid making the following deduction, nam~ly: 
that fixed batteries upon the shore are capable of resisting the attacks of ship~. 
even when the armament of the latter is by far the most numerous and ~e~,Y-
Thcre are several reasons for this capacity in batteries, of which the prmcipal 
may be thus stated; and these rc:asons apply to vessels of every siz? a~d every 
sort, to small or large, to vessels moved by wind or steam. The slup 1s every-
where equally vulnerable, and, large as is her bull, the men and the guns are 
Yery much concentrated within her; on the other hand, in the properly con-
structed battery it is ouly the gun itself, a small part of the carriage, and no~ 
and then a head or an arm raised above the parapet that can be hurt, the .:"at10 
of the exposed surfaces being not less than fifteen or twenty to one. ); ext. 
there is always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship-gun, although 
it may have been pointed accurately at one moment, at the next wil: be thrown 
entirely away from the object, even when the motion in the vessel 1::1 t?o sm.a~ 
to be otherwise noticed; whereas, in the battery the gun wi11 be fired JU:t a: 1 
is pointed, and the motion of the ship ·will merely vary to the extent of ~ fr"" 
inches, or at most two or three feet, the spot in which the shot is to be receJY_eJ. 
In_ the ship there are, besides, many points expoRecl that may Le called v~ al 
pomt.' ; · by losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her Fpars. ~be 
may become unmanageable and unable to use her strength; she mar recen-
shots under water and be liable to sink; she may receive hot shot am! he fet n 
fir ; and these damages are in addition to those of haYing her guns d1~m )~nt 
and her people killed by the shot which pierce her sides ancl scatter :-pli_nrer, 
from her timbers, ·while the risks of the battery arc confined to tliosc mentioned 
ahoYe, namely, the ri.k that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be ..:trnck. 
That the magazines should be exposed, as were thoi;e of the ca..:tle 't. Juan d 
"Glloa, must never be anticipated as posRible. 
"\Vhil on thi part of our ,·uLject, it is proper to nclvert to thf' uf:e of h · 
zoutal hell., or hollow ,·hot, or I>aixhau'::, flhcll , (as they arc varion..:l: taH. 
it liaving been aro-uccl that the intro<luc-tion of tlH·K, mis ile is scriou:e:ly t 1 · 
pair the ntility of fortification.· a~ a c1cfrnce of thr :-ca-coast. 
"\Y fully b ·licve tliat the fr c use of th<'. c shell:-; will have an influ nc 
ornc importance on th r ·lativ · fore of ·liip aud Lattery, but tl1Ht _iufln 
rnn:-t he the ycry r •vcrr- · of . uch prcdic-tion~. IIow ar the batten ' 
affected Ly them? It can Le but in two ways : fict, the hip-gun ba,1ng 
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pointed so as to strike a vital point-that is to s~y, a gu~ or a carri~ge-the 
shell may explode at the instant of contact. This explos10n may possibly hap-
pen thus opportunely, but it would happen against all chances_, and if. happen-
ing, would probably do no more than add a few men to the hst of killed and 
wounded. For reasons that will soon appear, it is to be doubted whether the 
probability of dismounting the gun would be so great as if the missile w_e1·? a 
solid 32-pounder shot. Secondly, if it be not by dismounting the guns or lnlh~1g 
the garrisoi1, the effects anticipated from these missiles must result from the m-
jury they do the battery itself. Now, we are perfectly informed by military ex-
perience as to the effects of these shells upon forts and batteries, for the shells 
are not new, although the guns may be so-the 8-inch and the 10-inch shells 
having always been supplied in abundance to evel'y siege-train, and being per-
fectly understood, both as to their effects and the mode of using them. 
Were it a thing easily done, the blowing away of the parapets of a work, (a 
very desirable result to the attacking party,) would be a common incident in the 
attacks of fortifications; but the history of attacks by land or water affords no 
such instance. The only practicable way yet discovered of demolishing a forti-
fication being by attaching a miner to the foot of the wall, or by dint of solid 
shot and heavy charges fired unremittingly during a long succession of hours 
upon the same part of the wall, in order not only to break through it, but to 
brt.ak through it in such a manner that the weight and pressure of the incum-
bent mass may throw large portions of the wall prostrate. This, the shortest 
and best way of breaching a wall, requires, in the first place, perfect accuracy 
of direction, because the same number of shots that, being distributed over the 
expanse of a walt, would merely peel off the face, would, if concentrated in a 
single deep cut, cause the wall to fall; and it requires, moreover, great power of 
penetration in the missile--the charge of a breachfog-gun being for that reason 
one-third greater than the common service charges. Now, the requisite pre-
cision of firing for this effect is wholly unattainable in vessels, whether the shot 
be solid or hollow; and if it were attainable, hollow shot would be entirely use-
less for the purpose, because every one ef tliem would break to pieces against 
tlie wall, even when fired with a charge much less than the common service charge. 
1'1)-is is no newly-discovered fact; it is neither new nor doubtful. Every hollow 
shot thrown agRinst the wall of fort or battery, if fired with a velocity afford-
ing any penetration, will unquestionably be broken into fragments by the shock. 
After so much had been said about the effect of. these shells upon the castle 
of St. Juan de Ulloa, it was deemed advisable, although the result of European 
experiments were perfectly well known, to repeat in our own service some trials 
touching this point. A target was therefore constructed, having one-third part 
of the length formed of granite, one-third of bricks, and the remaining third of 
freestone. This was fired at by a Paixhan gun and by a 32-pouncler from the 
distancr of half a mile, and the anticipated results were obtained, namely: 
1st. 'Whether it was the granite, the brick, or the freestone that was struck, 
the soliJ. 32-pounder shot penetrated much deeper into the wall, and did much 
more damage than the 8-inch hollow shot; and-
2d. rrhcse last broke against the wall in every instance that the charge of the 
gun was sufficient to give them any penetration. . 
_The rupture of the shell may often cause the explosion of the powder it con-
tam~, because the shell, the burning fuse, and the powder are a.ll crushed up 
together; but the shell having no penetration, no greater injury will be clone to 
the wall by the explosion than would be caused by the bursting of a shell that 
had been placed against it. 
From all this it appears, incontrovertibly, that, as re()'ards the effects to be 
produced upon ~atteries by ships, solid shot are decidedly preferable to hollow 
Fhot; and the ship that, contemplating the destruction of batteries,· should change 
any of her long 24 or 32-pounder guns for Paixhan guns . would certainly 
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weaken her armament. Her best missiles, at ordinary distances, are solid shot; 
and, if she can get near, grape shot to fire into the embrasures and onr the 
walls. 'I'he best shells ag·ainst batteries are the sea-mortar shells, :fired at high 
elevations; which, being of great weight and falling from a great height, pene-
trate deeply, and containing a considerable quantity of powder cause material 
ravage by their explosion. Such shells, however, can only be :fired by T"essels 
appropriately fitted. 
'The use of these same hollow shot by batteries against vessels is, howe,er, 
an affair of different character. 'I'he shells do not break against timber, but 
penetrating the bulwarks they, in the first place, would do greater damage than 
hollow shot, by making a larger hole and dispersing more splinters; and having. 
as shot, effected all this injury, they would then augment it many fold by ex-
ploding. + 
In all cases of close action between ship and battery, the shells will pass 
through the nearer side, and if not arrested by some object on the deck, will 
probably lodge and explode in the further side; causing, by the explo:iion, a 
much greater loss among the crew, and greater injury to the vessel, than by their 
mer e transit across the vessel. As before suggested, the vessel would suffer 
less injury were her sides made so thin as not to retain the shell, permitting it 
to pass through both sides, unless fired with a small velocity. It is not irnpos::i-
ble that an extensive use of these horizontal shells may lead to a reduction in 
the thickness of ships' bulwarks. 
In the facts quoted above, there is no illustration of the effects of hot shot. 
except in the case of Gibraltar. In that attack the floating batteries were made 
proof against cold shot, and, as was thought by the coustructor, proof agaimt 
hot shot also; and so, indeed, for a time, it seemed. It was conceived that the 
hot shot, when buried deep in the closely-jointed timbers,: would scarcely c.om-
municate flame; aud that it would not be difficult, by the use of the fire-engme:3 
provided, to subdue so stifled a combustion. 
By making these floating batteries impenetrable to shot, it was supposed they 
had been rendered equnl, in perfectly smooth water, to land batterie~, gun for 
gun; and so they might then have b~en, nearly, had the incombustibility of, the 
latter been imparted to them. But now resistance to £re would not mffice: 
these floating batteries must either repel these horizontal shells from their~ bul-
:warks, or, if that be impossible, permit them to pat1s through both sides. ~oth-
mg can be better calculated to exhibit the tremem1ous effects of, the~e :-hell~ 
than a vessel so thick-sided as to stop every shell, allowing it to burst TI"heu 
surrounded by several feet of timber; and thexe can be no greate.r mistake than 
supposing that by thickcnino· the bulwarks of vessels-of-war, or :fitting up .-:team 
bat_teries with shot-proof sides, the effects of land batteries are to be annulled. 
or m any material degree modified . 
. We will sum up this branch of our s~1bject with the remark that the fact:-_~-
h1.:tory, and the practice of all warlike nations, are in perfect ascordance m ~ 
thr _concln:::;ion~ of theory. 'I'he results that reason anticipated have occnrr · 
ao-mn and agmn. And so long as, on the one side, batteries are formed of earth 
and • tone; an~, on the other, shiJJS are liable to be swallowed up_ hy the 
el ·m ·nt on which they float, or to be deprived of the means by which they 
mrwr; so long as th y can Le penetrated by solid shot, set on fire or hlown u 
lJy hot i::hot, or torn piecemeal by shells, the same results must, inevitahly. 
rcpcatrd at ach uccecding trial. 
But, after all, it n~ay_ be urgec1 that the general principle l1ercin cont<~1~,l ·d r. 
munch·, th .. npcnonty of battcricf:I in a contcut with , hip:-:, m1_!:'ht 
ac1mitt ,d; and . till it would remain to . how thnt battcr:ct1 con:-:titute tl · kincl · 
cl ·fi•ncc Le;o;t adapted to our peculiar want ·. '1'11i:- i:-; true ; and we 11·ill 110 l- I 
ccrc1 to con:--ic1 r, ,.CY rally, the ca~e to which dcfrnc mu:,:t be applied. 
It ma • be well, however, nr...,t to r call the g ncral i::-cop of the pr~ 
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argument. It has been contended that floating defences should not be relied 
on, not because they are actually incompetent to the duty, but because they 
cannot fulfil this duty unless provided in inordinate numbers, and at a boundless 
expense ; and we have endeavored to show that this remark is g~nerally t1~ue, 
whether the defensive fleet be made up of sea-going vessels, of floatrng batteries, 
or of steam batteries. We have next urged the point that properly planned and 
constructed batteries are an overmatch for vessels-of-war, even when greatly 
inferior to them in armament-sustaining our opinion by many striking· exam-
ples, and explaining satisfactorily the only instances that have cast any doubt 
on such contests. If the facts and reasonings we have presented do not convey 
the same strong convictions that sway our own minds, it must be because we 
have obscured rather than illustrated them; for it would seem to be impossible 
that facts could be more unexceptionable, or reasons more beyond the reach of 
cavil. However that may be, we now leave them to candid and dispassionate 
revisal, and proceed to examine the mode of applying these defences to our own 
coast. 
I t may be well to divide these into several distinct classes: 
1. '_rhere will be all the smaller towns upon the coast, constituting a very 
numerous class. 
At the same time that no one of these, of itself, would provoke an enterprise of 
magnitude, it is still necessary to guard each and all against the lesser attacks. 
A small vessel might suffice to guard against single vessels that would other-
wise be tempted by facility to burn the shipping and exact a contribution; but 
something more than this is necessary, since the amount of temptation held out 
by a number of these towns would be apt to induce operations on a larger scale. 
It might often happen, moreover, that our own vessels-of-war would be con-
strained to take refoge in these harbors, and they should find cover from the 
pursuer. . 
Although the harbors of which we now speak afford every variety of form 
and dimension, there are few, or none, wherein one or two small forts and 
batteries cannot be so placed as to command all the water that a ship-of-war 
can lie in, as well as the channel by which she must enter. While the circum-
stances of no two of them are so nearly alike as not to modify the defences to 
be applied to them severally, all should fulfil certain common conditions, namely: 
the passage into the harbors should be strongly commanded ; the enemy should 
find no place, after passing, wherein he would be safe from shot and shells ; and 
the works should be inaccessible to sudden escalade-that is to say, a small 
garrison should be able to repel such an assault. With works answering to 
these conditions, and of degrees of strength in accordance with the value of 
their respective trusts, this class of harbors may be regarded as secure. We 
cannot, however, here avoid asking what would be the mode of defence, if 
purely naval, of these harbors 1 Suppose the circumstances are deemed to 
require the presence of a frigate, or a st.earn frigate, or an equivalent in gun-
boats : would not two hostile frigates, or two steam frigates, infallibly arrive in 
quest 1 Could there be devised a system more certain to result in the capture 
of our vessels, and the submission of our towns 1 
2. Another class will consist of great establishments, such as large cities, 
naval depots, &c., situated in harbors not of too great extent to admit of good 
defence at the entrance, and also at every successive point; so that an enemy 
could find no spot within in which he could safely prepare for operations ulte-
rior to the mere forcing an entrance. 
In thi' cla s are to be found obir.cts that are, in every sense, of the highest 
value. On the one hand, accumulations of military and naval material, and 
structUTes for naval accommodation, that could not be replaced during a war, 
which are of indi,.pensable necessity, and of great cost; and, on the other hand, 
the untold wealth of great cities. As these objects must be great in the eyes of 
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the enemy-great for him to gain, and for us to lose-corresponding effort. on 
his part must be looked for and guarded against. If he come at all, it will be 
in power; and the preparations on our part must be commensurate. 
'l'he entrance to the harbor, and all the narrow passes within it, must be 
occupied with heavy batteries; and if nature does not afford all the po. itions 
deemed requisite, some must,- if practicable, be formed artificially. Batterie" 
should succeed each other along· the channel, so that the enemy may nowhere 
find shelter from effective range of shot and shells while within the harbor, even 
should he succeed in passing the first batteries. 
Provided the shores admit this disposition, and the defences be supplied with 
an armament, numerous, heavy, and selected with reference to the effects on 
shipping, the facts we have quoted from history show that these defence may 
be relied on. 
If the mere passing under sail, with a leading wind and tide, one, or even 
two sets of batteries, and then carrying on operations out of the reach of these, 
or any other, were all, the enemy might perhaps accomplish it; but our present 
supposition is, that with this class his ulterior proceedings, and finally his return, 
are to be subject to the incessant action of the defences. 
3. ':I1his brings us to consider a third class, consisting of establishments of 
importance situated at a distance up some river or bay, there being intermediate 
space too wide to be commanded from the shores. In such cases the defence 
must be concentrated upon the narrow passes, and must, of course, be appor-
tioned in armament to the value of the objects covered. When the value is not 
very great, a stout array of batteries at the best positions would deter an enemy 
from an attempt to force the passage, since his advantage, in case of success, 
would not be commensurate with any imminent risk. But with the more valua-
ble establishments it might be otherwise; the consequence of success might 
justify all the risk to be encountered in rapidly passing in face of batteries, 
however powerful. This condition of things requires peculiar precautions, 
under any system of defence. If, after having occupied the shores, in the nar-
row places, in the best manner, with batteries, we are of opinion that the temp· 
tation may induce the enemy, notwithstanding, to run the gauntlet, the obstruc-
tion of the passage must be resorted to. By this is not meant the penna~ent 
obstruction of the passage; such a resort, besides the great expen ·e, m1ght 
entail the ruin of the channel. The obstruction is ·meant to be the temporary 
closing by heavy floating masses. . 
'11here is no doubt that a double line of rafts, each raft being of large size 
and anchored with strong chains, would make it impossible to pass wit~out 
first removing some of the obstructions, and it might clearly be made impossible 
to effect this removal under the fire of the batteries. Such obstructionfl need 
not Le re orted to until the breaking out of a war, as they could then be 8peedily 
formed, should the preparation of the enemy be of a threatening nature. _ 
Ther would be nothing in these obstructions inconsistent with our u:::c ot 
part of the channel, since two or three of the rafts might be kept out of line. 
reacly to move into their places at on hour's notice. 
The greatest danger to which these obstructions would be exposed would he 
from xplo ion vessel ; and from thfse they mio·ht be protected by a boom, or 
a line of .:maller raft, in front. b 
.From ·what ha_ ju t been said, it will be perceived that, when the induceme~ -
ar ,:uch a · to Lrmg the en my forward in great power, and efficient batt ·n -
can b e ·taLli lied only at certain point,, we arc not then to rely on tlH·m ex-
~lu. _iv ·ly. In ·uch a ca~e, _the enemy houlcl be topped by ome p_h,pic:al ~m-
p dun nt. ; and the batt ne mu. t be strong enough to prevent his rcmonn!! 
th :- imp ·dim nt::i , and al ·o to prevail in a cannonade, hould the enemy und · · 
tak to ·ilence the work . 
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rhe conditions these obstructions have to fulfil are these: 
1st. They must be of a nature 1J) be fixed readidy, and to be speedily re-
moved when there is no longer occasion for them; and, to this end, they must 
be afloat. · ( 
2d. They must have adequate inertia to resist, or ~ather not to be destroyed 
or displaced by, the shock of the heaviest ship; and, in order to this, they must 
be held by the heaviest and strongest cables and anchors. 
3d. They must be secure from the effects of explosive vessels; and, if in 
danger from this source, must be covered as ab0ve menti~ned. . . 
We do not say what are the exact circumstances in which all these cond1t10ns 
will be fulfilled, though we think the idea long ago presented by the board of 
engineers will, with modifications, embrace them all. 
The idea is this: Suppose a line ( extending across the channel) of rafts, sep-
arated from each other by a space less than the breadth of a ship-of-war, each 
raft being about 90 feet long, 30 feet wide, and 6 feet deep, formed of strong 
timbers, crossed and braced in all directions, and fastened together in the strongest 
manner. A long-scope chain cable is to proceed from each of the four corners, 
two obliquely up stream and two obliquely down stream, to very heavy anchors; 
and there should also be a very strong chain cable passing from one raft to 
another. Suppose a ship, striking one of the rafts, to break the chains leading 
down the stream: in doing this, she must lose much of her mqmentum. She 
has, then, "under her fore foot," the raft connected by a strong chain with the 
rafts to the right and left; on being tightened, this chain will throw the strain 
upon the down stream cable of that adjoining raft towards which the ship hJtp-
pens to tend. If we suppose it possible for these chains also to be parted by 
the power still remaining in the ship, or by impulses received from succeeding 
vessels, there will be other chains still to break in the same way. After the 
down stream chains are all parted, the rafts will "bring up" in a new position, 
(higher up the channel,) by the anchors that, in the first instance, were pointed 
up stream. Here a resistance, precisely like that first overcome, is to be en-
countered by vessels that have lost most of their force in breaking the successive 
chains, and in pushing these great masses of timber before them through the 
water. Should there exist a doubt as to the sufficiency of these remaining 
anchors and chains, or should it be deemed most prudent to leave nothing un-
certain, a second similar line may be placed a short distance above the first. 
The best proportions and dimensions of the rafts remain to be determined ; 
but as there is scarcely a limit to the strength that may be given to the rafts 
themselves, and to the · means by which they are to be held to their positions, 
and to each other, the success of a well arranged obstruction of this sort can 
harclly be doubted. 
rrhe expense would not be great in the first instance, and all the materials 
would be available for other purposes, when no longer needed for this. 
It may be repeated here, that such expedients need not be resorted to, except 
to cover objects of the highest importance and value, such as would induce an 
enemy to risk a large expedition. For objects of less importance, batteries 
would afford ample protection. It will be remembered that this last power is, 
when once established in any position, a constant quantity; and, although it 
should be incompetent to effect decisive results when diffused over a large fleet, , 
may be an overmatch for any small force upon which it should be concentrated. 
At the same time, therefore, that there is the less liability to heavy attacks, 
there will be, in the batteries, the greater capacity of resistance to others. 
It must not be urged, as a reproach to fortifications, that, in the case we are 
coni:,.idering, they are obligeu to call in aid from other sources, so long as these 
aids are cheap, efficient, and of easy resort. By the mode we have suggested, 
the defence will undoubtedly be complete, every chance of success being on the 
side of the defence; that is to say, if any confidence is to be placed in the les-
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sons of experience. How, on the other hand, will the same security be attained 
by naval means 1 Only, as before shown,. by keeping within the harbor a flrC: 
or squadron, or whatever it may be, which shall be at all times superior to the 
enemy. 
In a naval defence there wm be no advantage in obstructions of any sort, for 
there can be no lessening of the array of guns in consequence of such ob._truc-
tions; because, if these obstructions are under the fire of the floating defencr,. 
the enemy will first subdue that fire, and then remove the obstructions at bi-
leisurc. If this fire prove too powerful for the enemy, the obstruction will 
have been unnecessary) and will serve only to shut up our own fleet, preventing 
the prompt pursuit of a beaten foe. 
4. '11here is a fourth class, consisting of harbors, or rather bays or estuarie,. 
of such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. The-e 
have been before spoken of. If the occupation of, or passage through 
these must be defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the 
shore. rrhe reliance must, from the nature of the case, be a floating defence, of 
magnitude at least equal to the force the enemy may bring. The complete de-
fence of each of these bays would, therefore, involve very great expe11se; cer-
tainly, in most cases, greater than the advantages gained. 'The Chesapeake 
bay cannot, for instance, be shut against a fleet by fortifications; and if the en-
trance of the enemy is to be interdicted, it must be by the presence of a no 
inferior fleet of our own. Instead of such a system, it will be better to give up 
the bay to the enemy, confining our defences to the more important harbo1 and 
riv~rs that discharge into the bay. By this system, not only will these barbor:i 
be secure, but the defences will react upon the bay itself, and, at any rate, ~e-
cure it from predatory incursions; because, while Hampton roads and the na:y 
yard at Norfolk are well protected, no enemy woulcl proceed up the bay mth 
any less force than that which coulcl be sent out from the navy yard. 
In certain cases of broad waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire to 
rendezvous in order to prosecute a blockade, or as a shelter in tempe tnou~ 
weather, there may be positions from which sea-mortars can reach the whole 
anchorage, although nothing could be done with guns. A battery of sea-mor-
tari:;, well secured from escalade, would, in such a case, afford a good defence. 
because no fleet will lie at anchor within the range of shells. 
In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general 
clai:; 'C8, according to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not fin_d tl1at 
anything· can be substituted for fortifications, where fortifications are applicable, 
and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last; ancl in the la:;t we 
Rhall fin cl them indispensable as auxiliaries. In this la t class there are, _no 
doubt, some cases where naval means must con tituto the active ancl operative 
fore•; and it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defence:-, be 
th most , uitable. 
It must not be forgotten, however, that the very qualities which recommend 
this particular kind of force will equally characterize the steam ves el of th 
n rn r; nor mu t it be forgotten that, whether steam vessels or sailing ve;,:: · ~. 
or ~oth, arc relied on, unless there are well-secured point on the _hor~, u~? ·'" 
wl11th thc-y can take refuge, they will them elves constitute an oLJect mntm;:-
thc ·npcrior fore of an enemy. 
If for _c.·am_ple, we were to deem one of the open harbor of such import:m 
a. tu a:_~1,~11 ewht or ten steam battrri<" for its protection, we sbonlcl the 
plae • w1tl11n r a ·h of th enemy an obj ·ct worthy of the efforts of a squad 
r t" ·Ive or fifte n ves:els of the . ame cle:.;cription. Even, therefor , in 
< ·· <,,_ wltr·rc n:n-al mean must be re~ort •cl to for c1efcnc upon th watC'r. th_ 
,.houl<l h · work up n th shor b •hincl which, jf ovcrpow r cl, tbev can n:n 
t ha b ·en bcfor r mark cl that the .·team batteric ar .· in no wa, mo r-
mi<laLl · to :hor batterie:.; than ·ailing v r-._el ar : armed with Paixhan "'U -
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they would be less so. And they ·would be less for~iclable, also, on accoun~ of 
their comparatively small number of guns; for there 1s no reaso1: w~1Y: the. fi:·mg 
should be more accurate than from ships; and the chances of mfhctmg mJury 
would be in proportion to the nu1:1ber of I1;1issiles. . . . 
The only material effect the mtroduc~10n ?f th~s descr1pt1?n of ,vess?l can 
have upon a system of defence by fortifications 1s, that owmg to t?ell' les_s 
draught of water, it will be necessary to secure channels that, not bemg nav1-
gabl~ by vessels of the line and frigates, might otherwise be left ung·uarded. 
Some of these channels may have the draught of water lessened by an a~tificial 
ridge of stones, so as to be impracticable even to steam vessels ; and tlus may 
often be clone at small expense, and without detriment to the harbors; others 
will need additional fortifications. But the instances are not numerous where 
any such shallow channels exist. . . 
In O})position to an opinion not uncommon, that modern improvements m 
steam vessels will tend to lessen the necessity for fortifications, we here see that 
the tendency is rather to increase their number. 
Throughout this whole discussion the argument has turned on the relative 
efficiency of fixed and floating defences. The great relative economy of the 
former, we suppose, will be conceded. If not, we would ask, as conclusive, or 
at least as leading to calculation entirely satisfactory, that the following infor- · 
mation be obtained from authentic sources, namely: the first cost, when com-
plete in all respects, of the frigates United States, Constitution, and Congress, 
and also the entire expense of each of said vessels up to this time; specifying, 
as to each, the year of the several expenditures and the amounts thereof, under 
the heads, as far as practicable, of first cost, repairs or rebuilding, and improve-
ments and alterations,· and distinguishing-1st. rrhe expense bestowed upon 
the hull. 2d. The expense bestowed upon the masts, spars, sails, anchors, 
cables and rigging. 3d. The expense bestowed upon the armament; and 4th. 
The expense bestowed upon all other matters, ( as boats, ballast, tanks, paint, 
&c.,) necessarily connected with the preservation, or the ordinary service of the 
vessel. 
Before we proceed to describe the several positions on the coast requiring for-
tifications, we have something still to say on the general subject, though on 
another branch. We now refer to the kind of fortifications, or rather to their 
magnitude and strength. That this particular topic should be embraced by our 
remarks is the more necessary since views hostile to the system of works now 
in progress have been urged from a high source. 
'l'hc present system is founded on this principle, to wit : that the fortifications 
shonlJ be strong in proportion to the value of the objects to be secured. The 
principle will not, we suppose, be controverted, but only the mode of apply-
ing it. · 
There will hardly be a difference of opinion as to the mode of guarding the 
le.:., important points. 'l'here being no great attraction to an enemy, works 
simple in their features, requiring small garrisons only,. containing a moderate 
armament, but at the same time inaccessible to the dashing enterprises that 
ship, can so easily land, and which can be persevered in for a few hours with 
much vigor, will suffice. Oircunistances must, however, materially modify the 
properties of these w~rks, even when t~c. points to be guarded are of equal 
value. !n one, the disadvantage of pos1t1on must be compensated by greater 
power; m another, natural strength may need little aid from art; in another, 
grc·ater width in the guarded channel may demand a larger f.l.rmament; and in 
a fourth, peculiar exposure to land attack may exact more than usual inacces-
sibility. But all these varieties lie within limits that will probably be conceded. 
At- to the larger objects, it has been contended that there has been exaggera-
tion in devising works to cover these, the works having been calculated for more 
formidable attacks than they will be exposed to. It is easy to utter vague 
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criticisms of this nature, and it is not easy to rebut them without going into an 
examination as minute as if the criticism were ever so precise and pertinent. 
But let us look a little at the material facts. What is the object of an enemy 1 
What are his means 1 What should be the nature of our defences 1 
The object may be to lay a great city under contribution, or to de troy one 
of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbor~, 
&c. It was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York, in the 
year 1835, the property destroyed within a few hours was worth upward' of 
seventeen millions of dollars, although the fire was confined to a very smJl 
part of the city, and did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate 
the loss that would accrue from the :fires that a victorious enemy could kindle 
upon the circuit of that great city when no friendly band could be rai"ed to 
extinguish them 1 or is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay for 
exemption from that calamity 1 Can we value too highly the pecuniary losse~ 
that the destruction of one of the great navy yards would involve, and the los5, 
beyond all pecuniary value, of stores and accommodations indispensable in a 
state of war, and that a state of war can hardly replace 1 
But what are the enemy's means 1 They consist of his whole sea-going force. 
which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow. In the language C1f 
the critic : " From the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring 
its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and, by threatening or 
aesai.ling various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements ~ 
troops upon land, and effect the object bdore their concentration, or render 1 
necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but ~o 
divided as to be inferior to it on any one point." 
We have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude, and the means of the enemy 
consi:t in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these objects. 
·with the highest notion of the efficiency of fortifications against shipping, 
these are not cases where any stint in the defensive means are admissible. 
Having, therefore, under a full sense of the imminent danger to which the grea 
objects upon the coast are exposed, applied to the approaches by water an array 
of obstacles worthy of confidence, we must carefully explore all the avem:e' l'.y 
land, in order to guard against approaches that might be made on that s1~e. :.:i 
order to evade or to capture the works guarding the channels. But before dec1dm? 
on the defences necessary to resist these land attacks, it will be proper to em-
mate more particularly the means that an enemy may be expected to bring for-
ward with a view to such land operations. 
History fui·nishes many examplee; and the expedition to Flushing, commonly 
called the ""\V alcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly instructive. . . 
] roman early clay Napoleon had applied himself to the creation of a m:mum 
force iu the Scheldt, and, 'in 1809, he had provided extensive dock yar?s ":. 
naval arsenals at ],lushing and at Antwerp. On his invasion of Au tI:a t .. ,, 
year, he had drawn off the mass of his troops that had before kept Jeal U5 
watch over the, e naval preparations, relying now on forts and batterie .. , anJ on 
the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp, for the protection of the naval e:::tti -
lislnuf'11t:4, and of a fleet containing several line-of-battle ships and frigate:; and 
a uumcrou · flotilla of smaller vessels. 
'l he great naval e tabli hment at .Flushing, near the mouth of the .'ch ·I ·. 
and of . \..utwcrp, some sixty or scv •nty miles up the river, with the ,. " · 
afloat on the river or in progr , in the yards, presented an object to Engl 
worth T of on of her gr at :£fort . 
'l'h · troop~ mbark cl on this xpcdition con, i tcd of upward of 33.000 · -
fan try, :J,000 avalry, more than 3,000 artillery, and ·ome hundred ' of , : p ' 
and min 'r"- onf<titutino- an army of about 40,000 m •n. 'l'he naval J rri 
·011,..i tc·d of 35 , ail of the Jin ', 23 fri 0 ·at s, 33 loop -of-war, 2 gun. m 
and bomb v :-.' 1. , 36 .. mall r v '.~cl , and 2 O'unboats ; makinu a tot. I 
hip and oth r armed ve el and 2 gunboat . The gun , mortru , ~ -l, •• 
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vided for such bombardments and sieges as the troops might have to conduct. 
amounted to 158 pieces, with the suitable supplies of ammunition and stores of 
every kind. 
rrhe idea of sailing right up to their object, in spite of the forts and batteries, 
seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the fleet. The 
plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the ~anding ~ por~ion of t~e army on 
the island of vV alche-ren, to carry on the siege of 1! lushmg, while another 
portion proceeded up the Scheldt as high as Fort Bartz, which :vas to be. taken, 
after which the army would push on by land about twenty miles furt~er, a~d 
lay siege to Antwerp; all which, it was thought, might be accomplished m 
eighteen or twenty days from the first landing. 
The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, was 
reduced within fifteen days, and in less than a week from the debarcation ( which 
was on the 31st of July) .Fort Bartz was in possession of the English, having 
been abandoned by the garrison. But it was twenty-five days before the main 
body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were assembled at this point and 
ready to take up the line of march against Antwerp. Since the first descent of 
the British matters had, however, greatly changed. rrhe French were now in 
force ; they had put their remaining defences in good condition ; they had 
spread inundations over the face of the country; and not only would there be 
little chance of further success, but the safety of the expedition, formidable as 
it was, might have been compromised by a further advance. It was therefore 
decided in council to abandon the movement against Antwerp. The troops ac-
cordingly returned to the island of Walcheren, which they did not finally leave 
till the end of December. 
The failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to the 
omission to seize, in the first instance, the south shore of the river, and capture 
the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was prevented by the 
difficulty of landing enoii.gh troops at any one debarcation, in the bad weather 
then prevailing. The capture of these batteries would have enabled the expe-
dition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first week; and, in the then unpre-
pared state of the French, the issue of a dash upon Antwerp can hardly be 
doubted . 
The dreadful mortality that assailed the British army is wholly unconnected 
with the plans, conduct, or issue of the enterprise, as a military movement; un-
less, indeed, it may have frustrated a scheme for occupying the island of Wal-
cheren as a position during the war. 
Possession was held of the island for five months; and it was finally abandoned 
from no pressure upon it by the French, although, after the first six weeks, the 
British force consisted, in the aggregate, of less than 17,000 men; of which, for 
the greater part of the time, more than half were sick-effectives being often 
reduced below 6,000 men. 
"\Ve see, therefore, that an effective force of less than 10,000 men maintained 
possession of the island, in the face of, and in close proximity to, the most for-
midable military power in Europe, for more than three months; and no reason 
can be perceived why it might not have remained an indefinite period, while 
possessed of naval superiority. 
T~e. proximity of Englan~ undoubtedly lessened the expense of the expedition, 
but 1t m~uenced the result m no other way material to the argument . 
. We will allu_de to no other instances of large expeditions sent by the English to 
distant countnes, than the two expeditions, each of about 10,000 men, sent in 
the year 1814 against this country: one by the way of Canada, the other to the 
Gulf of )1exico. United in a single force of 20,000 men against our sea-coast, 
the expen e would have been less, and the results more certain. 
The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found 
opportunities to embark in great undertakings of the same nature. In 1802, 
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Leclerc proceeded to St. Domingo with 34_ line-of-battle ships and large friga ~. 
more than 20 small frigates and sloops, and upwards of 20,000 men. 
We learn from these points in history what constitutes an object worth, u 
vast preparations; and it is impossible to resist the fact, that our own coast,.and 
rivers, and bays, possess many establishments not less inviting to an enemy than 
Flushing and Antwerp. , 
We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition; in other wor~. 
what is the amount of force we must prepare to meet; and, more than all, we are 
taught· that such an expedition, seizing a favorable moment, when the military 
arrangements of a country are incomplete-when the armies are absent, or im-
perfect in their organization or discipline-does not hesitate to land in the face 
of the most populous districts, and, availing of the local peculiarities, and covered 
and supplied by a fleet, to undertake operations which penetrate deep into the 
country, and consume considerable time. 
It seems, therefore, that whenever the object we are to cover possesses a value 
likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desire to inflict a 
serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water are guarded agains 
his ships; it will be indispensable to place safeguards against attack' by 
land also. A force considerable enough for very vigorous attacks agaim;t the 
land side of the fortifications may be thrown upon the shore; and if these yield, 
a way is opened for the ships, and the enemy carries his object. 
In certai!l positions, the local circumstances would favor the land operatiom 
of an enemy ; permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, to be 
aided by the fleet, and covered from the reaction of the general force of the 
country. In other positions, the extreme thinness of the population in t~e 
neighborhood would require the forts to rely, for a considerable time, on their 
own strength. In all such cases a much greater power of resistance would be 
requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In all such circum,Jance~ 
the works should be of a strength adequate to resist an attack, although perse-
vered in vigorously for several days. But when these land operations lead away 
from the shipping, or when the surrounding population is considerable, ?r ~e 
enemy is unable to shelter his movements by local peculiarities, then it "\\"1ll 
suffice if the works be competent to resist attacks, vigorous also, of a few hour~ 
only. . . 
'l'he magnitude and strength of the works will depend, therefore, on the _J?lil' 
influence of the value of the object covered, the natural strength of the posinon. 
and the succor to be drawn from the neighborhood. We may introduce, ~ 
instances, New York. and Pensacola. The former is as attackable as the latter: 
that is to say, it equally requires artificial defences; and, owing to its cap~cin~ 
harbor and easy entrance, it is not easy to place it in a satisfactory conchnon ~ 
to the approaches by water. But while an enemy, in approaching any of th 
principal works by land, could not well cover himself from the at~ac~s of, th 
concentrated population of the vicinity, the rapid means of commumcation fro 
tho interior would daily bring great accessions to the defence. A land attac 
ao-ain:.;t the city must, consequently, be restricted to a few days; and the -work= 
will fulfil th ir object, if impregnable to a coup de main. . 
. l'rn:-:acola, an object, in many respects, of the highest importance, ancl !!TOWI_D;:; 
m cou:-e()_uencc every day, i capable of being defended as perfectly a the cny 
~n;-;t mP11tioned. The principal defence lie on a long andy i land, which cl • • 
m th· liarbor from the sea. A.n enemy landed on this i land ( anta Ro--a} wo 
b in unint rruptcd communication with his fleet· could, owing to the :,;par::: n ~-
of th · population, lrnv nothino- to apprehend, for' ome time, from any re- n · 
ment..: arrivino- at the })lac ; and would b well protected, by po.ition, fr m 
_ft<.· :t. of thi.: ·uc r, wh 'n it , hould arriv . ·while in po, e · ion of 11aYal -u -
r10nty, h m1 ht, therefore not unrea onaLly calculate on b inO' aule to pre--
icgc f many day of the work which occupie the extremity of th i::land. 
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o-nards the entrance to the harbor. And even before coming into possession of 
this work his gun and mortar batteries, on the same island, would destroy every 
thing not bomb-proof and incombustible at the na:y yard. An attack -not less 
persevering, and with equal chances of success, might be made from the other 
side of the harbor also. 
If, therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred on 
the works at Pensacola, their object will be obtained only through the forbear-
ance of the enemy; it being obviously indispensable that the principal of these 
works be competent to resist a short siege. If this liability resulted from tl~e 
thinness of the neighboring population, it would still be many years before th~s 
state of thiugs would be materially altered. But it does not depend on tlus 
alone; the peculiar topographical features will continue tEis liability in spite of 
increasing numbers, and ever so easy and rapid communication with the interior; 
it having been proved that a fleet may lie broad off this shore and hold daily 
communication therewith during the most tempestuous season. The English 
fleet of men-of-war and transports lay, during the last war, from the 7th of 
February to the 15th March, 1814, anchored abreast of Dauphin island. and 
Mobile Point, where the exposure is the same as that off Pensacola. 
Between the cases cited, which may be regarded as of the class of extreme· 
cases, (a class comprising, however, many important positions,) almost every 
conceivable modification of the defence will be called for, to suit the various. 
conditions of the several points. 
'l'he fortifications of the coast must therefore be competent to the double task 
of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks-two distinct and 
independent qualities. The first demands merely an array in suitable numbers. 
and in proper proportions of heavy guns, covered by parapets proof against shot 
and shells; the second demands inaccessibility. As there is nothing in the 
first quality necessarily involving the last, it has often happened, either from the 
little value of the position, or from the supposed improbability of a land attack,. 
or from the want of time to construct proper works, that this property of inac-
cessibility has been neglected. 
Whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a battery, 
we should bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the object as 
well as ourselves. That it is a very easy thing for him to land a party of men 
for an expedition of an hour or two ; and, unless we take the necessary pre-
ventive measures, his party will be sure to take the battery first; after which, 
nothing will prevent his vessels consummating the design it was the purpose of 
the battery to prevent. 
In general, the same fortifications that guard· the water approaches will pro-· 
tect the avenues by land also, but in certain cases a force may be so lande<l as 
to evade the channel defences, reaching the object by a route entirely inland. 
Of course this danger must be guarded against by suitable works. 
After the preceding exposition of our views on the general subject of the de-
fences of the coast, it may not be out of place here to indicate the mode by 
which the system of fortifications on which we would rely can be manned and 
Hervcd without an augmentation for that particular purpose of the regular army. 
~he force that should be employed for this service in time of war is the militia, 
(~smg the term in~ comprehensive sense;) the probability being that, in most 
of_ the defended pou1;ts on the seabord, the uniformed and volunteer companies 
will FZupply the garrisons needed. And it may be shown that it is a service to 
which militia are better adapted than any other. 
~'l~e prominent defect of a militia force results from the impossibility of so 
tr_amnw the men to field m~vements in the brief period of their service as to 
~1,e them an_y confidence m themselves as manceuvrers in the face of regular 
troops ; the little they learn merely suffices to show them that it is but little;. 
Il. Ex Doc. 92--8 
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every attempt of the kind proving, by the disorder that they know not how to 
avoid, how much greater would be the disorder if in face of an enemy and under 
fire. 
vVi~l:~ut the knowleclg·e to _be obtained ~nly by long and laborious practice, 
the militiaman knows that he 1s no match 111 the field for the reo-ular soldier. 
and it is not surprising that he should desire to avoid an encounte~. But there 
is no such difficulty in the service of fixed batteries. The militiaman has to 1e 
taught merely the service of a single gun, than which nothing can be more 
simple. He must learn to use the rammer and the sponge, the handspike and 
the linstock, to load, and to run to battery, to trail and· to fire; these are all. 
Each of these operations is of the utmost simplicity, depending· on individual 
action and not on concert, and they may all be taught in a very short time. 
There is no ma11reuvring, no marching, no wheeling. 'I1he squad of one gun 
may be marched to another, but the service of both is the same. Even the art 
-0f pointing cannon is, to an American militiaman, an art of easy attainment, 
from the skill that all our countrymen :;icquire in the use of fire-arms-" drawing 
-sight, or aiming," being the same art, modified only by the difference in the gun. 
'rhe mode of applying this force may be illustrated by the case of any of our 
-cities on the seaboard. 'I'he forts and batteries, being put in perfect condition. 
·should be garrisoned (at least the more important ones) by a small body ot 
Teg·ular artillery, such as our present military force could supply, and sufficient 
for the preservation of the public property, and to afford indispensable daily 
guards; to these should be added two or three men of the ordnance departmen , 
especially charged with the condition of the armament and ammunition, and 
tw0 or three engineer soldiers, whose sole duty it would be to attend to the con-
·diti0n of the fortifications; keeping every part in a state of perfect repair. In 
certain important works, however, that would be exposed to siege, or to analo-
gous operations, it would be prudent, especially in the beginning of a war. r 
keep up a more consi<lerable body of regular troops. 
The volunteer force of the city should then be divided into detachment:, 
without disturbing their company organization, and should be assigned to ~" 
-several works, according to the war g·arrisons required at each; from folll' to~u 
men, according to cfrcumstances, being allowed to each gun. . 
rrhe larger works might require ten, fifteen, or even twenty comparues; th 
smaller, one, two, three, or more companies; and, in some cases, even a platoc·~ 
.might suffice. Being thus assigned, each portion of the city force w?uld _ha', 
its definite alarm-post, and should be often taken to it, and there exerc1 ed m 
the duties of its garrison, and more especially in the service of its batterie _a~ 
in its defence ag·ainst assault. The multiplicity of steamboats in all the c1_nr 
·would enable the volunteers to reach even the most distant alarm-po t ma 
short time. 
In order that all these troops may become expert in their duty, one of _tu 
-works most convenient to the city, besides being the alarm-post of some parhLu· 
lar portion of the volunteers, should, during· peace, b~ the ordinary school_ · 
drill for all; and in this the detachments should, in turn, assemble and exerci-
Be ides the mere manual of the gun and battery, there should be frequen· 
targ t practice, as being not only necessary to the proper use of th battery. 
but a imparting interest and excitement to the service. 
t mi<>'ht be n cc sn.ry for a time to submit the volunteers to the drill ot 
com pet nt officer or non-commi ioned officer of the regular artillery; and. · 
particular, to conduct th practice with f"hot and shell under uch instrncti n. 
Th portion of the military ,force of the city not tationed in the :fix cl 
t ri would con. titut , uncl r an imp ncling attack, a re ~ervc, po.Jed eith · 
on or ·ev ral bodi R, accordin to circum tancc , ready to cover exp f1 cl poin·: 
to co- perate in offi n ive mo:v mcnt , or to relieve exhau..:tcd gani.::Olk : 
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portion having connected with it the mounted force, the field artillery, and the 
heavy movable guns. . . . 
'I1his appropriation of the volunteer force to the 1mmed1ate defence ?f the city 
would operate in the most favorable way upon that force, superaddrng to t~e 
impulses of patriotism every feeling connected with_ family,_ property, _and so~rnl 
and civil relations, and, while making military service the first of duties, reliev-
ing it of hardship and privation. It would be a peculiar feature in this kind 
of service that the governing motive in the choice of officers would be favorable 
to the condition of the troops, every man feeling that the safety of his dearest 
concerns depended on the efficiency and courage of his officers. The same 
motive would prompt him, moreover, to desire, and contribute to, the highest 
state of efficiency in the corps. 
The organization of volunteer force here contemplated may comprehend the 
whole maritime frontier; and be applicable, also, at the more populous points 
upon the inland borders. 
This arrangement, while it might be an enduring one, would be the least ex-
pensive by far of any that would be efficient. 
'11he days· of exercise, drill, and encampment should be fixed and invariable, 
in order that they may the less interfere with the private occupations of the 
volunteers. During an impending attack, greater or less portions should. be 
-constantly at these posts; but still the service would comprise but a very small 
portion of the year. 
According to the value of the interest -to be defended, and the extent of the 
works to be occupied, would be the rank of the chief command ; which should 
be intrusted to an officer of the regular army, whose control might often be ex-
tended, advantageously, over a certain extent of seaboard to the right and left, 
constituting a maritime department. 
In the tables to be presented at the end of this report, we shall give the 
whole number of men required for the complete defence of each of the works. 
"\Ve now proceed to examine the coast in detail; and, in order to conform to 
the Senate's resolution, we shall divide the whole sea-coast of the United States 
into two great portions: the first portion extending from Passamaquoddy bay 
to Cape Florida; the second from Cape Flon'da to tlie moutli ef tlie Sabine. 
In our description we shall: without any other than this general aclmowledg-
ment, quote largely from a report presented to Congress in April, 1836, ancl to · 
be found in the Senate clocuments of the 1st session 24th Congress, No. 203, 
vol. 4. This report contains an argument on the general subject, embodying 
many important consiclerations, which we have thought best not to repeat in this 
lengthened report, but to refer to as worthy of perusal. 
·we will conduct the examination geographically, beginning at the northeastern 
extremity, ancl referring in every case to accompanying tables which exhibit 
the several works in the order of relative importance as to time. 
COAST FROM PASSAMAQUODDY BAY TO CAPE FLORIDA. 
The extreme northeastern section of this coast, extending from Quoddy Head 
to Cape Cod, is characterized by its serrated outline and its numerous harbors, 
and, at certain seasons, by its foggy atmosphere. 'I.1he extent of this section, 
measuring from point to point wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is 
about 500 miles; while a straight line from one of the above-mentioned capes to 
the other is hardly half that di::itance. The eastern half is singularly indented 
?Y deep bays; the coast being universally rocky and possessing numerous 
ll!land ·urrounded by d ep water, which islands not only increase the number 
of harbors, but cover, besides, an interior navigation well understood by the 
hardy coa ter and measurably secured by its intricacies, and the other dangers 
of this boisterous and foggy region, from interruption by an enemy. •'l'he western 
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half is much less broken; it is covered by few islands in comparison, but con-
tains several excellent harbors. 
The eastern harbors of l\faine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They arr-
not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near the public estal -
lishments of the greatest maritime power. 'l1hey are, moreover, as yet backed 
by only a thin population; and are, consequently, weak as well as exposed. 
The time may not, however, be very distant when, becoming wealthy and 
populous, they will be objects of a full portion of the national solicitude. Work~ 
desigll(•d for these harbors must therefore be i:alculated for the future; must lJ!' 
founded on the principle that they mu?t defend places much more important than 
any now existing there-; that, being near the possessions of a foreign powei. 
they will be in a particular manner liable to sudden and repeated attacks; and 
that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they are liable to be tardily succored. 
The works must consequently be competent to resist escalade, and to hold out 
for a few days. Feebler works might be more injurious than beneficial: their 
weakness would in the first place invite attack; and it being often a great ad-
vantage to occupy fortified. places in an adversary's territory, the enemy c~uld 
prepare himself to remedy the deficiencies of the forts after they should fall rnto 
his hamls, by adding temporary works, by providing strong garrisons, and by 
aiding the defence with his vessels. . . 
:No surveys have been made of these harbors, and no plans formed for the~r 
drfcnce. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that. much confidence 1~ 
not asked for the mere conjectures presented below, as to the number and cost 
of the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been 
surveyed : in some cases there may be mistakes as to the number of forts and 
batteries needed; in others, errors will exist in the estimated cost. 
Eastport and 1Vlaclzias may be mentioned as places that wm unquest~ona?lY 
be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative un-
portance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There 
are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island that may, at that 
period, deserve equal attention ; at present, however, the places mentioned will 
be the only ones estimated for; and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost at 
each.-(Statemen~ 1, table F.) 
Mount, Desert i'sland, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, having a capa-
cious and close harbor, affording anchorag,e for the higJ1est class of vessel~, and 
easily accessible from sea, offers a station for the navy of an enemy superior_to 
any other on this part of the coast. From this point his cruisers might act ,~·1th 
great effect against the navigation of the eastern coast, especially that of ~Jame: 
ai~cl his euterpriscs could be conducted with great rapidity against any J?Olllt:' ~c 
1mght.sclect. These considerations, added to the very great advantage m certam 
IJ~litical events, of our occupying a naval station thus advanced, whence we 
m1g t act offensively, together with the expediency of providing placr . of ~u~-
cor _on ~ part of the coast wl1crc vessels are so frequently perple:xe_cl m_ the.rr 
uay1gat1011 Ly the prevailing fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fort1-ficat10n. m 
a ,_-tr?11g manner, of this roaclstead may before long be neces ary. A f\UHey of 
tl11~ 1:-:l:nHl wa:-; hrgun many years ago; but the JHwty being called off to other 
clut1c, It wa:-; 1wvcr completed. 'l'he project of defensive works ha:- not L ·r. 
uuHlr.. The entire cof1t may be, as a:-::-:umecl by the engineer department ~om 
year;-; a~o, , 500,000.-(Statcm('])t 1, table F.) 
Castme.-It would H<' m to lie impo;;~il,lc, on this coa t, to dcp1ive an new: 
njoyincr naval superiority of lrnrhor~, or prevent lii ui-ing th rn , :'- ::-ta io -
during: war-in ·ular ,.ituation:, wl1ich l1i.· YC~i-cl~ woulcl render u1111ppn t ·h, -
lilc, lwin~ :-o mnnerou, ; lrnt it ;<•pm:-; 1n·oper tlwt i-uc:h of tlie.-e po:--ifr,u,-,', 
th ' i-itP.' of town;; :-J10u1<l be .'<'turPd. l11'ing the lai-t war the Eno·]i:-h Jwl' ih 
110~ition of a ·tine for om time, aucl left it at their 1ilcasurc. It i:, probabl 3 
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woTk costing about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice 
of this position.-(Statement 1, table F.) . 
1 
• 
Penobscot bay.-Upon this bay, and upon the nvcr of tne same name flow~ng 
into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which 
intersect the coast the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number 
of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed a la.rge portion of these 
harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable com-
merce of the bay and Tiver must be covered; and to afford a secure retreat for 
such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under the protection of the 
works to the east or west of the bay, the passage of the river must be defended. 
The lowest point at which this can be done without great expense is opposite 
Bucksport, at the "narrows." A project has been given in for a fort at that 
position estimated at $150,000.-(Statement 1, table D.) 
St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Slwepscu,t.-West of the 
Penobscot occur the above-mentioned bays, all being deep indentations leading 
to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry and enterprise. The 
bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans have been formed for their 
defence. $400,000 are assigned to the defence of these waters. 'l'he Sheeps-
cut is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every size.-(Statcment 1, 
table F.) 
Kennebeck river.-This river ( one of the largest in the eastern States) enters 
the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It 
rises near the source of the Chaudiere, which is a tributary of the St. Lawrence, 
and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and 
extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several 
very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the 
harbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. 'l'he 
smveys begun many years ago were never finished. The estimated cost of 
defences, as formerly reported by the engineer department, was $300,000. Po-
sitions near the mouth will permit a secure defence.-(Statement 1, table D.) 
Portland lwrbor.-Tbe protection of the town, of the merchantmen belong-
ing to it, and of the ships-of-war that may be stationed in this harbor to watch 
over this part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of them important 
objects,) may be secured, as an inspection of the map of the harbor will show, 
by occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish 
Point. 
If the two channels to the west and east of Hog island can be obstructed at 
small expense (to decide which some surveys are yet necessary) there will be 
no necessity for a battery on th~ ledge, and Fish Point need be occupied only 
by.' uch works as may be thrown up in time of war. rrhe expense, as now 
estimated, of the works planned for this defence, will be $155,000 for ::b"'ort 
PreLle, and $48,000 for House island; for Hog I sland channel say, $135,000.-
(Sta~em(mt 1, t_ables A, D, E, and F.) In addition there must be repairs im-
mechately apphed to the old works at an expense of $G,600. · . 
Saco, Kennebunk, ancl York.-Small works comparatively will cover these 
places; $75,000 is assumed as the aggregate cost.-(Statement, 1, table F.) 
Port.rnnoutli ltarbor and navy yard.-The only good roadstead or hai·bor 
beb1:een Cape Elizabeth and Cape Ann is Portsmouth harbor, within the mouth 
of_ Pi1:1cataqua river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend as high as Fox Point, seven 
mtles above the town. This situation, sufficiently commodious for a secondary 
naval depot designed to repair vessels of war, should be maintained; but it is 
t? be :egrcttcd that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as the 
~ite of the navy yard instead of Fernald's island. Being where it is, it will be 
n~ces.;ary, in time of war, to make some particular dispositions for the protection 
of the navy yard from an attack from the north shore of the Tiver. 
The po ·ition of Fort Constitution will certainly, and that of Fort McCleary 
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will probably, be occupied by the defences, though the works themselves should 
give place to those that will better fulfil the object. The other positions for 
forts or batteries are Gerrishe's Point, Fishing island, and Clark's island, some, 
if not all, of which must be occupied. Surveys are required before the projectE 
can be formed, or before estimates can be made; but there is reason for believing 
that the entire cost of fortifying this harbor will not fall short of $300;000.-
( Statement 1, table D.) 
Newburyport harbor.-11he points forming the mouth of the harbor are 
continually changing, and it seems necessary, therefore, to rely, for the defence 
of the harbor, on works to be thrown up during a war. There is only a shoal 
draught of water. It is thought $100,000 will defend this harbor adequately.-
(Statement 1, table F.) 
Gloucester liarbor.-'rhe position of this harbor, near the extremity of Cape 
Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts bay, 
and imparts to it considerable imp0rtance. No surveys have yet been made. 
but it is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for $200,000.-(State-
ment 1, table E.) Should there be any occasion for defensive works before the 
proposed new works can be commenced, an expenditure of $10,000 in repairs of 
th e old fort will be required.-(Table A.) 
Beverly liarbor.-'I1his harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the 
works designed for Salem. $50,000 in addition will secure it.-(Statement 1, 
table F.) 
Salem lwrbor.-The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, and 
separated therefrom by a peninsula. The occupation of the extremity of Win-
t er island (where are the ruins of l!...,01-t Pickering) on one side, and K angu~ 
Head on the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been pre: 
sented for this defence, estimated to cost $225,000.-(Statement 1, tables D anu 
F.) On a sudden emergency, old Fort Lee may be put in an effective state for 
$2,000.-(Table A.) . 
Jl!Iarblehead liarbor.-Besides covering, in some measure, the harbor of Bo~-
ton, Salem and Marblehead harbors possess an important commerce of the1r 
own, and also afford shelter for vessels prevented, by certain winds, from enter· 
ing· Boston, or pursuing their course eastward. The proposed mode of d~fend-
ing Marblehead harbor consists in occupying, on the north side, the hillock 
which commands the present Fort Sewall, (which will be superseded by the ne_w 
work,) and, on the south, the position of Jack's Point. The two works "'ill 
cost 318,000.-(Statements 1, tables D and .I!,.) 
To repair old l!...,ort Sewall, which may be necessary, if the new works arc not 
, oon begun, will require $10,000.-(Table A.). 
Boston harbor.-We come now to the most important harbor in the ca. tern 
ection of the coast; and, considering the relation to genern1 commerce, and thP 
intere, t of the navy, one of the most important in the whole Union. 
After a careful examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problc~. 
the hoard of naYal officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, ga,e thi::-
l1arhor a prcfi rcnce over all other positions to the ea t, and inclusive, of ~.,.cw 
York bay m1d thr Iluc1 on, a the scat of the great northern naval deJ)Ot · aud 
the o-ov mm nt, by the g-reat addition and improvements that have from). ar 
to y ar been inc made to the navy yard on the Ohade town side, lu1-e ,~rro-
all - ,·anctionecl the recommendation of the board. But, independent ot h · 
rnff · Yard, B ~ton it a city of great ·wealth, :md po e e an xten fre and ac-
tiY cmmn 1cc. 
1 b old w rk defi nclrc1 rnpr l - tlic interfor bm,in from attacks b, w. r : 
lmt a:- it oft n bappem, that VP:-:. Ji,; nt r .,. anfa1-1ket road1-1 with a wi11d ·too c. u 
to ti k tlwm to th ·it ' r ar d •tain d in l)rr1'-ic1Pnt road:- by Jight wind, r 
a ,cr1- tic1 · a. th form r, specially i:; a vrry conv nicnt an homz wh 
1 pr c d to ·ea; ancl abov all, a· ... .,. anta.,,k t road afford th b ~t I o"· 
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station for a blockading squadron, , it was deemed inc~ispensable to place perma-
nent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The proJect of defence regards the 
existing works, with the necessary repairs and modifications, as constituting a 
second barrier. 
Besides a permanent work, now well advanced, on George's island, it contem-
plates perm~rnent works on N antasket Head ; filling up the Broad Sound chan-
uel, so a" to leave no passage in that direction for ships-of-war. 
Until the best draught for steam vessels of war shall be well ascertained, it 
will not be safe to say to ,0vhat depth the Broad Sound ~hannel_ s~ould be re-
stricted; nor, indeed, can it be positively asserte~ that this descr1pt10n of vessel 
can be conveniently excluded by such means. Other vessels can, however, be 
thus excluded ; and steam vessels passing this channel would still have to pass 
the inner barrier. The estimated cost of the works for this harbor is $2,040,000. 
Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be necessary, in the be-
ginning of a war, to erect several temporary works on certain positions in the 
harbor, and on the lateral approaches to the navy yard.-(Statement 1, tables 
A, E, and F.) 
Plyrnouth, and Provincetown liarbors.-These harbors have a commerce of 
some consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference 
to the port of Boston. ·while these are undefended, an enemy's squadron blo~k-
ading Massachusetts bay 'will have ports of refuge under his lea, which woul<l. 
enable him to maintain his blockade, even throughout the most stormy seasons-
knowing that the winds whiGh would force him to seek shelter would be adverse to 
outward-bound, and fatal to such inward vessels as should venture near the Cape. 
"\Vere the enemy deprived of these harbors, he would be unable to enforce a 
rigorous investment, as he would be constrained to take an offing on every ap-
proach of foul weather. Our own vessels coming in from sea, and finding an 
enemy interposed between them and Boston, or, being turned from their course 
by adverse winds, would, in case of the defence of these ports, find to the south 
of Boston shelters equivalent to those provided in the east, at Marblehead, Sa-
lem, Gloucester, and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not been fully sur-
veyed. Provincetown harbor has been surveyed, but the projects of defence 
have not been formed. The former, it is thought, may be suitably covered by 
a work of no great cost on Garnett Point; while, to fortify Provincetown harbor 
in such a way as to cover vessels taking shelter therein, and at the same time 
deprive an enemy of safe anchorages, will involve considerable expense. Pro-
bably no nearer estimate can be formed at present, than that offered by the ·en-
gineer department some years ago, which gave $100,000 for Plymouth, and 
S600,000 for Provincetown.-(Statement 1, tables D and E.) 
'l'he coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern 
section in po,_sessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great por-
tion of sandy shore, in its milder climate and clearer atmosphere; and it differs 
from all the other portions in the <lop.th and magnitude of its interior seas and 
sounds, and in the distance to which deep tide navigation extends up its numer-
ous large rivers. The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great 
bays, measures 650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named 
cape~ to the other measures about 520 miles. 
ll[artlw' s Vineyard sound.-'l'o the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of Nan-
tucket and l\Iartha's Vineyard1 which, with several smaller islands on the south, 
and the proj ection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose the above-named sound. 
The channels through this sound, being sufficient for merchant vessels, and one 
of the channels permitting the passage even of small frigates, are not only the 
~omtant track of coasting vessels, but also of large numbers of vessels arriving 
m the tempe tuou. months from foreign voyages. There are within the sound 
the harbor of Tarpaulzn Cove, Fiolnies's .Hole, Edgartown, Fal7nouth, Hyan-
nis, arid Santucket, besides small anchorages. 
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In addition to the many thousand vessels passing this water annually, (of 
which there are sometimes forty or fifty,) a portion, containing very valuable 
cargoes, to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed 
to be at least 40,000 tons of whaling vessels owned in the tow;ns of this sound. 
If the harbors just named are to be defended at a;ll, it .must be by fortifica-
tions. There is little or no population except in the towns, and even this is be-
lieved to be entirely without military organization. A privateer rnig·ht run into 
either of these harbors, and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure. 
11.'he use of the sound itself, as an anchorage for vessels of war, cannot be pre-
prevcmted by fortifications alone. $250,000 may, perhaps, suffice for the defence 
of all the harbors against the kind of enterprise to which they are exposed.-
(Statement 1, table :E'.) 
New Bedford and Ti'airliaven lwrbor.-N o survey has been made of this 
harbor, on which lie two of the most flourishing towns. It is easily defensible, 
and the amount formerly assumed by the engineer department wm probably 
suffice, namely, $300,000.-(Statement 1, table D.) 
Bu.zzard's bay.-Interposed between the main and the island of JUartha'i\ 
Vineyard, are the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay on the eouth. 
This bay covers the harbor of New Bedford, and might be nsed as an anchor-
age by an enemy's fleet ; but it is too wide to be defended by fortifications. 
Xarraganset bay.-The properties of this great roadstead will be here briefly 
adverted to . More minute information may be obtained by reference to report:\ 
of 1820 and 1821. 
As a harbor, this is acknowledged by all to be the best on the whole coas~ of 
the United States; and it i~ the only close man-of-war harbor that is accessible 
with a northwest wind, the prevailing· and most violent winc1 of the inclement 
season. Nnmcrous boards and commission:s, sometimes compo1<ecl of naval 
officers, sometimes of army officers, sometimes of officers of both services, have. 
at different times, had the subject of this roadstead under consideration; and all_ 
have concurred in recommending·, in strong terms, that it be made a P:ace ot 
naval rendezvous and repair, if not a great naval depot; one or more of these 
commissions preferring it, for the latter purpose, to all other positions. 'l'hese 
recommendations ha Ye not been acted on; but it is next to certain that a war 
would force their adoption upon the government. 
·with the opening of this anchorage properly defended, hardly a ve~sel-of-
war would come, either singly or in small squadrons, upon the coaet, m ~hr· 
boisterous season, without aiming at this port, on account of the comparat1w 
certainty of an immediate entrance. And this would be particularly the ca:-:r 
with vessels injured by h eavy wea,ther, or in conflict with an enemy; with vc::--
seh! bringing in prizes, or pursued by a superior force. 
This use of the J:>Ort would almost neces:=;arily bring with it the demand for 
the mean: of repairing ancl refitting ; and the concentration of the~c upon :-omc 
euitable spot would be the beginning of a permanent dock yard. 
For th same reason that ships-of-war would collect h re, it would b~ a 
favorite point of rendezvous for privateers and their prizes, and a common plac · 
of rr.fuge for merchantmen. 
From this , a. a na;val station, th e naviO"fltion of Long I sland sound, and th 
communication h •twc n thi.· antl llfartba'~ Yin eyarcl ,_ound, or Buzzard'~ l1ay. 
mi,rht lJc W<'ll protectN1; .r T cw Loll don harbor would be covered ; the 1uivy }-arl 
wonH commmHl ·outhwarclly, a, from Hampton 1wtd · northwan:ly, the !!T"a· 
iuwarcl cmTe of th· coa~t bet"· ·c·n Cape 'ocl and 'npe IIattera;-;; the inf!u ·nc 
of which command OYC'r th blockaclinp: opc·ration :-; of :m enemy will LP app:u·m. 
wh f'u it i:- c011:-irl r·rc 1 that t]1e only l1arbcm, of n·fop;c left to liim wiil be the 
<·l:nnm• 'anlincr':'I, and Buzzard:-- J,ay;4, :,ncl ::\Iartlia':'I Yincyarcl .:nund . 
'l he hays fir:t mcntimwcl IH'long- to tl;e ·la::-, IH'f;>re allndc(l to, which. b ·in~ 
too wid for complete def ·ncc Lv batteri -4, um.·~ call in :uch auxiliary ddc.1c , 
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as the navy may supply; and, in reference to ~heix_ defence by these means, 
nothing can be more important than the fort1fica~10n o~ N arraganset roads, 
because all but the first of the bays J11st named (mcludmg an anchorage for 
ship.;-of-war under Block island) would be commanded by a single squad-
ron of those floating defences lying in these roads. 'ro a squadron of steam 
batteries, for instance, lying under the fortifications, it would be a matter 
of little consequence into which of the above anchorages a~ ~nc1:1y should 
go- all being within reach in three or four hours, and some w1tlun sight. We 
will here observe, by the way, that this use of floating defences is in accordance 
with the ptinciple before insisted on; they are not expected to close the entrance 
into these several bays, that would require a squadron for each at least equal ~o 
the enemy's ; but as the enemy goes in merely for rest or shelter, and there 1s 
no object that he can injure, he may be permitted to enter, and our squadron 
will assail him only ·when the circumstances of wind, weather, &c., give all the 
advantages to the attack. 'rlie fortification of Narraganset roads is therefore, 
in effect, a most important contribution toward the defence of all the neighbor-
ing anchorages. 
But the same properties that make N arraganset roads so precious to us, would 
recommend them to the enemy also ; and their natural advantages will be 
enhanced in his eyes by the value of all the objects these advantages may have 
accumulated therein. 
If this roadstead were without defence an enemy could occupy it without op-
position, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgment on the island of 
Rhode Island for the war. Occupying this island with his troops, and with his 
fleets the channels on either side, he might defy all the forces of the eastern 
States ; and while, from this position, his troops would keep in alarm and motion 
the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York, or against 
more southern cities, would equally alarm the country in that direction; and 
thus, though he might do no more than menace, it is difficult to estimate the 
embarrassment and expense into which he would drive the government. 
It has been alleged that similar consequences would flow from the occupation 
of other positions, (such, for instance, as arc afforded in the bays just mentioned,) 
and that, therefore, the defence in a strong manner of N arraganset roads is use-
less. 
Even allowing that there are other advantageous and inaccessible positions 
whereon an enemy might place himself, is it a reason because the foe can in 
spite of us, possess himself of comparatively unsafe and open lmrbors, that we 
should not apply to our own uses, but yield up to him the very best harbor on 
the coast; that we should submit to capture and destruction the valuable objects 
that accumulate in consequence of the properti€s of the harbor 1 
But it is believed that none of the outer and wider harbors wm answer for 
such an establishment as we have supposed, nor for any other purpose than an 
occa~ional anchorage of ships-of-war; and for these reasons, amongst others : 
that although ships-of-war might possibly ride in these broad waters at all 
seasons, it would seem to be a measure of great temerity for transports to 
attempt it, except in the mildest seasons; and there can be little doubt that a 
hostile expedition would resort to no harbor as a place of rendezvous, unless it 
afforded sure protection to its transports ; these being the only means by which 
ulterior pmposes could be executed, or final retreat from the country effected. -
If, moreover, N arraganset roads be fortified and become a naval station, or at 
least the f- tation of a floating force designed to act against these outer waters, 
such an ,,stabli~hment by any enemy ·would at once be put upon the defensive, 
and r,·qnire the constant pre ence of a superior fleet; thus measurably losing 
the ohject of the establishment. 
Independent of the q_ualities of the hm·bor, however, none of these bays would 
an:::wer our IJUrpose : l::it. Because they cannot be securely defended ; and, 2d. 
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Because they are difficult of access from the main-the communication with them 
being liable to interruption by bad weather, and liable to be cut off by the enemy. 
The defence adopted for N arraganset roads must be formidable on the import-
ant points, because they will be exposed to powerful expeditions. .Although 
the possession of this harbor, the destruc6on of the naval establislunent, the 
. capture of the :floating defences, and the possession of the island as a place of 
debarkation and refreshment, should not be considered as constituting, of them· 
selves, objects worthy a great expedition, they mig·ht very well be the prelimi-
nary steps of such expedition; and defences weak in their character might 
tempt, rather than deter it; for, althoug·h unable to resist his enterpri,e, they 
might be fully competent, after being captured and strengthened by such means 
as he would have at hand, to protect him from offensive demonstrations on our 
part. 
'There are, besides, in the local circumstances, some reasons why the works 
should be strong. The channel on the eastern side of the island, being peima-
nently closed by a solid bridge, requires no defensive works; but this bridge 
being at the upper end of the island, the channel is open to an enemy all along 
the eastern shore of the island. Works erected for the defence of the channel 
on the west side of the island cannot, therefore, prevent, nor even oppos~, a 
landing on the eastern side. The enemy, consequently, may take possession, 
and bend his whole force to the reduction of the forts on the island, which can-
not be relieved until a force has been organized, brought from a cli_stance, ~on-
veyed by water to the points attacked, and landed in the face of h1s battenes; 
all this obviously requiring several days, during which the forts should be capa· 
ble of holding out. 'ro do this aganist an expedition of 10,000 or 20,000 men, 
demands something more than the strength to resist a single asrnult. 
Unless the main works be competent to withstand a seige of a few days, they 
will not therefore fulfil their trust, and will be worse than useless. 
It must here be noticed that, although the works do not prevent the landing 
of an enemy on Rhode Island, they will. if capable of resisting bis ~fforts ~or a 
few days, make his residence · on the island for any length of time IIDpossible; 
since forces in any number may be brought from the main and landed under 
the cover of the fire of the works. 
To come now to the particular defences proposed for this roadstead. It must 
be stated that there are three entrances into Narraganset roads: . 
1. 'I1he eastern channel, which passes up on the east side of the 1sland of 
Rhode I land. This, as before stated, being shut by a solid bridge, need~ no 
defence by fortifications, other than a field-work or two, which may be thrown 
up at the opening of a war. 
2d. The central channel, which enters from sea Ly passing between Rhode 
I sland and Canonicut island. 'rhis is by far the best entrance, andlead~ 
t? the be t anchorage; and this it is proposed to defend by a fort on th ca~t 
Bid · of the entrance, designed to be the principal work in the ~ystem. Thi-: 
1vork, called Fort Adams, is nearly completed. On the west side of the en· 
!ranee it ~- proposed to place another work; and on an i land, cal~cd Ro~c 
i.lancl, facmo- the entrance, a third work. It i also proposed to rep:ur _the _old 
£ rt on Goat i8land, ju::;t within the mouth· and al. o old l"'ort Green, which b a 
littl ' hi()"h r up, and on the i.-land of Rhode Island. 
3~1. A. to th westcm pa ag ,, thr .e rnodefl pre, ent thcmselve : first : rc-
dntmO" th' c1 pth of wat •r by an artificial ledo· , o a while the pa.._~ap;e --hall 
b • a fr· a. it i now for th • coa. tin()" trade, it shall be hut a to the v •,,-cl, t 
war includin"' .-t am-Y :-:. · ·l~; ccon<l, Ly r ,] ·ino- on fortication alone to cl ' 
th · c·hrum ·l · r, thirc1 b · r<'~orting- in part to one and in l)art to th oth r rn 
ju.:t m ntion d. Eith r i. prati ·ah!·· hut, L ing the 1 ast xpen..iYe and II ,· 
·rt-tin, the .timat • ar £ und ·cl on th • fir~t. 
MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 123 
The total cost of the Narraganset defences is estimated at $1,817,482.-
(Statement 1, tables A, B, n, E, and F.) . 
Gardiner's bay.-It is uncertain whether this harhor, wJnch WOl~ld be a verr 
valuable one to an enemy investing this part of the coast, 1s defens1ble by forti-
fications alone. After it shall have been surveyed, it may appear that from one 
or more positions, the whole anchorage may be controlled by he~vy sea mortars. 
In such a case, the defensive works would not be costly. If 1t be found ex-
pedient to fortify some particular portion of the bay, as an anchorge for steam 
batteries, (which, however, is not anticipated,) the expense would probably_ be 
as great as was anticipated some years since by the engineer department, viz: 
$400,000,-(Statement 1, table F.) 
Sag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut.-Neither of these har-
bors has been surveyed with reference to defence. The first ii:; possessed of con-
considerable tonnage ; and the second, besides being engaged in commerce, is 
the terminous of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the 
first, and $200,000 to the other.-(Statement 1, tables E and F.) 
New London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound ; 
and, as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, rarely freezing, and 
being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also valua-
ble as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a block-
ading squadron off Sandy Hook. 
In the plan of defence, the present forts (Trumbull and Griswold) give place 
to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $441,000.-(State-
ment 1, tables C and F.) 
1\lloutk ef Connecticut river.-'.rhis river has been shown to be subject to the 
expeditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to its de-
fences; $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost.-(Statement 1, 
table F.) 
New Haven liarbor.-It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and 
enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected 
during the last war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of both may be set 
down at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of old Fort Hale.-
(Statement 1, table F.) 
There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides 
of the sound; none of them are very large as yet, still, most, if not all, are pros-
perous and increasing. Although, in their present condition, it might not be 
deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of 
the present object is to ascertain, as near as may be, the ultimate cost of com-
pletely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time when 
some of these towns may become objects of predatory enterprises of some mag-
nitude. Bearing in mind the probabl.e increase of population in the mean 
time, and the situation of the places generally, it is thought that $200,000 will 
be enough to provide defences for all.-(Statement 1, table F.) 
Kew Yorlc liarbor.-1.1he objects of the projected works for- the security of 
New York arc to cover the city from an attack by land or sea; to protect its 
numerous shipping; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of this great 
port ; and to cover the interior communication uniting this harbor with the Del-
aware. In the present condition of the defences an enemy would encounter no 
great oppo ition, whether his attack were made by land or water. 
r.rhcre are two avenues to the city, namely: one by the main channel, direct 
from , ea, and one by the sound. If an enemy come by the way of the sound, 
he may now land his forces on the N cw York side, at Hell Gate, within less than 
ten mile;-; of New York, ancl the next day, at the latest, be in the city; or he 
may land on the Long Island side at the same distance, and in the same time be 
master of the navy yard and of Brooklyn heights, whence the city of New York 
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is perfectly comm.anded ; · or he may divide his forces and reach both objects a 
the same moment. 
The projected system of defence closes this avenue at the greatest distance 
possible from the city, namely, at 'Throg's Point. The occupation of this poin 
will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles from the city on one ~ide, 
and still further from the navy yard on the other. -
A work now in progress at Throg's Point will probably prevent any attempt 
to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to land at a 
considerable distance from the object; and, as he will then be unable to turn the 
strong position afforded by Harlem river, the cover on the New York side 11ill 
be sufficient. 
But should he land on the Long island side he might, by leaving parties on 
suitable positions with a view to prevent our crossing the river and falling on 
his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having no obstacle in his front. To 
prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, a work should be 
erected on Wilkins's Point, opposite Throg's Point. 'I1his work, besides com-
pleting the defence of the channel, would involve a march against the navy yard 
from this quarter in great danger; since all the forces that could be collected on 
the New York shore might, under cover of this work, be crossed over to Long 
island, and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting off his communication with the 
fleet. · 'l'he two works on Throg's and Wilkins's Points may, therefore, be re-
garded as perfectly protecting, on that side, the city and navy yard. 
Against an attack by the main channel there are-
lst. 'I'he works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an enemy'" 
squadron only after its arrival before the place. 'They consist of Fort Colum-
bus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's island; Fort Wood, on 
Bedlow's island; and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island. 
It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the 
lower barrier being forced, these would still afford a resource. !t is ~ cli~ad-
vantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might he 
going on simultaneously with the contest between these fort~ and the ~eet. 
They cannot, however, be dispensed with, until the outer barriers are entll'ely 
completed, if even then. 
2d. At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the psssagc become~ 
so contracted as to permit good disposition to be macle for defence. On the Lon(7 
islanr1 side of the Narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong water-b'.1tte:y 
standing on a reef at some distance from the shore; and immediately bchmd it, 
on the top of the bank, is a small but strong work, called Fort Hamilton. ome 
repairs being applied to these works, this position may be regarded a~ well 
occupied. 
n the west side, or Staten island side of the narrows, are the following work, 
belonging to the State of New York, viz: Fort Riclnnond, which i ' a water-
battery; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water; Batt:'!/ 
JJl~rtOJ~, which is a mall battery on the top of the hill; and Fort Tomkw · 
wluch 1. aL:,o on the top of the hill, and is the principal work. All the:-1c need 
great re1mir,: ; but, being once in proper order, would afford a very importau· 
contrilJntion to the defence of th passage; nothino- further, indeed, bein(l' con-
templ. tPd for thi: po ition, except the con, truction of a i:@all redoubt on a <.: ID· 
m:rncling hill, a little to the i--outhwC' t. The repair, of these works cannot t 0 
0011 1, · taken in hand; ancl it is hoped ome arrangement may oou he mad 
with th· :·tat authoriti(·.' to that end. 
Yith th·~ Tarrow,.. thn:-i c1c·frndc(}, and the work. 1war th city in pcifl'd order . 
.,.. ·w ~ork might L r garcled as 1n· tty well protected a<raini-t au attack l1y w. t r 
through thi: pa:-1~ag . 
13ut th ·r · li1·, h ·low th narrow,· < capa ·ion:; hay, affordinO' O'ooc1 anehor.,... 
for any number of v · ·cl -of-war and trau ]>OrL·. An enemy'. i-1uadron h ·u __ 
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in that bay into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this outlet 
of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of the ~ear . 
.And it would also intercept the water communication, by the way of the Rantan, 
between New York and Philadelphia. 
The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend baJ:, (the 
place of the landing of the British, which brought on th~ battle of Long 1sla1;1d 
in the revolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its 
commanding height, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any 
sort. 
This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to ~e. as 
fully realized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an exped1t~on 
being in preparation in England, 27,000 militia were assembled to cover the city 
from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences near the city, and 
those at the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other purposes, cannot_ be 
made to prevent this enterprise, which can be thoroughly guarded agamst 
only by-
3d. An outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor. This would accom-
plish two objects of great consequence, namely, rendering a close blockade of 
the harbor impossible; and obliging an enemy, who should design to move 
troops against the navy yard, to land at a distance of more than twenty miles 
from his object, upon a dangerous beach; leaving, during the absence of the 
troops, the transports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter. The 
hazards of such a land expedition would, moreover, be greatly enhanced by the 
fact that our own troops, by passing over to Long island under cover of the fort 
at Wilkins's Point, could cut off the return of the enemy to his fleet, which must 
lie at or somewhere near Rockaway; time, distance, and the direction of the 
respective marches, would make, very naturally, such a manreuvre a part of the 
plan of defence. .Against an enemy landing in Gravesend bay, no such manamvre 
could be effectual, on account of the shortness of his line of march, as well as of 
its direction. 
In view of these ·considerations, the board of engineers projected additional 
works-one for the east bank and another for the middle ground,· these posi-
tions being on shoals on either hand of the bar, outside of Sandy Hook. Before 
determining on the works last mentioned, the board went into much research in 
order to ascertain whether these shoals were unchangeable, and it was thought 
to have been fully proved that there had been no material alteration in more 
than sixty years. This apparent stability of the shoals encouraged the board 
to devise the project referred to. · 
Recent surveys have, however, discovered a new or rather another channel. 
If it 1e indeed a new channel, it shows a want of stabiHty in the shoals that 
forbids any such structures as the contemplated batteries, and it may be neces-
sary to resort to other means. Suitable means exist, unquestionably, though it 
may not be best to decide on them until all doubt as to the fixed or changing 
nature of the channel shall be removed, especially as it must necessarily be 
some time before the completion of more indispensable works will allow the 
commencement of these. 'l'his may, however, be said with certainty, namely: 
that, all other means failing, works may be erected on Sandy Hook which will 
have a good action upon the channel, and under cover of which bomb ketches 
o_r steam bat~~ries, or both, may lie. With such an arrangement there would be 
little probability of the lo,ver bay being occupied as a blockading station. 
To recapitulate : The security of the city of ~ ew York and the navy yard 
rr·r1nirc;4, fir:-lt, defences on the passage from the sound; namely, the completion 
<if :Fort Schuyler on 'l'hrog's Point, and the erection of a fort on ·Wilkins's 
~oint- cost of both, $976,000; eecond, the repair of works on Governor's 
i:-land, on Bcdloe's i,.;land, and on Eilis's island-estimated cost, $170,897; 
third, the repair of the works at the Narrows, including the works belonging to 
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tlie State-cost, $475,000 ; and, fourth, the erection of outer defences on or 
near Sandy Hook-estimated by the board of eng'ineers to cost $3,362,824. 
'l'he total cost, exclusive of these last, will therefore be $1,621,897, or, in-
cluding these, $-!,984, 721.-(Statement 1, tables A, 0, and F.) 
Delaware bay, Fort Delaware, Fort Mifflin, Delaware brcakwater.-The 
coast from the mouth of"the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the 
south side of Long island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated by several inlet; 
but not one besides the Delawa1~e is navigable by sea-going vessels. 'rhe Dela-
ware bay itself, being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and 
being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords no very good natural harbor 
within a reasonable distance of the sea. 
The artificial harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen will, 
it is hoped, fully supply this need, in which event it must be securely fortified. 
No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object, and as to the pro-
bable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the conjectural e~ti-
mate made some years since in the engineer department, namely, $600,000.-
( Statement 1, table F.) 
The lowest point at which the bay is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about 
forty-five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on that island, to re-
place the one destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware 
shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware channel, and at the same time pro-
tect the mouth of the Delaware and Ohesapeak~ canal; a temporary wor~ ~n 
the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of a war, to a. s1 t lil 
closing the channel on that side; together with floating obstructions, to be ~ut 
down in moments of peril, will effectually cover all above this position-Ill· 
eluding Philadelphia and its navy yard, Wilmington, Newcastle, the canal be-
fore mentioned, and the Philadelphia and Baltimore railroad. 
The commencement of the rebuilding of Fort Delaware being del~ye~ b! 
difficulties attending the settlement of new claims to the island on wh1c~ it IE, 
to stand, Fort Mifilin, which is an old work about seven miles below the city ot 
Philadelphia, has been put in good order. 'l1his work i::, ready to receive it;: 
armament and its garrison. · 
'l'he expense of the work on Fort Delaware may be estimated at $491,000. 
and of the fort opposite, $521,000.-(Statement 1, tables O and F.) . 
Cltesapeake bay.-The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted with 
the selection of sites for a great northern · and a great southern naval depot, 
recommended in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820 Burwell's bay, on Jame:: 
river, for the one, and Charlestown, in Boston harbor, for the other. They abo 
recommended Boston harbor and N arragansct bay, at the north, and Hampt?n 
roads, at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In those reports the coIDIDI::-
ioners entered at hrge into the consideration of all the matters relating to the::e 
im1)ortant objects, and reference is now made to those reports for many intereH· 
ing details . 
. Ham1:ton roads, ,Tames river, N01:follc, and tlie navy yard.-Tbe work pr~-
J cted for the defence of these are, 1st, a fort at Old Point Comfort-this 1:: 
call cl Fort ::.\fonroe; 2d, a casemated battery, called Fort Calhoun, on the Rip 
Rap hoal , oppo ite Old Point Comfort; and, 3d, a line of floating ob::truc-
tion: •xt ucling acro ._s the channel from one of the e work to the other. I-
wa: th opinion of the commis. ion above m ution ·cl that, in the event of a !!TC,· 
nav~~ J p t b ing fix cl on _J amc. river, it might ultimately be prop r to pron 
add1t10nal tr no-th by placmo- work· on the po ition of .1. ewport ... Tew, 1' ,. 
, aw ;-;hoal , ~nd 1ran y I laud flat . j ud1 an c:xpan ion ha , however: , iuce 
th ,n ? · !1 giv n t . ~he p~· , nt navy yard at o:-iport, ( oppo ite ... T 01folk.) ~ -
th re i.· httl probability of any oth r po ·ition on the e waters being occup1 
fi r .· u ·h purp • 
rl'he great importance of r taining Hampton roads during a war, and of co,er-
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ing the navy yard, is conceded on all hands. The bearing of this harbor upon 
the general defence of the Chesapeake bay is, perhaps, equally well understood, 
it being very evident that a small hostile force would reluctantly venture up the 
bay, or into York river, or the Rappahannock, or any of the upper harbors, 
leaving behind them a great naval . station, and the common rendezvous of the 
southern coast-a station seldom in time of war without the presence of a num-
ber of vessels just ready for, or just returned from, sea. 
A very important bearing upon the security of Norfolk and the navy yard, 
independent of the closing the channel to those places, is, however, not generally 
understood, and has been entirely overlooked in the officfal animadversions 
(before mentioned) on the system of defence of the board of engineers. 
If we suppose no defences at the mouth of the roadstead, or only such as can 
be disregarded or easily silenced, an enemy might debark his troops in Linn-
haven bay, and despatch them against Norfolk, while his fleet would pass up 
the harbor to the vicinity of the town, not only covering the flank of his troops, 
but landing· parties to turn any position that might be taken by the army at-
tempting to defend the place; or, insteai of landing in the bay, he might at his 
option land the main body quite near to Norfolk; and, having possession of 
James river, he would prevent the arrival of any succor in steamboats or other-
wise by that channel. 
There are two or three defiles on the route from Lynnhaven bay to Norfolk, 
caused by the interlocking of streams, that, with the aid of field-works, would 
possess great strength; and being occ11pied in succe~sion, would undoubtedly 
delay, if not repulse, an enemy assailing them in front. Since the naval depot 
seems fixed at Gosport, these must, indeed, be chiefly relied on for its security 
from land attacks; and timely attention must be given, on the breaking out of a 
war, to the occupying of these defiles with appropriate defences. These posi-
tions possess no value whatever if they can be turned, and without adequate 
fortifications at the outlet of Hampton roads; there would seem to be no security 
for Norfolk or the navy yard, except in the presence of a large military force. 
On the completion of the projected defences, the circumstances will be very 
different. 'Then, thuse defiles must be attacked in front, because no part of the 
enemy's force can be landed above the mouth of the roads. But this is not all. 
'l'he moment an enemy advances towards Norfolk from this point of debarka-
tion, his communication with his fleet will be jeoparded, because, as the defiles 
do not require a large body to defend them against an attack in front, the greater 
part of the reinforcements arriving from above, by way of the river, may be 
landed upon his flanks, or in his rear. An offensive land movement by the 
enemy, under such circumstances, could be justified only in the case of his 
finding an entire want of preparation, caused by the unexpected commencement 
o~ hostilities. In connexion-with this disposition for defe11ce, it may be expe-
dient on the opening of a war, to throw up a field work on the shore onposite 
the position of Fort Calhoun, which would, besides, contribute to the ex~lusion 
from the roadstead of vessels of small draught. 
The above remarks show that the fortifications in progress are not less neces-
sary to the security of the navy yard and the city of Norfolk from a land at-
tack, than from an attack by water, and that both these important functions are 
superadded to the task of defending the only good roadstead of the southern 
coa ·t, and of contributing, in a very important degree, towards the defence of 
the Chesapeake bay. 
A in the case of Narraganset roads, it has been objected to this system of 
def~nce, that, although it may shut up this anchorage, it leaves others ~n this 
region open. May we suppose, then, that if there were no other than th1s har-
bor, it defence would be justifiable 1 If so, it would seem that the objection 
rest on the principle that in proportion as nature has been bountiful to us, we 
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must be niggard to ourselves; that, having little, we may cherish it, but, having 
much, we must throw all away. 
The same criticism complains of the unreasonable magnitude of one of thM 
works, (Fort Monroe,) and we concede that there is justice in the criticium. 
But it has long been too late to remedy the evil. It may not, however, be im-
proper to avail of this opportunity to remove from the country the professional 
. reproach attached to this error. 1Vhen the system of coast defence was about 
to be taken up, it was thought best by the government and Congress, to call 
from abroad a portion of that skill and science which a long course of active 
warfare was supposed to have supplied. Fort Monroe is one of the result of 
that determination, It was not easy, probably, to come down from the exag-
gerated scale of warfare to which Europe was then accustomed; nor for those 
who had been brought up where wars were often produced, and always magni-
fied Ly juxtaposition or proximity, to realize to what degree remoteness fi·om 
belHgerent nations would diminish military means and qualify military objects. 
Certain it is, that this experiment, costly as it was in the case of Fort l\Ionroe, 
would have been much more so but for the opposition of some whose more 
moderate opinions had been moulded by no other circumstances than those pe-
culiar to our own country. 
'l~he mistake is one relating to magnitude, however, not to strength. :Magni-
tuae in f9rtification is often a measure of strength; but not always, nor in thi' 
instance. Fort Monroe might have been as strong as it is now against a water 
attack, or an assault, or a siege, with one-third its present capacity, and per-
haps at not more than half its cost. We do not think this work too strong for 
its position, nor too heavily armed; and as the force of the garrison will depend 
mainly on the extent of the armament, the error has caused an excess in the 
first outlay chiefly, but will not involve much useless expense after comple~o~. 
Although the:1:e is much important work to be done to complete the fort, 1t 1' 
even now in a state to contribute largely to the defence of the roadstead, and 
there is no doubt that in a very short time all the casemated parts may be per-
fectly ready to receive the armament. 
This work will be found in statement 1, table C; $223,367 being required to 
complete it. 
l!'ort Calhoun cannot yet be carried forward for want of stability in the foun-
dation. The artificial mass on which it is to stand having been raised out of 
the water, the walls of the battery were begun some years since, but it w~s soon 
found that their weight caused considerable subsidence. On an inspe~t10n by 
engineer officers, it was then decided to keep the f01mdations loaded with more 
than the whole weight of the :finished work until all subsidence had cea~ed. 
'l'~ie load had hardly been put on, however, before it was injudici?uslY: deter-
mmed to take it off and begin to build, although the settling was still gomg on. 
Happily a better policy prevailed before the construction was resumed, but not 
b fon• the very considerable expense of removiug· the load had been incuned, 
ancl the further expense of replacing it rendered necessary. It is hoped the 
whol load will be replaced early the present year.-(Statement 1, table -) 
R quir ·cl to complete the work $416,000. 
It may be expedient, in time of war, by way of providing interior barrier5, 
_ to er ·t lmtteric. on Cranry fr,Jand, at the mouth of Elizabeth river, and to put 
in concliti n arnl arm old :b~ort K orfoJk, which is ju t below the city . 
. ~Ir!r1){Jr rf S~. lllary:s.-'l'he c ntral situation (as regard the Uhe~ape~k~). o 
tl11:-- fllw ba-.;m, 1t. r lat10n to the l)otornac, it depth of water, and "the facility 
with which it may h de£ nd d, iucli ·ate its fitnc s as a harbor of rcfug · for the 
·onun re of the he. apeak bay, and a.· an occa;c.;ional, if not con~tm1t ~tation 
chll'~ng- war of c portion of th· naval force. A . urwy ha been mad , but_ no 
pr~ ·ct Im: be n formed. The ngiuecr department, , ome year ago, conJec-
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tured that the cost of defences in this harbor might amount to $300,000.-
(Statement 1, table F.) 
Annapolis liarbor.-No surveys or plans of defence have been made. The 
existino· works are inefficient and quite out of repair. A former estimate made 
by the ~ngineer department, amounting to $250,000, is adopted here.-(Statement 
1, table :F'.) 
Harbor ef Baltimore.-The proximity of the city to Chesapeake bay greatly 
endangers the city of Baltimore. In the present state of things, an enemy in a 
few hours' march, after an easy landing, and without having his communication 
with his fleet seriously endangered, can make himself master of that great em-
porium of commerce. There are required for its security two forts on the Pa-
tapsco-one at Hawkins's Point, and the other opposite that point, at the extreme 
end of the flat that runs off from Sollers's Point; these being the lowest posi-
tions at which the passage of the Patapsco can be defended. Besides the ad-
vantages that will result, of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distance-
thereby gaining time, by delaying his march, for the arrival of succor, and pre-
venting his turning tbe defensive positions which our troops might occupy-it 
will be impossible for him to endanger the. city by a direct attack by water. 
The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt W oocl, and Covington battery should be 
retained as a second barrier. The first mentioned is now in good condition, and 
the repairs required for the others may be applied at the beginning of a war. 
The fort on Sollers's Point flats, which should be first commenced, is estimated 
to cost $1,000,000.-(Statement 1, table D.) 
The fort on Hawkins's Point, (to be found in statement 1, table F,) will cost, 
it is supposed, $376,000. ; 
Moutli qf Elk river.-The completion of the line of water communication 
from the Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it proper to place a 
fort somewhere near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an enemy from 
destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works forming this outlet of the canal. 
There. have been no surveys made with a view to establish such protection, 
which are estimated at $50,000.-(Statement 1, table F.) 
Cities ef Wasliington, Georgetown, and Atexandria.-Fort Washington 
covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land 
at some eight or ten miles below Alexandria, should that city be his object, and 
about twice as far below Washington. It will also serve the very important 
purpose of covering tr()Ops crossing from Virginia with a view to fall on the 
flanks of an enemy moving against the capital from the Patuxent or the Chesa, 
peake. To put the necessary repairs on Ji-,ort Washington will cost about 
$20,000.-(See statement 1, table A.) 
Cedar Point, Potomac ri,ver.-But all these objects would have been better 
fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point. As it is, however, 
the contemplated works being constructed in the Patuxent, and the militia of 
the surrounding country in a clue state of preparation, an enterprise ao·ainst 
\\.,. ashington would be a hazardous one. ti 
. A. g~vin~ complete security to the towns in the District, covering more than 
sixty 1mles 111 length of the Potomac, and a large tract of country lying between 
the Potomac and the Patuxent, the work on Cedar Point should not be omitted. 
There have been no surve:ys made of the ground, nor projects of the fort, which, 
in a conjectural estimate of the engineer department, was set down at $300,000.-
(Statement 1, table E.) 
Patuxent river.-The more effectually to protect the city of Washington from 
a :-udden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation in the P atuxent, 
and to provide additional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a fort has been 
planned to occupy Point Patience, and another to occupy Thomas's Point, both 
a short distance up the river. The work on Thomas's Point is (in statement 1, 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--9 
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table D) estimated to cost $250,000; and the work on Point Patience, (in ,Jate-
ment 1, table F,) estimated to cost $246,000. 
It will be perceived that the system of defence for Washington contemplate._, 
first, defending the Potomac on Cedar Point and maintaining a second barrier at 
Fort -w ashington; second, defending the mouth of the Patuxent. This syfstem 
is criticised in the document before referred to in a way to induce the suspicion 
that it was not understood. 
During the last war there was no fort in the Patuxent ; and the consequence 
was, that the British approached by that avenue and occupied the whole riYer 
as high as Pig Point-nearly fifty miles from its mouth, and less than twenty 
miles from the capital; while, in consequence of there being no forts in the Po-
tomac, they occupied that river as high as Alexandria, inclusive; by this latter 
occupation perfectly protecting the left flank of the movement during its whole 
advance and retreat. Both flanks being safe, the British had nothing to fear 
except from a force in front; and that this risk was not great, in the short march 
of less than twenty miles from his boats, was proved by the issue. 
On the ninth day from that on which the fleet entered the Chesapeake the 
English army was in possession of the capital, having penetrated near fifty miles 
beyond the point of debarkation. On the twelfth day from the time of landing, 
the troops were again on shipboard near the month of the river. This attack, 
exceedingly well conceived and very gallantly executed, owed its success en-
tirely to the want of defences, such as are now proposed. 
Let us suppose both rivers fortified as recommended, and an enemy landed at 
the mouth of the Patuxent. If now he attempt this enterprise his march will 
be prolonged by at least four days; that is to say, it will require more than .,ix-
teen days, during which time he will be out of communication with his fleet, a· 
regards supplies and assistance. 
The opposition to his invasion wm begin at the landing, because our troops 
having now nothing to fear as to their flanks, either from the Potomac or Pa-
tuxent, will dispute every foot of territory; and although he should continue to 
advance, it must be at a slower rate. 
While he is thus pursuing· his route towards Washington, the forces of Yir-
ginia will be crossing the Potomac and concentrating at Port 'J.1obacco, or ome 
position between that place and Fort Washington, preparatory to falling on ~ii:-
fl.ank and rear. This would seem to be conclusive; for it is difficult to conceive 
of troops persevering in an expedition when every moment will not only place 
them further from succor, but greatly increase their need of it. Railroad reach 
from near the crossing places of the Potomac to the very heart of the co1m~ 
south; and a very few days would bring forward a large force, all of which 
would arrive upon the rear of the enemy. 
It is said in the criticism that, if shut out of the Patuxent, the enemy might 
land between the mouth of that river ancl Annapolis, and thence proceed agains 
1Y"a,·hin°'ton. But the same difficulties belong to this project, and a new diffi-
culty i,· added. The Virginia forces arrive, as before, and as.,ail his flank either 
L twe<'n the Potomac and Patnxent, or between the Patuxent and the Che::a-
1wakc; and thcr i ·, beside:-, the Patuxent for the enemy to cross both in goin!! 
and retumiuo--it: •Jf a formidable military obi;tacle. 
1 t i said al~o, that th<> landing mny be made in the Potomac; but thi" only 
pron.· that th sy:tcm animaclvnted on had not be n studied, it brino- a fun-
c~a_mental p_ri11ci11le of th f-lJ, .tem that such landing mu, t be prev nted by forti-
f ymg: the nY ·r. a~ low do vn a~ po:-;i-:iLle. 
'l Jw • ontlll'rn ·on:-t, ·tr ·tching from Cape Hatteras to the southern 11oiut o 
}'lnri<la ii; inv:ll'ialJly low, and for the rrr<'ater pnrt sandy; much r :-embli -
tlll' c a,-t from th· abovc-m •ntion cl cape to i\Iontank l'oint, on the ea::,t n 
Long· I--lan<1. 
ri<l <re f ,.and, h re and there interrupt d by the alluvion of the riveTo. x-
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tends through its whole length. This ridge, in certain portions, lies on the 
main land, while in others it is divided therefrom by basins or "sounds". of 
various width and depth, and is cut up into islands by nun:erous ch~nnel_s ':Inch 
connect these interior waters with the sea. Wherever this sand ndge 1s mter-
ru pted, its place is occupied by low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal 
and the many lesser outlets of the rivers. . . 
Ocracock inlet, N. C.-The shallowness of the water on the bars at this mlet 
effectually excludes all vessels-of-war-at least, all moved by sails. But as 
this is an outlet of an extensive commerce, and as, through this opening, attempts 
might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class of steam vessels, to 
destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of interior water communication, 
timely preparation must be made of temporary works equal to defence against 
all such minor enterprises. 
B eaufort liarbor, N. C.-A work called Fort Macon has been erected for the 
defence of this harbor, which will require some repairs. Some operations are 
also called for to protect the site from the wearing action of the sea. ( State-
ment 1, table A.) Estimate, $10,000. 
Moutlis ef Cape Fear river, N. C.-The de.fence of the main channel of 
Cape Fear requires, in addition to Fort Caswell, (now nearly completed,) on 
Oak island, another fort on Bald Head. And the defence of the smaller channel 
will require a redoubt on Federal Point. The battery magazine, block-house, 
&c., at Smithville, should remain as accessories. Fort Caswell, Oak island, 
(statement 1, table 0,) requires $6,000 to complete it; the fort on Bald Head' 
(statement 1, table F) will require $180,000; the redoubt on Federal Point' 
(statement 1, table F) will require $18,000; and the battery, &c., called Fort· 
Johnston, at Smithville, (statement 1, table A,) $5,000. 
Georgetown harbor, S. C.-The first inlet of any consequence south of Cape 
Fear river is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers, 
forming Georgetown harbor; which is a commodious and capacious bay, having 
sufficient water within, and also upon the bar near the mouth, for merchant 
vessels and small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor was begun many 
years ago, but never completed, and no projects for defence have been 
made. It is probable that a work placed near Moscheto creek, or on Winyaw 
Point, would give adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000.-(Statement 
1, table E.) 
Santee river and Bull's bay.-About ten miles south from Georgetown are 
the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not known 
whether the bars at the mouths of this river have sufficient water for sea-going 
ves. els. The same uncertainty exists as to the depth into Bull's bay. It may be 
"°ufficient to consider these and the other inlets between Georgetown and Charles-
ton as calling for small works capable of resisting boat enterprises, and to 
assign as the cost $100,000. Should they prove to be navigable for privateers. 
they will require a larger expenditure.-(Statement 1, table :F.) 
Cltarleston, S. C.-This city, situated at the junction of Ashley and Cooper 
rivers, is about five miles, in a direct line from the sea. Between it and the 
ocean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. ·upon the bar, 
lyiJ.1g three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only water 
enough for smaller frigates and sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of the 
harbor is ,James's island, in which are several serpentine passages, more or less 
naviga1Jle for boats, barges, and small steam vessels ; some of them communi-
cate <lir<>ctly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly 
pa:::. a~· from the Stono to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river opposite the 
middle of the city. 
Int 1 ior nc1tnral water communications exist, also, to the southwest of Stono 
rin::r, connecting this with North Edisto river; the latter with South Edisto 
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and St. Helena sound; this again, with broad river; and, finally, this last with 
Savannah river. 
On the north side of the harbor of Charleston lies Sullivan's island, separ-
rated from the main by a channel navigable only by small craft. On the north-
west side of this island is an interior water communication, which extends to 
Bull's bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown. 
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defence" to 
the principal entrance of the harbor. The lateral avenues must also be shut. 
And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show that the 
best mode of defending them will be by works at or near the mouths of the 
inlets, as the enemy will be kept thereby at a greater distance from the city; 
the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be protected, and the line of interior 
water communication will be inaccessible from the sea. 
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor 
can be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's 
island. This is, at present, occupied by Fort Moultrie-a work of some strength, 
but by no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak, and the scarp 
so low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by a 
modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a full defence 
of the harbor, has not yet been determined. But so long as it is the only work 
at this, the principal point of defence, it must be kept in good condition for ser-
vice; and no alterations that will disturb this efficiency should be undertaken. 
The repairs now indispensable will cost $10,000.-(Statement 1, table A.) 
On a shoal nearly opposite to Fort Moultrie the foundation of a fort has 
:been begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie. This is 
,called :Fort Sumter. (Statement 1, table C.) To complete this work will re-
quire, it is estimated, $286,000. 
In the upper part of the harbor is Castle Pinckney, on Shuter's Folly island. 
This requires some repairs, estimated at $_7,000.(-Statement 1, table A.) 
Stano, Nortli Edisto, and Soutli Eclisto.-All these must be fortified, at least 
in such a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or small ves-
schl. '!10 that end, $50,000 may be assigned to each.-(Statement 1, table F.) 
St. 1-Ielena sound.-'I'he proper defences cannot be pointed out till the sound 
shall have been surveyed. Although there is supposed to be no great depth of 
water on the bar, it is known to be navigable for the smaller class of merchant-
men and for steamboats, and to have a navigable communication with the head 
of Broacl river, or Port Royal, intersecting the interior navigation between 
Charleston and Savannah. 'I'he estimate is $150,000.-(Statement 1, table F.) 
Broad river, or Port Royal roads.-The value of this capacious road tead 
as n. harbor of refuge depends on the depth that can be carried over the bar; on 
th distance of this bar beyond the line of coast, and on the means that may be 
applicaulc of le. sening the danger of crossing it. 'I'his is supposed to be t?e 
de 1>ct-it bar on the outbern coast. Should there prove to be water enouO'h for 
frio·ate, ', and ·hou~d it be practicable to make the passage over the bar sa~·e ~nd 
ea~y, by the erect10n of li 0 ·ht-houses on the shore and lights, or other dii!hllC 
guide' on the bar, thi, harbor, situated within sixty miles of the city of harle·-
ton and twenty of 'avannah river, interEiecting the interior water commu-
nicat~on 1 ·tw ·en the. e citie , thereby securing the arrival of . uppli, . o 
very kincl, would po .. CflS a hicrh degree of importance, not only a. a harbor o 
r ·fnu , but al o a .a naval tation. 
'lh<·. mT y of the .·terior. hoal , con, tituting the bar, houlcl be male 'ili 
th 0 T ·ate ·t car· ancl all 1Jo, :ibl minut<·ne s. Only when thi, , hall baxe b 
cl nP C'an tlw tnH· r ·lation of thi inl t to the rc;;t of the coa t uc known. an 
on tlii. rPlation the· po, i_tion ancl macruitude of the r quir cl clefi n ·cs-wi.11 d n · 
• 11r the Jr :- nt tLe c·--tunate mad , m year:; ao-o by the eno-ineer d partm nt 
i adopt cl, mun ~y, , 300,000.- ( tatement 1, table E.) 
0 
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Savannalt, and moutlt of Savannalt river, Georgia.-1\fention has been rn~cle 
of the natural interior water communication along the coast of South Carolma. 
A similar communication extends south from the Savannah river as far as the 
St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages the city of Savannah, _like 
ChaTleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor or river, 
and accordingly its defences must have relation to these lesser as well as great 
channels. 
The distance from the mouth of '\Vassaw sound, or even Ossabaw souncl, 
(both to the southward of Savannah river,) to the city is not much greater than 
from the mouth of the river, and an enterprise may proceed the whole distance 
by water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either inlet or 
from both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, 
it cannot now be determined where they can be defended most advm1tagconsly. 
It is hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed 
near the inlets, because thus placed they will serve the double purpose of guard-
ing the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, in time of war, 
cannot but be very useful. 
The defence of Savannah river is not difficult. A fort on Cock.spur island, 
lying just within the mouth, and perhaps for additional security another on 
Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of the river, woulcl 
prevent the passage of vessels up the channel and cover the anchorage between 
Tybee and Cock.spur. 
Old Fort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, shoulcl be main-
tained as a second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the passages 
which come into the river from the south, which last would not at all be controlled 
by works on Cock.spur or Tybee. Fort Pulaski, on Cock.spur island, is well ad-
vanced, and to a certain extent is even now efficient, measures being now in 
hand for mounting the lower tier of guns; $215,000 are required to complete 
the works and the outworks and appendages.-(Statement 1, table C.) To 
fortify Tybee island may require $120,000, (statement 1, table E,) and to re-
pair Fort Jackson $50,000.-( Statement 1, table A.) 
TVassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, St. Catliarine' s sound, at tlie moutli of ]lfed-
way river; Sapelo sound, Dob_y inlet, Altamalia sound, at tlie mouth of Alta-
malia river; St. Simon's sound, at tlw moutli qj Buffalo creek,· St. Andrew's 
sound, at tlie united mouths of tlw Scilla and Santilla ri,vers ,· and Cumberland 
sound, at tlie moutli of St. JJdar_y's river.-All these communications with the 
ocean are highly important as regards the line of interior navigation, and several 
of. them as affording access to excellent harbors. 'rhe last, and one or two 
others, are known to be navigable to the largest sloops-of-war and merchant-
men, and some of the others are but little inferior, as regards depth of entrance 
or safety of anchorage. 
A.11 the e openings have yet to be surveyed; some of them are probably easily 
defensible by forts and batteries, while others may require the aid of floating · 
defence,. 
It is an important principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole 
southern coast, that on a shore possessing few harbors it is at the same time 
more neceBsary to preserve them all for our own use, and more easy to deprive 
an enemy of that shelter without which a close blockade cannot be maintained. 
This principle is enforced in the instance of our southern coast by the two fol-
lowing weighty con. iderations, namely : first, its remoteness from the nearest 
naval xenclezvous, the Che1'\apeake, which is on a mean 600 miles distant, and 
to leeward both as to wind and current; and second, its being close upon the 
larboar<l hand as they enter the Atlantic of the great concourse of vessels pass-
ing at all senson. through the ~"lorida channel. ·while, therefore, this part of 
the coa:,t, from the concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection 
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of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the ri~k 
of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy. 
Accurat~ and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether pursued 
by an enemy or suffering by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which bee 
the navigation of these harbors, and properly arranged defences to cover them 
when arrived, seem to be indispensable. 
WhGn these harbors shall be fortified, the operation of investing the coast 
and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida passage will be 
a difficult and hazardous one to an enemy, to whom no perseverance or skill can 
avail to maintain a continuous blockade, while, on the part of our small ves.eb-
of-war, steam frigates, and privateers, the same sort of supervision will be at all 
times easy and safe. 
Nothing· better can now be done than to assume $200,000 as the average cost 
of defending each of the nine entrances; giving a total of $1,800,000.-(Statc-
ment 1, tables E and 1!1 .) 
St. Augustine, Floricla.-'I'his, the most southern of the harbors on the 
Atlantic, and the key to the eastern portion of J!"'lorida, is accessible to the 
smaller c1ass of merchantmen, to privateers, and to steam vessels, and require 
a certain amount of protection from attacks by war. It is, therefore, proposed 
to put that part of the old Spanish fort (Fort l\Iarion) that commands the har-
bor in a f\erviceable state, which will require $i50,000.-(Statement 1, table A..) 
Having now passed along the whole Atlantic coast, from Passamaquoddy to 
Cape Florida, pointed out every h:'trbor of any consequence, and specified every 
work that a thorough system of defence will require, we will, in order to give a 
comprehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrisons of the works, 
refer to statement 1, accompanying this report. In that statement the work:; 
arc divided into tables, showing separately, 1st, (table A,) the old ·works alreauy 
repaired aoo those proposed to be repaired and retained in the system of de-
fence; 2d, (table B,) new works completed; 3d, (table 0,) works under con-
struction; 4th, (table D,) works to be first commenced; 5th, (table E,) work, 
to be commenced next after those in table D; 6th, (table 1!"',) works to be last 
commenced. 
'l'he most essential works on the Atlantic coast arc included in the fir t five 
tables, and, it appears from the recapitulation, that for these there will Le re-
q uirecl, for garrisons, in time of war, 28,720 men; for the armament, 5,7 4 
pircr, of ordnance of every kind; and for the expense yet to be incmreJ, 
'9,476,767. 
"\V' consider it to be our duty to estimate for the last class of work.:: al~o, 
(talile F,) although it must be a long time before permanent work for the:: 
po:-:ition:-: c:m be commenced. For these there will be required, in addition, t:or 
war garrisonB, 25,545 men; for armament, 4,790 pieces of ordnance; and t r 
th' c.·1H·11:-:e of erection, '·14,241,824. 
It mu:-t be here -tated that, as to a few of the works in table F, fuller infor-
mation may require tlH·m to be elevated into ome of the earlier classes. 
, EA-COA T FROM CAPE FLORIDA TO THE 1\!OUTH OF THE 'ABIXB. 
Th · fir:-:t po:.;ition.~ that pre:-:ent them, elvr , on doublincr around ap Flori 
into the Gulf of Icxico, ar' Key Trest and the Dry Tortuo-as. 
'1 Jij,, Loarcl concur in th · opinion:-: lier tofore c•xprc. ;:eel in fayor of th , fin 
harb ir , ancl tl1 ·y b<''" leaY' to rcfr·r for -very intC'rt':-:ting :--tatcmrnt:::, in r I 
to the lattn· harl,or ·:-pc·cially, tn a lctt0r from 'ommodor Roel~ 'r:4 to tl, 
r • ary of th· .._ ·avy, ,J nly 3, 1 20, (, 'cnatc• do ·um nt:-, 1:-;t :,;p:,;.-;ion 21,t (.', 1.~. " 
-vol. 1, A·>. 1, pa•rc: 2:JG,) aml I ·ttc·r from th<· 'ecretary of the -'- ..,:ff.'-, )far'h :.:. 
1 :; (• · ·nat · clotn11w1Jt:, 1.t .·c•;-;. ion -~l:,;t 101wrr.:-::-, -vol. 2, .l. .... o. 111, pa~ 1.) 
\. lHlYal fore , d ~ign <l to control th naYigatiou of the Gulf could <l ,ire n 
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better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very wayside of 
the only path through the Gulf, it is at the same time well situated as to all the 
great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, · the mouths of 
the Mississippi, and both the inlet and outlet of the Gulf. 
The 'rortugas harbors in particular are said to afford perfect shelter for vessels 
of CYery class, with the gTeatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can 
be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would, with 
great advantage, make these harbors his habitual resort and his point of gen-
eral rendezvous and concentration for all operations on this sea. "With an 
enemy thus posted, the navigation of the Gulf by us would be imminently 
hazardous, if not impossible, and nothing but absolute naval superiority lrnulcl 
avail anything against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer 
than the nearest shore of the continent. 
It is believed that, there are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable with 
these that an enemy could resort to with his larger vessels. To deprive him 
of these would therefore be interfering materially with any organized system of 
naval operations in this sea. 'l'he defence of these harbors would, however, do 
much more than this. It would transfer to our own squadron, even should it 
be inferior, these most valuable positions, and it would afford a point of refnge 
to our navy and our commerce at the very spot where it would be most neces-
a.ry and useful. 
In this report, already too much extended, we forbear to enlarge on this topic, 
merely adding that the complete and certain defence will not be difficult. By 
occupying two, or at most three, small islands, the harbors of the Dry 'Tortugas 
(there being an inner and an outer harbor) may be thoroughly protected. The 
works must be adequate to resist escalade, bombardment, and cannonade from 
vessels, and to sust,ain a protracted investment; but as they will not be exposed 
to any operation resembling a siege, there can be no difficulty in fulfilling the 
conditions. They must have capacious store-rooms, be thoroughly bomb-proof, 
and be heavily armed. 
The fortification of Key West should be of a similar character. 
Ko details can be given until all these positions have been minutely surveyed 
with reference to defence. 
The sum of $3,000,000 was, some years ago, assumed by the engineer de-
partment as necessary to provide defences for the Tortugas and for Key vY est, 
and this estimate may now be taken as arnple.-(Staternent 2, table F.) 
Tuming now to the shore of the Gulf, we :find a portion, namely, from Cape 
Florida to Pensacola, that has never been examined with particular reference 
to the defence of the harbors. "Within this space there are Cliar1otte liarbor, 
Espiritu Santo bay, Apalacliicola hay, Apalacliie bay, St.. Josepli's bay, and 
Sarda Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assume for these 
the estimate formerly pre::;ented by the engineer department, viz: $1,000,000 
for all.-(Statement 2, table F.) 
It may be remarked, as applying to the whole Gulf coast, that, from the 
relative geographical position of this part of the seaboard, and the country in-
terested in it· tiafety, from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent 
country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some time before 
that portion within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by 
an enemy, will Le competent, of itself, to sustain a serious attack from without. 
Upon the Atlantic seaboard the Alleghanies crowd the people down upon the 
hore, every important point on the coast being surrounded by a population 
den;;e now and every day rapidly increasing in numbers, while the ocean and 
the interior parallel communications transmit rapid aid to the right and left. 
The coa~t of the Gulf, however, is thinly peopled in itself, is remote from succor 
from behind, and is almost inaccessible to lateral assistance. Those reasons, 
therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, permanent, 
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and timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United 8tat~, 
apply to this part of it with peculiar force. 
We now pass on to the remaining points of defence on the Gulf. 
Pensacola bay.-'l'hc upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellow 
Water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river. The tributaries of the 
last, interlocking with the Alabama and the Ohattahoochie, seem to mark the 
routes whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a part of the producb 
of these rivers to P ensacola, while the qualities and position of the harbor and 
the favorable nature of the country have already marked out lines of railroad 
communication with a vast interior region. 
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward, from .the lower part of the bay, into 
Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and l\Iobile 
bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of 
cutting· to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last named bay, 
and thence, through an existing· interior water communication, to the city of 
New Orleans. · 
Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is now accessible to 
frjgatcs, and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanen:ly de~pene?· 
'l'be bar is near the coast, and the channel across it straight and ea::nly hit. 
rn1c harbor is perfectly landlocked, and the roadstead very capacious. 'rhere 
arc excellent positions ,vithin for repairing, building, and launching vessels, 
and for clocks and dock yards in healthy situations. The supply of good water 
is abundant. rrhe harbor is perfectly defensible. These propertie , in con-
nexion with the position of the harbor as regards the coast, have induced . the 
government to select it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and rerair. 
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficmg to 
form the scheme of defence for the town and harbor. Regarded, however, ~s 
an important naval station and place of rendezvous and repair, which it. now_ 1~, 
further surveys, extending a greater distance back from the shores, delmeatm"' 
accurately the face of the country and showing the several avenues by land 
and water, are found to be necessary. 
The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly complete, $22,000 
being asked to finish them. A work is just bcguu at the position of the Bar-
rancas. It is indispensable, in connexion with one or two other small works 
designed to cover the navy yard from a lateral attack through the we:,tem 
bays. The Barrancas work may require $100,000, and the others '200,000 · 
making _a total for Pensacola of $322,000.-(Statcment 2, tables A, 0, ~nd F.)_ 
Perdzdo bay.-This bay is intimately related to l)ensacola and Mobile Lay:: 
both as regards security and intercommunication, and :,.hould be carefully :iill-
vcy('d with a view to these objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be 
$200,0~0.-(Statcment 2, table F.) . 
Jlobtle _bay.-The l)lan of defence for this bay cornpri es a fort (no': n~e<lmg 
•om, repa11'14) for :Mobile Point. Another fort is projected for Dauplnu 1,la~d 
and a tower for the defence of Pass-au-Heron. 'l'hc estimates for all req 
,. !H~,000.- ( 'tatcmcnt 2, tables A, E, and F.) 
.J.\ <'W (!rle_ans and tlte delta ef the lllisszssippi.-The mo t northern water 
com1m_unc:ation L<'twecn the l\Ii:-f-i:,...ip}Ji ancl the Gulf is by the pa ::mer call~ 
th<' H1g-olc·ti-, c:onnecti1w Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. 'lhe next 1' 
th, pa:--. of hc,f Mcntn1r, aLo co1mc•ctincr thei:::e lake1<. 1'hrough these pa:-,,~, 
an 1wmy utcring- Lake· Pontchartrain, would, at th e same fan· that h int r-
'Ppt1·cl all water cornmnnic-ation with )Iouilf' and P 'lld1co1a, be able to r 
T ·w ( rlt·an: from the . onthc·rn . horc if thf' l:1ke · or h micrht continu on • 
through Lak · }Iaun·pa~ mite rin·r, a11cl llH'rviiic river, tl1er ·by n·achin!!' h 
- [i .. i :-ippi at th· very 1JC•acl of the c1 ·1ta; or, land inn- withi11 the mouth, of th 
'}U'f ),{ ·nt ·ur, he micrht lllOV' twain~t tl1 city alou•~ the ridge of the G ·uy 
ro; cl. 
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To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou 
Bienvenue, a navigable channel, (the one followed by the English army in the 
last war,) not running quite to the Mississippi, b~t bounded by. shores of ~uch 
a nature as to enable troops to march from the pomt of debarkat10n to the city. 
These avenues are defended by Fort Pike at the Rigolets ; by }tort vVood at 
Chef l\Ienteur; by a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue, and by a tower at Bayou 
Dupre. 
The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about 
seventy miles below New Orleans-the lowest position that can be occupied. 
Fort J ~ckson is on the right bank, and Fort St. Philip, a little lower down, on 
the left . 
.All these forts have been abandone~ for several years, and, having received 
no attention in the way of timely repairs, now require repairs somewhat exten-
sive, e pecially Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi. The follow-
ing sums, it is believed, will be required to place all these works in perfect 
order, viz : Fort Pike, $5,000 ; Fort Wood, $3,580 ; fort on Bayou Bienvenue, 
$2,500 ; Tower Dupre, $400; Fort Jackson, $20,000, and Fort St. Philip, 
$3,300.-(Statement 2, table A.) 
The most western avenue by which New Orleans is approachable from the 
sea passes on the west side of the island of Grande Terre into Barrataria bay, 
which is an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting trade on 
that side of the Mississippi. From this bay there are several passages leading 
to New Orleans. The estimate for a work which is now about to be begun on 
Grande Terre island is $325,000,-(Statement 2, table C.) 
Several times in this report we have alluded to circumstances which would 
demand the employment of floating defences, in addition to :fixed defences upon 
the shore. We have here an instance in which that kind of defence would be 
very useful. ],orti:fications will enable us to protect N cw Orleans even from the 
most serious and determined efforts of an enemy; but, owing to the great width 
of some of the exterior passages, we cannot, by fortification alone, deprive an 
enemy of anchorages, ( especially that of Ohandeleur island,) nor cover entirely 
the exterior water communication between the Rigolets and Mobile. We must, 
therefore, either quietly submit to the annoyance and injury that an enemy in 
posses .. ion of these passages may inflict, or avert them by a timely preparation 
of a floating force adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the 
shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive 
or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the 
enemy. 
Om- examination of the coast from Cape Florida to the Sabine having now 
been completed, we will, as in the case of the Atlantic coast, refer, for a com-
prehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrison of the works, to 
statement 2, wherein the works are divided into tables similar to those of state-
ment 1. 
'I'he more essential works on the Gulf coast, included in the first :five tables, 
will rec1uire for garrison, in time of war, 4,420 men; for the armament 794 
piece.., of ordnance of every kind ; and for the expense yet to be inc~rred, 
.,,;516,7 0. 
The works comprised in the last table (F) are generally such as may be post-
poned ~o a late day. But among them have been placed some (as, for example, 
tho for Tortugas and Key West) as to which the examination has not been 
,.ufficien~ly minute to decide to what class they really appertain. 
In th1s age of great jmprovements in the means of locomotion, it would be 
un-wi··e to decide, without pressjng need, on the details of the floating force 
rec1uired at certain points on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts-perhaps 
even on the nature of the moving power. Although the probability undoubtedly 
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is, that the power will be steam, genius may, in the interim, devise sorncthin,. 
still better than steam. -
And we may here remark, in relation to the preparation of steam veml0 or 
warlike purposes generally, that wisdom would seem to direct a very cantio 
and deliberate progress. Every new vessel may be expected to surpass, in im-
portant particulars, all that had preceded; and, to surpass the more, as each 
succeeding vessel should be the result of careful study and trial of the pre-
ceding. 
It may be considered unreasonable to expect that steam itself will give way 
to some agent still more potent, and at the same time not less safe and manage-
able. But it certainly is no more than probable that steam vessels now under 
construction may be regarded almost as incumbrances within ten years. 
A deliberate advance in this branch of naval construction is recommended the 
more by our ability to construct these vessels in large numbers when needed, 
the timber being collected in the meantime. 
Referring now to the tables which accompany this. report: 
Statement 1 includes all ·works from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida; ,Jate-
ment 2, all works from Cape Florida to the mouth of the Sabine; each state· 
ment comprising six tables, as before mentioned. 
In relation to every work executed, in progress, or merely projected, the 
tables show the garrison, the ordnance of every description, the sums already 
expended, and the :final cost. 
As to works not yet planned, a portion of the same particulars are exhibited, 
founded on conjecture merely; of course, without laying claim to accuracy, bu 
still as approximations, affording some indication of the final result. 
It may be well to give here a summary of all these table.i. 
The works which are likely to be erected on the Atlantic, within a rea.,onab!e 
time, and which are regarded as necessary to a good system of defence, -will 
require war garrisons, amounting· to 28,720 men; and they will require a further 
expenditure of $9,176,767. Works called for in like manner upon the Gulf ot 
Mexico coast will need 4,420 men to ganison them, and a further expenditure 
of $516,780. Of the wlwle coast, therefore, the garrisons will amount to 
33,140 men, and the expenditures to $9,993,547. . . 
The remaining works comprised in table F, of both statements, ·will reqmre 
30,695 men, and cost $19,521,824. . 
l\Iaking the grand total for the whole sea-coast of the United State~ ID 
garrisons for the works 63,835 men, and in cost $29,515,371. 
In addition to these statements as to the fortifications, there are two correspond-
ing statements of the cost of the ordnance, of the carriages, and of a ~ertain 
supply of powder and shot or shells for each piece, one statement rclatrnc, t_o 
the Atlantic coast, and the other to the Gulf of Mexico coast. From thc::;c 1• 
appear, that for the works likely to be erected on the Atlantic coast, within a 
r a;onable time, (that is to say, for the works comprised in the first :five taL!e~. 
A, B, 0, D, and E,) there will be needed 2,483 pieces of ordnance, and -1-,Jll 
carriage:, which will cost $2,252,290. 
For ::;imilar ·works on the Gulf of Mexico coa t, there will be needed 2 
pi ,C, , of or~n~nce, and 495 carriages, at a co, t of $240,720. . . 
I he r ·mammg work. named in tables F, of both statement , will reqmre in 
adclitio~, 5,447 guns and 5,554 carriag , which will co t ··3, 735,330. 
) akmcr th crr:md total required for the whole .,ea-coast 8,226 !!TIU an 
10,560 carriao-e:-, at a co,_t of ·6,~2 ,340. 
'I he tiin rcc1uir d t c n:,;truct and put in order the whole , yr-tern mu;:;t dep n 
on th · amount of th annual appropriation. All that necc.l now b ::aid n th 
·ulJj<·ct i , that in an undcrtakin<r lH'ce,·,·arily involvincr o much tim , ?n 
dl ·h vital imp rtaucc, th re ,·h ulc.l b no r ,Jaxation of clilicrcnc . "\ 1th 
dilig ·nee, many years mu t nee ~ ru·ily be con tuned. But the work m. Y 
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too much hurried, as well as too much delayed. There is a rate of progress at 
which it will be executed in the best manner, and at the minimum cost. If 
more hurried it will be defective in quality, and more costly if delayed. 
France was at least fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences. 
In the report presented by the engineer department, in March, 1836, (Senate 
document, 1st session 24th Congress, vol. 4, No. 293,) there is a demonstration 
of the actual economy that will resu,t from an efficient system of sea-coast 
defence, which is to the following effect, referring to the document itself for 
details. 
There is first supposed to be an expedition of 20,000 men at Bermuda or 
Halifax ready to fall upon the coast. This will make it necessary, if there be 
no fortifications, to have ready a force at least equal at each of the following 
points, namely: 1st. Portsmouth and navy yard. 2d. Boston and navy yard. 
3d. Narraganset roads. 4th. New York and navy yard. 5th. Philadelphia 
and navy yard. 6th. Baltimore. 7th. Norfolk and navy yard. 8th. Charleston, 
South Carolina. 9th. Savannah; and 10th. New Orleans; to say nothing of 
other important places. . 
At each of these places, except the last, 10,000 men drawn from the interior, 
and kept under pay, will suffice, the vicinity being relied on to supply the 
remainder. At New Orleans, 17,000 men must be drawn from a distance. In 
a campaign of six months, the whole force will cost at least $26,750,000. 
The garrisons necessary to be kept under pay for the fortifications in these 
places will eost for the same time $8,430,500. 'l,he difference ($18,319,500) 
will then be only $3,448,156 less than the whole expense of building these 
defences, viz: $21,767,656. Whence it follows that the expense of these 
erections would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in a 
single campaign. 
All which is respectfully submitted. 
For the board: 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
Colonel ef Engineers. 
RTA'l'E~lENTS RELATING TO TITE DEFENCES OF THE COAST FROM THE PASSAUAQUODDY TO THE 8ABINE. 
Ko. 1.- t/1r. forti/icalions constructrd, constructing, or repairing, and ef tlwse proposed to be constructed or repairedfor tlw defence 







De,i:;:nation of the works. 
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A.-01,l u·o1ks rrpaired, and th.-0se proJloscd to 
be rcpnirccl, 11•ilh the amounts expended, and 
the nmou.nts req1,ired to put them in a service-
able condition. 
- 1 1--- 1--1--1-- ,_,_,_,_,_,_ ,_,_,_,_ ._ ,_, ___ 1----- -----













l Fort Sullivan, Ea~tport, Maine.............. 180 
2 Fort Edi:ccomll, Wi~easset, Maine...... . . •• • . 60 
;J ~'on PrPbte, Portland harbor, Maine.......... 100 
4 ~·ort :5ca111111el, !l ouse island, Portland, Maine. 80 
!i F >rt MeOlenry, Port~mouth, N.11....... .. . .. . 80 
6 Fort Co11,ut11tion, N, [l... .. . .. .. . . . . . .. . .. .. 250 
7 t<'ort at Giouec~1n, Ma~s....... •• .. . • .. .. . . 8lJ 





9 Fort L<>e, 1'1as~ . .. .. .. .. .. .. . • • . ... . ... • .. . 4lJ 
10 f'ort Sewall, Marblehead, Mass ..•••• ,....... . 125 1 · .. • ~ · J" .. · · 
11 Fort fnd1•p"1Hlcnce, Bo~to11, Mass .. ••. .... , 50lJ h 49 
12 Furt W111throp, Governor's island, Boston,l\lass. 1 .••.• 
8 
13 W1•,1he11t1 battery, Governor•~ is la nd, Boston, \ 
Ma~H .••••...•••••••.•••.•..• , •..•.••••••. r 150 
U Ho11tltl'11~t hattl'ry, Govcrnor'.i i~land, Roston, \ 
Mil~M •• •••••• ' ••• ' •••• •• •••••• • ••• .••• ' J •••••. 
lri 1-'on 111 'lll'w IIP1lfnnl, M11•R ••••••• ••••• ,,..... 60 
Ill I l-'1111 \\'11\t-1111, N,·Wtlllrt, H. I •••. ••.••• •••••. 2001····"1 · .... 
17 l•'11r 1 llr1•1·11, NPwpun, It. I •• ... ..... . • ...... '10 •••••••••• , 
UI 1•'1111 l111l n, N,!w ll11v1 •11, 001111 ........ , .. .. .. 3lJ · · .. • · · • ~-
1
· 
111 \ 1,• 11,1 Culu111_h11 ·, (:uvt ·1uor 1 111 l • l1tn1I, N V ~ .••.. { •.... ··\·,t,· :~(, 
JU c•o. ,1, , \'Vllh 1UHN, CJuvt'lltlH 1•, l •ht1ul , N . \ . ... HOO .... -,... 
.ti Ji!tt lllt IM11u1y, t J.,v,· 111111 •11 l • lauil , N \ " ••••• • • ··• ••· 
2l .... .... 3 .... 
12 .... .... .... .. .. a· .... 3 3 . ... .... 3 . .•. .... .... 6 
12 6 
.... 6 ... . .... 3 .... .... 3 .... 
· "is· .. .. .. .. ... . 3 
25 .. .. ... .... 20 
16 
34 .••• ····\·: :: l:l .......... . 
4 ... 




2 . •.. ... 
l ... . l 
2 








'"' \""\····1····1 .. .. 2 ............... . 4 ............. .. 
2 .............. . 
·::i· '"' 
2 "·g·1··"1"·· 0 ......... .. 




36 ............ . $10,000 
12 ············ 5,000 23 $5,086 3,200 
17 440 3,400 
15 1,£9lJ 750 
52 2,5!!0 3,671 
15 ·· ········ 10,000 11 5,000 
8 :::: :::::: : : 2,0UlJ 
25 10,000 
121 . ... 22~;594 230, 000 
18 ........... . 100,000 
7 ···· ··· ···· · 5,000 
7 ... .. .. . .... 5,000 
12 ···· ········ 5,000 4:l ... ~ ....... 10,000 
8 ............ 2,000 

















































































tt'ott. Olh:-.on, 1'~111~"~ lshuu1, N. Y ...... .•••.. .. 80 
l•'orl \\' ood, 11,•,llow'>< l~la11<1, N. Y... . . . . . . . :JOO 
1-'ott 1tu·l1111011t1 , ~tnr,•11 island, N, Y . ..... ... . { ... . 
Fo,t Tompld11s, ~tat<'II i_slnllll, N. Y_ •...•.... . . .... . 
llnttt,ry L1111bo11,St11tc111s la111l, N. '\'. .......... 1,000 
llnttt•ry l\Iorto11, State11 1sla11cl , N. Y. .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . 
J,'ort \l11lli11, Uclawal'll river , Penn...... . .•. 200 
f,' 01tMdk11ry, Halti111ore. Md.... • • • • • • • • • • • . 350 
1''ort Mntli~on, Annapoli~, Md.... ...... .... . !:SO 
Fort Severn, Annapolis, Md . ................. 60 
J:<'ortJohn~ton, Cape Fear river, N. C. .... .... 60 
C11stle Pinckney, l)harleston, S. C .......... ., 50 
Fort Moultrie, l)harleston, S. O. .... .. •• ...... 300 
Beaufort battery, S . 0 . . • • . . . . • • . . . . . . • • •• • . 30 
Fort Jack,;on, :--ava1111ah river, Georgia....... 70 
i,~ort Marion, St. Augustine, Fla............ . 30 
Fort Hamilton, New York harbor, N. Y ••••••• 
Fort l,afayette, New York harbor, N. Y ...... . 
Fort Wa,;;hington, Potomac river, Md ....... .. 
Fort Mucon, l:!eaufort, N. C ................... 1 .••••••. 
10 • .. • • . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. • . 2 • • • . I 2 .... . ....... , • • . 15 ........... , 10,000 150,000 
10, 000 
150,000 16 26 • • • • .. 2 . • • . 6 . . • . 8 • • .. 2 .. • . . . . . • .. • • . . • . . .. 60 .......... .. 
:~: /: :::;;: // U t :;:: E :: I H ///: !! }···;;:;: .... '.'.'.:'.'' 1:::::~ 
19 11 20 .... .... 6 .... 7 .... 2 7 .... .•.. .... 2 74 140,tJOO .... ........ tl40,000 
......... ~ .... J :::: :::: ~ :::: ~ .... :t J :::: :::: > :::: iI :::: :::: :::: t~ge !~ggg 
8 ...... ...... .. . . .. ... . .... 1 .... .... .... .... 9 37,114 7,000 44,114 
30 . • • • . . 3 9 6 . • • . 1 . • . . • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • 54 • • • • • • • • • • • . 10, OilO 10,000 
:::::: :::::: 1g :::: ::: ··a· :::: .. i. :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: 1~ :::: :::: :::: 5g;g~g r.g:ggg 
:::::: :::::: :::t :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: ::: : :::: :::: :::: :::: ::::/: <:::::::: ~tggg 11~H~ 
: : : : : : : : : ·: : : : : : : '. . : : : : : : . . : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : , . : .. : : : : . : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ig; ~gg ll~g; ggg 
--t--1---------------------------------
168 268 343 5 14 57 34 114 ... 27 64 .•.. . .. . 3 J,097 699,319 1,227,918 1,!!27,237 
B.-New works completed. 
5,445 
--·--·--·--·-·- 1- 1-1- 1-1-1- 1- 1- - 1-1---,----,----,----
1 I Fort Hamilton, New York harbor, N. Y ..... . 
2 Fort Lafoyette, New York harbor, N. Y ... ... . 
3 Fort Washington, Poto111uc river, Md ........ . 
4 Fortl\faco11, l.leaufort, N. C ................ .. 
C .-Works under construction. 
1 Fort Warren, Georg~'s island, Boston, Mass .. . 
2 Fort Adams, Newport, R. I. . ... ............ . 
3 Fort Trumhull, New London, Conn •.•••••••. 
4 Fort Schuyle:. Throg's Neck, N. Y ........... . 
5 Fort Oelawan', Delaware river . ............ .. 
6 Fort Monroe, Old Point Comfort, Va ......... . 
7 Fort Calhoun, Hampton road~, Va ........... . 
8 Fort Casw1-li, Oak island, N. C .••••••••.••••• 
9 Fort Sumter, Charleston, S. O .............. .. 
10 Fort Pulaski, l)ockspur island, Georgia ...... . 
n.-Works to be first commenced. 
1 I F°'"' ""''''"''• Penobsoouiv«, Mo ... ···· I 2 Fort at mouth of Kennebec river, Me ......••• 
3 Fort Scammel, House island, Portland, l\fe •.. 




370 24 24 1e . • .. 2 
76 :n8,305 ........... . 318~305 
400 . • ••• . .• • . . . 66 ..••.•.. 3 ... 7 .... .... 2 ... 2 ........ 
80 454,103 . ••. ·•• ·•••· 454, 103 
3 14 6 .... .. 2 ... ... ..•. 2 62 349,506 ............ 
349,500 
800 I"I 1l ··· I ' I 'Ig ,.:~., 
300 .• .... 12 15 4 4 __ , __ , __ , ___ ,- 1- 1-1-1-1-1- 1- 1--1-1-1-1--,----1----,-----·-
99 I 9 I 11 I 14 I 62 I 27 I. . . I 2 I 8 I ... . I 4 336 1,6011144 1,601,144 
---,--,--1--1-1- 1- 1-•-•-•-1- 1- 1-1-1- r--1 -----1----1,870 38 5'1 
1,500 64 137 58 
2,~~g 
59 90 98 
14 14 14 
1,250 48 48 70 
750 32 32 54 
2.450 42 189 10 
1,120 54 54 88 
400 20 32 
680 41 41 33 
23 
21 13 12 83 
3 3 3 10 
8 12 6 70 
.......... 20 
14 25 12 16 
.. . ••. •••• 8 
2 2 ...... .. 










8 16 .... 
3 7 5 7 1 
] 3 1 1 
2 7 3 5 2 
1 2 .... 
3 7 3 5 5 .... .... .... ... ... 







































800 •••••• 65 53 4 •••. •• . 4 12 2 ---,--,--,--,--1-1-1- 1- 1-1-1- 1- 1-1-1-1---1----1-----I.----
n, 740 I 354 I 690 I 510 I 52 I 641 33 1234 jl66 l~l..::.l~l 12 11s I 8 I 581__:_,_287 I 1,421,911 I 2, 788,l:l49 I 10,210,760 
--1--r--1--1-1-1-·-· - ,- ,-,-•-







* Garrison and armament will contribute to those of new fort. 
II Included in table B. 
t Belonging to the State of New York. :j: Repairs completed. 





















































~ fo > ~ w Dc,-ignatiou of lbc works. .c:; - ~ i:° ~ t! .c rn rn C OS .... 
Cl) ~ l1l ~r "' s Cl) .... ~ 
~ ~ -~ 
!:l t! t! t! t! 
Cl) 
111 111 






0 5 5 5 0 
C 't:> ""' ""' ""' ',:I Cl) 't:> 0 5 ri, Cl) 0 C C C C C ·a c:l .c .c .c:: .c:: .c .c C ""' 
UJ :::, g :::, :::, :::, C .c .c CJ CJ CJ '5 CJ ci C 
·e 0 0 0 0 ""' 8 CJ CJ C C C .;; Cl) c.. c.. c.. c.. c.. .; ;; C C 
~ J J C ~ 0 c.. 
"' di ~ .... 00 ~ ~ ·7 J; J "' l><l 
C, .... C\I .... 0 00 ..... - -~ E-< J:'i;l -- - - -- -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - ---Works in Port~mo11th harhor, N. IT • •.• ••..... 750 ······ 45 52 4 6 5 9 16 2 •••• 4 2 2 l 2 150 ············ 
Fore P1t·kcn11~, Salrm, Mass ..•• , •......••.... 300 ...... 16 21 2 3 6 11 7 1 4 .... .... 2 73 ············ 
1-'ort 011 Jack's f' .,i,n, Marbl chend, Mass ...... 
350 32 20 2 2 3 10 7 2 l 4 1 4 88 ············ 
WOJ k~ at Provincetown, Cape Cod, :\lass ..••.• 1,000 40 56 56 . ... 20 16 2 6 2 2 ... . 200 ··· ········· 
Works at Nf'w Br ilford, Ma~s ................ 750 45 52 4 6 5 9 16 2 .... 4 2 2 1 2 150 ····· ······· 
Port 011 Ho~e island, Naraga11srt roads, R. [ .•. 470 30 27 21 ... .... . .... 12 .... l 3 .... .... .... .... 94 ············ 
Port 011 Roller~'s Point flats, Md.... . . • . . .... 800 38 76 33 12 .... .... 159 ............. Fort 011 Thl)mas'~ Poi,,t, Patuxent river, Md .. 350 ······ 20 25 2 .... 
Ded uct garrison and guns of Nos. 4, 7, 8, and 
15, of A .................................. . 
.i .. 6 ··2· 6 2 1 2 .... .... . .. 69 --,--,--,--,-,_,_,_,_,_,_,_, __ ,_,_,_, ___ , _____ , 
6, 020 1108 
280 ..... . 
424 
8 







i 0 rn 
Q.) -; = C. 
l'>.0 s ~-= 0 
CJ .... 
B 0 
"" C/J ~ 0 <:) 
·5 .;; O' 







1, ooo, 000 1,000,000 
259,000 259,000 
3,425,ooo I ----3,425,000 
E.-Works to be commencedne.rt after those in D. 
4
:: 1.~~-' ~~-1 3: 1.~~r: , .~~. 
--·--·--·--·-·-•-1- ·- ·-•-1-·-·- •-1-1 1----,----,----
5,740 I 108 \ 416 I 377 \ 22 \ 29 \ 23 \ 92
1
120 I 12 I 3 \ 29\10
1





: \ 3: !.].~~., .. ~ 
55, .•• · ••. ··········•·l••·········· 
Fort Pr«>blP, Portland harbor, Me............. 300 
\Vork~ at Giuuc c,-ter, Ma~s.... . ...... . . . . • • . . 500 
Clo~ing llrnud Sound Pass. Boston harbor, Mass •••••.• 
\Vork s nt 011riwt Point, Plymouth, Mass ..... 500 
\Vork~ at Stnni11gto11 Point, Conn..... . . • • • • • . 375 
Fort 0 11 I 't•llar Point, Potomac river, Md...... 550 
Work~ nt O, •oq.:1•tnw11 harbor, S . C. . •. . . • • • . . 500 
\V,1rk, in l'ort Hoyal roa(I~, H. C. .... .. .. .... 550 
\\"urk- 011 'l'yl11•1• 1, la11d, Hava11nnh riv,•r, Ga.. 100 
\\'111101 111 IJ11111li1•rla111l M11111 .<1, l:\t. l\1111y>~ rivl'r, 
(~t:1,1·1.. i1,. ··· · ····························· ·· - ----- \" 
:1 . 11-ir, I i~ 1 I 11111 






r,50 20 56 
:r~o 
3,425,000 







4 ··4· ··4· a .... 
.. 2 ··:i· 6 10 .... 6 10 8 
2 4 6 10 8 
2 4 6 10 8 
···· •··· 
) 
··2·1 1 .. j. 
... . 3 .. .. 2 
2 \ " I 3 I 10 I fl I 2 
1 
.... 
10 . ~~ _ :m 7 1!~..!.!, •I 
··2 













3 1 ·· ·I 2 l····l ·· I 110 J········~···I ::~:~~: -- --- ·-------- -tu :..:.___.__. ~ 1 _ ,a _ _ 7~1n • . .:..~· ... : .:..:,__ _ n, o;t:-, . no!!.. 
23 










~ mu, ooo 
l'!00,000 

























I•'. - /1 01·.<·.,· lo /Je last t·o 1111ne11r11d. 
\'\'mks in l•!t1~1por1 harbor, Mnino ........... . 
Work~ in Mnrhins hnrhor, Mnino ........... . 
\'Vork~ 011 1\1011111 Dt•s t•rt island , l\lainn . .... .. 
\York ~ at t 'n~1i1w, M:1111c .. • • •••••••• • , ..... . 
f> \York~ at St. Gcor~e',; hay, Maine .... ..... . . 
h \V nrks nt Oamari~cotta, Maior ............. .. 
7 Works at Broad bny, Maine ....... . ........ .. 
8 \Vorkil at :-heepscot bay, Maine ..•••• . ....••. 







10 \'Yorks at the mouth of Saco river, Maine .. .. . ,~ 
JI Works nt the month_ of Kennebunk rivet, Me.. 150 , ...... , ...... 
12 Works at York, Marne .................... .. 
13 Works nt N!'wburyport, Mass........ . ... .. 
14 Works at Bevl'rly, Mass....... . . ......... . 
15 vVorks at Nangns Head, Salem, Mass ..•.•••. 
16 Works at Fort Sewall, Mnrbleliead, Mass .••. 
17 Fort and outworks at Nantasket Head, Bos-
ton, Mass ..•••••.... . ...... . ........•.•. 
]8 RPdoubt on Hog isJ:rnd, Boston harbor, Mass •. 
19 Works at Nantucket harbor, Mass ........... . 
20 Works at Edgartown, Mass ••••••••••.••••••. 
21 Works at Falmouth, Mass ............... .. 
22 Works at Holmes's Hole, Mass ............. .. 
23 Works at Tarpaulin cove, Mass .•••..••••.••. 
!M Works at Canonicut island, R. r ............ . 










26 Fo~t bri;,~~1ci; N~~- L~;td~~·; c:'o·~~::: :: :: :: : : 1 •• •• 500° 
27 Works at the mouth of Connecticut river, 
Conn, ... . ............................. .. 
28 Fort Hale, New Haven harbor, Conn ....... .. 
29 Fort Wooster, New Haven harbor, Conn .. .••. 
30 Works for harbors and towns between New 





Works in Gardiner's b:iy, Long Island sound, 
N. Y ...... ............................. , 750 
32 Works in Sag Harbor, N. Y ......... , .. . . . .. . 250 
33 Fort on Wilkins 's Point, Long island, N, Y .... 1,336 
31 
34 Redoubt in advance of Fort Tompki11s, Staten 
is;land, N. Y... . ... . . . . . . . .••.......•.... 
35 Fort on Middle Ground shoal, Sandy Hook, 
N Y. .. .. .... .... . ..... ..... . ........ .••. 1,760 
800 
36 Fort on East Bank shoal, Sandy Hook, N. Y. 1, 760 





38 Fort opposite Fort Oelaware, Del,........... . 760 ........... . 
3!! Fort on Elk river, Md . .. •• .. .. ... • .. •••• •• .. 169 ......... .. 
40 Fort on Hawkins's Point, Md , •• , • .. .. • .. . .. 800 .......... .. 
41 . Works at Annapolis harbor, Md ., ._.., .. - . . . .. 500 .......... .. 
42 Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent nver, Md.. . 400 
• Not projected; guns, cost, &c., conjectural. t Work projected, t Gun~, cost, &c., conjectural. 
.. ...... , ........... . 
50 ........... . 
200 ••••••••••• . 
25 .......... .. 
200 
211 ..... ...... . 
30 .......... .. 







••••l•••• I•, •••••• 
82 
50 









































































































No. l.-Of the fortifications constructed, constructing, cyc.-Continucd. 


































































































4:1 I Works at St. Mnry'$, Potomac river, Md ----------- - 1---1--1--1--1-1-1-,-1-r-1-1-1-1-1-1-
QI t ; I ""' ~ ~ 0 ;;;; 
g 
;;;; ~ ! ~ 00 0 
44 Work, nt Bald Head, Cape l•'ear river, N. O ... 
45 \York~ ut FedP.ral Point, Cape Fear river, 
N. C ............................... .. 
46 Works at the 111outh of Santee river, S . C .... . 
47 Works nL Hull's bay and other inlets, S. 0 .... . 
48 Works nt :-10110 ~ound, ::,. C ................ .. 
49 Works at North Ed,~to sound, S. 0 .......... . 
50 Works at ~n,nh Edi~to i,ound, S. O ......... .. 
SL Works at St. lfeh•na Round. S. (.) .•• . ••.•.••• 







53 Work~ nt o~~abaw sound, Ga .... ·· • · •• • · • • • · I 
54 Works at ~t. Cntharine'8 sound, Ga •••••••••. 
55 W. orks nt Snpelo ~01111d, G.a , .......... • • • • • • · i 4 000 56 1 WorkH at lloby inll't, Ga .......... , • , ...... • ' 
57 Works at Altamahu ,ound, Ga .............. . 
5l3 Works at St. Simon',; sound, Ga . ............ . 
59 Works at St. An{lrcw's sound, Ga .......... .. 
















75 , .•••••••••.. 
75 






2l C UJ 
Q) .... 
0. I§ a ~ ... ::, 
<) ..... 
E C 
] 00 0 <J 
·5 -;; 





100,000 *100, fiOO 
150,000 *150,000 
150,000 *150,000 
1,600,000 * 1,600,000 
Deduct ~nrrison nnd guns of Nos. 9, 10, and 
--,--,--,--•-•- 1- •-1-1-•-1- 1-·-·-·-•--1----11-----1----
2s,no 1574 lt,390 lt,366186 109 142 40~ 401 33 46 145 17 a3 t2 73 4, 829 ........... I 14, 241 , 824 
ltl, or A •.....•••••.•.••.•••.••••••••••••• l 115 • • • • • • 8 24 . • • . . . 3 . • • . 2 . • . . . • • . 2 • • • • . • . . . . . . • . . 39 ...•.•..••.. 
14,241,824 






























co r ..... 
0 
- ---
A. 01!1 fort~ nncl hattl'rit•s . . • • • . ......... , .... , • , 5,445 Hi8 268 343 
11. N1•w for11til'a riu11~ t•ornplt•red .................. 1,870 3d 54 99 
t:. F'n111fi, nrinns 111111t'r co n~trncti on ........ . ...... J t, 74(, 354 690 5 10 
ll . For1ificnt1011~ to bu fir, t comme 11ePd ......... . 5,740 108 416 377 
g, Fo, 11tiefllio11s tu he 1H' xt ro11~trnctqJ. ........... 3,92,5 24 J69 3~0 
1''. Furufic ution~ to be last commcncell . • • • • • ••••. 25,545 574 t,:.J82 1,342 
-- - - -- --
54,265 1,266 2,979 2,991 
* Guns, cost, &.c., conjectural. 
For the board 
WASlllNGTON, .8pril 21, 1540, 
RECAPITULATION, 
5 14 57 34 11 4 
9 11 1'l 62 27 
.52 64 3::J :234 166 
22 29 23 92 120 
16 24 39 70 52 
86 109 l;j!J 402 399 
- ·- - - --
l!:10 .151 ::J05 894 878 
.... 27 64 .... 3 
2 8 4 l 7 
20 19 49 12 18 8 58 
l2 3 29 JO 10 5 16 
6 4 19 8 1 4 
33 46 143 17 33 l2 73 
- - - - - -- -
71 LOI 312 39 73 27 161 
t Work projected. 
1,097 699,319 1,227,918 1,927,237 
3:l6 1, 60 1,1 44 ··········· · 1,601,144 2,287 7,421,911 2,788,849 10, :2 10, 760 
1,272 ............ 3,425,000 3,425,000 
756 ............. 2, o:~s, oou 2,035,000 
4,790 ············ 14,241,824 14,241,824 
10,538 9,722,374 2::J, 718,591 33,440,965 






















Est imall'tl tost ef rmlnanre ef all kinds required.for tlw armament ef fortifications, agreeably to statement 1, enibracing cannon mounted, 
anrl 100 rounds ef ammunition for ear:li piece. 
Fortilicntiom·. 
. 
01.t forts nnd h:\1 lt>1 i,·~. - Tablc A .•.• , . . 
N1•w fortifkntions co111pletrd.-Tablc B. 
Fortili<'ntion~ under conHruction.--
'l'nhlc I.J, 
Fortifications to be fir~t commenccd.-
T11blt: D. 











9- 0. c:, ~ .... :-) 
- --
RrfptirP<I ............... .. H18 ~68 


























































-~~ rn a, 


















































°' ~ 0 <:) ;'o 
l,1197 
895 
'l'o he provider! ... .. I ....... \ .. .... . \ ........ I ... .. . I . .. I ...... I 34· \ 93 I ...... I 27 ·I 45 I . .. . I . . .. I. ..... I 3 I 202 
RPfJllirf'<l .............. . 











To he provi1h·d .•••• 2J , ........ , ..... .. 
R•q•1irPcl ............ , .. 354 
011 haud ... ......... .. 
To be provided •••.•. 354 
R• fJllircd ............... · \ 108 
On hand ..••.....•• .••.• . ....... . 
To be provided •••••. 108 
~:·.





















320 ~~ 1. .. ::. 
!! 1. .. ~2 27 , ...... 
6'>. 27 , .•.•.. 
ii~ I .. :~:. I .. ~~~ -1 .. :~ 
234 I 166 
















8 I••" • ' 






























Tobeprovidc,1. •••• . 1 24 \ 1611 3201. •••• . 1 24 \ .••• J 'iO \ ...... 1 61 4 1 191 .... I 81 1 I 41 693 
Req11irecl from A to E, ... 692 I,597 1,649 104 142 166 492 4i9 38 55 11691~1~1~1~15,748 
r~r-~:~;c11t1:-~n~ to bo ln~t constructed.- I ~~1'11~~:~:1.::::::::: :::::: · ~~'.~ .. ~'.:~~- .. ~::~~- ~~ .. ~~~ g~ - -~~~ .. :~~- ... :~. ·- -~~- --~~~- ... ~: . ... ~?. ·--~~- .. '.~. 4,J~g -------------- -- --------- --- --- --- --- ---
To be provided...... 574 1.382 1,3,12 ..... , 109 ...... 402 399 33 46 143 17 33 12 73 4,565 
Grand total n•ci11irP<I...... l,!l(i(i 2,H79 2,!l!ll 1911 2!'>1 305 891 878 71 ~ ~-~ ~ ~ 161 ~,~~~ 
011111(1 tollll Oil h11t1tl..... ) t\ l 1, •l:36 1,245 190 67 305 21 ...... ...... 19 ]ll __ 
7
_ ~ ~'.-





































































































































Old fo rts and battcries.-Table A ............ / Required .................. .. 
On hand .................... . 










14 57 I 3t I 114 
1 
...... 
57 .• •••• . . .. . . ..•• . 
27 64 , .•••• . , ..••.. 3 
14 , . ..... 34 114 I••"• 27 64 3 
New fortifications completcd.-Tablc B •.•• , I Reqni rPd ................... · I· 381 54 I 991 9 I 11 I 14 I 62 1 271~1--21--81= 1--4 1--l 1--7 
On haud. ••••.•• •••• •••• •••• .••• •.• . 54 9Y ••••. •••••. 14 . . .... .••.• . .•••.. . ..•. ....• . .• . . 
To be provided ......... I 38 1 ........ 1 ........ I 9 I ll 1 ...... 1 62 I 211=1--21--81=1-4-1- 1 1--7 
Fortifications under construction.-Tahle C •• I Required .................. .. 
On hand .................... . 
To be provided ....... .. 
Fortifications to be fir$! commenced.-Table D I Required ....... . .......... , 
On hand ..... , . . .......... . 
To be provided ........ .. 
Fortifications to be next constructed -Table E. I n .. quired ................. .. 
On ha nd . .. . ••••• . .•••••••• 
To be provided . ••.••••• 















64 ~~ l .. :~~. l .. ~~~ - 1 ... ~~ I. .. ~~ 
64 I . • .. • I 234 I 166 20 19 
















_1081 _416 1_3771 22 1 29 , ...... , 92 1 12,JI 121 31 291 101 101 51 16 
24 169 320 16 24 ~~ l ... :~.I ... :~ 4 19 I• ,., • 8 4 
24 1 1691 32U I 16 1 241 . . .• · 1 70 I 521 61 41 191 .... · 1 81 1 I 4 
692 1,597 1,64!! 104 142 166 492 479 38 55 169 22 40 15 88 
Fortifications to be last constructed.-Table F . I g~lql~~~I~~ ::: : : : : : :: :· :: :: :: : : I .. :::.1.. ~::~~ I . ~:::~ I .. ~~ I .. ~~9. I rn~ I .. :~~-I .. ::~ I .. ~~ I ... :~ I .. ~~~ I .. ~:.I ... ~~. I ... ~ ~ I .. .. '.~ 
To be provided ......... I 574 I 1,382 I I,::142 I 86 I 10!! I ..... I 402 I 399 I 3:.l I 46 I 143 1 11~ 1-12 73 
161 Grand total req uired ••••.•••. 
Grand total on hand. , •.•.... 








HIO 251 31\5 
305 
894 I 8i8 71 101 312 39 73 27 











































































































I CANNON l'OWDER. 
Pounds, 
---1---1---1---1---I·-------












3,100 I 11,4110 I 2,100 











Fnrtificntio11H tn he firtit com-
111c11ccd -'l',,tilc U. 
1''11rtificntionR to he next con-
structed -Table 8. 
f'or1ifi ·ntionA tn be Inst construct-
ed -'l'ublc Jo'. 
Un hand ............... .. 
To be provided •••••• 2, 965 I .•••••••• -1 • •••••••• . 1 .••••••. I - •••••• - I ••••••. 1 ••••.... I 5, 2so 2,700 
Rr(Juired ................ l 3,800 
On hand •• , ••••••••.•.••. . . ··., ... . 
5,400 1 · 9,900 
5,400 9,900 
900 I 1, 100 I I, 400 I 6, 9,10 I 3,100 I 200 
900 1, 1011 1,100 !i,348 ............... . :~~ I .... ~~~- 205,800 60,170 
To be provided ..... 3,800 
---1--.---1---1--1--1--1--1--i--r--l 144,630 
1,552 3,100 2 -,0 100 







6,400 ~;~~g l.:~::~~J:~:~~~ I .. ~::~~- 6, IOU 6,100 soo I 1,616,300 
41,600 I 37,100 
11,020 ......... . 
2,200 
2,200 
Tobe provided •• ,. ·1 35,4!JO, ......... I 19,0001 ........ 1 ...... 1 ....... 129,200 120,400 I 1,9ou J ........ 1_soo 1 __ 1,616,300 
~~l(JJ~~~~~ ·:::::. : : : : : ·.:::: ,. • ~~: :~~. . . .. - -- 2,900 2,900 ~:~zg I ~~:~~~r~:~~ 30U 3,900 3,900 500 874,300 
To be provitl~d .•• , •. 10,800 30,580 
---1---1---1--1--1--1---·--·--·--·---1------




Ri·quired ............... t-2-,-40_0_116-,-9-00-132-,-0-00- J,600 2,400 1~900,~4UO i--i--i--i--i---- ---
On hant.l...... .... ... .... ..... ..... ... .. .. . . . .... . ... . 1,600 2,400 3,900 ....... . 
------1------------ ---1---1--1--1--1----












RequiredfromAtoE .... 69,QOO 159,700 164,900 10,400 14,200 16,600 58,000 55,700 5,500 19,100 J,500 4,046,500 
R"<Juirrd ...... .......... 57,400 138,200 131,200 8,flUO 10.900 13.900 47,500 46,500 4,600 16,000 1,2uo 3,388,750 
Ou hand . .......... ..... .. . .. . .. . .. .. .... .... .. • .. . 8,600 J0,90 ') 13, 900 . .. .... . .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. . . ............... .. 
1'olwprovitlcd ...... 57, 11(10 138,200 131,2ll0 ........................ 47,500 46,500 4,600 16,()00 .2~ 3,388,750 
Grn111l totnt TP(JllirPd •••••• 
l)rnntl tornl on hand . •••• 




1"35 ll:?,2:!0 76,200 19,000 25, IUU 30,500 9,048 6,120 ... .. . 17,25'l ........ 
1~6, 6110 \ 297, Ullo \ 211n, 100 \ I Y, ooo 1 25,100 1 30,500 1105, 500 I 10:;i, 200 I 10,100 I :Jr,. 100 I 2,100 




















MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 149 
Estimated cost of ordnance ef all kinds required for tlie armament ef fortifir;a~ 
tions, gv;.-Oontinued. 
COST OF ARMAMENT, 
Fortifications. Ordnance, 
Cannon, Carriages, Projectiles. Powder. Total amount. 
----
Olil forts and batteries.- RPquired ......... $403,935 00 $361,935 OU $203,340 00 $175,760 00 $1,144,970 00 
Tallie A. On hand ........ . 338,115 0(, 242,3'75 Ou 151, 782 4(1 175, 760 00 908, 032 40 ---- --
To be provided 65,820 0( 119,560 00 51,557 6(J ........ .. 236,937 60 --
N ew fortifications com- Required ......... 105,065 01 105,455 00 47.283 00 41,160 OU 2!l8,963 OU 
pleted.-Table B. On hand ......... 6!l, 105 Ou 55,275 00 28;454 oo 12,0:34 OU 1641 ~69 OU --------~-
To be provided 35,960 0(1 50,180 OU 18,629 00 29,126 00 134,095 00 --- -----
Forti fl cations under con- Required ......... 816,770 Q( , 739,590 00 351,484 0( , 323,260 OU 2,231,104 00 
struction - ·Table C. On hand ..... . .... 502,360 Q( ; 99,025 OU 164,284 0(; ············ 765,669 00 ---
To be provided 314,410 0(1 640,565 00 187,200 00 323,260 00 1,465,435 00 
- ---
Fortifications to he first Required • , •• , , , .. 451,405 OL 411,685 00 188,547 00 174, 860 OU 1,226,497 00 
commenced. - Table On hand .......... ll90,925 00 6,900 00 39,560 4r ...... ..... 337,3~5 40 
D. 
To be provided 60,480 0( , 404,785 00 140,986 61 174, 860 00 889, 111 60 
---- ---- ----
Fortifications to he n ext RequirPd ........ , 243,410 00 240,329 00 102,333 Ol' 94,260 00 680,323 00 
l'Ollstructed.-Table E. On hand . ......... ll,500 OU ll, 700 OU 4,203 60 ............ 27,403 60 
To be provided 231,910 00 228,620 00 98, 129 4(J 94,260 OU 652,919 40 
R"(Juired from A to 2,020,585 01 I, 858,.985 00 892,987 011 809,300 00 5,581,857 00 
E . . ---------
Fortifications to be la~t Required ..... .... 1,692, 110 0( I 1,551,500 00 746,770 00 677,750 00 4,668,130 00 
construccd.-Table F. Ou hand .......... 35,400 0( I 41 1 700 00 11,202 00 ............ 94,302 00 ---~ -
To be provided 1,656,710 0{ , 1,509, 800 00 729,568 Ov 677,750 00 4,573, 8t8 00 
-----------------
Grand total req'red 3,712,695 00 .l,410,475 0 0 1,639, 757 0( I 1,487,050 0 0 10,249,987 00 
Grand total on hand 1,247,405 01 I 456,975 0 0 405,4b6 4 0 187,794 0 0 2,297,660 40 
--
Grand total to be 
provided. 
2,465,290 0 0 J, 953,510 0 0 1,234,270 6t : 1,299, 256 0 0 7,952,3i6 60 
NoTE.-The cost of saltpetre and brimstone may \Je e$timaterl at one~halfof the cost of gunpowder. 
ORDNANCE OFFICE, Wnshington, January 16, 1840, 
No. 2.-
Ille lhrtijicatious constructed, constructing, or repairing, and ef tlwse proposed to be constructed or repaired for tke defence 
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<I) Q) C.l 
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---------------1---1--·1--1---,-,-,_,_,_,_,_ ,_ ,_ ,_,_ ,_ ! 
A.-Old works repaired and tho•e proposed to be 
TCJ)(t1rcil, ,cith th,. amounts expended, and the 
amounts required lo put them in a serviceable 
condition. 




;z ~ ~ 
-~ 
~ :: -~ 00 ~ ~ c.;, "' 0 E-< 0.. ~ f:,J 
2 Fort St. Philip, l\lis~is~ippi, La. . ... ........ .. . 100 .••••. 11 IO 16 
5 3 3 
1 I Fort Barrancas, Pcnsncoln, F la ..... . ......... 250 •••••• 
3 Fnrt PickE'ns, P1•nFacola harbor, F la ••• • •••••• .• ..• ••..•.••. 
g ~~~~ ~~~~~~i'i:~t:}~;t1;:~i1~t.'. ~-'a.:::::::::::::: :: :: : : '. '. :: :: : · 1· • .. • · 1 ·• .. • · 1-- ·. , .. ·· 1 · .. . 
6 Fort Wood, Ohcf Mcn tcu r, La ... . • •• • • • • . . . . ..... .. . .. .. · .. • • • • · • • • • · · .. • • .. · • • · 
7 Rattery Rienven11P, La . .. . . ........ . ..... . . . , ....... , · .. • • · · • ••• • .. • • .. • • .... • • • • 
8 Tower nt Bayou D11p16, La........ .... .. .... • ... . . .. ·• •• .. · · · • • • ........ • · · • • · · • •· 
9 I Fort J ackson, Missbs1ppi river, La . • • , , • •. , . . . . •••.. ••• • . , , , · ·, · • • • • · · • · 
8 I 41····1····1 2 4 .••••• • • 2 i~ I .... ~:~, ~~? 
•• •l •• • • l •••• l •••• l· ••• 1, ... . 
• ••• l ••••••• •I ••••••••• • •• 
• ••l ••• •l •••• t• •• • l · ••• I• •• • 
•• •l ••• •I ..... •••• I •••••• ........ 
















3 , 51'0 




















* l0, 000 
*5, 000 
=~~;~g 
350 I• • • • •• ll 261 5I 31 3 I 81 81 .... 1 •• 1 2 1 . . .. 1 1 1 •••• 1 2 






8.-New works completed. 
--•--,--.--1- 1-1-1- 1-1-1- 1- 1-1-1- 1- 1--1----1---------75,000 152,780 227, 780 
l I Fort Pickens, Prn~ncola, Fla. • . • •• • • • • •. • • • . 1,260 6:1 17 49 5 13 6 26 1:1 .• • . l 4 I 4 I 4 I 2 I 5 
2 Fort '\1nrgnn, MnbilP Poin1, Aln .... .... •..•.. 700 14 ...... fi2 3 4 6 26 JO • • •• 2 4 2 2 2 5 
:t F'nrt Pikl', llignlt•t•, l.n..... .•. • • . •. .•• • •••••. 300 .... . .... 28 .. 6 9 5 .. .. .. . . 1 
4 l•'11rt \Von,I, C'ht'fMt'lllC'lir. La................ 300 ... .. ..... 28 3 6 .. 0 5 . ... .... l 
5 llr11tny lliP11v,•1111P, l.11 .. ... .. .. ...... •• .... JOU •••• ...... 8 . •• . 3 .... • .. 2 .......... . 
II I 'l'uw1•r 111 ll11y1111 1>1q1n,, l.11 . ..... .. .... • ... • . 50 . .. . . . .. • . . 4 . . .. .. . . . . ..•. 2 ·. , ... · · l 1···· 
7 l•'u,t Jack Htm, M1nn1n11lp11111vcr, La............ 330 .... . .•• . . • 42 . ••. 7 ••• 10 5 . • ,. 1 2 ··•· __ _ 













































C.- ll'orks under ,·01utrucl io11,. 
Fort on f'oster':3 hank, l'en~11cola, Fla ••.•••••• 
Fort Livi11gsto n, Durrutnria island, La ••••.•••• 
E.-Works to he con~trttcte,l after those in D of 
statement l are completed. 
•rower at Pass-au-Heron, l\fobile bay, Ala ••••• 
F .-Works to be last commenced. 
l Works nt K1>y West or Tortngas, }'la . .•••••••. 
2 Works at Cha rlotte harbor, }'la .••••.••••••••• 
3 Works at Espiritu Santo bay, Fla ............ . 
4 Works at Appalachicola bay, Fla .•••••••••••• 
5 Works at Appalachie, Fla .................. . 
6 Work~ at St. Joseph's hay, Fla .............. . 
7 Works at Santa Ro~a bay, Fla .•••....•••.••• ; 
8 \Norks to cover navy yartl 'i t Pensacola, Fla •.. 
9 W orks at Pertlido bay, Ala ................. . 
10 Fort at Dauphin island, Mobile bay, Ala .•••••• 
A. Old forts and hatteries ....................... .. 
n. New fortifications co111pleted •••••••.••••••••••. 
c. Fortifications unde r construction .•••••••••.•••.. 
E. Works to be co11strnctcd after those in D, of 
statemeut 1, are completed ..................... .. 
F. Works to be last commenced ................. .. 
* Included i_n B. 
























rn!l 30'2,648 14,000 316,fi48 
300 . .. ... .. .. .. 28 .... 6 3 9 5 .. .. .. .. 1 .............. . _ 52 75,000 325,000 400,(100 
950 24 24 94 .. . 6 6 9 15 .... .. .. 3 .... .. .... .. 181 377,648 339,000 716,648 
--------------------
60 , .••••. , .•••• · 6 I 2 I 2 / .••. 1 .... 1 2 , .••. , •••. , .••• , •••. , .... , .... , •••• 12 , .......... .. 







100 , ...... , ...... , .••••. , . • . , .... , .... , . ••. , •••• , •••• , •••. , .••. , •••• , .• • . , .... , .•• · 1 · ...... · 1 · .......... . 
400 ••••. . . •• . . . ••••. •••• . ••. •• •• •••• .••. • ••• •. •. . ••• •••• . • . .••. •• •. 50 .•••••••.••. 







5,150 I 118 61 I 394 I 21 I 58 I 25 ILI3 I 78 1 .... 1 5 I 21 I 7 I 8 I 5 I 14 928 I .. ...... .... I 5, 2eo, ooo 
RECAPITCLATION. 
3)iZ I ""11' I 11 17 
950 24 24 
26 5 3 3 8 8 2 .... I 2 69 75,000 152,780 
21 L 11 39 12 80 42 4 ]3 6 6 4 10 532 3, 148,Y06 ... 339,000 91 .... 6 6 9 15 .... .... 3 .... .... .... ] 8 1 377,648 
60 , .. 5,150 ll 8 61 
9,570 219113 
6 2 2 .... .... 2 .... .... .... .... .... 12 ........... 25,000 
394 21 58 25 113 78 .... 5 m 7 8 5 14 928 ............ 5,280,000 
------------ ·- 9 26T l~722 3,601,554 731 39 ,108 46 1210 145 • •• • 9 39 13 15 5,796, 780 















For the board. JOS. G. TOTTEN, Colonel Engineers. 






















Estimated cost of ordllancc of all kinds req1tircdfor tlic arma·ment if fortifications, agreeably to statement 2, embracing cannon mounted, 
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11) d r 
Old forts and battcries.-Tnblc A, ••• , ................ I Required ... , .......... , ••••••... 11 26 5 3 3 81 8 1 ...... 
26 
2 
On hand ...................... . 11 5 3 ~ 
To be provided ••••••••.•••... 1 • • • • 1 ••• • • 8 8 , ...... , ...... 2 , ..... 1 I•••••• 
New fortificntions completcd.-Table B ......... , •• ,. I Required .... , .............. .,. 
On band ....................... .. 
To be provided .............. . 
Fortifications under conHruetion.-Table C •••••••••. I Required .•.••••••••••••• , •••.•. 
On baud, ....................... . 










39 ~~ l ... ~~-1 ... ::J::::· 4 13 







6 I 9 I 15 I · .... · I · .... · I 3 
6 • • •••· ................ . ... .. 
6 6 4 
6 6 4 
24 , ..... . , ...... , ...... , ...... , ...... 9 15 , .•••.. , .••••. 3 , .... . . , .... . . , .. .. . . 
Works to be constructPd after those in table D, state- \ Required ....................... · I ...... \ ..... \ 61 2 \ 2 \ ..... ·\ ..... ·I 2 \ ..... ·I · ..... \ ..... 1 1 1 
mcut I, are co111plctcd.-Tablc E. On hand. ............... .... ... ...... ..... .... 2 ...... ..... .. ........................... . 
To be provided • • ••••..•••••. 6 , ..... 2 , ...... , ...... 2 I,,,.,, I,.,.,. I·•••• 
Required from A to E .......... . 101 52 I 337 18 50 21 97 67 , .••••. ]8 4 
Works to be last commenccd.-Tablc F ............. \ Required ...... , . . ............ . 
On hand...... • .............. . us\ 61 \ 394 \ ii\ ... :~\ i~ \ .. ::~.\ ... :~ \::::::\ .... :.\ ... ~~ \ .... :.\ .... ~.\ ..... ~ 
To be provided •••••••...••• · 1118 ~ 394 ~ 58 , . . . 1131 781 .... · 1 51 21 I 71 81 5 ------------ ------ -- --- --- --- ---
Grand total rrquired .... ..... 21!1 113 731 39 108 46 2l0 145 ..... 9 39 13 15 9 
Grand total on hand. .. . .. • .. 28 52 3:H 39 48 46 .. . . . .. .. .. • • • • . . . . . .. . .... .:..:..:..:..:_ ~





























..,. u, UJ rn rn 
Q) C: C: i:: C: 
.0 • ::, :::, :::, ::, 
~i:: 0D bl) "" bl) 
"' 0 ... 
;:, ;: Q.) Q,) Q,) Q) 
., I ~~ -g ~ ~ -g E ~ CJ :::s :::s =' ::, 
0 O O O O 0 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
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Old forts nud battcries.-Tahle A ................... J Req uired ........ . .............. . 
011 hand ..•.••••.••••••.•....••• . 
2 1--;:-=-1-1 ~I 5 
48 ...... 11 26 ...... 
31 81 81 ...... 1 ...... 
3 ................ .. 
2 1 .... .. 
To be provided .............. . 2 --1--1--,--1--,--,--1--1--1--1--1--1--1--
21 5 3 1 ...... 8 8 1 ...... 1 ...... 2 1 ..... . 
New fortifications completcd.-Table n .......... · I Required ....................... · 1 10 







l1 :;9 }~ I ... ~~ 42 I •• •• • 13 6 
To be provided .............. . 
Fortifications under construction.-Table C ........ J Required ....................... . 
On hand •••••••••••••••••••••••• . 
To be provided .............. . 
--1--1--,--1--•--•--•--·1--1-- 1--1---1--1--
IO 214 77 ll 39 t:10 42 13 6 
--,--,--,--1- -1--,--,--1-- 1--,--,--,--1--
181 I 24 I 24 
130 ...... 7 
94 I .... . 
1 
6 
6 .......... . 
6 1 9 1 15 1"· .. ·1 ·· .. ··1 3 1 ..... . 6 ...... . ......................... .. 
--,---,--,--1--1--1--,--1--1--1--1--1--1--
3 1., .... 51 24 17 l:8 lfi 
--,---,--,--1--,--1--,--1--1--1--1--1--,--
Works to he con~trurt.Prl aftPr 1.l10~e in table D, state-1 Required .............. • ...... •"I" .. .. 
ment I, arc co111plcted.-Ta1Jle E. On hand .............................. . 
12 I·•· ·· I••••• 
2 
~-1--1--1--1--,--1- -1--1----·· 1--1--1--,--,--
2 2 !• •••• I·•••• · 2 1······1· ..... , ..... 1 ...... 
10 1 ...... , ..... . 2 2 1 ..... . 1 ...... 2 1 ..... 1 ...... To be provided ........ . ..... . 1.. • .. ___ 1---1--,-- 1--1---1--,--,--1--1--1--1--1--
4 18 12 794 I 101 52 I 337 18 50 21 97 67 6 Required from A to E .... ....... . 
Works to be last commcnccd.-Tablc F ............ , Required ...................... .. 25 I 113 I 78 1 •••••• 
--·--1--,--1--1--1--1--1--1--1--1--1--1--
H 
On hand . .. ................... .. 
928 
46 
118 61 394 21 58 5 21 7 
25 . ..... . .... . 
Tobeprovided ............... 1~l-s82 \1IBT 6ll 394 I 2l I 581 ...... 1 113 I 78 I ..... j 5 l~ l--7 
Grand total required ......... · I 261 1, 7221 2191 Jl3 I 731 I 39 j 108 1 46 I 210 I 145 J ...... J--9-1391~ 
Grand total on Jiand..... .. .. .. .. .. .. 544 .. • .. . 35 243 . • .. .. .. .. .. 46 























Estimate£l cost ef ordnance ef all lcinds requiredfor tlie arniament ef fortifications, ~.-Continued. 
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Uhl fort s and battcries.-Tablc A ................. 1 RPquired ••• . •••.•.•••••••••.••. 
___ , ___ , ___ , __ . 
Ou hand.......... . .••••.•• , ••. 











1,000 I 900 
1 
. ••••• 
1,000 ............ .. 
To be provided ............. . 
To be provided ...... , ...... .. 
Ncwfortificationscomplcted.-Tableil ........... l Re']uircd ........................ 1 61·---~ 1· l~I -~~7~0 ·1 -~:7~~ 1·~ ;:~~~· 1 ·~,;~~-1 ::J,900 \ 1,200 I 9,000 I 4,800 
On hand........................ . ...... .••••. . •••. . ........ 1,700 21,000 1,100 3,900 l,200 6,800 




10 I 7,700 l····· .. ·1······· ·1 · .. ···; .1 ........ 1 ....... I 2,200 I 4,tlOO 400 
To be provided . . • . • . • . • • • • • . , ..... 
Furtrlications under construction.-'rable C .•.•••. I Required •.•.••••••.••••.•••••••. J ...... 1 ...... , ..... · I 2,400 I 2,400 I 9,400 I· ....... , 600 I 600 I 900 I l, 500 1 ..... . 
Ou hand......................... ..•.. .•••• .••• . . .• .. .•. 21 400 5,915 . ... .... 600 600 ... . . ...... ........ .. 
Workq to be conHructrd aftrr those in table D, state· j Requirer! ................................... . · .... • · · • • • .. • .. • · • ·.. '" 
--,--,--,---·--·--·--,--·--,--,--_, __ 
2,400 , ....... . 3,485 1 •••• ••• , •••••• • 900 1,500 1• .. •• • 
l-1-,-,--,--1--1--1--,--,--,---rneut J, arc complcted.-Tablc• .E. On hand..... .. .................. .. .. ...... ...... . . .. .•. . . .. uOO 200 200 200 1 · • • • • .. · 1 · ,. . • • . • I 200 I • , • • • • 200 . ....•. . .••..•. ..••. •.•. 
To be provided ............. .. 
Required from A to E ........... . 
--,--,--1--1--•--1--1--1--1--,---,--
••••••••••••••••• ·t ·•••••• I••••••• 
--•--1--1--1--1--1--1·--•--r---1---•--
tiOO , .••••••. , . •••••• . , .••••••• , •••••••. 200 I•• ••• 
WorkslobcJastcommenced.-TalllcF ........... ! Req uired........................ 8 5 14 11,800 6,100 39,400 2,100 5,800 2,500 rn,700 8,600 500 
On hantl. • • • . • • . • • . • .. • • • • • • . • • .. . • • . . .. • . . . • • • .. . . . • . .. .. .. . .. . .. • • . • . . 2,100 5,800 2,500 . .. .. • . . . • . . . . . . . ••••• 
------------------------To be provided . • • .. • • • • • . • • • 8 5 14 11,800 6, I oo 39_, 400 . • • • • • • . . • .. • .. .. . • • • • 12, 700 s, 600 500 
Grand totnl reqnirerl . ••.••••.. 15 9 26 21,9m 11,300 73,100 3,900 10,800 4,600 23,600 16,0t O 900 
Grand total on liaud •••. ••••.. ...... .••••. .••.•. ... .... 5,200 29,615 3,HOO 10,800 4,600 7,1::!UO ............ . 
--•--1--1---1--1--1 --,--1--r--1--1--
12 1 10,100 I 5,200 I 33,100 I 1,soo I 5,ooo 1 2,100110,9001 1,400 400 






















/!.,'sti'11wlnl cost r!f ord1tauce r!f all ki1tds required for the arniament ef fortiji(:ations, ~.-Continued. 
--- - - -
PROJECTILES, OANNON POWDER, fOST OF ARMAMENT, 
.., 
i:: 
Fortifications. Ordnance. .I& 
~ 
,_ ~ 
oi ~~ "' -~ "' .., m 0 
~ c 
.., 
-~ ... ~ ~8 0 -~ .., i:: :; i:: i:: "" 
~ 
:::l i:: t: ·2 ~..c:: 0 "' "' ~ 0 0 p... 0 0 p... 
Old forts and battcries.-Table A ................. Required ....................... 200 ···· ···· 38,950 $20,320 00 $20,660 00 $9,138 00 $7,790 00 On hand, .... . ................... 200 ······· 38,950 15,550 00 13,200 00 6, 76~ 00 7, 7!10 00 ---- ---- ----
To be provided ... " .......... ....... ······· ............ 4,770 00 7,460 00 2,376 00 . .......... . ------------
New fortifications completcd.-'I'able D ••••••••••. Required ....................... 1,900 400 :,27,450 164,075 00 164, 745 00 76,870 00 6.'>,4!10 00 
On hand ......................... l,!100 ·· ······ 95,735 lOL,975 00 78, l25 00 43,626 00 19,147 00 ---- ----
To be provided .............. . 400 231,715 62,100 00 , 86,6~0 00 33,244 00 46,343 00 
-- ----
Fortifications under construction.-Table C ...••. Required ....................... 300 -······ 122,400 61,530 00 59,950 00 23,812 00 24,480 00 On hand, ....................... . 300 ···· ··· · ........... 43, [50 00 6,200 00 11,243 00 ·········· · ---- ---------
To lie provided .............. . ....... ······ · 122,400 19,380 00 53,750 00 12.569 00 24,480 00 --------
\,Yorks tn be cnn~tru<'ted afln those in table D, state- Required ............ ............ ....... ....... 6,700 3,550 00 3,590 00 l,3i2 00 1,340 00 
ment 1, are cornpleted.-Table E. On hand .... . ................... .... ... ........ ........ , .. . 500 00 ··········· · 244 00 ··········· -- -------- ----
To be provided ............... ........ ....... 6,700 3,050 00 3,5SO OU 1,128 00 1,340 00 
---- -- ·--- ---- ----
ltequired from A to E ........... . 2,40U 400 495,500 250,475 00 248,945 00 111,192 00 99,100 00 
----------
Wurks to lie last commcnced.-Table F .......... . Required ....... ............. ... 2,800 500 5i9, 850 293,080 00 2!10, 9!10 00 130, 181 00 ll5,970 00 
On hand ......................... .. ...... ........... 7,750 00 7,500 00 5,412 00 . .......... 
--------
To be provided ............... 2,800 500 579,850 285,330 00 283,490 00 124,769 uo 115,970 00 -- ----
Grand total requirnd ......... . 5,200 900 1,075,350 543,555 00 539,935 00 241,373 00 215,070 00 
Grand total on hand •••••••••• . 2,400 ······ 134,685 168,925 00 105,025 00 67,287 00 26,937 00 -------- ---- --------
Grand total to be provided .••• . 2,800 9UO 940,665 374,630 OU 434,910 00 174,086 00 183,133 00 
NoTE.-The cost of saltpetre and brimstone may be estimated at one-half of the cost of gunpowder. 
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REPORT ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER. 
'This frontier extends, as described by the terms of the resolution, from Lake 
Superior to Passamaquoddy bay, a distance of somewhat more than two thous-
and miles, ,binding all the way on the British American Provinces. 
Whether we regard the strongly marked geographical features of this frontier, 
presenting, as it does, for the most part, a chain of great lakes Oi inland seas, 
stretching along the border, the common property of both nations, and affordin1r 
facilities for an extensive commerce, almost rivalling that of the ocean itself; or 
whether we look to the growing strength of our colonial neighbors, fostered by 
the immense power and resources of the mother country; its vast importrnce 
cannot fail to impress us with the necessity of being prepared, not only for de-
fence along that line, but also to act offensively, with decisive effect, in the event 
of our being involved in a conflict. 
ltrom the peculiar character of this frontier, its defence must necessarily par-
take somewhat of the system applicable to the seacoast; for, although it i~ _de-
nominated inland, in contradistinction to the latter, it is, nevertheless, mantime 
in many of its features, and must be treated accordingly for purposes of defence, 
So important is the mastery on the lakes, in any military operations in. that 
quarter, that it is scarcely to be doubted that, in the event of war, there will be 
some naval preparations on both sides, and a struggle for the ascendancy on 
those waters. Whichever power shall acquire that, even temporarily, will have 
the means of assailing his adversary with great effect along the shores_ of the 
lakes, in the absence of fortifications, by occupying the harbors, destroymg !he 
towns, (some of which are fast advancing to the rank of cities,) and controlling 
the commercial operations of which those lakes constitute the principal cha~el. 
These considerations render it highly expedient-indeed, necessary-to fort ify 
the larger harbors on the lakes, as well as the more important passe on the 
straits and rivers by which they are connected. . . 
Without entering fully into the military details of the subject, wh1~h m1_ght 
be deemed somewhat out of place here, regarding the object of the resolution, 
which seems to look rather to the expense involved, the board will proceed to 
enumerate the works of defence deemed necessary on the northern frontier. 
beginning at Lake Superior; merely glancing at the effects and advantage5 
which are likely to result from the establishment of those works. 
l. Fort at Falls of St. Mary.-A fort here will control the communication 
between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, and, at least, prevent an enemy_ from 
availing itself of it for purposes of communication and for the trans_por!at10n ot 
supplies, if it does not secure th-:>se important advantages to us ; which 1t would 
do, unless counteracted by a work on the British side of the line. In that event. 
almost certain to occur, it would be neutralized, but would still serve to coYer 
and protect our settlements along the St. Mary, and form a rallying point for 
local defence in times of alarm. 
E timated expense of fort, barracks, &c. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • ·75, 000 
2. Fort at Micl1,ilimackinac.-Although this position is some-
what int rior, it i regard d of high importance from it geograph-
ical r lation . A fort here, in conjunction with floating battcrie , 
may be made to command, effectually, the approach to Lake 
Michirran, and hut out an enemy who might po, e.., a naval 
a .cendancy on Lake Huron; thu prot cting the entire circumfor-
nce of Lak ichigan from attack t which it would otherwi e 
be xpo cd, even from a mall force, and , ecuring it to our . lve 
n a afi chann l of commtmi ation with the rich and productive 
tatc in the rear, who ·hor it w he . 
Estimated expen e . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . • • . • . • . • . . . . . • . • . • 50. 0 
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3 . F ort at the foot ef Lake Huron.-A work here will control 
the outlet of Lake Huron, and interrupt the navigation between 
that and Lake St. Clair and the river Detroit. It will serve also 
to cover the settlements on that part of the frontier, and form a 
rallying point for the neighbori11:g militia for local defence. 
E stimated expense ................... - . - . - . - - - - - - - - - · - -
4. F ort and barrack establisliment at Detroit.-In the event 
of war , D etroit would undoubtedly be a point of considerable con-
centration of troops, not merely for the defence of that portion of 
the frontier, but for such offensive operations as might be deemed 
expedient in that quarter. It may be regarded as the centre of 
the upper section of the northern frontier, and has important 
relations, both geographical and military. Although true policy 
would, in such a case, dictate that our chief efforts should be 
directed against the vital points of the enemy's possessions as low 
down the line as practicable, still it might become expedient, with 
a view to distract his attention and divide his forces, to menace 
him above ; and this is one of the points from which he might be 
assailed by minor expeditions, especially if he should relax his 
measures of defence in looking to his safety elsewhere. 
Estimated expense of barracks for one regiment, including 
site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $150, 000 
Estimated expense of fort at Spring Wells, including 
site... • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 100, 000 
5. F ield-work and barrack establishment at or near Buffalo.-
The wealth and commercial importance of Buffalo, and its close 
proximity to the British line, will make it an object of attack in 
time of war, unless it be protected by the presence of a respecta-
ble force there. It may also become a point of concentration of 
troops for minor offensive movements, by way of diversion; and 
is thus, in every view, entitled to seasonable attention. An 
extensive barrack establishment, defended by field-works, would 
be sufficient for all necessary objects. 
Estimated ex?ense ..........•.........................• 
6. Fort Niagara to be rebuilt.-A fort at this position is 
important, on the assumption ( admitting, it is believed, of but 
little doubt) that in time of war there would be some naval prepa-
rations on Lake Ontario. It commands the entrance into the 
Niagara river; and a work here will shut the enemy's vessels out 
from that harbor, while it will afford protection under which ours 
may take shelter in case of need. 
Estimated expense of completing the work now in pro-
gress.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $27, 500 
:E'or repairs of buildings and new barracks there. . . . 37, 500 
7. Fort at Oswego.-The growing importance of Oswego, the 
relation it bears to the great line of internal communication to the 
west, and its exposed situation, directly on the shore of the lake, 
from whence it might be assailed by armed vessels without the 
co-operation of a land attack, call for works of defence to protect 
the harbor, and thus secure a safe retreat for our vessels in case 
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place possesses many advantages for naval preparations for vessels 
of light draught of water, and would probably be made a subordi-
nate depot in time of war. 
Estimated expense of completing the works now in pro-
gress... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $20, 000 
For barracks, quarters, storehouses, and magazine. . 25, 000 
8. Fort at Sackett' s Harhor.-In the event of naval arma-
ments of any considerable extent being resorted to on Lake 
Ontario, Sackett's Harbor, from its bold water, and its excellency 
as a harbor, would at once become a depot of great importance; 
the safety of which should be insured against the enterprises 
of the enemy by the timely construction of appropriate works of 
defence. Situated directly opposite to the strong post of Kings-
ton, on the Canadian side, and adjacent to the head of the St. 
Lawrence, it is one of the points at which a concentration of 
troops may become expedient for the defence of that portion of 
the frontier and the protection of the naval depot. 'rhe barrack 
accommodations already established there are deemed sufficient, 
and it remains to fortify the approach to the harbor. 
Estimated expense of fort and barracks within ............ . 
9. Fort at the narrows if the St. Lawrence, below Ogdens-
burg.-The chief object of a work here would be to cut off the 
enemy's communication, by the river, between Montreal and 
Kingston, and thus prevent him from availing himself of that 
channel for the transportation of troops and supplies if we cannot 
entirely secure it to ourselves. By this obstruction on the St. 
Lawrence he would be thrown altogether upon his back line of 
communication by the Ottawa, which, although it has the merit 
of being more secure from interruption, is longer and more diffi-
cult, especially in seasons of drought. This would also be 
another point from which the enemy might be menanced, and 
from which auxiliary movements might be made in aid of the 
chief attack. 
Estimated expense of fort and barracks .................. . 
10. Fort near tlie line on Lake Cltamplain.-A work here may 
be made to command the pass of the lake, and is considered by 
f~r the most important of any proposed on the whole line of fron-
t1er. 
The po. ition of Lake Champlain is somewhat peculiar. While 
Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior stretch their whole length 
directly along the border, (forming, in fact, the boundary,) Cham-
plain xtends de ply into our territory, at right angle. with the 
line of the frontier; and, while its southern extremity reaches 
al.mo t to the Hudson, it £nds its outlet, to the north, in the St. 
La,n-encc, n •arly midway between Montreal and Quebec, the two 
great obj ct of attack. 
Thi i. undoubtedly tl1e avenue by which the Briti .. h posse -
ions m, y b mo. t effe tnally a Flail cl; while, at the ame time, 
it wonlcl afforcl to th n ·my po . .. e :--ing a naval a"c ndancy equal 
fa iliti •: for hringina th war within our own border ' if it be left 
unfortifi d. It ther for b come important to fortify a point a. 
near th line a- pra ·ti ·abl , o a t :hut ut th n my'· v ~ 1:-, 
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of the lake from the predatory attacks to which they would other-
wise be exposed, and of securing it to ourselves as the great 
channel by which our troops and supplies may be rapidly thrown 
foTward to the points of attack or defence. 
For a permanent work on Stony Point, (N. Y.,) including pur-
chase of site ................................. $300,000 
FOT a permanent work on Windmill Point, (Vt.,) in-
cluding purchase of site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300,000 
11. Barrack establisliment and dPpot at Plattsburg.-In the 
e"\"'ent of war, Plattsburg will become the great depot for the 
operations on the Champlain frontier, the point of COJ?.centration 
of troops preparatory to any offensive movements, and the station 
of the reserve to sustain those movements, and the posts that 
may be established in advance. Even in time of peace a respect-
able force should be posted here, especially during the continuance 
of the boundary q_uestion and border disturbances. Barracks for 
a regiment, at least, with suitable storehouses, are recommended 
to be erected, on a plan admitting of extension, if required, and 
also of suitable defensive arrangements. 
Estimated expense of completing the works in progress on the 
scale here suggested ................................•.... 
12. From Lake Champlain, eastward, the geographical features 
of the frontier materially change character, and require a corres-
ponding modification of the means of defence. The line no longer 
intersects great lakes, admitting of naval preparations, nor binds 
on straits and rivers, the. navigation of which may be controlled 
or interrupted by fortifications. It is altogether inland until it 
reaches the St. Croix, where the principles that have been applied 
to other portions of the frontier similarly situated will again be-
come applicable. Running on a parallel of latitude to the Con-
necticut river, and thence along a chain of highlands, not yet 
clearly defined, to the Province of New Brunswick, the board are 
not aware that there are any points immediately on the frontier 
sufficiently commanding, of themselves, to call for the establish-
ment and maintenance of fortifications or works of defence. 
Should it ever become necessary to sustain by force our title to 
the territory now in dispute, it must be done, not by isolated forts 
along the frontier, commanding, probably, nothing beyond the 
range of their own guns, but by an active army, competent not 
only to occupy the country and hold it, but also to assume the 
offensive, if necessary, and caTry the war beyond our borders. 
But while it is not deemed expedient to construct a chain of 
forts along this portion of the frontier, the board consider it a 
proper measure of precaution, in the present state of our relations 
with the British provinces, that positions should be selected and 
preparatory anangemcnts made for the establishment of depots 
of supplies at the head of navigation on the Kennebunk and 
Penobscot. In the event of movements in that quarter, these 
would be proper points for the concentration of troops, and would 
.. erYe a · a ba, e of operations, whether these should be offensive 
or defensive in their character. 
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13. Fort at Calais, on the St. Croix river.-A work here, 
while it will serve to cover that part of the State of Maine from 
the attacks to which it would otherwise be exposed, may, from its 
advanced position, be made to act an important though indirect 
part in the defence of the more northern portion of the frontier. 
Calais appears to be a very eligible point for the concentration of 
troops with reference to existing circumstances. A strong force 
stationed here, threatening the enemy's posts on the lower St. 
John's, and held ready to strike in that direction in case of move-
ments from New Brunswick towards the disputed territory, could 
not fail to have a decisive influence on such movements; since it 
is obvious that they could not be made with safety while exposed 
to attack in flank and rear, and to have their line of communica-
tion intercepted and thefr depots seized, by a prompt movement 
on our part from the St. Croix. 
Estimated expense of fort and barracks __ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $100, 000 
14. In reference to the northern frontier generally, it is the de-
cided opinion of the board that, besides the defences which have 
been suggested along the border, chiefly for purposes of local 
protection, there should be a great central station at some position 
in the interior at which troops might be assembled for instruction, 
and where they would still be within supporting distance of the 
more exposed parts of the frontier. 
Turning our views inland in search of some single position at 
which preparations might be made for extended operations on this 
frontier, and from ·which aid and succor could always be speedily 
derived, some position which, while it shall be equally near to 
many important points of the enemy's possessions, shall afford at 
no time any indication of the Jirection in which our efforts are to 
be made; which will, if it be possible, unite the opposite qualities 
of being at the same time remote and proximate far as to distance, 
but near as to time; which, while it brings a portion of the mili-
tary resources of the country to the support of the inland frontier, 
and places them in the best attitude for operations in that quarter, 
whether defensive or offensive, at the same time takes them not 
away from the sea-coast. Looking for these various properties, 
we find them all united in a remarkable degree in the position of 
Albany. 
From this place, by steamboat, canal boat, or railroadcar, troops 
and munitions could be transported in a short time to Buffalo, or 
onward to Detroit, to Oswego, to Sackett's Harbor, to Plattsburg, 
to Bo ton, and along the coast of New Englal'.).d ; to N cw York 
by steamboat now, and soon by railroad also; and thence onward 
to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and the heart of the 
south •rn country if necessary. In a word, Albany is a great 
central po ition, from which radiate the principal lines of com-
munication to the north, to the south, to the east, and to the west; 
and c~mbine o many advantages for a military d pot that the 
exp d1 ncy of occupying it and thu availing ourselves of tho e 
advantao-es would c m to be manifc t. 
E tirnat d cxpen c of the purcha c of land, and the construc-
tion of barrack and other buildings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300, 0 0 
Total for northern frontier. . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . • . . . . • • . . . • 2, 160. 0 0 
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The board beg leave to observe, in conclusion, that, in the preparation of the 
estimates submitted, they have not attempted to aim at precision. Hence the 
amounts stated for the various objects are to be regarded only as approximations. 
They could not be anything more, on the data used, which, for want of minute 
surveys and reconnoissances, were necessarily vague. It is believed, however, 
that the results presented will be found sufficiently accurate for the general 
purposes contemplated by the resolution under which tl1is report has been pre-
pared. 
For the board, 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--11 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
Colonel ef Engineers. 
Estimatccl cost r!f ordnance ef all kinds req1.tircd for the armanient <if the nortllCrnfronticr, embracing cannon mounted, and one hun-
dred rounds ef ammunitiunfol' caclt, piece._ 
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Wm·ks ot fol.fa of St. M"'Y··+······· Fort at M1cb1hmackmac.----· 400 
]!'ol't of Lake Huron ____ • __ .... ____ . ___ 
Fort for Spring Wells, below 
Detroit . ___ . ___ .. ________ --------· 
Buffa.lo and Black Rock. ____ . ---- ---· Fort Niu.g,m1. ______________ --------
Ji,ort Ontario at O~nvego ______ --------
Sackett's harbor ____________ --·-----
.Fort at the narrows of the St 
Lawrence ______________ .... -------· 
Fort on New York side at 
Cham plain .. _. ______ . ____ 6,400 
Fort on opposite side. ______ . 6,400 
Plattsburg ___________ . _____ 
Headwaters of the Kennebec .. ---- ---· 
Headwaters of the Penobscot .. ----·---Calais __________ • __________ --------
13,200 
For the boar<1 , 
W ASIHNGTON, April 23, 184.0. · 
.. h'stimrtlf·d cos/ r!f' ort?,uu1cc r!f' a l l l.- ht<l,,1, ~r.~Co1d..in1 1ed.• 
---- ---- ·--· ............. --~-~ ----- -----
ruon~CT1LES. POWDER. COST OF ARMAMENT . 
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400 200 . ---- .. _____ ... 200 2,700 $1,540 $3,160 $1,016 $540· $6,256 
400 200 ----- ... .. ----- 200 3,900 2,040 1,960 1, 128 780 5,908 
400 400 200 ----- ... ------ 200 2,700 1,540 3,160 1,016 510 6,256 
1,000 400 400 400 ---- - - 200 200 6,900 3, 630 6,920 2,376 1,380 
14,306 
1,000 400 400 200 200 200 200 fl,700 4,0iO 7,160 
2,928 1,740 15,838 
1,600 400 400 200 200 600 200 14-, 300 6,170 
8,460 3,760 2,860 21,250 
800 1,300 400 200 200 600 200 12,200 6,170 
9,650 ~,058 2,440 21,318 
1,000 400 400 200 200 200 200 
10,200 4_, 010 7,160 2,928 1,740 15,838 
I, 000' 400 400 400 ----- - 200 200 8,400 3,630 6,920 2,356 1,680 14,586 
1,000 400 400 l, 200 400 2,600 200 
52,250 31, 3.'iO 32,620 12,280 10,600 86,850 
1,000 400 400 L, 200 400 2,600 
200 52,250 31 , 350 32,620 12,280 10,600 86,85C 
400 400 400 200 ------- 200 200 5, ·100 2,290 4,960 1,416 1,020 9,68E 
400 400 800 200 ------ 200 400 6,000 2,890 6,760 1,610 
1,200' 12, 4fi( 
400 400 800 200 . ---- ... 200 400 6,000 2, 890 6,760 1,610 1,200 12, 46( 
400 400 800 200 ----- .. 200 400 6,000 2,890 6,760 1,610 1,200 12, 46( 
--- -- --- --- -- - --- -------- ---- ·--- ----
10,800 .5,700 7,200 5,400 1,600 8,000 3,600 
197,600 106,400 145,030 51, 37_2 39,520 342, 32~ 
.. 
























164 MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
REPORT ON THE WESTERN FRON'rIER, FROM THE SABIXE 
BAY TO LAKE SUPERIOR. 
The principles which should govern in fortifying the seaboard are not con-
sidered applicable to Oltr inland frontier, which will very rarely be found to call 
for regular fortifications. Hence, in relation to that portion of the frontier now 
under cousideration, the duty of the board will be performed by indicating the 
military positions or stations which should, in their opinion, be occupied by 
troops, in order to accomplish the .objects in view, and in presenting estimate~ 
of the pTobable cost of constructing the necessary barracks, quarters, and store-
houses, combined with such works of defence as circumstances may appear to 
require, to insure their protection against the attncks to which they may be ex-
posed. 
'l'he want of personal knowledge; on the part of the board, of our extemi,e 
western frontier, and the very limited surveys which h~ve been made in tliat 
quarter, have somewhat embarrassed them in the selection of positions; but 
they desire to be ) understood as merely designating places in a geographical 
sense, leaving the particular sites on which the works should be erected to be 
determined hernafter, by minute examinations of the country at and around 
those positions; which become the more important, inasmuch as the original 
locations of some of the places that will be recommended to be retained have 
been considered faulty. 
The southern section of this frontier, extending from the Sabine bay to ~he 
Red river, borders all the way on '1.1exas, and has, it is believed, little or nothm (J' 
to apprehend from Iuclian aggressions. 'I'he Comanches, the only tribe of any 
power iu that quarter, are represented as gradually receding to the westward, 
and the progress of the 'l'cxan settlements will tend to pnsh them further from 
our border. But our relations with the '11 exan republic, however amicable they 
may be at present, woul<l. seem to require that some military force should be 
stationed on or near the boundary line; and the board therefore re~ornm;nd 
the establishment of two smaJl posts on the Sabine river, suppressmg } ort 
Jesup, which is considered too far within the frontier, or retaining it merely a~ 
a healthy cantonment. . 
As these would be posts of observation, having reference to national police 
more than to military defence, they ought to be established on the river_ wherl' 
the principal roads cross it, by which we should be enabled to supen'18e tliP 
chief intercourse with our neighbors by land, and, at the f:'.ame time, con~·ol the 
navigation of the Sabine. 'l'he points where the Opelousas and Natclntoch ·~ 
mads, leading to 'l'exas, strike the river, are therefore recommended af< the po-
itions ·which should be occupied, and at which barracks for two or three com-
1mnie , defended Ly light worb, should be constructed. . . 
'l'hc middle ection, which extends from the Red river to the :Mis~on11, 15 hy 
far the mo t important portion of tl1e whole of our western frontier. It i-. nlon'.! 
thi:-; lin ' that t11e numerous tribes of Indians who have emigrated from the r~::, 
li:n~ h · n loeat d; thu14 adding to the indigenous force already i_n tl1nt rl';!'10n 
an nnmcn maR. of migrant., . ome of whom }rn.Ye been sent tb1t1H·r liy cotr-
ci, n wi_th , mot~1rrccl fo ·lin_O's of ho:::tility raukling in tl1 ir bo. om, wh i~·h. prob -
1,!y, wait:-t hut f ran occa 10n to burst forth in all it ...,avagr fiuy. 'I hr.~ cor.-
:id<·.r.~tion. alo~1 wo_ul<l .ecm to _call for stroncr precautionary mea, urc, :_ Ln an 
ncl<l1t1011al motive will b found 111 our pc uliar rc·lation with tho .. c Jndrnn~. 
, T ar · hound, by ,·ol nm treaty stiJ>ulationR, to i11tcrpo e force, if JH' • ,~ary. 
t o pr •vc•nt donw:-ti · t-trifo amon"' th m pr '::serve peace between tlie cvt'ral tn . •· 
and to J_Jrot ·ct th m a<rain.-t auy cli:-1turhancc, at their n w homr hy tl1 I 
ll(l°;m: wh inhabit th countr' he· ·ond. The o-ovcmmcnt ha tlm-- conrra 
th two.fold oLligati n of int rv ntion among, ;nd prot ction of, the 1 
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tribes, in addition to the duty which it owes to its own citizens of providing for 
their safety. 
It appears to the board that this obligation can only be properly fulfilled by 
maintaining advan~ed positions in the Indian coun~ry with an a~e~uate r_e-
..., training military force, and that the duty of protectmg our own citizens will 
be best discharged by establishing an interior line of posts along the western 
border of the States of Arkansas and Missouri as auxiliaries to the advanced 
positions , and to restrain the intercourse between the whites and the Indians, 
and serve as rallying points for the neighboring militia in times of alarm. 
With these views they would recommend the maintenance of Fort Towson, 
on Red river, and Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas, and the establishment of a 
post at the head of navigation on the Kansas, and one at r.P&ble creek, on th_e 
Missouri, below the mouth of the Big Platte, as constituting the advanced po~1-
tions on this portion of the frontier. 
For the secondary line intended for the protection of the border settlements 
the boar d would adopt the positions which have been selected by a commission 
of experienced officers along the western boundary of Arkansas and l\Iissomi, 
at some of which, it is understood, works are already in progress, namely: Fort 
Smith , on the Arkansas river; Fort Wayne, on the Illinois; Spring river and 
::\Iarais de Cygne; terminating to the north at Fort Leavenworth, on the Mis-
souri. They would also recommend the establishment of one or two intermediate 
posts between the Arkansas and Red rivers, if, on further examination of the 
country , _suitable positions ca.n be selected near the State line. It is not deemecl 
advisable to establish those posts on the route of the road lately surveyed, which 
(especially the southern portion) is considered too far in advance of the border 
settlements to accomplish the object in view; but if eligible positions cannot be 
found along the line, then a post on the road where it crosses the Poteau river, 
which is not very remote from the settlements, might have a salutary influence. 
On the northern portion of this frontier, extending from the Missouri river to 
Lake Superior, the board would recommend the establishment of a post near 
the upper forks of the Des Moines river, the maintenance of Fort Snelling, on 
the )lississippi , and the ultimate. establishment of a post at the western ex-
tremity of Lake Superior. The last is suggested with some qirnlification for 
want of the necessary information by which to determine the channel of commu-
nication to that remote position ""\Vhether it shall be through Lake Superior 
or by the Mississippi and its tributaries, it would in either case be difficult in 
peace and next to impracticable in time of war. As the position has, however, 
important geographical relations, and would enable us to extend our influence 
~nd control over the Indians in our territory, and afford protection to our traders 
m that remote region, it would seem to be worthy of early occupation if its 
maintenance can be rendered secure-a point which can only be determined by 
a careful examination of the country. 
I t is nevertheless recommended to retain Fort Ora,vford, at Prairie du Chien, 
Fort 1Viunebago, at the portage of the :Fox and Wisconsin rivers, and Fort 
~oward, at Green l)ay. These posts are deemed necessary to protect that por-
tion of our frontier, while at the same time they serve to cover an important line 
of intercommunication between the northern lakes and the western waters. 
It ha.-, not been thought expedient to continue the interior line of defence 
1<uggc.-ted for the middle section of this frontier across from the Missouri to the 
1Ii:::~is:-i]!pi river. Our Indian relations in ~hat quarter assume a different aspect. 
There i.: no , pecial guarantee of perpetual occupation of that country by thE. 
tribes who now inhabit it, nor can it be doubted that they will ultimately be 
P~:ihed "Ly the advance of our population to the west of the Missouri river. 
[ nder tho. c circumstance, it is believed that the intermediate post recommended 
r, be c·tablished on the Des Moines river, co-operating with the posts on the 
Ii:isouri and those on the U ppe1· Mississippi, will afford adequate protection to 
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the border settlements against any attacks to .which they are likely to be ex-
posed. 
rrhe board have not felt called upon by tlte terms of the resolution under 
which they act to project a plan of operations for the western :frontier, nor to 
go into an estimate of the military force that will be required there, further than 
·was necessary to determine the extent of accommodations to be erected and the 
expense which these will involve. They would, however, observe, that the 
positions which have been designated will not of themselves have the desired 
influence in restraining the Indian tribes and protecting our border :settlcment5 
without the aid of a respectable force, of which a full proportion should 1Je 
mounted and held disposable at all times fm active service in the field. To 
effect this the works should be so constructed that, while they will afford ade-
quate accommodations for all the troops when they are not actively employed, 
their defence may be safely intrusted to a small force. With these precaution-
ary :q:ieasures, and the co-operation of small but effective reserves posted within 
sustaining distances of the several sections of the frontier, it is believed that 
peace may be preserved and the first onset of war met until the militia of the 
neighboring country could be embodied and brought into the :field. 
It only remains to recapitulate the positions which have been recommended 
to be occupied, apportion the requisite force, and present a conjectural estimate 
of the cost of erecting the accommodations and defences deemed necessary at 
each. 
1. Itor quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where the 
Opelousas road crosses that river, including defences. . . . . . . . . . $20, 000 
2. For quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where the 
Natchitoches road crosseR, including defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 000 
3. For permanent quarters and other accommodations for 500 men 
at Fort Towson, including defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100, 000 
4. For permanent quarters and other accommodations for 1,000 men 
at Fort Gibson, including defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0, 000 
5. J! or quarters for 300 men at the post on the Kansas river, inclu-
ding defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60, 000 
6. For quarters and other accommodations for 500 men at the post 
at Table creek, near the mouth of the Platte, on the lUissouri, in-
cludiug defences._.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75, 00(1 
7. For quarters and other accommodations for 400 men at the post 
on the Des Moines river, including· defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60, 000 
For the enlargement and repair of Fort Snelling, to fit it for the 
accommodation of 300 men, including defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30, 000 
9. l!--,or quarters for 400 men at the post at the western extremity 
of Lake uperior, including d fenceR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50, 0<YJ 
INTERIOR LINE. 
10. 1 or quart r. for 200 men at t11c 110. t between tl1e Red and Ar-
kan~a. riv r ,· , iuclndino· defences._ ....................... . 
11. .l! or cornplc•tincr quarter. and other accommodatin. for '200 m •n 
at :Fort , 'mith, includino- defc,nc: , ......................... . 
12. } or cornpl ·tii1g quartc·r:l and oth er accommodation. for 200 men 
at l! ort '\Vayn(•, includino- dPfc>nCP.' ........................ . 
1:3. } or cpiart •r-: and. oth r a ·c:ommoc1ati n ., for 200 men at the po-:t 
at 1 '1n-i1JO' 1-iY r, including d ·fence ........................ . 
50. 0Dfl 
50: 1 1 
50.00 1 
50.00 
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14. For quarters and other accommodations for 200 men at the post 
at Marais de Cygne, including defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $50, 000 
J 5. For completing quarters and other accommodations in progress 
for 400 men at :E'ort Leavenworth, including defences.......... 50, 000 
1'otal for western frontier.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895, 000 
All which is respectfully submitted. 
For the board, 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
Colonel Engineers. 
stimall'd ,·ost o · dl kinds required for tlze armament ef tlze western frontier, cmbraci'ng cannon nwunted and one lwndred 
rounds ef ammunition for each piece. 
CANNON • CARRIAGE S. PROJECTILES, POWDER, COST OF AR~1AMENT. 
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REPORT ON THE ARMORIES, ARSENALS, MAGAZINES, AND 
FOUNDERIES, WHICH ARE MENTIONED IN THE THIRD SEC-
TION Ol, THE RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE IN THE FOL-
LOWING WORDS, VIZ: 
" The armories, arsenals, mao-azines, and founderies, either constructed or 
deemed necessary, with a conjectural estimate of the expense of constructing 
such of said establishments as may not yet be completed or commenced, but 
which may be deemed necessary." 
The necessary arsenals and magazines will be first consic1erec1, as armories 
and founderies, being manufactories of arms destined for general distribution, 
do not pertain exclusively to any particular frontier. Arsenals and· ordnance 
depots will be understood to include magazines in the general sense of the term; 
and these establishments will be rated, according to their relative importance or 
magnitude, in three classes : 
I. Arsenals of construction, which embrace also repairs, and for deposit. 
II. Arsenals for repairs and for deposit. 
III. Depots, or places for deposit and safe-keeping of arms, and other ord-
nance stores. 
I. On tlie nortliern frontier, from Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy bay.-
An arsenal or ordnance depot will be required at some suitable point on the 
L pper Mississippi; and Fort Crawford, at Prairie du Chien, offers a good posi-
tion, particularly with reference to supplying the line or tract of country extend-
ing southwesterly from Fort Snelling, through the Territory of Iowa, towards 
the Des Moines river, as well as northwardly toward Lake Superior, and east-
wardly through the Territory of Wisconsin to Lake Michigan. The expens~ 
of constructing this depot, on a scale commensurate with the probable importance 
that must be given to it, will be not less than................ $70, 000 
forming an arsenal of the third class. 
'l'he Detroit arsenal, on the river Rouge, twelve miles from De-
troit, now nearly finished, is an arsenal of the second class, des-
tined to supply the lake frontier from the Sault de St. Marie, the 
outlet of Lake Superior, to Lake Michigan and Lake Erie.~ . . . 20, 000 
will effect the completion of this arsenal. 
Alleghany arsenal, at Pittsburg, an establishment of the :first 
cla1-s, is also available for the supply of the lake frontier, as well 
as the western frontier, through the western arsenals. 
Rome arsenal, of the third class, is the place for deposit for 
etores required at the posts on Lake Ontario. 
Champlain arsenal, at Vergennes, Vermont, also of the third 
cla~s, will supply the posts on Lake Champlain and the northern 
part of Vermont. But the whole lake frontier, and the arsenals 
in that region, may be supplied from the Watervliet arsenal, near 
Albany, which is an establishment of the first class, and admira-
bly located for the preparation and sending forth of ordnance 
· tores, not only to the northern, but likewise to the maritime 
frontier. The periods of free navigation of the New York canals 
and the Hudson river arc used for the distribution from vVater-
vlir,t of such upplies as may be required in the winter season. 
. Th~ Kennebec arsenal, at Augusta, Maine, of the second class, 
13 df·:-1gned to supply the northern and eastern frontiers of that 
,'.tau·, and part of New Hampshire; but arms would be furnished 
rJ the frontier of the latter State from Springfield armory, and 
170 MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
ordnance stores would be passed up the valley of the Connecticut 
from arsenals either east or west of that river. 
It may become necessary to establish a depot on the Penob-
scot, at Bangor. But this point is only sixty miles from Augusta; 
and no estimate of the cost is furnished, as the deposit would 
probably be temporary. 
II. The maritime.frontier from Passamaquoddy bay to Cape 
Florida.-'rhe Kennebec arsenal is the place of deposit for the 
greater part of the sea-coast of Maine ; the sum of ............ . 
will finish the additions required. 
The Watertown arsenal, five miles in the rear of Boston, also 
of the second class, will supply the westerly part of ~faine, the 
sea-coast of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island; 
and .................. _. _. __ ..... _ .. ____ .. _ ....... _ .. . 
will be required for additional buildings and encfosures. 
Both the Kennebec and Watertown arsenals are of considerable 
extent, with every facility for being converted into arsenals of the 
first class; and the construction of gun-carriages, necessary for 
arming the forts and batteries within the limits above stated. may 
be effected at both or either. The Watervliet arf;lenal, before 
mentioned, is, however, the principal one relied on for supplies re-
quired, not only from Cape Cod to the capes of Delaware bay, 
but for much of the maritime as well as the lake frontier. Addi-
tional quarters and storehouses at this post will cost ......... . 
A depot in the harbor of New York receives articles from W a-
tervliet, during the season of navigation, which are transhipped, 
in time of peace, to all parts of the coast and to the Mississippi. 
nuriug a war, supplies would be furnished from arsenals in the 
more imme<liate vicinity of the sea-coast defences, viz : Frankford 
arsenal, six miles above Philadelphia, is of •the second class, and 
will supply works on Delaware bay and river; Pikesville arsenal, 
of the thi.J:d class, four miles from Baltimore; Washington arsenal 
and :F'ort Uonroe arsenal, both of the first class, will furni h what 
may be required for the sea-coast defences of Chesapeake bay and 
Potomac river. 'rhe last mentioned was established with special 
reference to the construction of the gun-carriages required at that 
post and at Fort Calhoun. It has been found advantageous, however, 
to construct there carriaO'cs for other southern forts; but it can-
not b · considered as a pe~anent establishment of the first class, to 
be kept up after the occasion which called for it shall have passed 
by. 
The North Carolina ar enal, at Fayetteville, on Cape Fear 
riv r is uucl r construction, and wa. originally intended to be 
mad one of the fir. t cla , . Doubt have been entertained 
wh ther it onght to exceed tho e of the second cla ; but the 
plan i: ._ u ·h that it can at any tim b xtended according to the 
ori 0 -inal dct<ign. Th , um of eio-hty thou and dollar will be re-
quir d to fini:-h it a one of the 8C'cond cla s ............... ·: 
'harl f\ton cl pot is at pr nt of diminutive capacity. It 1 
prop •r to r.niaro- · it, ancl thirty thou~and dollar will make it u e-
ful a, a plac(! of d po it ........ _ .................... - . - .. 
ll"'U. ta ar:Pnal at U"'U, ta, '<'Or0 -ia i of th ccond cla. , and 
with the two la~t m ntion cl will fnmi:-th uppli · rcquir d from 
h . ap akP hay to 1ap :E lorida. 






MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
located at an inconvenient distance, beyond the control of the force 
at the post. For the construction of a new magazine, and other 
n~cessary a~ditions to this establishment, sixty thousand dollars 
will be requrred .................... - · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Several of the arsenals have been built upwards of 20 years, 
and require extensive repairs and additions, which it is suppose~ 
may be effected, from time to time, by the aid of annual appropri-
ations, amounting in all to abo~t ................ · · · · · - · · · · · 
III. "The Gulf frontier,from Cape Florida to Sabine bay."-
.Appalachicola arsenal, at Chattahoochee, just below the junction 
of the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers; Mount Vernon arsenal, on 
the ~Io bile river; and Baton Rouge arsenal, on the Mississippi, 
are all establishments of the second class, and destined t-o supply the 
whole Gulf frontier, and the forts below New Orleans, on the Mis-
sissippi. About sixty thousand dollars will be required to com-
plete them, and erect some additional buildings at Baton Rouge .. 
IV. "Tlie western frontier, .from Sabine bay to Lake Supe-
rior."-Baton Rouge arsenal, already mentioned, will furnish 
supplies for posts on the Sabine and Red rivers. 
Little Rock arsenal, just commenced, will be the source of sup-
plies for posts on the Arkansas, and along the western border of 
that State. It will necessarily become at :first an arsenal of the 
second class, with the depot at Memphis as subsidiary, and will 
require one hundred thousand dollars to complete it .......... . 
St. Louis arsenal is a large establishment of the second class, but, 
with very little expense can be raised to the :first class; with the 
subsidiary depot at Liberty, on the Missouri, it will supply the 
posts on that river, the western border of the State, the posts on 
the D es Moines, and the Upper Missippi. 
A depot at Prairie du Chien, mentioned in relation to supplies 
required ·in the direction of Lake Superior, and southwesterly, 
through the Territory of Iowa, would be sustained by the St. 
Louis arsenal, and completes the chain upon the several frontiers 
embraced in the resolution. 
Total amount required for constructions, additions, and repairs 








The two national armories at Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harper'-: 'Ferry, 
Virginia, are the only public establishments for the manufacture of small arms. 
They furnish about twenty-five thousand stand of arms yearly. rrhis number 
might be extended; but it has been an object of solicitude with the government 
for nearly twenty years past to establish an armory west of the Alleghanies. 
Commissioners were employed in 1823 to examine the western waters, with a 
new to the location of an armory. Many sites were surveyed, and careful esti-
mates made of the cost of an armory at each, with an exhibit of their several 
advantages and disadvantages. The result of their investigations may be found 
~t large in Gales & Seaton's reprint of American State Papers, folios 729 to 790 
inclut-ivc, Yolume 2, :Military Affairs. 
It i::; perMps fortunate that the place then selected was not adopted by Con-
grcsic:; for, since that period, the immense increase, not only of population and 
the gf'll ·ral re ources of the western region, but of the particular articles required 
for the manufacture of arms, by the discovery of masses of coal, and the exten-
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sive working of iron mines, where nothing of the kind was then found, has 
shown that an armory should be located much further west. 
The data collected by the commissioners in 1823 may be usefully applied in 
estimating the probable cost of an armory at the present day, making suitable 
allowances for the increased price of everything connected with such an estab-
lishment. This cost will be found to vary, according to localities of positions, 
from $280,000 to $500,000 for an armory capable of furnishing twelve thousand 
muskets per year. It will therefore be stated at the mean of $390,000, to which 
twenty per cent. should be added; making the sum of_ ____ . . . . $,468, 000 
Another mode of proceeding proposed, consists in forming an 
establishment complete in itself, of limited extent, and having the 
great mass of component parts of arms manufactured by the piece 
in private workshops, and only the inspecting, assembling, and 
finishing be done at the public works. '.rhis course would mate-
rially reduce the first cost, or necessary expenditure for buildings 
and tools. It also admits of extension to a great amount of fab-
rication, with but little additional cost of permanent fixtures. 
But, whichever mode is followed, or whatever site may be 
selected for its location, there can be no question of. the necessity 
for an armory on the western waters; and as regards a proper 
location, it may be observed, that, to consider the relations of an 
armory in the same light as that of an arsenal or magazine, would 
be an error; the means of production being the principal requisite 
for the one, and those of transportation or distribution for the 
others. 
Total required for an armory on the western waters ........ - . 468,000 
Founderies. 
The United States own no cannon foundery. Although possessing some ore 
beds, from which iron of approved quality for casting cannon has long ?een macl~, 
yet artillery of every description is procured from private foundenes. 'l'~r 
subject has been so recently before Congress, and so ably treated, tha! nothmg 
will be said further than to state the probable cost of such an estabhs~ime~t ; 
and here, again, so much depends upon the location, that only an approx1mat1on 
will be attempted. A report from the War Department made to the 24th Con-
gress, 1st session, Doc. No. 106, states the cost of a foundery, to be located a 
Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, at $312,000. If this estimate i cor-
rect, (and it is known that great care was bestowed on its preparation,) it may 
be a sumed that about __ .. _____ . _ .. __ .. ____ .. _ . _________ . 300, 000 
will be required for a foundery when favorably located for the use 
of water power. Should team power be adopted, the fast co t 
of the e tabli hment would be les , while the annual expenditure 
,vould be greater than for water power. 
A regard a suitable location for a foundery, the great weight 
and bulk of the raw materials u eel in the manufacture of cannon, 
an l th wc•iO'ht of heavy gnn , which are required for u e only on 
th , aboard, would em to c1 mand that particular attention 
i:ih uld b iv n to them an of tran portation both to and from 
th founcl ry. 
Total amount required for a founclery .. _ .. _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300. 000 
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Recapititlation. 
Total amount required for constructions, additions, and repairs to 
arsenals and depots .... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - · · · 
Total amount required to establish an armory on the western 
"'aters ........................ - ...... - . - - · · · · · · · · · · -
Total. amount required to establish a national foundery .... - ... 
Total .................... - ....... - - - - - · · · · · · · · 







By order of the board, 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
Colonel of Engineers. 
MEMORIAL OF EDMUND P. GAINES. 
To the Senate and House ef Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled : 
The memorial of Edmund Pendleton Gaines, a major general in the army of 
the United States, commanding the western division, respectfully showeth: 
That, believing the federal and State constitutions guarantee and consecrate to 
every free citizen capable of bearing arms the ri·glit and duty of participating 
alike in the civil and military trusts of the republic, solemnly requiring the 
soldier to exert his every faculty "in peace to prepare for war," so that 
on the recurrence of war he may be well qualified to fight the battles of his 
country in the greatest possible triumph, and at the least possible cost of blood 
and treasure; requiring him, moreover, to study and respect her political and 
social institutions; and requiring the statesman to discipline his mind for the 
tate and national defence, by adapting his civil acts and occasional military 
studies to the purposes of the national defence and protection, as well against 
foreign enemies in war as against the home incendiary and other criminal offenders 
" in peace; thus rendering the statesman and soldier equally familiarized with 
their common kindred duties of self-go·vernment and self-defence: by a knowl-
edge of which our independence was achieved, and without which this inestima-
ble blessing cannot be preserved ;-your memorialist, a native Virginian, a citi-
zen of Tennessee, schooled in her cabins and her camps to the profession of 
armt\, has, within the last seventeen years, matured a system of national defence, 
to ·which he now respectfully solicits your attention and support: a system of 
national defence which the late giant strides of invention and improvement in 
the arts have rendered indispensable to tlie preservation of the Union: a system 
of national defence which recommends itself peculiarly to the central, southern, 
and Atlantic States, as well as to those of the north and west; as it assures to 
our i::lolated central States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and to all the western 
, 'tatcf, of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Arkansas, in peace, commercial 
advantaO'c•s equal to those enjoyed by the most favored eastern, Atlantic, or 
::outhern btatei:i; and in war, giving to the disposable fighting men of these cen-
tral and western States the inestimable privilege of flying with unprecedented 
certainty, celerity, and comfort to any of our vulnerable seaports, to aid our 
hrethren of the border States to repel the invading foe ; and to accomplish this 
es::ential duty in one-tenth part of the time, and one-tenth part of the expense 
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that would attend such an operation over our present bad roads. But, above 
all, to accomplish these great and good objects by means that will more than 
double the value of our State and national domain, and without expending a 
dollar that may not be insured to be replaced in the public coffers in from seven 
to ten years after the completion of the work here recommended. 
Your memorialist is admonished by the universal employment of steam power, 
and its applicability to every description of armament hitherto moved upon the 
sea by wind and canvas, or upon the land by animal power, that an epoch is 
at hand in which the art of war, in whatever regards the attack and defence of 
seaports, has undergone an unparalleled revolution. 
Hitherto the transition from peace to war between neighboring nations, 
though sometimes sudden and unexpected, was usually preceded by some sig-
nificant note of preparation not easily mistaken; and after the actual commence-
ment of hostilities there were frequent opportunities and ample time for the 
belligerents, and more particularly for the nation acting upon the unerring 
principle of self-defence, to complete the work ef preparationfor war before the 
work of destruction upon her principal seaport towns had been begun by the 
invading foe. Hitherto the enemy's fleets were to be seen for weeks, often, 
indeed, for months in succession, " standing qff and on," waiting for suitable 
winds and weather to enable them to enter and attack the destiued port, and 
then, in case of accident, to carry them safely out again-winds such as could 
never be calculated on with anything like certainty. Hence the great and 
unavoidable delay in the attack by fleets propelled by wind and sails has often 
enabled the people of the threatened seaports to throw up works of defence; 
and after slowly marching their interior volunteers and other forces at the rate 
of twenty miles a day, they would in time be so well prepared for action that 
the menacing invaders have but seldom ventured to attack places of much 
importance, but have usually condescended to vent their prowess in a petty 
border war against villag·es and private habitations, as upon the Chesapeake bay 
ancl the Georgia sea-coast in the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814. . 
If the obvious effect of steam power, in the rapid movement of e:erythmO' 
to which it has been applied around us, has not been sufficient to convmce us of 
the expediency and transcendent advantages in war and in peace o~ ~he pro-
po>ted immediate work of preparation, by steam power, to guard agamst the 
incalculable disasters that must otherwise attend the sudden outbreak of war 
with any of the great nations of Europe able to send against us even a small 
fleet propelled by steam power, it would seem obvious that the late naval and , 
military operations in the harbor of Vera Cruz were sufficient to prove clear~y, 
that to bring a hostile fleet inside tlie breakers of a seaport of the country m-
vaded, and within the desired range of the best of cannon and mortars for 
red-lwt slwt ancl sliells of one of the strongest castles in America, wa the work 
of but ·two hour ; and that the utter destruction of that ca tle by three mall 
hip:-of-war r quired but four hours more. . 
'l'o provide for the defence of our , eaports, and thus effectually to obviate 
the po:i ibility of a sudden calamity like that which has befallen the ca.'tle of 
'an J nan clr Ulloa, anc1 to enable u to repel by the agency of team po,-rcr 
v ry inva, ion suddenly forced upon u by fleet prop ·lled by stcan_1 power, 
I now , uLrnit for the con:--id ·ration of the national legitilature the prqJcct and 
~·pl~rnttory vi w which follow: 
ART. I. Floating batterie for the defence ef tlte seaports and lwrbors of th 
Uttit ,fl , late .. 
1. ~ our nwmoriali. t propo:- tl1 imm diate con truction of from two to four 
hr"' floatino- Lattcri :, for th' c1 f ·nee of a ·h navigal>l pa. into th .Ii,-.:-i:;-.ippi 
riv :r and from tw to five other. for th d fi 11 • of very other n:rvilTaLlc i1~l • 
I ·1dino- in ny of the principal ap rt of the United tatc . Each floatwz 
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battery to be from 200 to 300 feet long, and from 90 to 150 feet wide-the 
bottom to be as nearly flat as the best tested principles of naval architecture 
will allow, consistently with the great weight of timber and metal to be pro-
vided for, with the requisite facility of the movement that will be required over 
shoal water. Each floating battery to be secured in the bottom and sides with 
copper sheeting, and copper or iron bolts ; and on the upper parts, exposed to 
the enemy's shot and shells, with the thickest sheet iron, and iron bolts; and 
otherwise made capable of sustaining a heavier broadside than the larg·est of 
our ships-of-war is capable of sustaining; to carry from one hundred and twenty 
to two hundred heavy cannon-say long 24 and 32-pounders, with some 80-
pounders for carrying hollow shot, together with some mortars for throwing 
shells ; with a furnace for heating red-hot shot for illuminating the enemy's 
fleets and transports. · Eaca . floating battery to have state-rooms for the com-
fortable accommodation of from 600 to 1,000 men, with storerooms for all the 
munitions of · war requisite for that force for six to eight months' service. Each 
floating battery to be attended and propelled by sueh number of tow-boats as 
the exigencies of the service shall from time to time demand-to be permanently 
stationed in each harbor in time of peace, and in war as many tow-boats to be 
chartered as the commanding officer may deem necessary to render the floating 
batteries in the highest degree efficient. As in war tow-boats will seldom be 
needed for the merchant service, an ample supply of them, particularly in our 
large seaports, may be chartered on moderate terms : for example, in the harbor 
of K ew Orleans it is believed that twelve tow-boats, with several steamboats 
having the best of engines to be converted into tow-boats, would be thrown out 
of employment during a state of war. These could be usefully employed in 
the United States service, in aid of the public tow-boats and floating batteries. 
But should this reliance be deemed unsafe, we can readily adopt the obvious 
alternative of having each floating battery supplied with two tow-boats of great 
power, as in war they would be needed near the batteries, ready to wield them 
in the event of an attack, and at other times to act as tenders in eupplying them 
with men and munitions of war. In a state of peace the floating batteries, it 
is believed, would require but one tow-boat each, excepting when employed in 
deepening the ship channels-a work which ·may be accomplished with the 
most perfect ease and to any desirable extent, wherever the bottom of the chan-
nel consists of mud and sand, as iu all the outlets of the Mississippi. This 
important work will be done by attaching to the bottom· of each floating battery 
a framework of ploughs and scrapers ef iron, made to let down and raise up at 
plea ure, according to the hardness or softness of the clay and sand, or mud, of 
which the bar or bottom of the channel may be composed. If very hard or 
tough, the ploughs and scrapers might not break up and take off more than two 
to four inches in depth at one movement; but where the bar is composed entirely ' 
of ..,oft mud, as that at Balize and the Northeast and Southwest passes have 
often been, from four to six inches in depth, it is believed, may be carried off at 
once- wherever the bar is very narrow, and in the immediate vicinity of very 
deep water, which would be the reservoir or place of deposit to which the mud 
and ... and would be removed. But in a state of peace, when the batteries should 
not be employed in deepening the ship channels, their extra tow-boats might be 
advantageously employed in the merchant service. 
2. :Floating batteries such as are here proposed, consitute, as your memorialist 
-verily believes, the only sure means of defence of the passes into our seaports 
again t ships-of-war propelled by steam power-means of defence without which 
it i::; in the power of any nation, or community of men, or pirates, capable of 
fitting out ten or even five such steamships-of-war as those employed in the 
df.: '" truction of the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, to destroy the city of New 
York or ... .,.. ew Orleans by fire, with the newly invented SO-pound cannon shot 
and hell , in a single day, at any season of the year i approaching them in the 
176 MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
night, and taking them by surprise : as with such a fleet, well manned and 
supplied, either city could be fired in five hundred places in one hour; and in a 
few hours more thousands of the most splendid edifices, by which these mag-
nificent cities are embellished, would be reduced to ruin and desolation. 
3. This opinion has not been formed without a full knowledge of the fact that 
both New York and New Orleans number among their citizens many men and 
volunteer corps of military science, patriotism, and unsurpassed chivalry. But 
these fine volunteer corps, attacked by means and by weapons hitherto unknown 
to them, or unprovided for, and thus taken by surprise, may share the fate of 
the heroic Danes at Copenhagen, when attacked by Nelson; with this striking 
difference in their favor, and against us, the Danes were not taken by surpri e. 
A protracted negotiation with England preceded the attack; and after the British 
fleet had made its appearance on the coast of Denmark, and in sight of their 
harbor, they had some three or four days for preparation; they had a fleet nearly 
equal to that brought into action against them by Nelson, together with an army 
of some thousands of men, seamen, soldiers, and volunteers, with several fo1tifi-
cations on land, aided by some floating batteries-presenting altogether an arma-
ment of upwards of 1,000 cannon, with an immense supply of small arms and 
every requisite munition of war. In this state of preparation the harbor of 
Copenhagen was entered in open day by twelve ships of the line-three of w~ch 
were rendered nearly useless by having got aground; with nine ships of the lin~, 
therefore, Nelson sustained a close action for four hours, during which time hIB 
loss was less than one thousand, while the loss of the Danes was near six thou· 
and men, together with their fleet-to say nothing of the losses sustained by the 
inhabitants of the city. This was the result of an attack with nine ships of the 
line, propelled by wind and sails, upon the seaport of Copenhagen, when strongly 
fortified and defended by large naval and land forces. What then must be the 
fate of such a city as New York, or New Orleans without any effective mean" 
of defence, attacked by ten, or even five ships-of-war, armed with the newly 
invented SO-pounders, and propelled by steam power? We know that a fleet 
consisting of this description of ships-of-war may cross the .Atlantic from a 
European port to New York in the short space of fourteen days' time, and that 
it may enter our harbors in the night, and be seen at our wharves, with matche5 
lighted ready for action, at daylight in the morning-ready to take or de tr?Y 
money or property amounting to ten times as much as all the :floating b'.tttenes 
and railroads embraced in the proposed system of national defence would _c~~t. 
In the outrageous attack on Copenhagen, England was :fighting for the d01mn10P 
ef tlie sea. Denmark and Sweden, with Russia and France, were then nob~y 
opposing that lawless pretension, as we, the United States, have long opposed it. 
Nelson, on embarking in the expedition, is reported to have said to hi co~-
mauder, Admiral Parker, "I hope we shall give our northern enemies that hail-
• torm of bullets, which gives our dear country tlie dominion ef tlie sea; we ha-re 
it, and all the devils in the north cannot take it from us if our wooden wall ha-re 
fair play." 'I1his is the language of a truehearted Briti,·h seaman and ~oldier. 
u ·h wa the noble bearing of our own Decatur, when he exclaimed, 'Our 
country! in her intercour,·e with for ign nations may she always be right; bu 
iu war ma ' he alway triumph-right or wrong!" 
In th· memorable attack on Copenhagen, it is worthy of remark here tha· 
the xpcri nc 1 d Admiral clflon, ·who had won more great naval victorie: th_an 
any other ommandcr had, pr viou, to the action , tated to the command r-in-
chi ·f th followino- 01Jinion: "If th wind i. fair, and you determine to at a 
the .·hip, and rown i:--lanclt-1, ycv must expect the natural £ssue of ucli a battlt-: 
h111 crippled, a11d pcrlwp one or two Lost/ for the wind wlticli carries '!f 
will most probably not bri11g o_ut a crippled lu'_p." el on, however had 
goocl fortuu , aft r takinr, and de.:troyin,,. a fl t n arly equal to hi: own .. • 
killing "ix tim · a many m ·n a he lo tin action, to ail out of the hru·bor. whic 
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he had filled with wrecks, without the loss of a single British vessel, though ~ie 
had several greatly damaged. , . 
4 . With floating batteries, such as are here proposed, it is more than probable 
that the brave Danes would have destroyed the whole of Nelson's fleet without 
sustaining the loss of a vessel, a battery, or one hundred men. rnie floating 
batteries of the Danes, like those of the French and Spaniards at the siege of 
G ibraltar in the year 1783, were inefficient, simply because they were unwieldy. 
~ o effective means for wielding floating batteries, when large enough to be 
formidable, had ever been discovered previous to the discovery by Robert 
Fulton of that development of steam power applicable to ships and all other 
floating structures. With regard ·to the ten great floating batteries, especjally 
constructed for the memorable siege against Gibraltar, it is obvious to every 
man of military mind that, however formidable such batteries might have been, 
even without towboats, or steam power in any other form, employed in the 
defence of a high rock fort like that of Gibraltar, such floating batteries could 
never be relied on as effective means ef attack upon a high rock fort of that 
description, as the immense strength ef tlie position and ef the work, with the 
g reat ele·vation of the cannon of the work attacked, would insure the destruction 
of floating batteries, or render an attack by them ·unavailing. It is a well 
ascertained fact, however, not generally known, as but few historians have 
noticed it, that the floating batteries employed in the siege of Gibraltar were 
manned principally with convicts. This fact may be considered as the most 
conclusive among the principal causes of their failure, as well as of the opinion 
entertained and expressed by the French and Spanish commanders, that most 
of these batt<~ries were set on fire by the men on board, whose duty it was to 
defend them. Be this as it may, a minute examination of the military history 
of the ten:i-ble siege of Gibraltar is respectfully referred to by your memorialist 
as evidence in favor of his proposition for the immediate construction of floating 
batteries for the defence of our ports and harbors; inasmuch as it is obvious that, 
if the commander of Gibraltar had been supplied with ten floating batteries, such 
as are here proposed, with our present means ot towboats, with steam power to 
wield them, he would have destroyed the whole of the combined fleets employed 
against him, or at least have kept them out of the bay or harbor of Gibraltar. 
To the siege of Gibraltar and the attack on Copenhagen, two of the most terrible 
and extraordinary events known to modern history, in reference to the attack 
and defence of seaports, an event known to your memorialist anc1 many other 
officers now in service will be added, to show the utter impracticability of locking 
up a navigable river or inlet, or of arresting the movement of a fleet thereon, by 
fortifications with cannon placed on the banks of such river or inlet. On the 
night of the 6th of November, 1813, the flotilla, under the command of Major 
General Wilkinson, consisting of nearly 300 boats, sloops, and schooners, passed 
the fort of Prescott, upon the Canada side of the river St. Lawrence, under a 
con tant fire of the cannon of the fort, manned by the best of British artillerists, 
·without the loss of a boat or other vessel, and with the loss of but one man killed 
and two wounded; notwithstanding the flotilla was nearly one hour in the act 
of pas ing the fort, during the whole of which time the fire of the enemy's cannon 
wa~ incessant, and the line formed by the flotilla in its movement was deemecl 
~o be within pointblank shot of the fort-say from 600 to 800 yards' distance! 
This fact was proven by the whistling of the enemy's shot, many, probably 
hundreds, of which passed apparently from 20 to 50 feet above our heads, while 
on Loard the boats in their slow passage, for they were propelled by oars, upon 
a gentle cuuent, which enabled us to move at the rate of not more than three 
mifes an hour. This movement was effected in the night, tolerably c~ear, but 
"ithout moonlight. With the history of these three events before us, it :v-ould 
::.eem to be the height of imprudence in us to persevere in the construction of 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--12 
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costly forts, with the vain hope of protecting our seaports against fleets propelled 
by steam power, :without the employment of floating batteries, such as are here 
recommended, with railroads to sustain them by timely re-enforcements. 
5. But it has been contended by men of high pretensions in theory, if not in 
the practical science of war, that, in place of the floating batteries here propo..,ed 
as means of lwrbor· defence, we should direct our attention mainly to the con-
struction of steams'7.,-ips qf war. In reply to this theoretical suggestion, it is 
only necessary to say that we must, indeed, ultimately have steamships of war, 
or we must give up the whole of our foreign commerce; but, if we desire to 
preserve our seaports and commercial emporiums, we must have for their pro-
tection .floating batteries, which constitute, in the present state of the arts, the 
natural link in the great chain of national defence between the land and naval 
means of service: and, as these floating batteries are not designed for going to 
sea, ( excepting near our ports and harbors, in calm weather,) they properly be-
long to the land service. 'The fact that our seaports are rendered more than 
ever liable to sudden and unlooked-for attacks by fleets propelled by steam 
puwer, renders it all-important to their security that our means of harbor defence 
should never, even for a single clay, be left exposed to an assault~ when that 
assault may, in all human probability, result in the destruction of one of our 
most vital points of military and commercial operations. If, however, steamship~ 
of war should be preferred to the proposed floating batteries, a solemn act of 
Congress should be passed, forbid.cling any officer from removing them beyond 
the immediate vicinity of the harbor to which they may be assigned; as itnm~t 
be obvious that our seaports cannot be protected without every requisite mean, 
of protection is held ready for action within our harbors, repectively. The 
floating batteries1 it is believed, will cost but little more than the timber, iron, copper. 
and other materials for their construction, if they are built, its they should ?e. 
by the troops intended to defend them, aided by some ship-carpenters to give 
them tight bottoms. 
6. With three to five of the proposed floating batteries placed in the form of 
a crescent across the lVIississippi river, with the concave side of the crescent do'ITTI 
the river, and this curved line of floating batteries flanked by a small temporary 
fort on each bank of the river, so as to bring the cannon of each fort or battery 
to bear on any fleet or vessel ascending the river from the sea, we should b(, 
certain thus to give each of the enemy's leading vessels a double cross-fire;_ 
raking them in front and on each side at one and the same time, with several. 11 
our heavy guns from each one of our floating batteries and adjacent forts, uit 
red-hot slwt-a description of defence which would to a certainty, in 99 ca~r: 
out of 100, be fatal to any fleet that could possibly be brought against our ~n 
of batteries. But, "to make assurance doubly sure," we could have our fl.oati_ng 
batteries occasionally connected together by cliain cables and clievaux-dej n • 
,vhich might ·ometimes bring us in close contact with a daring foe, a 1 e~ n 
or our own Decatur and Perry wBre in the mode of attack which charactenzed 
tho e chivalric naval commanders. But the cont,tet thus produced would_in~ 
t u _the moral and physical effect of our efforts being in self-defence, mth h. 
sup_ r1or trcngth of ?ur batteries, bulwarks, and weigkt of metal-ad:~t-1gt'' 
which w houlcl enJoy from the moment the invading foe comes Wl~ID rh 
f our long ancl h avy cannon, until he finds himself entangled m, 
arret-t d by, our chewux-de-frise, where the contact would be so clo.,e a, · 
uabl_ u to throw i:1-to hi ship ltand grenades and incendiary sliells. wi h 
occa 1onal . upply of h at d team; while our own batterie would be pre~ r · 
from a ·im~lar annoyance by th_ ir superior width, strength, and peculiar_ dnl · 
tur of thell' upp ·r work~, wlnch are propo cd to be secured by .. beet- n 
imrn ·n .. e thickuc:-i~; a d '· ripti n of ,York which it i believed could not -
·ff · tuall · appli<'d to vc .. : L of auythu1g like the ordinary model of shi -- · 
w ar dc~i n-u d for s a .. rYicc. 
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But again: u to make assurance doubly sure," we should not risk such places 
as New York and New Orleans-by far the most vital, and in a civil and ( the 
latter more especially) in a military point of view, the most important seaports 
in .America-without at least two curved lines of defence-one at or near the 
entrance of the harbor, and the other at the next narrow, strong, interior point, 
fortified as above suggested, with the curved line of floating batteries flanked 
by a fort on each side of the river or channel; for example, for the harbor· of 
New York, the Narrows; and for the Mississippi, Forts Jackson and St. Pliilip. 
7. Floating batteries, such as are here proposed, constitute the only effective 
means of defence against fleets propelled by steam power, in a nation situated 
as the United States are, covering a large extent of country, bordered by a 
seaboard of near 4,000 miles in extent, indented by many fine seaports, with 
great cities filled with the wealth of a lucrative commerce with every quarter of 
the globe, together with our own agricultural products, fully capable of sustain-
ing our expansive commerce, until it surpasses that of any other part of the 
globe: provided we take care to maintain an attitude of honest defiance 
towards the licensed as well as the unlicensed pirates of every quarter of the 
world, by which they will clearly understand that we desire to be at peace, to 
do equal and impartialjustice to all nations, and to engage in entangling alliances 
with none; and above all, if we are attacked, we should be prepared speedily to 
concentrate at the point of attack sufficient force and supplies to overwhelm the 
invader with irretrjevable defeat before he will have it in his power to destroy 
any of our means of defence, or our seaport towns. Our law less neighbors will 
thus be taught that if they attack us they do it at their peril, and at the risk of 
leaving their armies to enrich our plantations. 
8. So much for their uses in a state of war; then, on the return of peace, 
when the most expensive fixed fortifications are absolutely useless, and, more-
over, a heavy burden to the country to keep them in repair, floating batteries 
will be usefully employed as barracks and hospitals, and in deepening the chan-
nels, liable to be filled up by clay, and loam, and sand, as those at the mouth of 
the Mississippi river are often filled up. As floating barracks and hospitals, the 
proposed batteries would be of essential benefit to the service everywhere, inas-
much as the outlets of our rivers and sea pods are generally healthy positions; 
and they will form the most appropriate asylums for our convalescent or slightly 
disabled soldiers or seamen, most of whom will render essential service in pre-
paring fixed ammunition, and in the instruction of the young and inexperienced, 
and in holding them ready for action. Above all, in a state of peace the pro-
posed floating batteries will be of immense utility to the service for all purposes 
of military schools, to which the aspiring youth of our country of the commu-
nity will gladly repair, for the attainment of military knowledge, where it can 
be acquired both in tlieory and in practice, and where its study and practice 
will be rendered most delightful and praiseworthy by the simple process of the 
students rendering immediate and important public service in return for the pub-
lic instruction received by them. 'I1he military education of our youth should 
commence at the age of sixteen, and be completed at the age of twenty-one or 
twenty-two. If our youth are educated upon floating batteries at the entrace of 
our harbors near the Balize, Sandy Hook, or the Narrows ; otherwise, if the 
youth of each Atlantic or southern State are educated at the entrance of the 
principal eaport of such State, the graduate, after finishing his equcation, would 
have the proud satisfaction of exhibiting to his parents or guardian, on his return 
home, the gratifying evidence of his having performed five years' honorable 
service, while acquiring attainments qualifying him for a high, perhaps the highest, 
command in the army; attainments, too, tending to qualify him in no small 
degree for the highe t stations recognized by the free institutions of our country, 
and exonerating him for ever after from any other than mere voluntary service. 
9. Shall we be told by the advocates of our obsolete systems of national de-
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fence that the risk: of health and comfort fa too great to have the youth of onr 
country educated upori our floating batteries at the entrance of our harbors, or 
at the mouths of our rivers, where the swell of the sea and the turbid water of 
our overflowing· Mississjppi and other rivers may too sensib1y affect the nerves 
and disturb the meditations of the students on whom the defence and fate of the 
republic must soon depend 1 Will o~r opponents point to the United State· 
Military Academy, and contend that the graduates of that institution are the 
better for the serene stillnesR, quiet, and comfort of the interior position of that 
institution 1 We may answer, no! no! The only great defect to be founcl in 
that institution consists in the quiet and almost exclusively sedentary mode of 
li-ving which has long marked the character of that otherwise admirable instih1-
tion; a mode of living which contributes too much to sacrifice the vigor of con-
stitution necessary to a real hard-duty soldier, to the attainment of that literahue 
and science, with the social habits and enjoyments more befitting a country 
gentleman of affluent fortune, than a thoroughbred soldier, statesman, or man of 
business: 
'' The life of fame is ACTION understood ; 
That action must be virtuous, grea,t, and good." 
Habits ef action, of mind and body, should be formed in childhood, or at 
least before the seal of manhood is fixed upon the student. Why is the seaman 
placed on duty on board the ship-of-war at the age of twelve to sixteen, and 
required to perform his practical labors from the moment he takes his first le -
sons in the theoretical duties of his profession 1 It is to facilitate his attainment· 
of both in the shortest possible time, and to the greatest possible extent of pe~·-
fection. His health and habits are perfected upon the precise element, and m 
e'J;posures to the climates and weather, tow hich his duties will call him, and often 
confine him during a state of war. Why is the law student required to attend 
the courts, and the medical student the hospitals, while attending to the theory 
of the profession 1 It is because, even in these learned professions, where much 
more depends upon books, or theory, than in the profession of arms, all expe-
1·ienced men unite in the opinion that great benefit to the student results from 
combining practice with theory. 'I'he watchmaker, shoemaker, carpenter, and 
blacksmith, always put their students or apprentices to work at the eru·lie, t ~o~-
sible period of their instruction; often, indeed, before they are able to wield 
many of the tools of their trade. With these facts before our eyes, added to the 
custom which has obtained in many of the enlightened States of Europe, and 
which we are apparently disposed to rivet upon our own land of freedom and in"'e~-
tiou, it would seem impossible to resist the conviction that the science of war 1s 
indeed in its infancy. Of all the sciences and arts, there are none where the 
'union qf theory and practice, in all the duties of preparation for the grea 
dernier r ,tuts, are so much altogether necessary and proper, as in the cienc 
of war and the duties of an army; and yet, wonderful to tell, there i no trade 
or pro£ s ·ion, red.need to separate and distinct rules of science and ru·t, in whic~ 
theory i so much relied on, or practice so much neglected, as in the art ot 
war, a it regards military operations on land, or in the attack and defence ot 
-eapo1i . 
ART. II. So much for floating batteries, and their u es in peace and in war. 
L t u now proceed to con ider the all-important kindred mea ure of railroad, 
for co-op ratino- with the propo ed :floating batterie , and perfecting the pn>m· 
i ed .:yi-t m of national d t uc . 
10. "\V propo::-e th imm cliat location and con truction of even railroad,. 
to c. t ·ncl from th two c ntral ~ 'tat of 'I enn and K ntucky to the, ,- · 
grand divi,'ion of the national frontier, a ugge tcd by a plan embraced in h 
a companying diagram, viz: 
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First One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, to Buffalo or Platts-
bm·g, New York, with branches to Detroit, Albany, and Boston. 
Second. One principal railroad from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Norfork, Vir-
ginia, or Baltimore, Maryland, with branches to Richmond, Virginia, and New-
bern, North Carolina. 
T'7/ird. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to Charleston, South 
Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia, with branches to Milledgeville, Georgia, and 
East Florida. 
Fourth. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, to Mobile, Ala-
bama, with a branch to Pensacola, Florida. 
Fifth. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, via Nashville, to 
Kew Orleans. 
Sixth. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to the Sabine ridge, 
with branches to Fort Towson and ] 1ort Gibson, Arkansas. 
Seventh. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, or Albany, Indi-
ana, to St. Loms, Missouri, and thence to the Misouri river, north of the mouth 
of the Big· Platte; with branches from Albany, Indiana, to Chicago, and from 
the northwest angle of the State of Missouri to the upper crossing of the river 
Des Moines. 
11. These seven great arteries or principal railroads here enumerated will 
each be from 500 to 700 miles in length, (averaging 600 miles,) making alto-
gether a distance 'of 4,200 miles; and the average cost of locating and con-
structing them is estimated at $15,000 per mile_; amounting, altogether, to the ' 
sum of $64,000,000, provided they are located anc1 constructed by the army of 
the United· States-the railroads to be of the most substantial kind, each having 
a double track. The whole work to be completed by the . authority and at the 
expense of the United States; provided that, on its final completion, it shall re-
vert to the States, in their sovereign and individual capacity; each State to re-
tain forever the right of property in and to all of such section or sections of the 
said railroads, with all their appurtenances, lying or being within the territoi-ial 
limits of such States, respectively, upon the simple condition that all troops, 
whether regulars or volunteers, in the service of the United States, with their 
munitions of war, together with the mail, shall be transported forever upon 
these railroads free of expense to the United States. 
12. Without attempting to enumerate all the benefits to be derived from the 
proposed railroads in peace as well as in war-benefits which are for the most 
part too .generally known to require any particular notice here, (and others, cer-
t ainly of very great value, can only be conjectured, inasmuch as they are to 
some extent invisible, and to be developed, principally, it is believed, by the 
excavations necessary to complete the graduation of the basis of the work 
through the vast regions of mineral wealth over which its various lines will 
extend, where accident has hitherto led to the discovery of a sprinkling of gold, 
with millions of acres of the richest iron and lead ore and coal, together with 
copper and other valuable minerals,) yourmemorialist will here concisely advert 
to the principal benefits which the military aspect of the proposed work prom-_ 
i~es, and conclude with a notice of such advantages as must immediately result 
to the army, to the several States, and the UNION, from the organization and 
employment of the national regulars and volunteers as operatives upon the 
work. 
13. The principal advantages· to be derived from the proposed railroads 
ill a military point ef view . 
. ~ a state of war they will enable us to transport the military men a?-d ~u-
mt1on of war of the two central States of the Union, and of all the wtenor 
dibtrict..., of the twenty-four border States, to the seven grand divisions of the 
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national frontier, without animal power, in one-tenth part of the time, and at 
one-tenth part of the expense that the movement would cost in the present state 
of our bad roads. The proposed railroads would thus enable us to obtain more 
useful service in war from ten thousand men, by the increased rapidity and 
safety of their movement to the point of attack chosen by the invading foe, 
than without railroads we could obtain from an army of one hundred thou and 
men marched upon our common roads; as, in addition to the saving of time, 
which in war is power, and healtli, and life, and money, we shall save our citi-
zen -soldiers from what they usually deem the most irksome and insupportable 
affiictions and privations attending their tours of military service; we shall sa,e 
them from long and tedious marches, and from the still more trying scenes of a 
long-continued delay in camp, and the consequent painful separation from wife, 
children, friends and business. On the contrary, after being assembled and pre-
pared for action, we shall fly to meet the invading foe at the rate of 250 to 300 
miles in 24 hours-taking with us every desirable necessary of life for the pre -
ervation of health, activity, and personal prowess, so that when we meet the 
enemy we shall enjoy every desfrable advantage in every conflict, in mo t of 
which we cannot but be successful; and in place of the usual campaign of three, 
six, or twelve months of distressing service, we may reasonably calculate on 
being conveyed, with every desirable supply from the central States to the fr?n-
tier, in the short space of fifty or sixty hours' time, and of meeting and bcatmg 
the invading foe, and returning· to our homes in a few days, or at most a few 
weeks more. Hence the great utility of the proposed railroads in a state of 
war; and then, on the return of peace, when our sixty millions of dollars worth 
of fortifications, and armories, and arsenals, and ships-of-war, are worse than 
useless for any of the purposes of peace, and a great and constant expense to 
repair and replenish them in order to hold them ready for another war; then 
our railroads, taking, as they must take, precisely the direction that the com-
merce of our country takes, from the seaboard to the central western States, 
will, when turned to commercial purposes, produce a revenue to the States ~hat 
own them that will be more than sufficient to replace, in seven year./ time, 
every dollar expended in their construction, and forever thereafter produce a 
revenue sufficient for the support of all the State governments, and to pay f?r 
the education of every orphan child in America. The proposed railroads will 
do more-they will form ligaments of union more powerful than bulwark' of 
adamant, or chains of iron or gold, to bind the States together in perpetual 
union. In designating the military men of the central States of Tenn~~ ee and 
Kentucky as the disposable force of the nation, we have reference to the fact 
that this force is rendered disposable by the central position of these two State:: 
-they having no frontier to defend; while the forces of all the other twent):· 
fo~r Stat s are rendered local forces, and not disposable, by rea on. of th ·ir 
b mg all border States-the boundary of each extending to the frontier : and, 
th r fore, having no frontier of their own to defend, they arc thus rendered local, 
not di po. able. 
14. 01ganization ef tlie regular forces and operatives to be intrusted with 
th<' location and r:onstruction qf t!w work. 
n major g ncral ; one adjutant g neral, with even a i tants; two bri!!adier 
g~n ra1 ; v n urn- on , with twenty- ight a i tant urgeon ; and twent,-
wht hi f artific r. or ci ntific m chanics; cv n r giment , each r ~ment to 
ou ·i t of one colon 1, two lieut nant colonel , four majors, one adjutant. a~ 1 
one quart rma t r, two ro- ant major,, and two quart rma ter r17 anr-, nth 
t n companic : each ompany to 011.·i.-t of one captain, two firt Ii ·ut n n ,. 
two L concl Ii ut nant ancl tw c1 t , with on quarterma ter ,. r!r<'llll • n 
rd crly . ·r17 ant, four ro- , nt , four c rporal. , two mu ician , t ·n artific r,, an 
•i 17hty privat ;olcli r . ' h o- n ral, fi ld, and taff ffic r , with the pt in, 
an fo t lieutenant , to Le taken from the offic r of the engin er, t pogra hie. 
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engineers, artillery, and infantry now in service; officers of established reputa-
tiou for professional talents, experience, industry, economy, and exemplary 
habits, and to have the pay and emoluments of mounted dragoons, with 50 per 
cent. additional pay, while actually employed as eng'ineers, superintendents, or 
operatives, upon the location or construction of the work. 
15. Location if the proposed railroads. 
The location must embrace the nearest and best routes, commencing within the 
two central States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and extending to the seven 
grand divisions of the seaboard and northern frontier, as above suggested; to 
be ascertained, particularly through the mountainous regions, by a series of to-
pographical surveys, and finally decided on and established by a board to con-
sist of a general and four to six field officers, upon whose decision the major 
general commanding upon this service should have power to act : to approve or 
disapprove the decision of the board, upon the same principles that the President 
is authorized by the Constitution of the United States to approve or disapprove 
an act of Congress. 
These surveys will produce an immense mass of mineral, geological, and topo-
graphical information, of great value to the States and the Union, and of indis-
pensable utility to every member of the army and militia of the nation who 
aspires to that employment in the national defence which leads to the true fame 
of a citizen soldier-information tendiI1g to develop the military and physical 
resources of every State and district preparatory to a state of war, and of essen-
tial benefit to the people of every clas,s during a state of peace. 
16. Operations in tliefinal construction if tlte work. 
Each one of the proposed routes to be placed in charge of a colonel, who 
will superintend the construction of the work; and for the prompt and conve-
nient accomplishment of every part of the work, each route will be subdivided 
into ten sections, and each section placed under the immediate superintendence 
of a captain, to be assisted by the whole of the subaltern officers, non-commis-
sioned officers, artificers, and privates of the company, with as many volunteer 
a.rtificers and other operatives as will be sufficient to insure the completion of 
each section in from four to five years after the location of the work, which may 
be accomplished in one year; so that when one section of sixty miles in extent 
is completed, the whole work will be quite or nearly finished, with the exception 
of that which is unavoidably located over a mountainous country. rrhe com-
pletion of the mountainous sections may be hastened by such increased means 
as the exigencies of the service shall demand. The simple process of carrying 
on such a work necessarily increases the means and facilities of its progress 
and peedy accomplishment. Thousancls of our young men, ignorant of every 
operation upon the work, will soon become able operatives. To the regular 
army we should have the power to add every scientific meclianic, artificer, and 
able-bodied willing laborer, to be employed as volunteers, principally within the 
limits of the States where the sections of the railroads on which they are to be 
employed, respectively, are located and constructed, so that the services of all 
may be near their places of residence. We shall thus call into action and use-
fulne s that class of American genius which would otherwise, to a great extent, 
langui h and fall into the whirlpools of vice or imbecility for want of employ-
ment and judiciou direction-that genius which is found in the learned profes-
._ion. , in all the walks of fa hionable life, in the pursuits of agriculture, commerce, 
and the mechanic arts, as well as in the haunts of dissipation and idleness ; 
who~e votaries may indeed often too truly say, "We are idle because no man 
hath given u employment." By these idlers, wh0se employment would save 
them from mi ery and min, and render them valuable citizens, and enable them 
to render their country invulnerable in war ancl enrich it in peace-aided by the 
enterpri ing young men which every section of the republic is capable of afford-
ing for the proposed great work, and arming with the irresistible weapons of 
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industry and enterprise necessary to enable them, h1 obedience to the sublimP 
mandate of Holy Writ, "to replenish the earth and subdue it," and render i· 
fruitful, that it may multiply the benefits and blessings which it is capable ui 
yielding to man-the proposed work will be speedily accomplished. 
17. The hidden wealth which the progress of the work will disclose, addet 
to the vast supplies of materials for construction, for transportation, and for food 
and raiment fo1· the operatives upon the work, and for commerce-supplies, a 
considerable part of which every year waste away among the interior sectiom 
of the western and middle States for want of a cheap conveyance to good mar-
kets, such as the proposed railroad will afford-will contribute much towards the 
completion and final profitable employment of the work; supplies that would 
e,ery year be augmented by new improvements and by encouraged industry 
until t.9-ey would far surpass the immediate wants of the great and increasing 
influx of population and operatives upon the public works and frontier; and, on 
the completion of the work, these constantly increasing supplies would be poured 
into the improved channels of cheap transportation and profitable commerce. 
gradually swelling the profits of both, as the millions of tributary rills and rivu-
lets expand the mighty river into whose bosom they pour their liquid treasure~. 
It is believed, moreover, that the construction of the proposed railroad through 
the southern, western, and Atlantic States would not fail to create the means for 
the speedy completion of all the lateral branches requir8d for every State ~nd 
seaport, by multiplying among us experienced engineers and scientific mecbam_c~ 
with lrn,bits of industry and enterprise; giving to all classes of the commumt; 
profitable employment, calculated to render them independent in their domestic 
affairs, respectable and happy in peace, and formidable in war, while the money 
expended would be kept in a healthful state of circulation among the farmer,. 
merchants, and mechanics of our interior settlements, in place of its being car-
ried off to enrich foreign merchants, or to form every year at home a new bone 
of contention between the votaries of the spirit of party, such as go all length-
for par'Ly men, regardless of the true interests and honor of the republic. .And 
when, during a state of war with nations surpassing us in naval streng_th, _""e 
find ourselve;- compelled to abandon the ocean, and be deprived of our foreign 
commerce- the inevitable consequence of a war with any of the strong powen: 
of Europe, without first supplying ourselves with a fleet of steam hips of "'~· 
as well as floating batteries and the proposed railroads-these roads, even while 
occasionally employed in the transportation of troops from the central State · t<J 
the south, wi11 take return cargoes of southern products, such as sugar, cotton, 
oranges, and lemons, from the southern to the middle and northern tates, from 
whence they will bring return carg·oes of the numerous products and mannf~c-
tur ·rl article. of the northern and central States needed in the south-an m-
frrior commercial intercourse by which the privations of our foreign comrncr 
W?t~ld be remedied, and many of the evil. of war· removed, and all other _greatly 
nn~wat cl. Indeed, the completion of the propo. eel railroad and floatmg ba~-
tf'rw;-1 your m moriali. t brlievcs would soon effectually prevent the recu!Tcnc 
of war ,·o lono- as the United tat ·hnll i:-ee fit to confin their view::- and 
national poli :Y to the mao-nanimous principle of dcfrn ive war; a. the prop "' 1 
111Pan.; ot national drfonc would giv a d gree of available tr no-th, both phy·+ 
cal ancl moral, that would render th peril of an attack a p rp tual . ource o 
t :rror to ur vil-rli;-1po ·d n io·hbors, aucl con cquently moral strellgt/1, and cc1J-
'rtl !J t our bclovc· l ·onntry. 
. 1~. ~t _i_' prop r_ in a fate ef peace to prrp((refor war. Th wi- ,-t ,-ta~e--~ n 
m all ·1nhzN1 nation. lrnv a ·t ·d upon thr prin ·iplc h re :-mmrr:;ted. It 1. nm 
for n to imp1ir<· wha wonlrl lw th · ·on f'rin nee of our rc·ceivino- tlH' un -·1> 
vi it of a larg<' fir t of . tPam:-hip,, annc-,l a~ the• } r nch fl, t lately in th h r-
1wr of \ ra 'ruz WP1'<', lirin"'ill"' in h ' mouth . of th ir annon an un :xp 
d ·laratiou of war. ~Inch a we m y r ·ly n the un. urpa;· · d hirnlry 
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our volunteer corps, such a visit could not but be attended with incalcula?le 
mischief, without the means of defence here proposed-means of defence which 
will enable us to march by land from Tennessee and Kentucky to Buffalo, ~ ew 
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore; Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, St. Aug~stme, 
Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, or 'rexas, from 200,000 to 500,000 men m the 
short period of three days' time ! This rapid movement would have ?een very 
desirable, as it would have saved millions of money and thousands of valuable 
lives in our former wars, and would have been very essential to our security 
against a land and naval attack when we had no reason to apprehend an invasion 
by fleets propelled by steam power. But now that we know many o~ the most 
warlike nations of Europe are busily occupied in the work of preparmg steam-
ships of war, we have no longer a choice in the issue whether we must or must 
not prepare the means here proposed for defence against the improved elem~nts 
of destruction which we know our neighbors hold in readiness to employ agamst 
us. We must lay aside our old obsolete military books of the last century, 
such as we have borrowed from England and France, and we must profit by 
the lights by which the present age, the present year is illuminated, and prepare 
to defend ourselves by the agency of this mighty power, by which the invading 
foe will inevitably attack us. 
19. Ancient and modern history is replete with evidences of the wisest of 
governments having promptly availed themselves of the use of every description 
of weapon deemed to be most formidable in war, as well as of every kind of 
power applicable to the purposes of rapidly wielding armies and munitions of 
war, as soon as practicable after their discovery. We need only advert here to 
some few discoveries which, trifling as the first and third may seem, were 
deemed sufficient at the time of their discovery to merit the attention of men 
and monarchs of profound wisdom and genius. 
1st. When the commanders of the armies of ~ing David reported to that 
. veteran monarch that they had sustained heavy losses in their operations against 
the Philistines, in consequence of their having employed in battle the bow and 
arrow, David promptly gave orders to his commanders to avail themselves of 
the discovery of this then formidable weapon, and make themselves and their 
men acquainted with t,he use of it, "so as to place them on an equal footing 
with their enemy."-(See the" History of the Bible.") 
2d. When in the fourteenth century an obscure monk of Germany dis-
covered gunpowder, with some of its uses in war, all the other nations of Europe 
that were blessed with wise rulers hastened to avail themselves of the discovery-
a discovery which ere long induced all the civilized world to change their un-
wieldly weapons of war for fire-arms; gradually laying aside their war chariots 
armed with scythes, their battering-rams, with their coat of mail, and most of 
their personal armor. 
3d. The use of wheel carriages on improved roads added more than twenty-
five per cent. to the efficiency of an army, by enabling it to march one-fourth 
further in a giveri. time, and by carrying with it a more ample supply of artil-
lery, ammunition, and subsistence, prolonging the period of active operations, 
::i~d occasionally taking the enemy by surprise, as, by the increased celerity of 
Ins movements, Napoleon took the enemies of Ji7 rance by surprise in his first 
campaign into I taly. , 
4th. A.ll civilized nations speedily availed themselves of the discovery of the 
magnetic _needle, with the inventions and improvements in ship-building, the 
me of sails, &c. Many of the discoveries here alluded to, however, though 
the:-y co~tributed to facilitate the movement of troops and munitions of war, 
excited httle or no interest at the time of their discovery compared with that of 
he application of steam power to ships and other vessels, and to vehicles of 
l:.md tran portion on railroads. In these last discoveries we may well be allowed 
to .,peak in the language of poetry, and say that-
"Steam power wa:; almighty in its birth;" 
• 
186 MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
while gunpowder, fire-arms, wheel carriages, and all former improvement in 
marine structures, though partially known and in use for centuries past, hare 
exhibited little or nothing beyond their now apparent state of infancy until 
within the last and present century. Even now no civilized nation can boast of 
any discovery or improvement in fire-arms, gun-carriages, or in naval architec-
ture in anywise calculated to be of any pecuiiar advantage to any one nation 
over another nation; while these developments of steam, with :floating batteries 
and railroads, are calculated to render a nation, in tbe position which we occupy. 
at least ten times more formidable in a war ef self-defence than in an offensire 
war against nations of equal numerical strength, and provided with the mean5 
here proposed. All the discoveries above referred to in the science of war have, 
however, contributed much to ameliorate the condition of nations and of armies 
in their conflicts and controversies, and greatly to lessen the evils of war. The 
greater the improvement in this awful and sublime science, the less calamiton:; 
and the more humane have been the results of milikry operations, wherever the 
contending parties were equally acquainted with the progressive improvement~, 
and had equal or nearly equal means of profiting by them. If these propo~i-
tions are correct, (and history proves them to be strictly true,) where, it may be 
asked, where must our improvements in the science of war, dependent on team 
power, terminate 1 The wise and the good who have long cherished the prot-
pect of a blessed millenium will readily answer the question. 
20. Your memorialist had long cherished the hope that some patriotic state,-
man of military mind would be found at the head of the War Department, able 
and willing to bring the subject of his system of national defence bef?re th .. 
President of the United States and the national legislature; and in this hope 
he has freely and frankly submitted to several of the heads of that departmem 
hi.s views upon the subject at different periods during nearly seventeen. year: 
past, until he received from Mr. Secretary Cass the most irrefragable eVld_enc 
that the official communications and reports of your memorialist were either 
misunderstood, disregarded, or disapproved. Nevertheless, assured as he hll" 
constantly been of the practicability, propriety, and necessity of ~uch a. sy~tem 
of national defence, and deeming it to be a matter of discovery, inventwn, and 
improvement in the art of war, which should be discussed with the same freed1 m 
as any other discovery in the useful arts, your memorialist, as the author and 
inventor of the proposed system, has addressed himself freely to _private ~s w~ll 
as public men of several different nations and of all parties, and has received m 
r turn, from men of the highest attainments and unimpeached and unimpeach-
able patriotism, full and cordial coE.currence in his every view hitherto ,presen~ · 
in favor of his system of national defence here set forth and explained. :E II! 
from being discouraged at the opposition of three honorable 'ecretarie for P. 
year in succession, he has learned from that oppo ition that th~ War .Depart· 
m nt of the United States republic is rather a theatre of executive actwn u~ 
political matter already settled, enacted, or ordered, than upon new discoren 1• 
inventions, or impr&vements in any branch, ef tlte art ef war. He could not h · 
p 1-.· re, therefore, in hi humble efforts to render his country ome good ... · 
vie in peace, a he had done in war; convinced a he i that hi y tern:: ~ 
abo_ve th p til ntial atmo..,phcre of the evil spirit ef party, a it i a F m ' 
national d f nc d . igned to impart b nefits ancl diffo e ble ~ingA alike thr u.: · 
out v ry tate and T rritory of th r public and upon all partie . 
~h oath f ffic takrn by your memoriali t, requiring him to s IT 
l11llted tale , (not a party,) r ·quir him to act and ..,peak in accordanc 
th rul · ancl articl of war. Ilr ha alway. held him.., lf ready to ri k 
7 ifi, 71.,i bread, and lu's forfl11ie, for hi ountry; and he ha th happin " • 
kn winer tha h ha ri kf. 1 hi lif fi r h r oft n-hundr d of time . Hi, 
of offic doc not r .. ti" in him from ·p aking frankly and truly in the nnd· 
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of his motives, his conduct, his honor, and his system of national defence. rro 
withhold his view3 upon an occasion of this kind, indeed, would be virtually a 
violation of his oath of office, which requires him, as a primary duty, to serne 
the United States honestly and faitlifully against their enemies or opposers 
wh01nsoever; and he could not conscientiously comply with this oath, without 
submitting to the national legislature every section and every J?aragra:J:lh co~-
tained in this memorial. He feels conscious that he is right. His enemies will 
not hesitate to admit that he is either right or wrong. If p,ny member of the 
national legislature believes him to be wrong, he entreats that member to insti-
tute any, the most rigid, scrutiny into the whole of the views here presented by 
your memorialist. He thus respectfully solicits his friends, and fearlessly chal-
lenges his enemies, to put him in the wrong, by proving his system of national 
defence to be either unnecessary or impracticable. But if he is deemed to be 
right in the foregoing views, showing that his system is indispensably necessary, 
and that its accomplishment is practicable, at the expense and within the period 
of time here suggested, surely no time should be lost in carrying into execution 
this system of national defence. As it regards the treatment he has received 
from the last three beads of the department of war, personally, he has nothing 
to say ; having, ever since he entered the public service, acted upon the princi-
ple that 
"The real patriot bears his private wrongs 
Rather than right them at the public cost.'' 
Your memorialist desires no greater triumph over his weak or wicked calum-
niators, nor any other atonement for past injuries, than the triumph of truth 
that must result from a full and perfect examination of his past life and services ; 
and more especially a critical comparati·ve review ef his services in Canada 
( approved by a Madison)-and his sPrvices in Florida ( condemned hy a Jack-
son ) -and more especially of his system of national defence, approved by a 
Seward, a Gannon, a White, and a Lumpkin, compared with the services and 
system of the party men opposed to your memorialist. 
21. 1'he discovery, by Oliver Evans, of that development of steam power by 
which the locomotive and other vehicles of land transportation are propelled 
upon the railroad, and by which the movement of la1ge armies, which may be 
hastened from twenty-six miles, (the day's march of Napoleon,) to three hundred 
miles in one day; and the discovery, by Robert Fulton, of that kindred develop-
ment of steam power, by which our rivers and lakes have been covered with 
floating palaces and warehouses, surpassing in the velocity of their movement 
anything before seen upon our waters-making an easy conquest of the pre-
viously unsubdued current of the mighty Mississippi, and now proudly encoun-
tering in triumph the mountain wave of ocean; as these discoveries were the 
re~ult of previously known developments of steam power, in its application to 
mill and other labor-saving machinery, suggesting to Evans and Fulton the great 
p rinciple upon which their success was known to depend; so it must be obvious 
to every man of military mind, and to every scientific mechanic, that the dis-
coveries of these two great public benefactors must necessarily form the basis of 
th~ .. yEtem of national defence which your memorialist here offers to Congress. 
Oliver Evans and Robert Fulton were, until a few years before their death, de-
nounced by thousands of learned tlteorists as eccentric visionary men. The 
same class of censors have honored your memorialist with similar epithets. He 
ha had the satisfaction, however, to learn from some of those who thus de-
nounced him that they have since seen their error, and are now among the true 
eli,..vers in the feasibility, value, and importance of his system. He adverts to 
his fact, here, only to jue,tify or excuse what he deems it to be his duty to say 
in his own vindication, and in reference to his own past public services; because 
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he can refer to no historical work or biographical memoir containing any account 
of his public services in the war of 1814, excepting such as have been distorted 
by malignity or by ignorance. He is therefore co~strained to say, as an act of 
justice to himself, that he is the only general officer now living, who, as com-
mander-in-chief of a division, or separate army, or detached corps, ever achieved 
a victory over any British army, upon any part of the Niagara frontier, in the 
war of 1814; that he had the good fortune to command the division from which 
his beloved Major General (Brown) had been taken, by reason of a severe 
wound, on that frontier, in August, 1814, during twenty-three days of which 
time your memorialist was actively engaged in battle, and in a brisk cannonade 
· and bombardment, and other severe conflicts with the British army under Lieu-
tenant General Drummond. In the principal battle, the lieutenant general ac-
knowledged a loss of nine hundred and five officers and men killed, wounded, 
and missing, with a similar loss of nearly six .hundred in the several other con-
flicts. During twenty-two days of the time, there were but few hours, from day-
light in the morning until dark in the evening, in which the British·can'non shot 
and shells did not present to your memorialist the most instructive exhibition of 
every variety of effect of which a well-directed cannonade and bombardment 
upon a very slightly and partially fortified camp, of which an unfinished ba tion 
and block-house formed the only tolerably fortified angle, could possibly pre~ent. 
In that long conflict-in which the British forces were reported to amount t•) 
4,200, principally regulars, and the United States forces to 2,500, near one-
fourth of which were New York and Pennsylvania volunteers under Gene.ral 
Peter B. Porter-your memorialist is convinced he had a better oppo~-tumty 
than any other general officer of the United States army ever had durmg the 
war of being thoroughly acquainted with the effect of the enemy's sliells and 
cannon slwt upon our stone-masonry, earthen traverses, embankments, or breast-
works. He had previously witnessed at Fort Meigs, and on the rive~- St. ~ w-
rence, as well as upon Lake Erie, in the British and United States ships-of-war, 
three days after Perry's glorious triumph, the effect of the enemy's and our own 
cannon shot upon block-houses, ships-of-war, and other vessels, as well a on 
other means of defence. The investigation of these results of some of the m0~: 
important conflicts between the United States and British troops, in the war of 
1813 and 1814, added to a careful attention to the theory and practice of gun-
nery for several years prior to the war, with much attention to the subject ince. 
warrants your memorialist in speaking somewhat confidently, as he h~ , upon 
th~ various bearings and tendencies of cannon shot and shells on fl.oatm~ bat-
tenes, steamships of war, forts, and other means of attack ari.d defence of ~ea-
!)Ort~; and of railroads for the prompt movement of re-enforce~ents, a~ embraced 
m his system of national defence here set forth and explamed. 1! or further 
particulars in reference to the various conflicts referred to in this article, your 
~ emorialist respectfully refers to the officers whom he had the honor to command 
m tho e conflicts: among the most meritorious of whom are Payma ter General 
Tow on and Adjutant General Jones, now on duty at W a hington city. Th 
name of all others will be found by referring to the adjutant general' offic" . 
. ~1cl to s~ow in what estimation his conduct was held by the Executive a~d ru • 
honal leo-1 laturc, your memoriali t takes leave to refer to the joint re .. olut1ou 0 
emb r, 1 14, by which he and the officers and men of hi command w~ 
honor cl ·with a vote of thank , and the Pre ident authorized to pre .. ent to _hi~ 
a gold medal. Il r ceivecl al o from the lcgi lature of the great and patnoa 
· tat . of w York, Virginia, and T nnes ee, imilar re, olution of thank.; ~ 
from each a gold-hilt d :word of honor. With the e magnificent token of hi_h 
, pprobation of hi conduct, your m .moriali t could not but£ 1 hims If in h . 
and in clut r bound to :x rt hi be ·t facultie to serve ltis country faitlifullg 111 
1.l'a r a ntl in peace. ,Yith th : impr · ions, he re p ctfully offer to Cou~n>· 
hi' pr . nt y tern of national a fence. 
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22. Y om memorialist is convinced that the proposed means of protection con-
stitute the first and only discovery known to man, whereby a nation situa!ed as 
we are, and acting upon the magnanimous principle of seif:dif:,nce, can, without 
any doubt, at a moderate expense, and by means th3it wip. m a few years of 
peace repay all the expense of the work, hold in their own hands: forever, the 
incontestable issue of any possible war upon her seaboard or domam, waged by 
any nation, or by any such combination of empires or kingdoms as have once 
dared to assume the appellation of" h.oly alliance,-'' and that any nati~n of oui· 
numerical strength and military resources availing herself of the discovery, 
may, if she be just and true to herself, safely assume the attitude of honest ~e-
fiance towards the armies of Europe, if not of every quatter of the globe: while . 
the most warlike nations, neglecting the use of steam power, with railroads and 
floating batteries, will be found wholly unable to maintain their independence. 
In this view of the subject, it presses itself upon our attention not as a ma~ter 
of choice, but as a work of absolute necessity-as a measure ef self-preservation. 
23. The constitutionality of the proposed system of national -defence would 
oe left untoucned by your memorialist, but for the veneration he entertains for 
that sublime and sacred instrument bequeathed to us by our fathers of the 
,revolution, added to the oath he has taken to support that inestimable charter 
of om free institutions. He would not willingly be deemed capable of urging 
or soliciting the adoption of any measure not in accordance with the Constitution 
of the United States; and having, in common with each one of his fellow-citi-
zens, an indubitable right to judge for himself upon all questions arising upon 
the different provisions of that most perfect charter of human freedom and self-
government, without confiding too much in the opinions of statesmen laboring 
under the despotic influence of party discipline-a despotism ever Qperating 
upon the hopes and fears of all who tamely submit to the tyranny of such a 
discipline-the vi~ws which follow are respectfully submitted. The 8th section 
of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States authorizes Congress 
to "declare war," and "to raise and support armies," and "to provide for call-
ing forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, 
and repel invasions;" and also "to provide for organizing, arming, and dis-
ciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed 
in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the 
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to 
the di cipline prescribed by Congress." 
Inasmuch as these important provisions of the Constitution cannot be carried 
into effect without roads, and the effective defence of the republic . is a work 
upon which our national existence depends, the transcendent importance of this 
work calls aloud for the very best roads; and railroads being immeasurably the 
best for all military purposes, they are deemed to be as fully authorized by the 
Con. titution of the United States as the best of rifles, or the best of cannon, or gun-
powder, o;r flints,or forts, are authorized, as will be seen by the last paragraph of the 
abov:e-mentioned 8th section of the Constitution, which, after particularizing the 
specific powers granted to Congress, as enumerated in that section, concludes with 
the words which follow: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, vested by this Consti-
tution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer 
thereof." 
A wise people, with the experience which the framers of the federal Consti-
tution had acquired in the triumphant revolutionary conflicts through which 
t1ey had then recently passed, could never have authorized a declaration of 
war "to repel invasion," without making provision for the best of means for 
insuring a successful and glorious termination of the war : that provision was 
accordingly made in the above recited authority given to Congres_s, to make all 
law~ which hall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution " the fore-
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goi~g powers, vested by this Constitution in the government of the United State~, 
or in any department or officer thereof." By this comprehensive grant of power 
the national legislature has passed laws for supplying the land and naval 
forces with many things not expressly named in the Constitution. Hundred:: 
of military roads have been made by the troops and otherwise at the expen"e of 
the United States ; first, for the purpose of facilitating the march of the troops 
to and from the places of their destination, at the rate of twenty to twenty-.,ix 
miles a day, when, without such roads, they could not have marched a quarter 
of the distance without leaving behind them their cannon and baggage-train; 
and, secondly, for the use of the constantly-moving families and other travellers 
to the continually-expanding border of the republic, by which simple proces~ 
thirteen new States and near thirteen millions of inhabitants have been added 
to the old thirteen States of the revolution in the last sixty years. Who ever 
pronounced these miserable roads to be unconstitutional? These roads seldom 
cost more than at the rate of from fifty to one hundred 0.ollars per mile; and 
jet these poor roads contributed more to the immediate benefit of the commu: 
nity at large, during a period of peace, than any of our fortifications, which cost 
from one to two millions of dollars each. Your memorialist is unable to percei,e 
upon what ground a military road, upon which our troops can be marched three 
hundred miles in one day, can be unconstitutional, when roads upon which they 
could march but twenty-six miles in a day were constitutional ,and proper, 
(more especially when all are made by the troops themselves,) no1;,withstandin0' 
the great difference in the cost of the two kinds of military roads here alluded 
to. As it is obvious that the military railroads will enable our young warriors 
of the central and western States to fly at the rate of three hundred mile in a 
day to meet the invading foe, the constitutionality of such roads, as "nece, s~ 
and proper means for repelling invasion," cannot but be admitted by all parhe.3, 
convinced, as they must be, that we are destined in another war with any 
European nation to be attacked by fleets propelled by steam power. But if: a5 
your memorialist respectfully asserts, our seaports cannot be defended agrumt 
an attack by foreign armies, with the co-operation of fleets propelled by , team 
power, who can doubt the absolute necessity of the proposed railroads and 
floating batteries ? If, indeed, then, they are indispensable, and our country 
cannot be defended without them, they are strictly constitutional, as the m ~ 
rigid constructionist will admit. '1.10 make use of our common bad roads t r 
marching our volunteers and other troops from the central and western Stat -
to our seaports in a state of war, or to continue the use of sails, without 0 team 
power, to meet an invading foe with large fleets of steamships of war, would 
as unavailing and as unwise as it would be to attempt to extinguish by wattr 
carried in a nutshell the flames by which thousands of our houses are doom 
to be enveloped in the course of a war when destitute of the propo..,ed mealli 
of d fence, while po sessing the power to obtain the best of :fire-engine . . . 
24. The apprehended expense of the proposed work con titute the prmcip 
obj ~tion advanced by any state, man, or by any man of military_min~, ':h ~e 
opunon have come to the know! dge of· your memoriali t. To this obJechon 1 
may b an .w red: 
Fir t. Tl1at the appr bend d appropriations to meet the expen ... e will b~ n 
mor than_ lev n million of dollar. a year for a p rfod of ix year, prond 
th work 1:-1 lone by the army of the U nit<>d tatc. , a heretofore uo-0' ,ted. 
1 econcl. Th mploym nt of the army upon the work will be to th offi . 
and men , nd to the y uth of v r T 'tat and di, trict throun-h which th work 
_·t nrl, tb . h ·t of a11 po,. ibl . ·hool:-, to pr I arC' th m fo~ the d fence of th · 
ountry; a, th offic ri- aiul m n . o ·mploy d will have the l)roud ati,fn · 
of knowin...,. th, t v r • rla ·' lab r in thi." . , utial work of pr paration 
·ontriLut · t incr a ·e th ir moral and phy ical ca1)aciti for u efulu , 
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domestic happiness in peace, and for a glorious triumph over the invading foe in 
war. 
Tliird. In exhibiting the cost of this system of · defence, it is gratifying to 
find that of the $66,000,000, which is the estimated amount required for the 
seven railroads from the central States to the seaboard and northern frontier, 
with five floating batteries for the Mississippi river at the passes,. ~nd below 
New Orleans, and five others for the defence of the harbor of New York, more 
than sixty-three millions of that sum will be expended for materials and ,vork 
which the interior of the United States will afford. 
Fourth,. The most costly material required for the work will be bar-iron for 
the railways, and sheeting for the sides and tops of the floating batteries; of 
this article, not less than /500,000,000 pounds will be needed. This quantity, at 
four cents, will amount to twenty millions of dollars. 
Fiftli. For supplying the whole of the iron, it is proposed to erect at conve-
nient places near the site of each one of the seven great railroads a foundery 
and a roUz'ng-mill, for the manufacture of the iron required, upon the same 
principle that armories are established by the United States for supplying the 
army and navy and the militia with cannon and small arms. By these works 
ample supplies of the best of iron may be obtained in season to complete the 
railroads and floating batteries in the time here suggested. 
We shall, in this way, lay open to the individual enterprise of the people of 
the United States rich mines of wealth hitherto but little known; and we shall 
moreover relieve ourselves of the reproach to which we have for many years 
been subjected-the reproach of sending to Europe and expending there many 
millions of dollars for iron, whilst most of our States abound with inexhaustible 
supplies of this valuable metal equal to any in Europe. 
25. The great 1·evolution which steam power has produced in its application 
to everything that is wafted upon the sea and that rolls upon the land, applica-
ble to the attack and defence of seaports, leaves our country absolutely desti-
tute ef the means of defence indispensably necessary to the protection of our sea-
ports against any nation or community of men, or pirates capable of· attacking 
us with a respectable fleet of steamships of war, armed with the improved bat-
tering cannon of the largest calibre, without floating batteries of sufficient 
strength and number to enable us to lock up our seaports and railroads extend-
ing from the central and western States to the principal seaports, for marching 
our disposable force and munitions of war of the central and western States, at 
one-tenth part the expense and one-tenth part of the time that their movement 
on our present bad roads would cost. 
26. The floating batteries here recommended constitute the most sure and 
economical means for the immediate defence of our seaports in war; and when 
aided by the proposed railroads, in the rapid transportation of troops and muni-
tions of war from the central and western States to the principal seaports of 
the Atlantic, southern, and northern States, aided at sea by steamships of war, 
we shall thus render our means of defence complete and impregnable in war. 
And on the return of peace, when all other expensive means of defence, such as 
fortifications, armories, and fleets propelled by wind ancl sails are useless, then 
our floating batteries and railroads, turned to commercial purposes, will con-
tribute to deepen our ship channels and to the improvement of our seapo1ts, and 
afford facilities to our interior commercial intercourse, which it is believed will 
replace every dollar expended in canying into eflect this system of national de-
fence in from seven to ten years. 
27. The floating batteries and rnih·oads, embracing the system of national 
defence here recommended, which will cost not more than eleven millions of dol-
lar a year for six years, will, it is confidently believed, by the simple process 
of its construction, contribute more to qualify the army, and the young :11-cn of the 
United State employed upon the proposed floating batteries and railroads, for 
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active military service in the national defence, than they could possibly be 
qualified by the expenditure of double the estimated amount of the work paiJ 
for giving each one of them a complete military education, according to the 
system pursued at the Military Academy at West Point; as in that system the 
theory of the art of war alone is acqHired, and much of that mere tlleory is 
rendered useless by the revolution which steam power has produced in all that 
relates to the movement of armies and fleets, and the attack and defence of 13ea-
ports; whilst in the system here recommended, the young student upon the 
floating battery, as well as upon the railroad, is enabled, from the first moment 
be takes in hand his book to study the theory, at once -to combine with it 
the, practical scie14ce and manual labor of his profession; and when, at the end 
0£ four or five years, he graduates and obtains his discharge, his mind, limbs, 
and body would be alike improved and invigorated by his having learned lwzc 
to make and lww to wield, and having· actually assisted in making and wield-
ing floating batteries and vehicles of land transportation on railroads, with 
every other preparatory means for rendering them formidable in war and profita-
ble in peace. This will afford him the happiness of knowing that he has ren-
dered his country much useful public service for the public instruction which 
will enable him ever after to be in the highest degree useful to ,his country and 
his family, in war and in peace. 
28. With the floating batteries and railroads here recommended, we can fear-
lessly and truly say to all Europe, and to all the world, " We ask ef you notltfng 
but wliat is ri'glit, and u:e will submit to nothing tltat is wrong;" whilst, wi.th-
out the proposed or some such system of national defence, such a declarat1~n 
might be considered as pure gasconade ; as, without floating batteries and rail-
roads to lock up and promptly re-enforce our seaports when menaced by an en-
emy, it would be in the power of any one or two of the great nations of Europe 
(with two of whom we have boundary questions to settle) to enter any one or 
more of our principal seaports, and destroy the richest of our cities in the coui:~e 
of a:i;iy day or night in the year; and in doing so, to damage our commerc_ial 
establishments to the amount of more money and property than would thnce 
defray all the cost of the proposed system of defence. 
29. The opinion has been expressed that these raih·oads will, during a sta~e 
of peace, produce a revenue that will replace the money to be ex~ended m 
their construction in the course of seven years after their completio?· Bu 
should it be twenty, or even forty years, before their annual revenue 1s fo und 
adequate to reimburse the money expended in the construction of the work. 
this delay will tend to do no wrong or inju tice to our immediate or remote po--
terity. They cannot fail to enjoy, as much we can enjoy, the bene~t of our 
labor for our and their protection and prosperity. But the great que tion upon 
which we are now to act is, not whether we have or have not a right to tax our 
po terity with a heavy debt for a work that will certainly be of great value to 
u , and which is destined to be, in all human probability, still more 1:al11ahle 
to tltem; but the true question is, whether it is not our imperative duty to do 
what ver i obviously necessary and proper to ecure to our elve , and al::Co 0 
our po terity, the means of pre erving to each and all o deeply inter , t 
the bl , ~incr of that liberty and independence seclll'ed to u by Olll' fath r, 
the r volution, in the a ·hi vement of which a great national debt wa;:i con tr, ct 
for u,_ to pay-a debt which we have mo. t gladly and gratefully paid. ~ 11 
hav we not good r a. on to b lievc that our imm <liate 1>O::;t rity will a: '!1'3_ • 
fully pay auy ·uch cl ·Lt which w may deem prudent to contract, toJ>r nd 
for th ir u:: and IJrotection, a w 11 a, our own, a y.;t ·m of nationnl n 
without whi ·h our and tlwir lib rty and indc·peud nc would L l ·ft at th m Y 
of what v r nation of Europ may · fit to hold in th ·ir own hand-. .. th 
1ni,ao11, of the ea?" 'l'hi. will L att mpt ·cl, without doubt, y the !'.!'f m · 
itimc nation , ·ho firt pr vidc for h r · ·lf a fleet of .. omc fifty or a hun 
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steamships-of-war, with floating batteries and railroads for s~curing her own sea-
ports and her interior. This is a measure, however, more hkely to be under-
taken by some future combination of empires, arrog·ating to themselves, as the 
enemies of France did in the years 1814-'15, the title of "Holy Alliance," 
than by any one nation. 
30. Our unnatural mother, England, who has had the address to subsidize 
most of her neighbors, and to force others to sanction. her pretension to t~e 
dominion of the sea,· and for half a century past to hold m her own hands, amid 
professions of peace and good will towards us, near a third part of our greatest 
eastern border State, and to hold several of their and our border savage nations 
ready to take the scalps of our frontier citizens; tJ:iat enlightened nation, who 
has shed more blood than any other, if not more than all other nations, to secure 
to herself the dominion ef the sea, has, it is believed, at this moment, among us 
organized bands of spies and pioneers, assuming to themselves the plausible 
character and vocation of" advocates of human freedom," more familiarly called 
"abolitionists." That this same England will, in due season, avail herself of 
her newborn abolitionism to secure to herself some favorite scheme of a foothold 
near us, to the northeast or south of us, or to pay us for our having twice· 
beaten her, and more especially having, with our little giant navy, taken from 
her the glory of · her long contested dominion ef tlie sea, we can have no doubt. 
Without railroads and floating batteries, such as are here recommended, with 
steamships of war, England's banner of abolitionism may ere long be planted 
in Louisiana, and in every other border State upon our seaboard, from Sabine 
bay to Eastport, Maine. Thus may we soon behold England openly attempting. 
by force to accomplish what her spies and pioneers have long been secretly em--
ployed in preparing and hastening, a tragedy of blood and desolation, the 
elements of which were principally provided and brought hither from Africa,. 
within the last two centuries, by the outrages and avarice of this same 
England, in her efforts to monopolize the freedom of the seas. The incendiary 
fires have already been lighted up at Charleston, South Carolina, and Mobile,. 
Alabama, and perhaps somr, other cities of our southern and eastern border can 
testify. The system of national defence here recommended will enable us 
effectually to guard against the apprehended catastrophe. It will do mo:c.e. It 
will, when the proper time arrives, enable us effectually to fulfil the apparent 
destiny by which an overruling Providence has decreed that the African 
savages should, by the simple though often abused process of the slave trade, 
with the long continued pilgrimage of slavery which they are undergoing, ( a sla-
very ~arked_ as it has been here, ~ver since the reign of England ceased among 
u~, with a high degree of humamty and benevolence,) when the proper time 
arrives, namely, whenever, in the next century, our own caste and color shall 
have increased so as to amount to two hundred millions of free white inhabitants, 
then it is believed that our statesmen will see clearly the propriety of preserving 
every acre of the national domain for the support of our own caste and color,· 
then hall we plainly see, and cheerfully do what we can to fulfil, that apparent 
destiny-a destiny by which the supposed evils of the slave trade, and of the 
slavery of the Africans in America, shall eventually contribute to cover that be--
nighted quarter of the globe with all the blessings of civilization and freedom;. 
A consummation not more devoutly to be wished, than it is certainly to be ac-
compli hed within the coming century; unless, indeed, the great work is delayed· 
by the lawless interference of the blind votaries of abolitionism, or by the appre-
hended incapacity of the African blacks for self-government. Be this as it may, 
our own United States republic of the coming century will, in all human proba-
bility before the middle of that century-say 80 or 90 years hence-have it in 
heir power to make, for the first time since our political existence, a fair experi-
ment towards the solution of the long contested problem, involving the question of 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--13 
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the utility ef Africans when left alone as members ef a free civilized community-
the question upon which their possible capacity for self government necessarily 
depends; for we shall then be able to spare from our two hundred millions of 
free white population a fleet of steamships-of-war, with an army of missionaries 
and United States volunteers, for the instruction and protection of the numerous 
savages of Africa: the terms protection and instruction are here employed in 
connexion with each other, because these two great engines of civilization have 
always gone side by side, wherever the work of civilization has succeeded kt. 
That complete instruction necessary to all the purposes of civilization and self-
government, as we understand it, never was, nor ever can be perfected without 
mil£tary protection. 
'rhis navy and army of protection and instruction may be accompanied and 
followed by such detailed corps of the instructed blacks of our country as may 
be qualified to assist in the great work: these detailed corps to continue, with the 
consent of their owners, until every black in America shall find a comfortable 
and a safe home in the land of his fathers. Any other system of abolition would 
inevitably delay though it might not defeat the accomplishment of the great 
work of giving civilization and self-government to Africa, and of giving to the 
United States republic the glory of the achievement-of giving civilization and 
self-government to two quarters of the globe; first to America, and next to Afri~. 
To secure to ourselves the happiness, the imperisliable glory, of giving to A.menca 
and Africa all the blessings of civilization and self-government, we have onlyto 
do that which we are now admonished by every dictate of the first law of nature 
to do quickly for our qwn preservation-that which we possess more a~ple 
means of accomplishing before the year J 846, than the patriotic people of :N ew 
York possessed to enable them to complete their magnificent canal before !he 
year 1826-namely, to locate and construct the proposed railroads and floatmg 
batteries ; as by the simple operation of the execution of this work, we hall 
insure the instruction of all the young men of our country that may be nece ~ary 
or desirable as engineers or scientific mechanics to teach millions of the youth of 
South America and Africa the art of covering tlieir country, as we shall ~ave 
covered our country, with these essential means of'national defence and natwnal 
wealth,. The missionary, whose sacred duty it is to extend to every people the 
blessings of the Christian religion, may with perfect propriety himself learn. to 
be a scientific mechanic and a practical engineer. He may thus add the ~ttracn:e 
power of practice to tlieory; and to the sublime precepts of Holy Wnt, and m 
teaching men lww to live and how to die, teach them also how to pre erve unt 1 
their country the things that belong to their country; ancl how to defend. an 
protect the helpless women and little ones confided to their care, in obcd~e?c 
to the solemn mandate which should apply alike to each social ancl pohncal 
union most dear to us, namely: " T lwse whom 0od liath, joined togetlter, l~ ~ 
man put asuuder." Such will be-such must be-a portion of the glono~ 
r ult of our carrying into effect the proposed system of national defence. Bu· 
if w neglect it until the crowned heads of Europe shall have lei ur to prepare 
another holy alliance, with fifty to one hundred first-rate ship -of-war adapted 
t t~1 action of team power, we may, pos ibly in the next ten y ar:::: .. ee our 
for icrn_ comm rec under the control of that holy alliance; and if w r :-1:::t- imd 
who will have the hardihood to ay we u ill not resist ?-we may be told by th 
vain di plomatL t. of that imperial combination of pirat -"Yanke ::, ! the holy 
allianc i graci u:4ly pl a. ed t permit you, with your wive ancl childr ~· · 
k au a: Tlnm b y ncl th Rocky mountain ." th rwi e w mu-:t :-ubm1 
th de!!radati n of I" ing c 11 our ea port.· in the po, . :-don of th inrndin2' 
r of · inn- ur c mm r ial iti Latt r ·d clown wHhout the po~,iuilitv ot ur 
rin°·ing to th ir .·uc ·or .-uffici •nt for in tim fo1'. th ir protection. - .. 
31. 'l' obviat any, u ·h c· lamity a the for going view ·uo-g I a p ,~ D 
your memoriali t pray Congre., to pr vide for the con truction of th pr 
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works. Or, should some previous experiment be desirable, he prays that he 
may be authorized by law to select and employ, under the authority of the Presi-
dent of the United States, such engineers and other officers, scientific mechanics, 
artificers, ship-carpenters, and laborers, as may be necessary to enable him forth-
-with to locate and construct, upon the principles and in the manner here stated, 
one ef tlie proposed principal railroads-say that from Lexington, Kentucky, 
to Nashville, and thence to New Orleans; or the one from Louisville, Kentucky, 
via Xashville, to Mobile; or that from Memphis, Tennessee, to meet the one 
already completed from Charleston, South Carolina, and Augusta, Georgia, to 
Tennessee river. And also to construct three of the proposed floating batteries, 
viz : two for the harbor of New Orleans, and one for the harbor of Mo bile; to be 
constructed under his direction, in accordance with the project here recommended, 
and under the immediate superintendence of such officers as he may select. And 
when the floating batteries and railroads here recommended are completed, armed, 
equipped, and manned, the said floating batteries and railroads to be sujected to 
a scrupulous inspection by such committee of Congress, and by such other public 
functionaries as may be authorized by Congress, or by the President of the 
"C nited States: provided that no military or naval officer be selected for any 
such inspection, but suck as shall have been in battle and witnessed the effect of 
the enemy's cannon shot upon our works of defence; to the end that by such 
inspection the precise cliaracter, 'value, and utility ef these works ef internal 
improvement as means ef national defence and national icealth, takrn in connex-
ion 1£ith each other, may be fully ascertained and certified. Under such author-
ity, with two regiments such as the foregoing organization contemplates, sustained 
by an appropriation of three millions of dollars a year, for three years, your me-
~orialist pledges himself to complete in this period of time the proposed railroad 
and tliree .floating batteries,· which will serve as an expei;iment upon which the 
residue of the. works here recommended may be safely undertaken. 
32. Your memorialist having, at different times during the last seventeen 
years, submitted to the proper authorities of the War Department most of his 
views contained in the foregoing 30 sections, as will more fully appear from his 
official reports, (which he pra.ys may be called for and taken as a part of this 
memorial,) he has .thus repeatedly appealed to the War Department, but he 
deeply regrets to say that his appeals have been wholly unavailing. He now 
respectfully calls on every member of the national legislature who loves his 
country and her institutions to sustain his efforts in preparing for her a system 
of defence worthy of their fathers of the revolution, worthy of the Union, and 
of the Constitution which we all stand pledged to support. Your memorialist 
did not enter the service of his country for the mere selfish enjoyment of the 
pomp and ephemeral lwnors ef the.field of battle, (though he would not shrink 
from a comparison of liis services in battle with those of any other United 
States commander now living;) his anticipated glory and great o~ject have been 
to employ her means of defence, ample as they must ever be, so effectually as 
to convince her neighbors that honesty is th.e best policy, and that defeat must 
attend their every act of invasion; and thus to direct th.e elements ef war to tlie 
attainment of "peace on eartli and good will towards men." With these im-
pressions he deems it to be an act of common justice to himself, his wife, chil-
dren, and £ii.ends, that he should solicit the only relief to which a United States 
general officer, honored as he has long been with one of the highest commands 
in the army, and whose best efforts are ever due to his country's service, can 
·with propriety claim. He claims to be th.e autlior and inventor ef the system 
if national defence herein set forth and· explained; he therefore prays Congress 
to confirm his claim by such act or joint resolution as in their wisdom shall 
::eem just and right. And your memorialist, as in duty bound, will ever pray. 
EDMUND P. GAINES. 
_~ASHVILLE, December 31, 1839. 
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BUREAU OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, 
TVasliington, April 24, 1840. 
Srn: I l1ave the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th 
instant, referring to this bureau a memorial of Major General Gaines, proposing 
a system of national defence, of which he enumerates, as an essential part, an 
extensive series of railroads. · Upon these last, your directions are that I should 
submit an estimate of the probable cost. 
rnrn various routes enumerated by the general will be found in the 10th 
page of his memorial. According to his computation, they would embrace 
about 4,200 miles; are to b_e laid in double track; and would cost, on an 
everage, $15,000 the mile. 
rI'he routes are-
1st One principal railroad from Lexingto, Kentucky, to Buffalo or Platts-
burg, New York, with branches to Detriot, Albany, and Boston. 
2d. One principal railroad from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Noifolk, Virginia. 
or Baltimore, Maryland, with branches to Richmond, Virginia, and Newbern. 
N ort.h Carolina. 
3d. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to Charleston,_ South 
Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia, with branches to Milledgeville, Georgia, and 
Eest Florida. 
4th. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, to Mobile, Alabama. 
with a branch to Pensacola, Florida. , 
5th. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, via Nash ville, to 
New Orleans. 
6th. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to the Sabine ridge. 
with branches to Fort 1'owson and Fort Gibson, Arkansas. 
7th. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, or Albany, Indiana 
to St. Louis, Missouri; and thence- to the Missouri river, north of the mouth oi 
the Big Platte, with branches from Albany, Indiana, to Chicago, and from th1• 
northwest angle of the State of Missouri to the upper crossing of the ri-rer. 
D es Monies. 
As the general has given no precise indication of the courses which the-~ 
routes would pursue, or of that of their branches, I find it difficult. to detcrmin' 
the method by which he has ascertained the whole distance. But, taking Tan-
ner's map of the United States as a basis, drawing straight lines from point o 
point, without refereJlce to the physical peculiarities of the country, and invoh--
ing but once in the consideration those parts which may be common to mor 
than one principal route or branch, I make the distance of the whole spte 
equal to 5,260 miles. 
This is a distance of air lines, and of course is mur h less than what would 
be the_ actual distance of the roads. Their windings and sinuo itie~ would 
much mcrea e that length, to an extent which I think may, with propriety. L 
a., u.mcd a equal to 20 per cent. and which would make the entire length oi 
roa~ ~nd branches equal to 6,310 miles. 
U util urvey are made and the roads located, it is impos ible to make a 
ac ·ura~ . ~ timatc of the cost. But, in the ab ence of the e, by rea:-onin"' ' 
probabihti and from xp riencc in ca es somewhat similar, one may arri,e a· 
a re· ult which may be con id red a a probable minimum. 'l'he g neral r a, n' 
upon th uppo, ition of a doubl track, throuo-hout· but I doubt if thi, 
n •c .. ary. A , ingl track, with , uitablc turn~ut , ;nd double lin ;; of , 
· ·t n in particular localiti , wm J>_robab1y be found adequate to all th o ~ 
of :h r ad . .A, th r a? ar mt nd •d for gr at peed a well a~ !!'"n' •• 
w 1ght. and ar to be n~tional r ad., tl1 y mu t be made of great tr"r'- h , 
w 11 a, of durable mat 11al · and a th y will cro the counh-y in ... man. -
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directions, they will no doubt encounter all the causes of great expenses in st~ch 
strnctures-rock excavation, deep-cuts, tunnels, heavy embankments, extensive 
bridges, &c. 
Under these considerations, and after having, in addition to my own inves-
tigations and observations, c<;msulted some of the most experie1:ced and ~ost 
eminent railroad engineers of our country, I find myself obbged to differ 
with the general in reference to probable cost. He states the average, on the 
supposition of a double track, at $15,000 per mile. I cannot, consistently with 
my own views, state it at less than $20,000 the mile, for a single track and its 
requisite accessories; and this amount I desire also to be understood as my 
opinion of a probable minimum. 
Six thousand three hundred and ten miles, at $20,000 the mile, will amount 
to $126,200,000. 
There is no doubt that many advantages may be taken of the railroads 
ah·eady made and being made by States and incorporated companies, in adopting 
them as parts of the major general's system, but one cannot say to what extent, 
until the same shall be shown by the surveys. If we suppose it, however, to 
be equal to 1,000 miles, it will reduce the cost before stated to $106,200,000. 
The objects of these various roads being to transport masses of troops and 
. munitions of war with great speed and to great distances, means of transporting 
will have to be provided, and will also have to be under the exclusive control of 
the government, which last condition makes it necessary that these means should 
be owned by the government; they become, then, an essential part of govern-
ment expense belonging to the system. 
rrhese means are locomotives and cars. A car that would properly accom-
modate 50 men with their arms and necessary baggage would probably not cost 
less than $500. To transport 10,000 men, then, would require 200 cars. We 
will now suppose that to move these cars with the anticipated speed will require 
one locomotive to each train of ten cars; there must, then, be twenty locomo-
tives, which, with the requisite tender to each, will not cost less than $8,000 
apiece. It will, therefore, be necessary for the transportation of 10,000 men to 
have 20 locomotives and tenders and 200 cars. This may be considered as an 
equipment for one of the principal lines; but as there are seven principal lines, 
a_nd as each should be supplied with an equipment adequate to the transporta-
tion of 10,000 men, there will have to be, for the whole system of roads, not less 
than 140 locomotives and tenders and 1,400 cars. Applying to these the prices 
which we have stated, it will make the cost of the means of transportation equal 
to - - - - - • - - . - ......... - . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . $1, 820, 000 
To which add the cost of the roads .............. __ . _..... 106, 200, 000 
And the whole will be ............ _ ....•.......... $108,020,000 
_I have, in the foregoing, supposed the plan to be practicable-that is, that 
:a~lroads may be made in the several directions as required by the system; but 
it 1;5 proper to add that this is a point which cannot be determined except by 
accurate surveys. 
Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant, 
J. J. ABERT, 
Hon. J. R. POINSETT, 
Secretary of War. 
Colonel Topographical Engineers. 
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NA VY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, April 25, 1840. 
Sm : The board of navy commissioners have the honor to acknowledge the 
receipt of the letter from the honorable Secretary of War to you, of the 16th 
instant, requesting your ~·eference to them of the memorial of General E. P 
Gaines to Congress, submitting a system of national defence, "for a report a to 
the practicability, expediency, and expense of the plan, so for as relates to float-
ing batteries and other naval defences;" and, in compliance with your indom-
ment, respectfully state : 
That in relation to the "expense," the board called upon the chief na-val con-
structor for the probable cost of one of the floating· batteries and a tow-boat, as de-
scribed in the memorial, a copy of whose report is herewith enclosed. These 
estimates form the best data which the commissioners can fmnish for ascertain-
ing the aggregate expense which might be necessary to carry into effect the 
recommendations of General Gaines. No definite number is specified in the 
memorial, nor any other information given by which that number can be ascer-
tained with any probable certainty; and no attempt has been made to supply 
the want of this information by conjecture. 
There appears to be no cause for doubting that the approaches of an enemy 
by water to any of our cities and seaports might be prevented by the employ-
ment of a sufficient number of floating batteries and tow-boats, prepared, armedi 
and manned, as are proposed by General Gaines; and, consequently, that the 
plan is "practicable," provided the expense can be met and a sufficient number 
of men be obtained. 
In considering the " expediency" of adopting the fioating batteries whi~h are 
proposed in the memorial, it is necessary to estimate their comparative efficiency 
with other means ·which may be provided, manned, and supported with an eqnd 
expenditure of money ancl an equal number of troops or other persons. 
The board of navy commissioners, when presenting their views upon thF 
general defences of the country upon former occasions, have expressed the 
opinion that, upon a subj ect so important and evidently requiring the be t com-
binations of military and naval force, it was very desirable, if not indispen.able. 
that it should be considered and reported upon by a board which should com-
prise officers of both branches of the service. This belief has not been changed 
by any subsequent information or reflection upon the subject, and consequently 
they can only offer opinions upon the relative advantages and disadvantage, ; 
the floating batteries and fixed fortHications, which are based upon fact~ th,·· 
apprar to be too well established or so obvious as not to be questioned. 
The system presented in the memorial is intended "to provide for the defen 
of our. seap?rts," and "to enable us to repel, by the agency of steam po-we:: 
Yery mvas1011 suddenly forced upon us by fleets propelled by steam power. 
'Io rffect this object, the m moriali. t proposes floating batteries and attrudan 
tow-boat."' , which he has de._cribed in very general term,, and con iders. th· 
prc.fC'rablc .to fortifications with cannon placed on the banks of ri~·e1-. or mlet,: 
hccau::-e with , uch fortification. only it woulcl be utterly impracticable to lock 
up a naYigahl riYcr or inl t, or to arre t the movement of a fl et tber on. H 
al:o prc·[c~·t- th fioaiino- batterie to tC'am~hip -of-war, unle such ..,bi~-- ~}JOU! 
b prol11b1t?c1 from lraving the vicinity of the port' or harbor to :'·h1ch. they 
may he a .. :-:1g-n cl. From the. e g 11 ral views it appear to be the mt ·ntion , 
the m moriali..:t that rach and eYcry port or harbor .,hall have at all tim '~ 
th m an: for c1 fence ao-ainst a naval force which may be necc:-.:ary tor ',· 
a ta ·k. until r inforccmc·nts can b olJtainC'd from th int rior · and tha no · 
li:mc i: to b plac :cl upon th one ·ntrntion of th sc .,eparate floatin.,. tl ·nCt..: 
from c nti!!l1ou · port for trmporar • pnrpo,' <':-:. 
Th r can b no loubt that n hap rfi• t . y .. tcm of cl £ nee would b_ ,··ry 
d . irablc, if it could h obtain d with , prop r reo-ard to it~ co::t and 1 ' J · 
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mands upon the population of the country .. But if th~ probable expense of !lrn 
construction and maintenance of the floatmg batteries and tow-boats which 
would be required, and the number of persons neces1:1ary for their advantageous 
use, are considered and compared with the resources of the country, reasonable 
doubts may be entertained whether an attempt to obtain complete security in 
this manner would be expedient. 
That floating batteries of some kind will be necessary as component parts of 
the defences for several of our harbors is generally admitted, and it is believed 
formed a part of the plan of defence as proposed by the board which had' that 
subject under examination shortly after the close of the last war for those pas-
sages to important points which could not be well and thoroughly commanded 
by the fortifications on the land. 
One of the strongest objections which is usually made to fixed fortifications 
is, that they must of necessity await an attack, and leave the choice of time and 
circumstances to an enemy. '11he greatest advantage of a floating force over 
fixed fortifications consists in the greater power which they possess of choice of 
position, with facility and prompitude to meet in the best manner any form of 
attack with which any point may be threatened. All varieties of floating force 
are liable to greater danger from shells and hot shot, and require much larger 
amounts, in proportion to their original cost, to keep them in repair than fixed 
fortifications. 1 
In considering the defence of a coast so extensive as that of the United States, 
and upon which there are so many positions which are important either for their 
commercial, military, or political relations, the Board of Navy Commissioners, 
when they refer to the probable nature and force of the attacks which may be 
expected from a naval enemy, and the physical, fiscal, and personal resources 
of the country to meet them, are led to the conclusion that many points must 
be left more or less exposed for many years ; and that, while permanent arrange-
ments are made for giving security to others in proportion to their importance, 
the best policy for the whole country will be to extend those movable defences 
which can advantageously meet an enemy at the greatest distance from his 
meditated points of attack, or be soonest concentrated to retard his progress, or 
to repel him from our shores. 
This force, if composed of steam and ordinary ships-of-war, employed sepa-
rately, or in combination, as circumstances may require, might, it is believed, be 
used (except at some few points) with at least equal advantage as the floating 
batteries which are proposed in the memorial, and would possess the further 
advantage of being able to meet and annoy an enemy in his progress, to con-
c~ntrate where it should be most required, to retire, if necessary, before a supe-
nor force, and be held ready to take advantage of any accidents to the enemy, 
or of any mistakes which he might commit. Its powers would be active-
aggressive if necessary, whilst that of the batteries proposed must necessarily 
be a~ost wholly passive and strictly defensive. 
Without entering more particularly into the general subject of national de-
fence, after a careful consideration of the employment of such floating batteries 
as are proposed in the memorial, the board are of opinion that, although a few 
such or simil~r batteries might perhaps be useful in particular places, it would 
not be expedient to adopt them generally as substitutes for fixed fortifications, 
or for a floating force which should be adapted to more extensive use and capa-
ble of quicker and more rapid combinations. · 
The papers are herewith respectfully returned. 
I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant, 
C. MORRIS, 
For tlie Board ef Na·vy Commissioners. 
Hon. JAMES K. PAULDING, 
8ecretary of tlie Navy. 
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WASHINGTON, April 22, 1840. 
Srn: I have read the memorial presented by Major General Gaines to Con-
gress on the defence of the coast. A part of the system proposed by the 
general is the construction of heavy floating batteries, the probable cost of which 
with their tow-boats, you require me to state. It is difficult to form an opinion 
on the cost of vessels of such unusual dimensions as those proposed by General 
Gaines; and in addition to this difficulty there are no data given on which to 
ground an estimate, excepting length and breadth, but it is believed that the 
largest battery with her tow-boats will cost about 1,400,000 dollars, and the 
smallest about 700,000. 'l'his estimate includes copper-fastening and coppering, 
cables, anchors, boats, and water-casks, but does not embrace masts, spars, sails, 
armament, nor stores of any description . 
. I am, sir, respectfully, &c., 
SAMUEL HUMPHREYS. 
Com. CHARLES lVIoRRIS, 
President efthe Navy Board. 
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HO. REPS,, EX. DOC, No. 5, 32d CONGRESS, 1st SESSION. 
LETTER 
FR01l 
THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 
IN 
Reference to Fortifications. 
DECE1lBER 11, 1851.-Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, and ordered to be 
printed. 
. WAR DEPARTMENT, 
Washington, December 8, 1851. 
Srn: On the 3d of March last, your honorable body adopted the following 
resolutions : 
" 1. R esolved, That the Secretary of War be directed to report to this House, 
the second Monday in December next, on the subject of the land defences of the 
country, in which he will review the general system adopted after the war with 
Great Britain, and since pursued in regard to the permanent fortifications then 
deemed necessary for the national defence; and that he report whether the gen-
eral plan may not now be essentially modified by reducing the number of works 
proposed to be erected, and by abandoning some of the forts now in progress of 
construction. , 
" 2. R esolved, That the Secretary of War also report the number of fortifi-
cations which have been built, including those nearly completed under the general 
sy tern, the number in process of construction, and the number not yet commenced, 
but proposed to be erected, and in such form as will conveniently show the States 
and Territories in which the several forts are situated, or to be located; when 
the work was commenced, when completed, or expected to be finished; the num-
ber and calibre of the guns mounted, or to be mounted, the estimated cost, the 
amounted expended, and the sums yet required to finish or construct, as the 
ca::::e may be, each work respectively." 
I now proceed to discharge the duty thus imposed on me. 
On more than one occasion during the last war with Great Britain, the country 
had been exposed to serious misfortunes from the want of suitable fortifications 
at important points. Its capitol had been taken, and several of its largest com-
mncial cities owed their preservation from the same calamity to the undisciplined 
couraue of troops hastily assembled for their defence. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that at the restoration of peace, the attention of the government should 
be turned to the defences of the country. 
In the year 1816 a board of engineers was organized by order of President 
:\fadi.,on, charged wit~ the duty of preparing a general system of fortifications 
f, r our maritime frontier; and, by a resolution of Congress, adopted in the same 
YE:ar, the P resident was authorized to employ . " a skilful engineer as an as-
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sistaut" to this board. The appointment was conferred upon General Bernard, 
a distinguished officer in the l!.,rench army. The board of engineers, thus con-
stituted, entered zealously on the discharge of their duties. They planned an 
extensive system of permanent coast defences, and surveys were immediately 
commenced with a view to carry it into execution. They ananged the proposed 
works into six classes.. Class A comprised certain old works, constructed dur-
ing· the two wars with Great Britain, but which required alterations and repairs. 
Classes B, 0, D, E, and F, the new works proposed to be erected, arranged in 
the order of their relative importance. 
The plan, both in its formation and execution, appears to have been left for 
several years (from 1816 to 1821) entirely under the control of the Executin. 
Congress appears to have had no agency in it, except to make the necessary ap-
propriations, which were made in a gross sum "for fortifications," and were ex-
pended with the approval of the department, by engineer officers, under the 
direction of the chief of that corps. In 1821 the practice was changed, and the 
appropriations were made for each work specifically. 
This plan has been partially carried into execution, with a few exceptiom 
made by direction of Congress, in the same order as that in which it was fir~t 
arranged-
1. By altering and repairing the most important of the old works. 
2. By commencing the new works embraced in class B; then those in class C. 
]from that time to the present the works have been slowly but steadily ad-
vancing. , Doubts were occasionally expressed, both in and out of Congref'S, nr 
the necessity of so extensive a system, and the appropriations were frequently 
so curtailed as materially to retard the completion of the works, but they were 
suspended but for a single year. . 
In the year 1836, when our relations with France wore a threatemng aspec:; 
the attention of Congress was again called to the defences of the country, anu 
the President was directed, by a resolution of the Senate, adopted on the Lt1 
of February of that year, to :ipake a report on that subject. 
General Cass, then Secretary of War, took this occasion to review the who!~ 
system adopted by the board of engineers. He disapproved of ~everal of rh: 
works recommended by them, either as useless or as unnecessarily la1:ge, an 
con idered the whole system as on too extensive a scale. Par~s of th1: d~cu-
rnent, referring to particular works, are no longer of any practi_cal app~1cat10~-
as the works to which they refer are completed; but such portions of 1t a~ rt-
late to the general system adopted by the board, are as appropriate at the pr 
sent day as they were when they were written, and whatever difference_ n 
opinion may exist on the subject to which it refers, none can exist a~ to the 
ability which it displays. 'rhe report is Senate document No. 243, of the year 
1836 . 
. In tran, mitting this report to the Senate, President Jackson ( on .,~ch a ~ne~-
t10n undoubtedly high authority) expresses his concurrence in the news of the 
Secretary. 
·whatever effect this repo1-t may have had on the Oongr to which ~t w-a.: 
tranemitt cl, it does not appear to have produced any permanent change m th 
,_y,·t ·m which, from that time to the pre nt, ha been gradually ad-vancin5!'., an · 
in but on instance, until the la. t , e. :ion, did Oono-rc, fail to carry out the r · 
ommcmlation. of thr boru·d. ..Within that p riod many (and tho-.e by tar 
mo:--t important) of th work. hav be n com pl tcd; other ar n arly ... · 
vcral hav b n commenced and arc in varion tao-es of ad-vanccm n · 
h rcwith app nd a tahular Rtatcrn nt, in w11ich the work r comm nd d by 
boarcl • re arran(J' cl into their r :-pcctive cla. :e , howin(J' th work-.. n h 
I. ntic and 1ulf of )I xi o that ar compl t , or n arly , o; tho-. , th 
r (J'r · · · of con ·truction, and tho.- that ar propo. cd to be built, but whi 
not yet been commenced, tog th r with th c t, actual or e ·timat d (a-- th 
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may be) of each work, the number of guns for which it is calculated, &c. I 
also append sectional maps showing the exact position of eac~ work, exec_uted 
or proposed, and exhibiting to the eye its actual state, that is~ wheth_er it be 
completed, in course of construction, or not yet commenced. :E rom this state-
ment it will be seen that tlie number of all the works recommended by the 
board, on the Atlantic and Gulf of lVIexico, including old works repaired, is one ' 
hundred and fifty-seven, carrying, in the aggregate, 12,685 guns. · 
That the cost of repairing the old works, class A, has been $3, 583, 7 42 
The cost of the new works that are completed, ornearly so, class 
B, has been ...................................... - . . . 13, 172, 966 
Making, of all sums expended since the year 1816 to the present 
day, in the construction and repairs of the works embraced in 
classes A and B, an aggregate amount of .. _ .... - .........• $16, 756, 708 
To complete them will require ...... _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 1, 123, 896 
That on the works now under construction, class 0, 
there has been expended ..................... $3, 902, 828 
To complete them will require.................. 5, 028, 194 
Uaking, as the estimated aggregate cost of the works now under 
construction, class 0, the sum of......................... 8, 931, 022 
And that the estimated cost of all the works recommended, but 
not yet commenced, is ....... _ ........... __ ............. 18, 147, 000 
Grand total.. . _ ........... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $44, 958, 626 
Thus we find that the total cost of the entire system recommended by the 
board for the defence of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts (including the cost of 
old works repaired) is estimated at $44,958,626. It must be observed, how-
ever, that a large portion of the estimate for works not yet commenced is purely 
conjectural. 
Having shown what the plan adopted by the board proposed to accomplish, 
and how far it has been carried into execution, I now proceed to consider the 
question submitted by the House, whether that plan "may not be essentially 
modified by reducing the number of works proposed to be erected, and by 
abandoning some of the forts now in progress of construction." 
As this question is one of vital importance to the country, I deemed it pru-
dent to obtain all the aid that professional knowledge and experience could 
afford in arriving at a correct conclusion ; I therefore addressed a series of ques-
tions to some of the most distinguished officers of the navy, and of the corps of 
engineers, which I requested them to answer. The answers to these questions 
are hereto appended, and, together with the able and elaborate report of the 
chief engineer, constitute a mass of highly interesting and instructive matter on 
the subject of the national defences. I have been much indebted to these 
interesting papers in preparing this report. 
I shall first consider that part of the inquiry submitted by the House, which 
refers to the works now in progress of construction. The board, in carrying 
their plan into execution, commenced, (as I have already said,) with the most 
important works ; it follows, therefore, that those now in progress of construc-
tion arc deemed by them more important than those that have not yet been 
commenced, and, therefore, that if the former are unnecessary, the latter are 
still moi-e so. I shall confine myself at present to the works on the Atlantic 
and on the Gulf of Mexico; those on the northern lakes will form the subject 
of a eparate inquiry. 
The works now in course of construction are enumerated in class 0. Some 
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of those in class B are not yet quite :finished, but they are all so nearly so as 
to _be classed by the board among those that are completed. 
By reference to thfa list it will be seen that several of these works constitute 
parts of the defences of some of our most important seaports, to wit: of Phil~ 
delphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, (with the navy yard at Portsmouth,) Charleston, 
Pensacola, (the only good harbor for vessels-of-war, and the only naval depot 
on the Gulf,) and Mobile. There can be no doubt that if any points on our 
coast ought to be fortified these should be among the number. 
With regard to important positions like these, my opinion is that nothing 
should be left to chance, but that they should be fortified, so as to make them 
impregnable by any force that may reasonably be expected to be brought 
against them. In the event of a war with a great maritime power, these points 
would probably be the first to be assailed. Indeed they are the only ones at 
which we are assailable. The power of steam has, in point of time, deprived 
the Atlantic of two-thirds of its width, and in certainty of movement and accu-
racy of calculation has narrowed it still more. It is, perhaps, not going too far 
to say that a naval expedition from England could now calculate with mor_e 
precision the time of its arrival at one of .our ports, than forty years a~o. it 
could have calculated the time of its reaching the opposite side of the Bnti h 
channel. 
It is evident, therefore, that our great cities should be prepared against such 
~xpeditions, not only in time of war, but that as war may come unexpectedly 
upon us, they should, even in time of peace, be always prepared to r~pel an 
attack. The only question is, how is this to be accomplished 1 Three different 
modes have been suggested: 
1st. By such temporary, fixed, or floating defences as may be hastily pre-
pared to meet an emergency. 
2d. By vessels-of-war; or, 
3d. By permanent fortifications. 
With regard to temporary works on land, hastily thrown up, they are 
unquestionably often of great advantage where there are no fortifications, and 
sometimes have been found sufficient to repel an attack. It is manifest, how-
ever, that they ought not to be relied on as substitutes for the latter, for defend-
ing important positions like those we are now considering against ve els-of-
war. Their only recommendation is their cheapness. On the other band, t~ey 
require greater numbers to defend them, and they afford less protection agarn~· 
the enemy's fire. Even if they were equally effectual, therefore, they "?uld 
only be the means of saving money at the expense of life. But it is manife~ 
that, even when skilfully constructed, they must be inferior, as means of defence, 
to permanent fortifications of olid masonry. 
In re pect to floating batteries there appears to be but one opinion among 
officers both of the army and navy. This subject was brought before on<!'r~s 
some years ago by a late di tinguished officer of the army, who propo .. ed_them. 
a ub titute both for fortifications and for ve sels of war in the protecrton ~1 
our coa t. The then ecretary of War (Mr. Poinsett) was directed to !!iw hi.: 
vi w upon it. He refened the matter to the board of navy commi ioner~. by 
whom it wa fully inve tigat d, and they conclude their report upon it by ex-
pre ·ing th opinion " that although a few such or imilar batterie might. · 
hap , • u ful in particular place , it would not be expedient to adopt th_ 
g n rally a uh titut for fi Id fortification or for a floating batt ry, whi _ 
hould b apt d to mor xt n iv u e and capable of quicker and mor ra 
c m inati n~," t wit, a naval fi re . 
In thi opini n Ir. oin.. t c ncurr d, ancl it will b n that the. offi . ~-
b th military and naval, wb have fi vor d m with th ir vi w on tlu, I 
ncur in th Ii f that altbou"'h t am att ri may, und r me cir um,tan 
b highly valuable a auxiliaric · to fortification or vcs" 1 -of-w r, alou 
MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 205 
are inferior to either, and that from the perishable nat~re of the In:ateri~l of 
which they must be constructed they are far more expensive than fort1ficat1ons. 
It only remains to inquire whether vessels-of-war should be resorted to as a 
substitute for fortifications. 
On this point opinions widely differ. The more prevalent one, even among 
naval officers, is, that the navy could not, or if it could, that it ought n~t t~ be 
relied on for this purpose. In this opinion I entirely concur. The obJe~t10ns 
to this mode of defence appear to me insuperable. The moder1: P:acti_ce of 
nations dispenses with any formal dec;laration of war, and the first mt1mat10n of 
it may be the appearance of a hostile fleet before one of our cities, or, perhaps, 
simultaneously before several. Is it probable that a sufficient naval force would 
always be at band ready to repel such an unexpected attack? But eve1;1 when 
the existence of a war was well known, could a city always calculate with cer-
tainty on the presence of a naval force precisely at the moment it was needed ? 
The vessels assigned to this duty would either cruise off the coast to watch for 
and intercept the enemy's fleet, or they would remain stationary in the harbor. 
If the first course were adopted, what security would they afford? Any one of 
the numerous casualties to which vessels are liable at sea might enable the 
enemy's fleet to pass them, and accomplish his purpose of destroying a city and 
millions of public and private property, or of selling forbearance at an enormous 
price, before our vessels were aware of its approach. 
If, on the contrary, the vessels assigned to the defence of a city remained 
constantly in port, this would necessarily involve an immense increase of our 
naval establishment. The chief engineer estimates that, inasmuch as it would 
be necessary to retain at each important point a fleet entirely adequate to its 
defence, the entire naval force destined for the defence of our coast alone would 
have to be as many times larger than the squadron that might reasonably be 
expected to attack one of these points as there are points to defend. Supposing, 
therefore, that Boston, N(;lw York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, and New 
Orleans were unprovided with land defences, each of them would require for its 
protection a naval force as large as any that might probably be sent against it; 
and as twenty ships-of-the-line would be no extraordinary armament to send on 
such a mission, it would require a force , at least equal to that at each of the 
above-mentioned ports, making in all an aggregate force of one hundred and 
twenty ships-of-the-line for the defence of these ports alone. 
. T~e argument is, perhaps, pushed to an extreme, but it cannot be denied that, 
JUSt m proportion as fortifications are dispensed with for the protection of our 
principal seaports, the navy must be augmented; and all naval officers who 
recommend a partial substitution of naval for land defences admit that such 
mu t be the consequence of the adoption of this policy. It follows, therefore, 
that of the two modes of defence, the naval is by far the most expensive. A 
few facts will more fully demonstrate the truth of this assertion. 
1. A first class man-of-war, carrying say eighty-four guns, is estimated to cost 
$500,000. Now this sum would, under ordinary circumstances, construct a 
fortification that would mount two hundred and fifty guns. , 
Th~ cost of building, equipping, and repairing the navy from 1816 to 1850, 
both mcl~~ed, was upwards ~f $51,000,000. rrhe aggregate cost of building 
and repa1;1Ilg ~11 the forts which have been completed and are now in course of 
con_ truct10n will (when the latter are finished) amount to $26,811,626. The 
entire na~al force of the United States carries 2,032 guns; the number of all 
the guns m the forts that are completed and being built will be 6,093, so that to 
kee~ 2!032 ~ns on ship-board costs nearly double what it costs to mount 6,093 
on fortifications, and the first amount does not include the cost of docks and 
other establishments erected by the government for the construction and repair 
of ve sels. But this is not aJl. It is computed that few ships last longer than 
forty years, and their average duration does not exceed fifteen years, and at the 
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end of sixteen years the expense of repairs of a ship about equals her first cost. 
On the contrary, a fort when once built lasts forever, and the cost of repair is 
trifl.iug. It is evident from these facts, that, supposing the two modes of defence 
to be in other respects equal, on the score of economy there can be no compari-
son between them. 
I will not undertake to decide a question which has long been a subject of 
controversy between officers of the army and navy, and that is, the relative 
superiority of fortifications and vessels-of-war. It is believed, however, that 
few naval officers, at the present day, would venture to affirm that, in a contest 
between a regular fortification and a vessel-of-war, equal in the number and 
calibre of their guns, and in the skill and courage with which they are managed, 
the vessel would be likely to prove victorious. 
The practice of the civilized world is opposed to such a theory. There is 
hardly a nation that has seaports to defend that does not resort to fortifications 
for that purpose, and the instances are rare in which they have failed to accom-
plish the object. 
Some memorable instances of successful attacks by vessels-of-war on fortified 
places have been adduced in support of this theory, but it is probable that the 
result in these cases may be traced to some fortunate accident, or to causes not 
inherent in the two modes of attack and defence. 
On the other hand, many examples may be found (some furnished by our own 
history) of successful resistance by forts to vessels-of-war. It would seem, too, 
that if there were ever any doubts on the subject, the Paixhan gun, which, it iE 
admitted on all hands, gives great advantage to forts over vessels, must have 
removed them. 
England is frequently cited as an example of a country which has long relied 
successfully on her navy for the defence of her seaports. Even if the fact w~re 
so, it would constitute no argument in favor of the adoption of the same policy 
by the United States. England has a small coast and a powerful navy. The 
United States have a sea front nearly equal to that of all Europe, and a mall 
navy. r_riie naval supremacy of England has always enabled her not ~nly ~o 
protect her own commerce and harass that of her enemy, but often to d1:1ve h~ 
.,hip:; from the sea, and compel them to take refuge under the guns of his forn-
fi.cations, while the proximity of her shores to those of France often enable the 
same squadron to overlook the ports of her enemy, and to protect her own. 
But it is a mistake to su1)pose that England relics exclusively on her navy fo:· the 
defence of her ports. On the contrary, those of her ports that are mo t likely 
to i~1vite attack, from being the site of public naval establishments, are tI~on17ly 
fortified. Nevertheless, the most eminent state men of that country admit and 
deplore the insufficiency of her land defences, since the introduction of war 
t amcrs has almo ·t bridged the Briti h channel. ·what effect thi new lemen 
of naYal warfare i destined to produce on the de. tinies of Eno-land-whether 
it tend to incr a. e or to diminLh her maritime, uperiority-whether it will not, 
in ,·omc mca, ure, deprive her of the immunity from inva ion which her in.:ul&r 
pol"ition ha. hitherto secur c1 to her, are question that yet remain to _be c~ cided. 
I conclude, ther fore, that wh nev r a plac i con iderecl of uffic1ent lIDJ>Ort· 
anc to rcc1uire defence. , and iB , u"c lJtibl of b ing defended by fortificMion-. 
th Tar in Yery point of vi<'w pr £,ral,le to ve cl -of-war. 
In _a~ ·ing thi , I mean do di. paragement to th navy. On th contr:iry. I 
would , till r ly mainly on it for the cl fi,nce of the country, but I would h , e 
them clcf~nd h •r, not by rc:maini11"' at anchor in her poli , but by ""Oiug abro: 
on tl1 · w1cl o · an, prot ·ctnw h ·r comm •rce and hara" ino- that of the •nemy : 
hovcrin"" on hi coa,t ancl com1, ·lliiw him, in tcacl of attackinO' ur iti ~ · 
look to th d .fcnc of hi · wn. Th ·:- , in my opinion, are th appr pri 
Inti ::; of the navy, and by a chi v ment like the· have all their laurel;:: 
won. 
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The form of expression used in the resolution, that the Secretary of War be 
directed to report whether the plan of 181_6 may not "now" ~e modified by 
abandoning the works in course of construct10n, would seem to imply a suppo-
sition on the part of the House that although they may have been necessary at 
one time they have ceased to be so now. · 
Great changes have undoubtedly take1:1 place_ s!nc~ the plan_ was adop~ed. 
The country has advanced with unexampled rap1d1ty m wealth, m populat10n, 
and all the elements of military power. Discoveries and improvement~, directly 
or indirectly affecting the facilities of attack and defence, have astomshed the 
world. Railroads have been introduced; steam has been applied to navigating 
the ocean ; the telegraph accomplishes what would then have been considered 
miracles. 
Among these changes there is one which, although of far less general import-
ance than those just alluded to, nevertheless as it is directly connected with the 
military art, deserves to be mentioned, and that is the invention, or, at least, 
introduction into general use of the Paixhan gun, as it is generally called from 
its supposed inventor.* These discoveries or improvements are destined to ex-
ercise an influence on military affairs, the extent of which cannot be appreciated 
until it shall have been tested by experience. 
There can be no doubt that so far as regards its capacity to resist invasion, 
these changes have vastly increased the relative power of this country. The 
rapidity with which intelligence may be transmitted, and troops and munitions 
of war conveyed from one extremity of the country to the other, enables us to 
combine the opposite advantages of an extended territory and a rapid concen-
tration of force. 'l'hese advantages, together with the augmented population 
and resources of the country, must remove all apprehension of an invasion of it 
by an army from abroad . No army could be transported across the ocean large 
enough to venture beyond the reach of the transports that conveyed it to our 
shores, and any fortificat!ons designed to provide against such a contingency, 
may safely be dispensed with. 
But the fortifications now under consideration look to no such event. They 
are designed to protect large cities from attacks by vessels-of-war, and against 
such attacks numbers are of no avail; the most populous city is as powerless 
against them as the smallest village. It follows, therefore, that neither the in-
crease of our population nor the facilities afforded by railroads and telegraphs 
tend, in the least degree, to diminish the necessity of these works. · 
On the other hand, it is admitted by all that the introduction of war steamers, 
which greatly facilitate the attack on all places accessible by water, renders it 
more necessary than ever to fortify them against such attacks. 
It is also admitted that the Paixhan gun, so terrific in its effects on all floating 
defences, is comparatively harmless against the solid masonry of forts, and has, 
therefore, rendered the latter, at the same time, more necessary and more effica-
cious. 
I therefore conclude that if the above-mentioned works were necessary in 
1 16, they are still more so at the present time, and that they ought not to be 
abandoned. . 
There are several works comprised in this class (C) that stand on different 
ground. They are, Fort Knox, in Maine; Fort Clinch, in Georgia; Fort 'l'aylor, 
at Key West; and Fort J efferson, on one of the Tortugas islands. 
Fort Knox is designed to protect Penobscot river, which has a large commerce 
' 
0 This formidable gun is said to have been invented and introduced into our service (by 
the name of ''The Columbiad") by the late Col. Bomford of the ordnance, some years 
before the alleged discovery by the French officer who has had the honor of giving it hi.s 
nam·~. Hence the manner in which I have qualified my remarks in relation to it. 
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and affords a fine anchorage The large town of Bangor and several flourishinO' 
villages lie on the river and bay. b 
Fort Clinch is intended to defend the entrance into Cumberland sound. 
'rhis sheet of water affords an excellent harbor, and the bar at the entrance, it 
is said, affords a sufficient draught of water for sloops-of-war and merchantmen. 
There is no town of much consequence, I believe, either on the sound, or on 
St. Mary's river, which empties into it, and the utility of this work depends 
upon the importance of excluding an enemy from the sound, and securing it to 
ourselves. Both this work and the preceding belong more properly to another 
class of cases to which I shall presently refer. 
The two remaining works now in course of construction are those on Key 
West and the Tortugas. In relation to these there can be but one opinion. 
~I.1hese islands, situated directly in the narrow channel between the southern 
extremity of Flo,rida and the island of Cuba, may be said to command the 
northern gateway of the Gulf, as Jamaica does its southern. ~I.1he latter is in 
possession of the only nation from whose naval power the United States have 
anything to apprehend. Were these islands, with their fine harbors, also to fall 
into her hands, they would enable her to cut off all communication between our 
naval forces on the Gulf and those on the Atlantic, to obtain complete control 
over the Gulf, and block up the vast and increasing commerce of which it is the 
theatre. A railroad across the isthmus of 'I'ehuantepec (the existence of which, 
at no distant period, can hardly be doubted) would impart additional importance 
to the Gulf, as it would then become the main channel of communication be-
tween the Atlantic and the Pacific; and recent events admonish us that our 
progress in that quarter is watched with jealousy by more than one of the great 
powers of Europe. ·· 
I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion, not only that these two works should 
not be abandoned, but that they should be completed as soon as practicable. 
It has been objected to several of the works which have been or are nearly 
completed, that they are on too large a scale. One or two of those which we~ 
commenced shortly after the adoption of the plan, are doubtless liable to !his 
criticism. They are calculated not only to repel an attack by sea, but to with· 
stand a long siege by powerful land forces. It seems to me extremely doubtful 
whether the strong defences on •the land sides of these forts were ever necesnary; 
be that as it may, however, there can be no question that railroads and the 
telegraph have, in most cases, done away with the necessity for any works on 
the land side, except such as may be requisite to resist a coup de main, or pre-ren 
an escalade. It is to be presumed that the board have modified the pla~ o~ ~ho: 
works now constructing so as to adapt them to the present time, and to dimlill-h 
their magnitude and cost. This concludes what I have to say in relation to th ' 
works now in the course of construction. 
I now come to the last branch of the inquiry proposed by the Hou e, and 
ancl that is, whether the number of fortifications proposed to be built may Ill)' 
be reduced 1 
The...,e works are enumerated in classes D, E, and F, aRd the accompanyin~ 
map will show their respective positions. I t will be seen by the statement A., 
that they con id rably exceed in number those which have been completed, or 
ar now in progres of con truction. 
ome of the proposed works are designed to complete the ystem of defi,n • 
for the protection of the large seaports or naval depot . Whether the e 1>l c • 
be not ah ady ufficiently prot ct d by the work that have been completed. or 
are in progre~ of con. traction, i a pur ly profi ional que tion, in r 1!'3l'd_ · 
whi ·h I hav no r a on to dou t the corr ctn of the concludon ~ at wh1 
the board have arrived. In r o-ard t two of tho e fort , however, I will Y n 
to oft r a fi w ugo- .. tion.. . 'I h y ar the two mention d in cla ~ an f 
which it is propo ed to con tru~t on the atu.xent river, as part of the Y e 
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of defences of Washington. The construction ~f these works is based on the 
supposition that the enemy may cross the Atlant~c, asce?-d the Ol~es~peak~ bay 
to the Patuxent river, disembark a large army with all i~s rnateriel, mcludmg a 
h·ain of artillery, and then march upwards of twenty miles through a countr;y 
abounding in facilities for resisting or retarding his march, and capture this 
eity. 
It appears to me exceedingly improbable that ~uch an att~mpt should be 
made, or, if made, that it should be successful. It 1s true that it was once made 
and succeeded, but it was under very different circumstances fro~1 t~10se which 
now exist. rro say nothing of the probability that there would, m time of war, 
at all times be found some vessels-of-war at Norfolk, lying securely under the 
protection of Fortress JYionroe and Fort Calhoun, (neither of which existed in 
1~14,) a telegraphic despatch might in a few hours concentrate in the bay all 
the war steamers as far north as Boston, and as far south as SaYannah, whereby 
the enemy's retreat might be cut off, and the squadron (unless a very powerful 
one) be captured. 
In the second place, the two forts on the Potomac-Fort Washington, and 
the one proposed to be built at Cedar Point-would prevent the fleet from a -
cending that river (as they did on the former occasion) to co-operate with the 
army, cover his flank, and secure his retreat in case of disaster. Lastly, a more 
numerous and efficient militia could now be assembled for the defence of this 
city, in twenty-four honrs, than could have been brought together in 1S14 in the 
.ame number of days; and my opinion is, therefore, that these works may safely 
be dispensed with. 
But the great majority of these works are intended to fortify places where no 
fortifications now exist. Whether any or all of these places are of such im-
portance as to 1·equire permanent defences is a question in regard to which it is 
probable that a great diversity of views will be found to exist. 
I have already given it as my opinion that all seaports where there are im-
portant public establishments, such as docks and navy yards, or where there is 
great accumulation of private wealth, should be strongly fortified against attacks 
by sea. Beyond this it is difficult to lay clown any general rule, and to say 
where we should stop, although it is evident we must stop somewhere. General 
Ca",, in the report to which I have already alluded, says : 
"I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemy should 
h~ defended by works, fixrd or floating, suited to its local position, and suffi-
ciently extensive to resist such attempts as would be made against it." 
And again: 
"All the harbors and inlets upon the coasts where there are cities or towns, 
who,_e situation and importaI).ce create just apprehension, and particularly where 
wr, have public naval establi, hments, should be defended by works proportioned 
to any emergency that may probably occur." 
The correctness of these propositio;s may be admitted, and yet a wide field 
rJf dif:cu:sion be left open, for the difficulty does not lie so much in finding a 
ruh: a,; in applying it to a particular case; a difficulty increased by the local and 
P' litical con iderations which will always exercise more or less h1-fluence on its 
<lf-frion. 
It will be seen, howeYer, by an examination of the lists D, E, and F, that the 
board have gone considerably beyond the limits which this rule would prescribe. 
Jlany of the work embraced in thi, list arc not de, igned to protect any city or 
" :-u that could "tempt the cupidity of an enemy," or ·where there are many 
public etitabli, hment of any kinc1, or "whose situation and importance could 
tT ate ju t appr hension." Most of them are intended to protect the entrances 
·,) bay,, ;:ounds, inlet ... , road.~ tead, or harbor , the loss of which might be in 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--14 
210 MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
convenient to our merchantmen, or the possession of which might be useful to 
the enemy. 
For information in regard to these works I refer to the very able report of 
the chief engineer, in which they are separately examined, and the object of 
each is fully explained. This report may satisfy Congress, though I confess it 
has failed to satisfy me that all of these works ought to be built. 
The construction of fortifications at such points and for such purposes seem::; 
to be based on the supposition that the enemy is to have complete mastery over 
our coast, a supposition we are not warranted in making. On the contrary, it 
seems to me that the protection of our commerce, whether on our own coast or 
elsewhere, -is the appropriate function of -our navy, and may be safely left to it. 
We cannot expe~t, particularly since the introduction of war steamers of light 
draught, by any system of fortification, however extensive, to exclude the eneipy 
from every bay, inlet, or creek in a seacoast on the two oceans, of several thou-
sands of miles in extent; and there can be no great advantage in preventing hi~ 
access to one when he can find another nearly or quite as good at no great di~-
tance. I admit that some of these harbors may be so important as to require 
fortifications, but I believe that such is not the case with a great majority of 
them. 
In determining the extent to which we will fortify our seacoast there i .. one 
fact which we ought never to lose sight of, and that is, that every fortification 
which is not necessary is a positive disadvantage. },orts are elements of weak-
ness as well as of strength, for, if they happen to fall into the hands of the enemy. 
they become means of annoyance and even of danger to the country by which 
they were erected. ':rhe strength of Gibraltar, which did not prevent it cap· 
ture by the English, has enabled them to retain it, in spite of the effort' or 
Spain, for nearly a century and a half; and Calais was more than two centurie-
in the possession of the same power. Although -we have no reason to appre-
hend that any attempt would be made to acquire permanent possession ?f an; 
of our works, yet bays or harbors, in themselves of little consequence, mwht, u. 
they were fortified, and the forts were taken by the enemy, become a ource ot 
great annoyance during the whole period of the war. It follows, therefore, ~ha· 
every fort should be provided, in time of war, with an armament and garruon 
fully adequate to its defence. 
By statement A it appears that if all the works enumerated in the list for ~e 
.Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico were completed they would require, to pronde 
them all with proper war garrisons, 62,300 men. Those on the lakes would r'· 
quire 2,600 more, making, for the forts on the Atlantic side of the State~, no 
less than 64,900 men, a larger force than the regular army of this country h~ 
ever amounted to. 
I have no means of knowing what force would be necessary for the worh on 
the Pacific; but if the system were carried to the same extent on that coa,t 
which it is proposed to cany it on the Atlantic, to garrison all the wor ~ ~ on 
both ocean in time of war would carcely require a maller force than 100,00 
m n. 
The hi f engineer ha suggested that the militia of the neighborhoo~ m~h. 
in a gr at m Ul'e,_ be reli cl on for thi purpose, a" it i a ervice to wh1~h 1. ' 
w 11 adapt d. Thi may be tru , but it doe not entir ly obviate the obJecrt n. 
Thi, duty would diffi r from tha for which re ort i u ually had to mili tia. I· 
i not lik ha tily coll cting m n to r i t an imp nding danger, and then allow-
incr th m to cli!'lp r and r turn t th ir u ual a-vocation a ~oon c" it i, o 
It woul not d t I v th fort unprovided with arri. on until the n · -
had actually mad hi · app arau · . n th c utrar ~, a there would 
m an f knowincr wh n h' would m ,, th militia w uld hav to remain c · 
t ntly in the fort . This w uld p rticularly th ca with w rk.-, o t 
la .. tha w , ar now . aminiug, many of which ar rcmot fr m 
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from which they could be speedily reinforced._ Fo_r this kind of service, there-
fore, the militia would possess no advantage, m pomt of economy, over regular 
troops. . . . 
Great, however, as would be the expense attendmg this syste~, th~re is no 
doubt that, in a time of war, the country would cheerfully submit to it. But 
thi is not all. These works ought not only to be protected in time of war, but 
even in time of peace they ought to be prepared to resist an attempt to capture 
them by a surprise or coup de main. To construct them and leav~ _them_un-
!!l.larded until war has actually broken out, when the first act of hostility_ might 
and probably would be to seize them, would, it seems to me, be the height of 
imprudence. 
What is a proper peace garrison for works of this sort is a question in regard 
to which military men differ. 'I1he strength of the garrison would depend not 
only on its size, but, in some measure, also, on the position of each work, the 
facility of speedily affording it relief, &c. 
Supposing that the estimate I ha-ye made of the war garrisons of all the 
works erected and to be erected according to the plan of the board, on the 
Atlantic and the Pacific, of one hundred thousand men, to be correct, and esti-
mating a proper peace garrison at one-tenth of this number, (which is believed 
to be a very low estimate,) the force required for this purpose would be almost 
equal to that of the present army. 
Would the country submit to the burden which such a gigantic system of 
fortifications would entail upon it 1 I think not. The people of this country, 
although prodigal of their expenditures in time of war, are parsimonious in pre-
paring for it. They would never consent to expend annually large sums in 
order to prepare for a remote and contingent danger. The consequence would 
be that these works, when completed, would be neglected, and would never be 
prepared for a sudden and u~expected attack. 
We have ample experience of this fact. No military man will affirm that the 
works already completed are provided with such garrisons and armaments as a 
prudent foresight would dictate. The reverse is notoriously true, and yet 
within a few years past events have several times occurred calculated to ad-
monish the government of the necessity of preparation. If these preparations 
have not been made, it is not because they have not been repeatedly urged upon 
Congress. 'l,hus, by attempting too much, we run the risk of accomplishing 
nothing, or worse than nothing. I am, therefore, of opinion, that many of the 
ork in the classes D, E, and F, particularly in the last two classes, might and 
r 1ght to be dispensed with. 
It is with regret that I feel constrained to differ from the board of engineers 
'n a ... ubject to which they have devoted so much time and attention ; but this 
i~ not a mere question of engineering. To designate the points that are suscep-
1ble of being fortified, to determine the extent, character, and strength of the 
-orb, and to superintend their construction, is the province of the engineer; 
l_nt whether any and which of these points it is expedient to fortify is a ques-
_ion of national policy, involving a great many and important considerations. 
I'bi- question should be fully investigated, and now is the time to make the 
inve tigation. As soon as the works now in progress of construction shall have 
ken completed the board will enter upon a class of works of more questionable 
ilit~. 
I ;ecommend, therefore, that the department be authorized to organize a 
~ard, compo ed of officers of the army and navy and of civilians, whose duty 
• 3hall be to examine which of the works comprised in classes D, E, and F 
" o-ht to be con~tructed, and/whether any that are not comprised in that list be 
e<:e ·ary ; that they be directed to report to Congress the results of their 
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inquiry, and to state at length the grounds of their decision in reference to each 
particular work. 
I shall now say a few words on the subject of 
THE LAKE FRONTIER. 
General Cass, in 1836, expressed the opinion that this frontier required nr 
permanent defences; that we might safely rely for its security "upon tho51· 
means, both in personnel and the materiel, which the extent and other advan-
t ages of our country insure to us, and which must give us the superiority in tha 
quarter." ~I1his opinion has been ably combated by the chief engineer, and I 
cannot entirely concur in it. 
The mercantile marine of Great Britain on Lake Ontario considerably exceed, 
tha t of the United States, and her undisputed command of the St. Lawrence 
enables h er to augment her naval force on that lake to an indefinite extent. 
On the other lakes the reverse is the case; our shippfog there far exceeds that 
of England, and every day is adding to our superiority. But to enable us tn 
retain this advantage we must have docks and navy yards, and in time of w11r 
these establishments ought to be rendered secure against a coup de main. The 
Welland canal, affording an inland communication between Lakes Ontario and 
Erie, would greatly facilitate enterprises of this nature. 
Statement B contains a list of the works on this frontier, with their po ition, 
strength, &c. It will be seen from this statement that there are in all eight 
forts on the whole northern frontier, of which only three, to wtt, Fort Porter, a' 
Buffalo, l!--,ort Wayne, at Detroit, and a fort at Rom;e's Point, Lake Champlain. 
are new ; the· remainder are old works, constructed before and during the la::· 
war with Great Britain. 
With regard to the first two, as they are completed, it is useless to di .. cn:· 
their utility. In reference to the first, however, I presume there can be scarcely 
a difference of opinion. Buffalo, with the great amount of shipping alway col-
lected there, would offer great temptations to an enetny, and its proximity to. th 
W clland canal would render an expedition against it not so improbable as mwb· 
be supposed. There was, therefore, an obvious necessity for the defence· a 
that city. 
The necessity of the strong work at Detroit is not so apparent, unle th 
enemy should acquire the ascendency on Lake Erie or L ake Huron, an mn 
by no means probable. 
My first impressions were against the utility of the very stron~ fort n?w u 
course of construction at R ouse's Point. 'l1he arguments of the chief engm~ r. 
however, on this point are very strong if not conclusive. The enemy, ban-~ 
the command of the St. Lawrence, could, by means of their canals commnn:· 
eating with the head of Lake Champlain, in a very brief space of time throw 1 
suffici nt naval force into that lake to give them command of it. I ·think, the 
fore, that tbi. ·work, on which a large sum has been already expended, ,.,ho 
be completed. 
'l'h frv oth r fort. on the lake are old work,, con tructed during or bet 
the la t war. A only .'mall appropriation are required to repair and enl -
th m, d not think th y ouo-ht to be abandoned. 
Fort-. . ntario and ~iagara ar the only fortified place we have fr?m •. 
m nth of tlH' t. Lawr nc to Lak Eri ; and, althouo-h they ·w re bmlt • 
r fi r nee to a ,liffi r nt .'tat of thiivr from that which now xi tB, they wo 
u · ful in affi rclinl1' prote 6on to our .'hippino· in tho e wat r.. . 
• rt: rad • ~.fa kina and rrati t ommand, r pectiv l_~, th narrow ,t •· 
tw en ak .,. UJ ri r ancl Iuron, and b twe n th latt r lake and L: 
i hio-an and , 't. lair. ~ 1th u00h d not think that cir um.:tancc arc Ii· . 
oc ur to r nd r th rn n · · ar - a .. mean. of d fi nee 
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recommend their abandonment. In the event of a war it will always be neces-
~ary to keep a military force on that frontier, and ~10 more eligible statio?s co~ld 
probably be selected than the very points at which these forts are built, bei?g 
all directly in the line of communication between the lakes, :where sup~hes 
could be easily sent to them and whence they could be most easily and rapidly 
transported to any other point where they might be needed. 
The chief engineer suggests that, in addition to the works above enumerated, 
it will be advisable to construct one on the St. Lawrence and one or more on 
Lake Ontario, as a protection to our shipping in that quarter. His rema1;ks on 
this subject are entitled to great weight, and will form a very pr_oper sub3~ct of 
consideration for the joint board I have recommended, should this suggestion be 
favorably received. 
THE PACIFIC COAST. 
In 1848 a joint commission, composed of naval and en~ineer officers, was 
organized to make a reconnoissance of the Pacific coast, with a view to a desig-
nation of such points as it might be deemed advisable to fortify. That board 
has recently made a report in which they point out various positions where, in 
their opinion, fortifications should be constructed. These positions are divided 
into three classes in the order of their relative imp@rtance, and a list of them 
will be found appended to the report of the cqief engineer. The commission 
recommended that measures be taken as soon as possible for the construction of 
fortifications at San Francisco, San Diego, and the mouth of Columbia river. 
There can be but little doubt that these three last mentioned points, from 
their importance in a commercial point of view, will require defences, and con-
sidering their remoteness and the difficulty of affording them speedy relief in 
time of war, I should think that no time ought to be lost in carrying this recom-
mendation into effect. With regard to the other points, my remarks as to the 
extent to which the Atlantic coast should be fortified apply with still greater 
force to the Pacific, on account of the difficulty and expense of constructing for- ' 
tifications and of providing them with proper garrisons. I need not, therefore, 
repeat those remarks. 
Before closing this report I beg leave to make a few remarks on a subject 
which, though not embraced by the resolution of the House, is yet so intimately 
connected with the defences of the country that the report would hardly be 
complete without some reference to it; and ~hat is the 
ARMAMENT OF FORTIFICATIONS. 
Cong1·ess, at their last session, omitted to make the usual appropriations either 
fo r fortifications or their armament. But, whatever policy may be adopted with 
reference to fortifications, it will still be necessary to provide a much larger sup-
ply of ordnance than we now have on hand. By reference to the report from 
he head of the Ordnance bureau, hereto annexed, (marked 0,) it will be seen 
_hat the whole number of guns, of all calibres, now on hand, whether in the 
'orts or in the arsenals, amounts only to 3,535, and that of gun carriages is still 
"maller. The entire number of guns that can be mounted in the forts already 
completed, ( classes A and B,) amounts to 4,572 guns; and if the works now in 
Pro~es of construction should be completed, the total number of guns that 
\\'ould then be required for all the forts would be 6,093. It appears, therefore, 
'hat the supply of ordnance now on hand is very inadequate, even to the present 
anL of the ·ervice. I will ob· rve, too, that even if Congress should determine 
·rJ rhtrict the sy tern of fortifications, this ·would not obviate the necessity for 
large increaoe in the supply of heavy ordnance. Some means of defence must 
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be employed, and cannon is an indispensable part of .any system that may be 
adopted. 
It appears, too, from the reports hereto appended, that the great naval power~ 
of Europe have, within a few years past, greatly increased the calibre of the 
guns mounted on their vessels-of-war. This renders it obviously necessary that 
the power of the batteries intended to resist them should also be proportionably 
increased. I believe it is the opinion of all officers, both of the army and navy, 
who have devoted much attention to this subject, that many of the guns now in 
our most important forts ought to be removed and others of longer range sub-
stituted. A glance at the report of the Ordnance bureau will show how very 
deficient we are in the heavy descriptions of ordnance, particularly in eight and 
ten inch columbiads, the most effective weapon against vessels- of-war. 
To manufacture cannon of good quality is a work that demands considerable 
time, and as they are imperishable wheii properly taken care of, there is no good 
reason why the government should not at once provide the requisite supply. 
In connexion with this subject I would venture to suggest that provisions b_e 
made for a distribution of artillery among the militia of the States and Tern-
tories. Our people are more deficient in the knowledge of this arm than of any 
other, and yet it is one that would be most required in a war with any European 
power. If a standing appropriation were made applicable to the distribution of 
artillery, and of the book on artillery practice among the States and 'I.1erritoiie,, 
it would tend very much to promote the knowledge of this essential branch ot 
the military art among the citizens of the country. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Hon. LINN BOYD, 
Speaker ef the House ef Representatives. 
C. l\L CONRAD, 
Secretary ef War. 
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List nJ documents accompanying tlie report if the Eecretary if War rf Decem-
ber 8, 1851, on tlie su~ject if.fortifications, i'n answer to a resolution ef tlie 
House if Representatives ef Marcli 3, 1851. 
.A..-Statement of fortifications on the Atlantic coast and Gulf of Mexico, the 
amount expended on each, and the estimated co8t of completion and 
armament. 
B.- Statement of fortifications on the northern frontier. . 
C.- Statement of cannon and carriages at the forts and arsenals. 
D.-Report of General J. G. Totten, chief engineer. 
E.-Letter to the Secretary of the Navy requesting the views of naval officers 
on certain points stated, and their reports, viz : 
1. Report of Commodore 0. Morris. 
2. Report of Commodore l\'I. 0. Perry. 
3. Report of Commander R. B. Cunningham. 
• 4. Report of Commander S. F. Dupont. 
5. Report of Lieutenant J. Lanman. 
6. Report of Lieutenant l\'I. F. Maury. 
7. Report of Lieutenant J. A. Dahlgren. 
F.-Ordcr to the chief engineer, requiring the views of engineer officers on cer-
tain points stated, and their reports, viz : 
8. Report of Lieutenant Colonel R. E. De Russey. 
9. Report of Major W. H. Chase. 
10. Report of Major R. Delafield. 
.. ,, ·ti.fications 1aliicli liave been bui'lt on tlw Atlantic coast and Gu,if ef M exico, including tlwse nearly com,-
1>frt1·d 1111dt·1 th,• grurmt s.11stem, adopted aftrr tlw war wit/1, Great Britain, tlte number ·in progress ef' construction, and tlw numbPr 
11tJI ,I/ti t·om11um·etl 1mt proposed to be erected; and exltibiting also tlte States and Territories in wkicli tlte several /arts are sititated 
,,. a re lo ht• 1ocall'd; 1chc1t tllC.1J were commenced, wlten completed, and wlten tlwy arc expected to be finislied; tlie garrisons rcqufred 
.,'r>r rn ~·I, i11 Ii Ill<' '!l pea cl' and in war; tlie number and calibre ef the guns mounted or to be mounted; tlie estimated cost ef con-
,,~ rt.(( l1o11 and w ·mwncnt rl'spectively; tlw amount expended for construct1'on or repair; and an estimate ef tlie amount required to 
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l~. l'.OrL 'l'~umbull, N't' W Lo11tlo11 hnrb~r, Ct*..... l 350 1838 .. .. . ... 250:94 1 250, 941 . .. . . ~:??~. "j.j. 'j4 I~ •3 ·3 ·3 ·8 " is .. 'j j•j ·1 .. ·4 8 6,656 ~: :~~rn~~~T~~; g~;~~~~{sbf:,~~~-N.' y;::::::: " 2 · 3 0 .. iSJt .. . .. .. 5, 000 • • • • .. . • . • • 5,000 • .. .. .. 6 .. .. ... .... . : : ........ : : • • 8~ 7~: ~ii-~ 
2 1. CnscleWillin mi:,Govcruor's island~_N. Y* .... . .. . .. . l 800 J l83l :::::: } . ... 269,' 467. ''"259',jfr "''io 'ooo· "25 ~i ~g .. .. .. 4 g .. 212 · · .. .. .. 1~~ 103, :19 
~- South battery, Governor's isla nd, N . Y .... . .. ...... \ /isa1 1845 ...... .... . . .. . ... : ......... :.... . .. 5 °5 .. .. .. 4 • . .. •• •• •• •• .. 14 Ii,~~! 
~3. Fort Gibso n, E ll is's,is!n~d, N. Y * ,; ..... .... .... .... 80 1841 1844 5,096 :J, 096 .. .. .. .. .. 10 . ... :::: .. :: :: :: 2 :: 'i ·2 :: :: :: :: ·15 18;672 
_-t. Fort Wood, Bcdlow s 1s1,m d, N. Y .... ... ..... . . .. 350 184 1 •. .• .... 245,689 21.1, 000 32,689 26 17 . . .. ll .. fi •• 13 .... 2 2.. .. .. 77 76,540 
25. Fort Richmo_nd, S ta ten i~la11d, N. Y •;. .... . • • • • . . • . l I 1847 • . . . .. . 505,808 205,606 300, 202 . .. . 58 ....... . .. 24 58 .. .. . . . . . . .. . . 140 124,302 
~ - Fort Tompk111s,t S taten_ islan d, N. Y .. . ... . . . . ... f i, oro .. .. . . .. .. . . .. .. .. . . .. .. . . ...•... .. . . . .. .... .. .. .. .. . . .. 32 .. 2 .. JO 7 .. 4 8 . . .. 1 .. 64 5!J,20!J 
_7_ Battery Hudson, Staten 1s1:rnd, N. Y . ..... .... . 1 1841 1846 20,081 20,081 .......... 40 ........... , .. 10.. . . •. .. . .. .. 50 57,060 
28. Battery Morton, S ta te n isla nd , N. Y .. .... ..... . ... L !8·11 1846 3,508 3,508 .... ...... 9 .... .... .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. •. .. .. 9 I0,665 
29. Fort L afaye tte, Na rrows, N ew York harbor, 
N . Y * .... . .. . .. . .... .. . . .. • • .. • . .. ... .. .. 1 370 1812 . .. • .. . 348,573 341 , 941 6,63-2 24 24 18 .. 2 2.. 6.. .. .. .. .. .. . . 76 75,778 
30. Fort Mifflin , Delaware river, Pa* ............... 1 200 1836 . • .. s ;:i, 999 81, 9!!9 2,000 .. . . 9 28 4 . .. .. 8 .. .. 4 . . .. .. 53 47,745 
31. for t Mc Henry, Baltim ore harbor, Md • . .. • .. .. . 1 ~O 1836 1840 146, 663 146,663 .. ... • .. . . 19 ll 20 .. :. 6 .. 7 .. 2 7 ...... 2 74 75,913 
32. Fort l\ladison, Anna polis harbor, Md *........... .. .. 150 1846 .. .... .. 45,000 15,000 30,000 .. .. 16 2 2 3.. 5 .. 1 1 .. I .. •. 31 27,012 
33. Fort Severn , An na 1Jolis ha rbor, Md* .. • • • • • .. • 60 1841 . . . . . . . . 6,484 ti, 484 ....... , • . . .. .. . . 7 . . . . 3 . . 2 . . . . 2 ...... , . 14 12,850 
34. Fort Washington, Potomac ri ver, Md ..• ,.. . .... . l 400 1816 1348 575, 369 575,369 ..• , . . . . . . . . . . • . . 67 3 4 3 . . 7 2 •• 2.. • • . . . . 88 73,379 
35. Fort J olm son, Ca pe ~·ear river, N. C* . . . .. . . .. .... 60 • .. . ... .. •. .. .. 5, 000 .•• .. . ...... 5,000 .... .... 10 •. .. .. .. .... .. . . .. .. . . . . .. 10 8,320 
36. Ca~tlc Pin ckn ey, Charlestonharbor,S.C* ....... ½ 100 1829 .... .. .. 43, 809 43,009 800 8 .... 10 ........ 4 .... 111 .... 25 23,906 
37. Fort Moultrie, Ch arles ton harbor, S . C*......... l 300 1841 1844 75, 301 75,301 .. .. . • . . .. 30 .. .. 3 9 6 . . 5 .. l .. .. .. .. • 54 48,732 
38. Heaufu rt ba tte ry, Bea ufort harbor, S. C. .. . .. .. .. .. 30 . .. • . .. . .. .. .. • • 51 000 . .. .. . .. .. • . 5,000 .. .. .. .. 6 .. . • .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. 6 4,992 
39.FortJackson,Savanna h rive'r, Ga* ............ . . .. . 70 1842 ........ 125,000 80,000 45,000 ... . .... 10 .... 3 .. 1 .......... . ... 14 11 1 830 
40. Fort Marion and sea wall , St. Augustine, Fla... ½ 100 1841 1844 51,394 51,394 .. . . . .... .... .... 15 .... 3.. 5.. . .. 1 1.. •. 25 20,821 
41. Fort Barrancas and barracks, P ensacola, Fla*... l 250 1839 .... .... 390,574 315,574 75,000 . ... 11 10 5 3 3 8 4 .... 2 .. 1 .. 2 49 37,384 
42. Fort S t. P h ilip, Mississippi river, La* •••••. . .. . _:__ _ 600 ~~ . . . . • • . . 203, 734 143,734 60,000 ..:..:.:.:. ..:.:..:_ -~ ~ ~ ~ ..:..:_ _.:'. .:..:_ _! j..:..:_ _: ..:..:_ 5 124 101,980 
16 8,225 I• ,.,,.,. 1 ,., "" 1, 212, 138 3, 583,742 688,396 189 394 560 53 41 79 76 334 2 22 731 8 7 1 13 1,852 1,719,126 
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Ct.A~H 11.-Xc,o u•orh (third 1y1tem) completed, or 
\O 11turly rom71/l'/td as to be able to use all or nearly 




~ -<ll 8 ~ ~ ~ c!i ~ ~ ri: ~ 
~ _g!!!s~I~ 
~ ~~~~J;~8 0 E-< ~~-;:: 
l. f:or1 \Ynm'n, Roston hnrbor, Mass* •..•.•..•.•. 
,~. 1:urt Adam", Nt•wport hnrbor, R. L* .......... . 
:J. Fort ~CIHJ) l!'r 1 Throg',- Neck, }:a~l riv«'r, N. Y.*. 
,I. l•'nn lln11111ton, New York harbor, N. Y.* ..... . 
5. Von Mou roe, Old Poinl Comfort, Ya.* ...... .. . 
G. 1-'o~t Mn(·on, (nnd pre>lervntJon of its sile,) Beau-
torr hnrbor, N. 0.• ......................... . 
7. Pon ca~well, Oak i~lnnd, N. C.* ............. . 
H. 1-'un Pulaski, Cockspur i~lr111d, Gn. * ..••........ 
!I. l'on 1'1~kens, Pen~ncoln harbor, Fla .•••••••.•• , 
10. l•'orL Mcn ee, Fo~tcr'.i Hank, Pcnsneola harbor, 
Pia.• ..................................... .. 
11. l•'on ~forl(nn, Mobile Point, Ala.* ••....•..•..•. 
l:!. Port l'1kt', £!1gol1•ts, La.* ....••....•.••••..•. . . 
1:1. l•'ort Maco1111J, (forn1crly Fort Wood,) 0hef Mc n-
wur, La• ................................ . 
I I. H11ttNy IIH•11v1•11 11, Bayou Bienvenu. La .....•.. 
l,i. 'l'11w1•r lhq1r,:, llnyou llupr(•, La .............. . 
Hi. l•'urt Jnckson, Ma~si~~ippi rivPr, La.* ......... .. 






































$1,168,000 I $1,093,000 
1,6lll,343 1,661,343 
873,013 848,013 











460, 790 I 3, 000 
5il,221 7,000 
923,859 35, 000 













59 90 98 21 I 3 l2 83 27 7 3 7 5 7 7 25 464 6211:.111 s81 .. 1 .... i .. l 231 :;01··181161 .. 1 .. 1··1 ..1334 48 48 70 8 12 6 70 19 6 2 7 3 5 2 12 318 
14 18 .. .. 5 5 6 48 8 .. 2 4 .. 2 1 5 118 
42 189 10 14 25 12 16 20 5 3 7 3 5 5 15 371 
63 
121 22141 4131 6 20 322 23 12 
65 53 4 .... .. 4 
17 49 5 13 6 26 
m.~~ 62 ..... . 3 .••. 523 46 26 
28.. 6.. 9 
28.. 6.. 9 
6
1··1 .. 1 ?1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 :11 
61 
8 2 1 3 . .. ... 2 87 
12 2 l 7 ...... 2 150 









817,608 40,00U ...... .. 
}(j .. 3 ..... . 
4 .......... .. 
2 .... . ...... .. 



























m:m1········.··1 .. 1 .. ··
312,379 ................. . 
70 . . 7 3 10 
28.. 6 3 II 
5
1 .. 1· :1 l1 .. 1··1 .. 1·. 
50 .. 12 .. 2 .. 5 






























81<l/1·111t11/ ,.if' th,· J/111111)('1· r!f'.fortUltrtlio11s tf'liitlt li((I'<' 1Jt't'II 1)/(ilt rm th e Atlrrnlit toast anrl 011(/ r!f Afr·;r·if'o, ~·r·.- ( 1011ti111l(:d. 
-- - --- -·-- - - - -- --- ---- --- --- ---- --- --- ---... i:: 0 ----r:: 0 .g '' 8 c:l 0 • ARMAMENT. c:l::,ri, -~ ·.:;_§ 0) ~ ~ -~ .... 0 
~ 'a. 
~ .. 
C. s:: El'-0) 3 E >, s ,,::, >, "'0 s:: ~c:; ~ ui 5~ 0 8 0 8-~ ~ ;> ~ C.l ::, "O <>...: ~ ~ Designation of the work, and State in 0) s:: OJ 1 ~-[ 
'0 C. BE .s:: .s:: ~ t! ..... ;:: which locatccl. <) ... ~ <) .,., '0 w 00 00 0 '- co 
"' "' ~ 
..,., '0 .... 
-~ § 
.... ~ Q) 
,,, 
~ s 0 -
0) 00 ""' S::""' 
Q) 
C. ~ 8 'a. 0 
Q) 0 ::,c:.• 
~ ~ t 
.':l "' "' ~ ~ "' ~ 
OJ OJ ~g 
s:: s:: s 8 C.l Q. r w 00 00 "[; "i -~ 0 C ,,::, "'-·- ·- '0 ,.. OJ OJ "' s 0 0 ~ 8 s:: s:: g 0 s Q) '0 '0 "" _, '0 0 0 0 8 s E ::, !.Si 
0 C 
C.l 
"' i:: i:: 
s:: "' s:: s:: c:l ·a .s:: .s:: .s:: .s:: .s:: .s:: .s:: 
00 s:: 
00 s:: ~ 
::, ::, ::, ::, ::, .s:: .s:: 
s:: 
E ::, ::, 0 0 0 0 0 J<: 
<) <) C.l .s:: <) 0 s'g-§ Q) 
.s:: ~ 0 C. C. C. C. 
.,_ ~ "' 
<) <) i:: s:: 
~ 
<) s:: .; 
"' 
.s:: E "' J s:: 
.,. s:: .s:: 0 -~c:;-~ 
~ ~ s: ~ < ~ a-, ..,. d, ~ ~ ~ ;;; ~ 0 ~ '° 0 C, -<!l <? OI .... 0 E-, J:;rJ 
---- - ---- ---- ---- - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - - - ------
Cr,A ss C.-TVorks 110w mulc1· co11stn1clion, 
a11d more or less atlva11cet1. 
1. ~'ort Knox, opposite Buck~port, Me*., ½ 500 1843 .... $630,442 $ 130,442 $500,000 45 50 4 6 5 9 16 2 .... 4 2 2 1 2 148 $125,663 
2. ForL Delawnre, Dt• laware river, Del* .. 1 750 1833 J, 119,914 539,914 580,000 3i 32 54 .. .. .... .... 20 10 .... 1 2 . ... .... .... l5l 138,074 
3. Fort Carroll, Soller's Point Flats, Bal ti-
800 1847 l, ooo, 000 135,000 865,000 38 76 33 more harbor, Md* ........ , ........ l .... ... . .... .... 12 .... .... .... .... .. .. .... .... 159 159,54ti 
4. Fort Calhoun, Hampton Hoa,ls, Va*,. 1,120 1818 2,394,328 1,664,996 729,332 54 54 88 8 20 .... .... .. .. .... 224 213,708 
5. Fort Sumter, Charleston harbor, s. C* .. I½ 650 18i9 827,408 677,408 150,000 41 41 33 9 4 12 .... 2 2 2 146 140,893 
6. Fort Cli11ch, Cumberland Sound,Fla* .. .1. 550 ]850 200,000 20,000 180,000 .... 29 5 5 3 20 20 2 .... 3 2 1 5 95 71,496 
7, J<'ort Taylor, Key West, Fla* .••... , . , . 1. 1,000 1845 1, :iuo,ooo 395,000 805,000 88 10 .... ... . 3 20 42 .... 5 5 •••• 2 10 185 ]60, 725 
8. Fort Jefferson, Garden Key, Tortugas, 
l,500 1846 183 36 Fla* ....................... , ••• . l 1,200,000 210, 138 989,E62 .... .... 3 •••• 66 .. .. .... 5 5 298 273,594 
9. Redoubt of Fort Barrancas, Fla* . •••. 158,930 109,930 49,000 8 3 10 .... 2 1 2 26 14,179 
JO. Fort Gaines, Dauphin island, Ala* .••. ½ 400 1846 200,000 20,000 180,000 25 5 5 3 20 20 .... .... 1 2 2 1 5 89 66,473 - ----- ---------- - - - - --- - - - - - - - ---------
7 7,2iO ..... .... 8,931,022 3,902,828 5,028,191 165 573 304 22 25 24 107 218 4 1 19 19 lO 6 24 1,521 1,364,351 
























olalcmw/ of tl,c number f![ fortifications wltidi luwe been built on the Atlantic coast and Gulf ef Mexico, 'Yc.-Continued. 
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: 1,As,- ll.-Works the lint to be com11lctcd. 













~ l 0 .<: 0 0 E-s ~ 
I. ~·on 1111h1: 11w111h of Kl'r111cbec river, Me* . 
:!. Nt·w fort S.:nmmrl, l'ortlancl harhor,Mc* . ... 
:I. Nt:w fort nt l'ort~1110111h h;,rbor, N. Jl* .•.... 
I. Nl'w Fort P1ckNi11g, S:ilem harhor, l\1nss* . 1 
r,. Fon 111 Juck 's Point, I\JnrblPhead, Mas~* .... 
ti. Works lll Prov111cct•>wn harbor, Ma~s*.... ½ 
7. Nt•w forts nt N1•w Bedford harhor, l\Ia~s*.. l 
ti. l•'orL nn Ro,-c li,land, Narragansct Roaus, 
R. 1• ............................... . 
!J. Fono11 Snndy llonk Point, N . J * . ........ l 
10. Forl 011 Thomas',; l'oint, l'aluxcnt riv~r, 
l\111· • ••• •••••• · ••••••••• ••••••· •••· ½ l I l•'nn at Proctor's Lnnlling, La*..... . . . • . . ~ 
J:?. Work1-1 at Galve .. 1011 boy, T!'x'ls*..... l 






























4 6 5 
4° .. i;' .. i; 
2 3 6 
2 2 3 








470 . • .. .. .. 150,000 .. .. .. +150, 000 30 27 21 .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . 12 
1,000 . ... , ... 1,200,000 ...... p,200,000 . .•. 106 37 ........ 12 8 104 
2 
2 
2· I ~ 
2 
350 .. . . .. .. 259,ooo ..... t'J59,ooo ... 20 25 2 ... . 3 6 6 I 2 
100 . .. . .. • . 100,ouo . . .. .. 100,000 .. .. 12 .. .. 3 3 .. .. 8 11 








































6A- 15,970 , .... ,., .. \4, 083,000 
1 
1 
4,083,000 I 70 1418 1358 I 23 I 38 I 43 IUO l\!53 I 8 I 6 I 38 I 11 I 6 
200 .... ,,. , 300,0UO •• ••. 300,000 •.....•. 28 . • •. 6 3 9 5 









• Expected to he completed within about one year after the amounts required to complete shall have been appropriated. t These estimates are conjectural. 
t \-Vorks hnve been projected for these positions. 























."\f11 trnm1/ ,!f' t/11 · 111t>nlJ1·r <!/)i>rtij,'{'(/tious 111/tic/1 /1(1/'t lm•JI built OJI tlu· Atlantic co(ls/ mul Ou(/qj' lllc.l'i('(), ~-r·.-UonLinne<l . 
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'O u,::; -1 .~ 
Drs ignntion of thr work, ancl Slate in wh ic h locatrd, j ~f C (I) 'O '-«s ""' 0. "c:1 00 "' C 0. .,., "'"' C ~ t: ~ ""'"" ... 0 ,,, Ii 
u, u, ...... 













t:f) .... = 
'- 0 0 
0 ........ 
~§ 
('1 .1.ss g ,- n·orks lo he rommcncc,l after those in 
dass D. 
J. New Fort Pr!'ble, Portland harbor, life* ...•• .•• . 
2. \Vorks at Gloucester harbor, Mass* •..••. . ... . 
3. Clo~i,~g Broad Sorrnd pass, Boston harbor, Mass*. 
,i, Works at Gurn e t Point, Plymouth , Mass* •••••. 
5. Works at Stonington Point, Conn* ............ . 
6. Works at Cedar Point, Poto mac river, Mt.I * •• •• . 
7. \Vorks at Georgetown harbor, S. C* • .•••••.. •. 
8, ,vorks in Port Royal roads, S. V* .••.. . ... . .... 
9. \Vorks on T ybee islands, Savannah river, Ga* . . 
10, Tower at Pass du Heron, Mobile bay, Ala* . .•• . 
1 I. Fort at Ship island, Miss* . .. ........... .. .... . 
]'.?. Works at Passo Cavallo, Matagorda bay, Tex* . . 
0: "' (I) a C ._ ·a"' 0. ~ -a 0 ., 0 C,) 
~ 
c'O 




C C "' 8 ',: 0 0 
~ .~ 
§ 00 ·.: ~ = 8 0 "' ~ 
,,:: ,,_ E 
~ ~ ~ -<l < 
~ 00 ~ (I) 
""' 'O ""' = § C = = 0 0 0 
0. 0. 0. 
~ ~ .J, C, 
00 
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- ,--1- 1-1----d --,----1-1-1- 1 - 1-1- 1 - r - 1- 1 - 1- 1- 1- 1 - 1·-1-1---
300 $155,000 ...... t$155,000 8 15 18 4 4 6 10 6 2 •.• .... .... 1 4 78 $62,670 
500 ... . .... 200,000 +200, 000 16 :JO 33 .... .... 10 8 .... 1 2 .... .... 100 93,274 
210,000 t210, 000 
33 
.... ... . .... ..... 
250 100,000 +lOO, 000 4 4 3 4 2 •.•• 
50 41,174 
375 :::: :::: 200,000 ··• •·• poo,ooo :::: ·20· 36 •••. .... 6 10 .... .••• 1 2 ................ 75 64,240 
½ I 550 • . . . 300, ooo .. . • . . p~u, ooo • .. • 24 so 2 4 6 10 8 • .. • 1 3 . • • . 2 .... no 92,493 
500 250,000 ..... p;i0,000 .•.. 20 44 2 4 6 10 8 2 2 .••. 2 .••...•. 100 82,054 
550 . . . . . ::ioo, ooo . • .. • . poo, ooo 24 50 ~ 4 6 10 8 1 3 • • . • 2 . • • . . • • • 110 92,943 
100 .... 120,000 ...•.. +120,000 .... 16 3 ..•. 2 .... •••• 2 ................ 23 22,9 14 
60 •. . . . . . 25,000 , •• .. t25,000 .• •. .. . 6 2 2 .••• . . •. 2 ............ . .. , ... . • . , .... 12 9,304 
½ I 400 . . . . .••. 200,000 . . • . 200,000 .• . 35 35 5 5 3 20 20 •••• •••• I 2 2 I 5 89 66,47:l 
½ 150 . .. . ..•. 175,000 ···••· 175,000 . ••. 10 .. •. 3 2 . ....... 10 .... .... 1 1 •••• 1 3 31 25,897 
l ½ 3, 735 .•• . . ". 2,235,000 ' •.••. 2,235,000 241184 270 24 29 39 80 76 4 4 18 3 8 3 12 778 653,436 
* Expected to be completed within about one y~ar after the amounts required to complete shall have been appropriated. 
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I. Work~ nt l·~n~tport hnrllor, Me*............. . . . • • • . 250 
2. Work~ nt Machias harbor, Mc*................. .. .. 250 
3. Works nt Mount Drscrt itiland, Me* ............ • .. 1,000 
I. \Yorks at Castine, Mc•............. . .. . .. .. .. .. . .. . 125 
5. Works at St. Gcorl?e's boy, Me* ................ ) 
6. Works at Damariscotta bay, lite• .... ........... J J 000 
7. Works at llroad bay, Me*...... .. . • . . .. • .. . • .. • • · ' 
8 . Works at Shcepscot hay, Ille• ..... . ........... . 
!l. Works in lloA Jsland channel, Portland, Mc* ...... .. 
10. Works al mouth of Saco river, Me* ...... . ...... i 
11. Works at mouth of Kennebunk river, life* ...... , .. 
12. Works at York, Me* .......... ................ J 
13. Works at Newburyport, l\Inss• .••.•.•••••..••..•• , • 
14. WorkH at Beverly, lllasb• .. .. .. • .. .. • ......... • .. 
150 
150 
:t :i:vkt,~~rs:~e~~,1-~:~bl~~~~~: :1~1:;::::::::::: I:::. 
17. WorkijntNnn tasketllcn1l,Bostonharbor,Mnss*. l I 
1 
700 
18. Redoubt on 0111.( ialand, Boston harbor, Ma~s* .. 5 • · ' 





20. Wo1ks nt Ed~nrtown, ll1ns9• • ... • .. • .. .. • .. ... I 
2L. Works nt Fnlmouth, Mass• • • .. .. .. .. • • .. .. .. .. ~ .. 625 2-J. Work• 111 llolmr1<'s llole, Mttss• ................ J 
!!:l. Work11 nt Tnrpnulln cove, ll1a8s* ••••••••.•••••• 
21. Work• nt Canonicut IRlnnd, R. I•.............. • ... I 1,soo 
2:,. Oloaln1t W<'t<l Jln~NRII<' of NnrragnnscL ronds, R. I* . •••........ . 
!.>ti. Nt1w Fon Ori1wold, New London hnrhor, Ct*... . • . . 500 
l.17. Work• nt 1110111h of Cnmu•cllrut rlver, Ct•....... . . . . 250 
\.Iii . N1•w 1-'on 111111•, N11w llnvl'n hnrhor l ' t•........ • . . . t\! ::, 111






























:j: l 74,000 
:1:1, 020,000 
~•••I••• • I•••• 
···••••• 1•••• 1•••·•···· 
••••l•••• l •••• I ••••••••• 
•• l • • l • • l •• l •••• l ••••I•••• 
• •l •• t o ,1 · •1 • • 1•••• 1••••1•••• 1•••• 1•••• 
•• l•· l ••l••l•• l •••• l• •••I •• ••• •••I•••• 
·····• • •1 •• 1•• 1•••• 1•••····•• 1••·· ·· ······•· 1• ••• 1•••• •••••1 .••. 
••1•• 1••1 •• 1•• 1 • .. ••••••!••• ••• •• l•••• l •• • •••••• l •••• l ••••I•••• 
ti::::::: I: .1
1




:: :: II :: ::I·. --1 • ... I .... I .... 
mi~~~ :: :: :: :: ::i: ::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: ::::i:::r.:: 
1
48,000 .... . . .... 1 ........ .. .......... \ .... \ .... \ .. . ·•~.ooo 





























































~O. ,,~orkN thr hnrborf-1 I111tl tO\vns but,voeu Nt•,v 
, Ha,•(• n tHHI N,•w York, Ct* ... •• . ...•••••.... 
JI. Work~.!" Oantincr's hny, Long lsluud sounrl, 
N.' .................................... .. 
3':!. Works at St\~ nt1rbor, N. y .. _ ................. 
1 
... . 
3:J. Fort nt Wilkins's l'oint, East river, N. Y* .......... . 
34. Redoubt in iulvnn~e of fort Tompkins, Staten 
isln11tl, N.'Y* . ..................... . ......... .. 
35. 'Fort nt Dcluwnro brrakwater, Lewes, Del* .•...•... 
36. Fort op1wsito l!'ort Delaware, Delaware river, 
Del* ..........••... .•...• . •••••••••••.•••...... 
:n. Fort on Elk rivrr, Md .. ......................... ... . 
~18. Fort on Hawkins's Point, lielow Baltimore, Md* .••• 
39, }'ort on Point Patience . l'atuxeat river, Md* ...... .. 
4U. Works at St. l\Iary's, Potomac river, Md* ...••..•... 
41. Work~ at Bald Head, Cape Fear river, N. C* .... . .. 
42. Works at Federal Point, Cape Fear river, N. C*. 
43. Works at mouth of Santee river, 8. C* .......... } 
44. Works at Bull 's bay and other inlets, S. C*. ..... · · 
45. Works at Stone sour1d, .S. C*. .. .. . . • . • • • .. .. • . ~ 
46. Works at North Edisto sound, S. C*...... . • • • • . . . 
47. Works at :3outh Edisto sound, 8. G* ........... . 
48. Works at St. Helena sound, S. C* ................ .. 
49. Works at Wassaw sound, Ga*· .: ............... ) 
5U. Works at Os&abaw sound, Ga* ... ,.,, ·, ·., · ·. · · I 
51. Works at St. Catharine's sound, Ga* .......... . 
52. Works at Sapelo sound, Ga*........ .. .. . • • • .. . ~ 
53. ,vorks at DolJoy inlet, Ga*.... .. .. . • . .. .. .. • .. 1 .. 
54, Works at Altamaha sound, Ga* ........... , . ... , I 
55. Works at St. Simon's sound, Ga* ..•.•.•••.••••. 
56. Works at St. Andrew's sound, Ga* •...••.•••••. J 
57, Works at Charlotte harbor, Fla* •••• , ••••••••.•. ) 
58. Works at Tampa bay, Fla* .............. , ..... . I 
60, Works at Apalachie bay, Fla* ...•• ,...... . • • • • . • · 
61. Works at St. Joseph's hay, Fla* .............. . 
500 .. .. .... 
750 .... .... 
250 .... .... 
1, 3:36 .... .... 
80 .... .... 
I, 125 
760 .... .... 
169 
800 .... .... 
400 .... .... 
550 .... .... 
450 .... .... 
200 .... .. .. 
250 ... , .... 
375 .... .... 
375 .... .... 
4,000 j .... j .... j 
I,250 
200,000 ···· ·· t200, 0(10 ..... .. .. .... 
400,000 ...... t400. 000 .... .. .. .. ... 
100,000 ...... trno; ooo 
686,000 ...... t686,000 
52,000 ...... t52,000 ... . .. .. .. .... 





······ t52L, 000 f50,000 
t:l76,000 
f246,000 
.... .. .. .. .... 
300,000 ...... f300, 000 .... .. .. .. .... 
180,000 tl80,0UO .... .. .. .. ... . 
18,000 t l8, 000 .... .. .. .. .... 
100,000 ..... tl00,000 .... .. .. .. .... 
150,000 ...... t L50, 000 .. . .. . .. .... 
150,000 ...... f 150,000 .... .. .. .. .... 
1,600,000 ...... tI,600,000 .............. 
1,000,000 fl,000,000 
. .. ... . ... . .... .... .... .. .. .... ... . )0() rn,ooo 
.... 150 ... . .... .... .. .. .... ... .... .... 133,500 
50 44,500 
195 173,550 
... . .... .... .... ... . .... .... .... 26 23,140 .... . ... .... .... .... .... 225 200,250 
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 112 99,680 
25 22,250 
131 l L6,5!JO 
87 77,430 .... .... .... ... . .... .... .... .... .... 110 97,900 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 87 77,430 
. ... .... . ... .... . ... .... 40 35,600 
.... .... .... ... . .... .... .... .... .... 50 44,500 
... . .... .. .. ... . .... .... .... .... .... 75 66,750 
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 75 66,750 
.... .... ~ ... .... .... ... .... .... .... 800 112,000 
250 222,500 59. Works at Apalachicola bay, Fla* .•.••.•••••.•• · t 
62. Works at Santa Roso bay, Fla*................. 
1 1 1 1 1 
63. Works at Perdido bay, Fla* ...... ,. ............... __ 400 .. .. • • .. 200,000 ..... · I f200, 00~ l.:.:Jj.:.:J.:..:J.:.J · .. I···· 1.:..:.:.:.1.:.:::.1 ""1-· .. , .... I·· .. I" .. , .... I 50 I 44,500 
.... , 22,!JOO 1 .... j .... l 11,829
1
000 j ...... j ll,829,0001 .. 1--J .. H .. j, ... j .... j .... j .... j, .. , j .... j ... ,j ... ,j.,.,j, ... 14,401 I 3,916,490 
* Expected to be completed within about one year after the amounts required to complete shall have been appropriated. 


























224 MILITARY .AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
GENERAL REMARKS. 
In estimatipg for peace garrisons, it is considered disad,,antageous to discipline to break up the companies 
when it can hll avoided. Several works are reckoned as requiring peace garrisons, though they will not, at 
our present rate of progress, be prepared for troops for some years. Some of these garrisons might, on an 
emergency, be _reduced for a time; but the force proposed -should be regarded generally as the minimum proper 
to secure our ports from insult and keep watch over the military property, _The garrisons, as· stated, amount 
to forty-seven and a half companies for the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard, independent of Tampa Bay and the 
eity of New Orleans. 
The works that have been under repair of class .A, and those of class B, may all be regarded as completed as 
respects efficiency. The expenditures still required have relation, most generally, to matters of accommodation 
of troops, to storehouses, sea walls, wharves, and roads; to repairs of perishable portions; to the substitution 
of permanent for certain decaying. materials ; to preservation of sites from the action of the sea, &.c. 
The amounts given in the column under the head of expended for construction or repair, include all the appro-
























Class A.-Old works repaired •••••••••••••••.••••••••• ~.......... 16 
Class B.-New works completed or nearly completed.............. 16½ 
Class C.-Works now under construction •.••••.••••••••••••• _.... 7 
Class D.-Works the first _to be commenced....................... 6½ 
Class E.-Works to be commenced after those in cJass D·. •••••• •••• I½ 
, I 47½ 

























































3,902,828 ... ___________ 
-----------------
20,659,536 
~ . .... 
0 <:) .... ::: ,.. 
"O~ 
Cl) A ·s 2 
O' ... 



























Amount still required for armament of the first five classes •• , •••••• ,_ ••••••. , . - ••• - ••••• - , - •••• - •••••. , ••••••••••• - , •••••••• 
Class F.-Works to be commenced last of all ••••••••••••••••••••• 22,900 ·, 11,829,000 11,829,000 4,401 
Grandtotal ••••••••••••••••••••• · ••••••••••••• I 47½ j 62,300 j 44,958,626 j 20,659,536 j 24,299,Q90 j 12,685 
_...,. 
~ 0 
Q., s ta 
al 
~ 2 .... 
Oc, 
~ :=: ci 
8 bO~ 1l d ..... 
.... ·- d C'll "O::, 
sE S 






































·nocr qi.fortifications wliicl1, ltm,e been built, including tlwse neat·ly completed under tlie general system, adopted 
it/1 Great Britain, tlie number in progress ef construction, and the number not yet commenced, but proposed to be 
hihiti11g, also, the States and Territories in which the several forts are situated, or are to be located J. wken they were 
nerd, when completed, and wlien tliey are expected to be.finished; the number and calibre ef the guns mounted or to be mount-
thnated ~ost qf construction and armament, respectively; the amount expended for construction or repair, and an estimate 
amount requzre,l tofinisli or construct; and the total amount required to be appropriated to complete the armament. 
C: 
~ s ... ·2 0 
~ ~ 
E .s:, 
Dcqi,;,nation of tlw works nnd Stnte in I r E ::, 
~ s:: whloh locatcl}, <.> l : "' & Cl, i?: E .s .s E 
0 s:: s:: <J 
-~ ·§ ~ 
"' "' ~ C, e 
1. Fon Rrncly, Michi~nn* .............. .. 
-·-1-
2. Fort Mn<·kinnc1 Michigan• .•••.•..••• . 
3. Fort Grntiot, l\'1ichi11an* .•••.•........ 
<l. New Fort Durruoks, nr. Detroit,Mich,* 
5. Workti nt Oufl:110, including Fort Por. 
ter, Nt•w York• . ............... . 
6. Repnir of old Pon Ninllorn, N cw York" 
7, Rcpnir of old Fort Ontario, New York* 
8. Port n the outlet of Lnl(o Uhnmplnin, 
New York* .. ,.,, ................ . . 
300 
300 
300 ... ... 
300 1841 
1 I 300 1842 
1 300 1840 
































""C. q,., ..,, ... 























,,:,::, ARMAMENT, INCLUDING 100 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION FOR EACH PIECE, 














ci ~ ~ ., '., "d "d s:, 
C: s:: C: ::s ::, ::, 
0 2. e C. t ~ di 
'<t' C") 
~ ~ 




rl ~ ..... 




































































~-~ ~ .... 
~ ; ... ~ ~ 
--J----1----1---r-1-1-1-1-1.--1.- 1-1-1-1-l-l-l-l.:.___,._.
1 
__ , __ _ 






























............ 10 5 .... 10 .... .... 5 .... 10 5 .... . 23 20 16 
.... .... 44 16 .... .... .. .. •. 16 .... 20 10 
... . 64 12 .... .... 
84 79 82 4l 
3 8 
• . .......... 1 .... 1 2 3 10 2 .... .... 2 .... 2 3 10 2 ., ...... 2 ... 2 .... .... 4 ................ 
.... 4 .... .... .... .... 5 .... , .. .... .... ..... .... .... 
3 40 32 ... .... 21 4 




2 I 5 
























































~ 0 ~ cn 
Nn.mt:s of forts. I ~ ~ 0 ,.Q § 
'"O .... ...;; c:l p;., 0 c:l c:l cn <ti (£J cp p;., <l) 0 cp :s 0 c:l 0 c:l > > ~ .... Q - s t ui ~ ~ ~ 
0 0 0 0 © i c:l ti! i ~ tQ ui ~ 0 ui ~ 0 bJJ ...d 0 cn ... ~ (l) (l) ..... ... p 
~ 
(l) (l) Q) (l) ~ s:l (l) d bO Q) ~ ,.Q ..... bO en <l> (l) (l) (l) (l) 0 
'"O "O "O '"d en (l) p cn (l) 
(l) '"d ..... ..d§ "O "O "Cl "O i::i 0 0 0 Q ...d en bO ...d w ·ciJ Q ..cf ..cf ..cf s::l 0 Q Q 0 p ::, p ::, ::, 0 ...d ...d 0 ...d ...d p <.> 0 0 ..c::l- g 0 p p ::, p ...d 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i::i 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0.. p, p, p, 9' J .s s:l J .s ·* 
0.. ..... .s ..... p, p, p, C. p, .s 
c--1 c--1 .J 00 CN 00 ~ 00 "'1' ch 
d, 0 00 ~ .J c--1 c--1 .J ~ 00 
~ IN ..... ..... ..... ..... 00 CN ..... ..... ..... - ~ '""' O'j CN IN '""' ---,--,--,--1--,--,--1--1--1--l--l--1--1--1-1-1--1--1--,--,--
Cast]e WilJiams, New York _______ ! 26 
Fort Columbus, NcwYork--------






24 Fort McHenry, Maryland _________ 19 
Fort Monroe, Virginia.- ___________ 39 80 1------1----
Fort Moultrie, South Carolina ________ _ 
Castle Pinckney, South Carolina._. 4 
Fort Sumter, South Carolina.·---·· ----
Fort McRee, Florida •••••••••• __ •• 24 
14 16 
-- 14 
:! 1--- 6~· 
Fort Ontario, New York.--------- ___ _ 
Battery Hudson, Staten island, N. Y. ____ 27 
Battery Morton, Staten island, N. Y. __ •• 10 
7 
SouthBattery,Governor's isl'd,N Y. ---- 5 
FortPickens, Florida _____________ ---- 621 591 6 
Fort Washington, Maryland----··· ---- •••••• 30 ___ _ 
Fort Gibson, Ellis island, N. York.---- 10 _________ _ 
Fort Niagara, New York •••••••••• ---· . ------------ 6 
-- --·----1----1---- ·--- • 
2 
10 








----· --- -• --- -1---- · ----·---· 
16 
26 
- • 1 " - I•-•• I 26 
3 1----1--1--1 39 I 72 1----1 16 
4 , ____ , ___ _ 
:::TJ:I ·24-j ;! I 34 






















C.-Statement of tlie cannon and carriages at tlte fo·rts, ~.-Uontinued. 







I I I I I ,~ ~ ,_ Names of forts. ~ 0 Q ...c:: 
~ 
..., C<l >-. C<l C<l ~ q::; >-. . 0 0 X 0 ;> ;> ~ ~ 
<l) 0 
'-' 0 0 00 C<l i:: ~ Cll ~ ,,; 00 0 Cll d co C<l ~ rn ,_ ... ,_ d 0 0 ... <l) <l) 0.0 ..., ,_ <l) <l) <l) <l) <l) <l) ~ A <l) ~ 0.0 <l) ...c:: ...:i ..... ~ 00 <l) 'O '"O '"O '"O '"O ca ~ :::, w <l) <l) '"O - '"O A A A i:: A ...c:: b.O ...c:: GO ·w A ..cf ..cf ,.ci" A Q :::, :::, :::, :::, :::, 0 A ...c:: 0 ...c:: ...c:: :::, 0 0 0 ..d '-' :::, 0 0 0 0 0 A 0 0 Q 0 0 0 0 A .s 0 A C 9' 0, 0, 9' 0, .s .s ' .s .s 0, .s J ~ C'l ~ ~ 00 ~ 0 0 ~ ch 0 0 
"""' 
c:,':) C'l r-t ..... r-t 00 00 r-t 00 ri:i C'l r-t r-t r-t 00 r--1 ~ ------------ -- --· -- -- -- ------ -- -- -
Fort nt New Bedford harbor, Mass . ___ • ____ • 9 ... --- ---- ---- ....... - ---· --- - ---- ---- --· - -- -- -- -- ---- -- --lt'ort Gris,volcl, Connecticut •. __ ---· ____ 12 3 ---- ---- ---- . -- - -- .... .. -- - .. --- ---- ---- ---- ---- - --- .. --- -- ., Fort 'frumbull, ('onnecticut _____ ,_ --- .. 1-..4: 13 3 3 1 17 .. -- .. --- - f, --- .. 8 ---- --- .. ---- ---- -.. --Fort Wood, Now York . _____ ·-···· -- -- 12 ------ ---- --- - --- .. ---- ---- ---- ... --- ---- .. --- - &,, - - --- - ---- . .. -- -- --]'ort Adams. Rhode Island ________ .. --- 100 49 --- - ---- . --- ---... .. --- .. --- ---- ---- 57 ---.. - --- ---- -- --Fort L-ifn.yette, Now York . ____ •••• -- -- 72 23 ---- -- -- - .. - - ---- --- - --- - .. -.... ---.. ---- ---- ---- .. --... ... .... -- --Fort Hamilton. New York ________ ---- 33 26 ---- --- - ---- ---- -- -- ---- ---- ---. ---- . --- - --.. ---- -- --Fort Constitution, New Hampshire. --- - ------ 20 -- -- ---.. ---- ---- --- --- ... ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .... --Fort Independence, Massachusetts __ ---... 20 50 Fort Prebl~, l\'Iaino .•• ____________ -- -- ------ 12 1 1 Fort Mncon, North Carolina. ____ •• ---- .. ----. 17 ---- ---- ---- ---- - --- ... --- ---- ---- -- -- --.. - . -. ---- --- .. - .. - .. 1:l'ort Caswell, North Carolina. .••• - . --- .. ------ 20 ---- ---- .. - - .. ---- -- - .. ---- - .. -... ---.. ---.. ---- .. --.. ---- --- - -- --ll'ort Pulaski, Georgia ___________ _ -- -- 20 ------ - --- - - -- --- ... .. --- --- - ---- ---- ---- -- -- ---- ---- .. --- -- -- - - --Fort Morgan, AL1l> ,ma ____ ·-···--· .. --.. 64 15 - --- ---- . -- .. .. -- .. - --- ---- ---- ---- ---- .. -- .. ---- 2 ---- -- --l•'mt ,l1wkt-lon, Louii;it\na. _____ .••.. ---- 16 26 ---- --- ... ---- ---- ---- - --- --- .. -- - . 10 ... - - - . --- ... --- . --- -- --
Fort Woo<l, LouiRi11111i .••••••••••.. ---- ------ 28 ---- - --- ---- .. - - - --..... --- - --- - ,. -- . 8 --- - --- . --. - - --- -- --
ti'utt l'ilw, l.011iR\i\1U\,_ •••••••• -••• -- .. - ------ 28 .. --- --- .. . --- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 9 - --- ---- ---- ·--- -- - ... 









A '"O oe C<l 
q::; :E 
~ ,,; s ~ ,,; ~ ,_ :::, <l) <l) <l) 
0 '"O '"O '"O '"O 
A Q A A 0 :::, :::, :::, :::, ...c:: 0 0 0 0 0 p. p.. p. 0, .s ~ C'l .J .J 
,::/i c:,':) C'l <N 00 -- -- -- ·----
--- - --- - ---- --- .. 
---- -- -- - --.. ------ - . --- .. --- 8 
--- - --- - ----




·---,----,----,-------- ......... ---- -----·-- ---- ---- ----
--- -
----
... --- 20 
--- .. ---- 13 
...... . . --- 14 10 
- -- - --- - 13 8 
---- --- .. ---- 9 
---- ----





















































.. , .... 
'l'tnYt'l' nnpr{1, Loni:;lnnri...... •.••. .••. .••••. 4 ·--· ·-·· .••..••. ···- .•...••. ---- .....••. ---- .••. ·--· -- .. 
l•:ort t'Ch\~ylor,,No~v York......... .•.. 25 .•••••.•.•.••..... ...•. ·••· ··•· .••. -··· .•...••..••. -··· •...•... , 18 j 48 
l!tn:t 11tu1ou, J1 lo111lt~ .•••••••••••. --·· 16 .••••• ---- ---· ---- ---- --- ---- 4 ---· ____ ·--· ____ ··-- ..•. ______ .••. 
___ , ___ , __ ,, __ , __ , __ , __ , __ , __ , __ , __ , __ , __ , __ , __ 1-1-1--1--
Total at the forts •••••.•••• 112 806 652 27 30 3 32 ~::J::·1 :: ,-~:-1::: [:J:~-
Total at tte arsenals .••••••••••••• 106 637 403 15 12 12 102 
9 1- ••• 1 •• 1 •• 1 85 1357 I 91 1103 
27 I 11 
30 
42 
5 1115 I 42 I 49 I 153 
In Cal ifornia, not known whether 
in forts .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . ••• 30 30 - - - . --- .. ---. . --- 6 1-··· 1----1····•-··-1·••• 1•••-
Grand total. ••••••••••••••. 1 2181-i, 173 ll, 085 I 42 I 42 I 15 I 134 
4 
--,---,---,--,--,--,--,--,--,--1--,--,--1--•--
6 I 11 lt21 I 21 1300 1 •••• 1 12 I 40 
4 1--1--1--•·I·•-· 





















0.-Statcment qf tlw cannon ancl carriages at tlic forts, 'rO--Continued. 








00 .;j ~ 0 ce -~ 
d 
A ·.:: ,~ ·; A r-. I I I 0 r-. o;! o;! Names of forts. I I en ,.Q 0 0 0 c:., o;! 'O ..., ,.Q en ,.Q <t--< <t--< ;8 ce (J1 ..., r-. I>, I>, 0 0 0 ;8 o;! (J1 Cl) 
~ 
(D 0 s 0 o;! t,;) > > 
~ C 
r-. r-. ~ ~ ~ E ~ s <:.> 0 tO 0 ai t/2 ... o;! ,:I ~- Q) Q) ::, ;::l ~ <:.> C @ "" ,... 'i Cl) Q) if 0 ..0 .D Cl) Q) Q) Q) Cl) 0 te Q) Q) ,.Q ~ bO ~ Q) s s "'O "'O "'O "'O 'O <:.> 0 ~ ::, "'O 'O "'O 0 "'O C C C C C <:.> ~ bO C C C ,.Q ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ C 2 ::, ;::l ::, ::, ::, ::, ,.Q ..Cl ::, ::, ::, ::, C <:.> ,.Q <:.> ,.Q ,.Q ..0 0 <:.> <:.> 0 0 8. 0 0 0 Q <:.> C .9 0 0 0 0 0 .:l .::: C u C 0 ~ ..... 'T< 0.. 0.. '?< .s .s P. 0.. P. .s ..... .s ::lo .s <N ~ 00 0 0 .,J. 00 <N ch 0 I .,J. 0 C'I C'I 00 00 00 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ C'I .... .... .... .... C'I ..... .... 00 00 .... .... .... .... C'I E-4 ~ 1-- 1--1--,--,--,-- ,--,--,--,--,--,--,--,--,--,--,--,--·----1---
Casile Williams, New York .••• ____ 26 
1'.~ort C~lu?lbu~, New Yor._k .•••••••• ----150 
liort M1Jlltu, I ennsylvn.ma ••••••••• ____ 9 
Fort ~lcHcnry, l\fu.rylo.nd .••••• ____ •••• 37 
]fort Monroe, Virginia ..• _... • • • • • • • • • • 39 
]•\,rt Moultrie, South Carolina. _____ ----
Castle Pinckn"y, South Carolina •••••••• 
Fort Sumter, South Carolina. ______ •••• 
Fort McRcc, Florida .•••••• ____ •••• ---· 
Fo1t Ontario, New York ..••••••••• ____ ----
B:\ttcry lludson ,Stn.tcn island, N. y_ ---- 27 
Ihttery Morton, Staten i::;land, N. Y. - • • . 10 
8_onth >~1\ttjry ,~ov_ernor's isl'd, N Y. - -- - 5 
l!ort 11cke°i'rs, Elonda ••••.••••••••• ---- 10 
Fort Wtli<hin~ton. Mn.rylanrl •••••..••••. 
l•'ort Oib1;ou 1 Ellis hilmul, N. York .. ---- 10 
1"01\ Ni.1giim, NHw York ..•••••••• 
l.•:od; at. Now BtHlf111·1l h1~rhor, M1un, •• 
1 
.... 
J101l UdHwuld, Ou111Hict1cut. _______ ----\ 12 















4 ----· .......... . ____ . ___ _ 
7 
2 10 ,----·----
... --- 1-- -- 1---··----
10 , ___ _ 
----·----, ·--.1 ---- ·- --- 1-- --
----·----· ----, ·---·----1---- ·-- --
6 I 14 1 . ••• 1 .••• 1 .... I 12 4 
•-••l-•••I •••• I ••••I-•• •l-••-1 •••• I ••-•1••••1 •• •• 
2 
6 ·----,----· ·-·· ·---- ................................. __ ,.. ___ _ 




























































ll'od, Woo1l , Now Yol'k •••••• .••••. ____ 12 ••• • _____ __ __ _ 
lfort Adams Rhodo 1811,nd 30 38 ·· ·-- - · - -- -- - - · · - · · · -- · · -- ·-- - .. . . . 1··- · 1·· ·· 1··-· 1·•·· 1··· •·-- -
~:ort, Lafott1tto, Now York::::::::::::: ____ 18 :::~ :::: ~::: ~::: :::: :::: :::: :::~ :::~ :::: :::~ _______________________ _ 
I ort IfnnHlton, Nt'W York .•••••••.•••..••••••..•...... ---- •••. ---· ---· ---· ---· -·-· ---- ---- --- · I f I I 
l!'ort Constitution, NcwHampshiro •••••• . ••. 20 .••.••.. __ _ _________ __________________ _____ ___ :::~ ::::i=::: :::: :::: 
:Fort Independence, M:1ssacbusetts •• ____ 20 25 ______ __ ---· _______________ ______ __________________ _ 







Fort Macon, North Carolina .... • • • • __ .. • • • . 6 . • • . . • __ . • . . . • • . . ••.. - • - •• - ••••.••• ___ •. _. - .• _ •. _... • _.. . ••. _. ____ • _ 
Fort Co.swell, North Carolina .•••••. ---- --- · 12 •••..••• ---· ---- ---· ---- ---- ---- ---- ---· •••. ---· ---· ---- ____ , ___ _ 
Fort Pulaski, Georgia.·----· __________ ---· ____ ---· 
~~~! ~~~~~1;;, t!~;::~::::::::::: :::: -~~- ~~ ~::~ =::: :::. :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: =::~ :::: :::: :::: :::: .. :. :::: :::T::: 
.Fort Wood, Louisiana .••. _ • _.. . • • . • • • . . - . 15 . _ • . . • - . • • - . - • • . - - - - - - • . - - - - • • • . • - - - • - - . • - - . • - • . - • • . - •• - ••• - ••• -
~~~! ~:~;·htf;,t~~f;i;~~-.-.:::: :::: :::: :::: ~~ :::: :::: :::: ===~ :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: ~==: :::: :::: :::: :::: ::::i:::: 
Fort Barrancas, Florida...... • • • • • . _.. . 11 10 
Battery Bienvenue, Louisiana .••••. ____ .••. 10 l •••• 1 •••• 1 •••• 1 •••. 1 •••• 1 •••• 1----1---- 1----1 ·---1----1--- 1----1---·•----1----1----
Tower Dupre, Louisiana .•••••••••• ____ ---- 4 
Fort Schuyler, New York .••••• ____ ---- .••. 20 
-- - - · ... __ -1---- 1----1---- ·--- - •---- 1--- - •---·- I· - • -1----1----1----1----
5 3 1----
4 
--· -1----1 ----·----1----1--- -1 -- -- 1----•---- 1----, ---- 1----1----,---· •--- ... 1--- -
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Fort Marion, Florida .••••.•••• ________ 16 .••. 
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9 1----1----1----11, 873 1,700 
1,081 
Total at the forts. __ ••• ___ • I 26 1367 1474 31 26 
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In California, not known whether 
in forts .••••••••••.• ________ • _. . _ _ _ 20 20 
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D. 
Report ef General J. G. Totten. 
WASHINGTON, November 1, 1851. 
Srn: In obedience to your orders of April 17, I have the honor to present 
my views and opinions on the subject embraced in the first of the resolutions 
adopted by the House of Representatives on the 3d March last in relation to 
the permanent fortifications of the country. 
I shall successively take up the points which you have made particular subjects 
of inquiry, though I foresee that I may need your indulgence for some time, using 
a rather broad license in connecting them with collateral topics. I hope, also, 
to have your indulgence for occasionally quoting from a report on national de-
fence, made by a board of officers to the Secretary of War on the 10th of May, 
1840. I have the less hesitation in thus quoting since that report was written 
by myself, and its statements and opinions have been confirmed by all my sub-
sequent meditation on the subject. As I shall, however, repeat herein a part 
only of what is therein set forth, and as that report goes into a pretty full dis-
cussion of the whole subject, and was concurred in by several experienced 
officers, whose countenance and support gives to it, indeed, all its authority, I 
would respectfully urge the whole report upon your attention. It is to be found 
in House Document No. 206, 1st session 26th Congress. 
The remarks made by Mr. Secretary Poinsett, when laying the report before 
Congress, as given in the same document, seem to me worthy of full considera-
tion. 
I do not consider it necessary to urge the point that wars may again visit us, 
and wars moreover with powerful nations. All the questions of the Secret~-y 
assume this as a possibility at least, as do the resolutions of OongreEs calling 
for this inquiry. How much soever a nation may love peace, and however well 
disposed to preserve it by moderation, justice, and impartiality, it is not les true 
now than it ever has been that the interests and honor of nations cannot alway" 
be made to run in parallel courses, and that jostling and interference are the 
more apt to occur where there is the closer proximity by position or by the re-
lations of trade and business. 
Within the last :fifteen years four or :five times has this country, owing to 
some question suddenly rising into importance, been surprised to find it. elf on 
the very verge of war with the most powerful nations of the earth. And the 
latent spirit, not to say belligerent, aptitude on either side, has not alway been 
quite satisfied that the concessions made for peace have not purcba ed it at too 
high a price. The point of honor will always, when really touched, a it e_ver 
has done, keep with nations as with men, the poh1t of interest in subject1?n. 
And a hackneyed adage shows that it is ever deemed not less important ~nth 
nation than with men that there should at all time be obvious preparation and 
r adine to d fi nd both honor and intere t. It is, therefore, notwitb tandin!r 
certain th ori of the day and public d claration..,, that the aO'e of trife and 
warfare ha pa.:cd away, only r asonable and prudent to a sume that a ' . 
of war may xi t, and to inquire in what way a powerful enemy may ·a!!e 
a O'a_in t u.. H may do o-
1. By attackinl>' ur ommercc and navigation upon the ocean. A.-:. h w-
v r, n military pr aration nth h r can avert tbi danger, and them :: 
of me tin()' it mu t I ur ly naYal, th mean do not now fall under c n,· · 
ration; r, 
2. By a sailing ome one or m r imp rtant point or point of the co m 
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a large military and naval force, with a view to immediate damage or more or less 
protracted occupation; or, . . 
3. By suddenly appearing with a large squadron of vessels b_efore our p~m-
cipal commercial cities, laying them under contribution, and burnmg or ~arrymg 
off the shipping, and by making powerful attacks upon our navy yards m order 
to destroy those establishments ; or, 
4. By attacks upon smaller towns and establishments of the coast with small 
squadrons or single vessels, or with privateers, capturing the shipping therein, 
and levying contributions, and by like means intercepting the interior commerce 
within the bays, sounds, and estuaries of the coast ; these lesser enterprises being 
often conducted under the countenance and support of considerable fleets. 
The danger may take any of these forms, or all of them. And against any 
or all of these a naval force of equal or greater strength, if it could with any 
certainty be found at hand, might be an adequate resort, though it would not be 
the most economical. But, in the first place, we are yet and shall be for years 
inferior in our naval preparation to nations with which we are likely to be in 
conflict; and next, if we were even far superior, it would be impossible to have, 
at each of the points to be guarded, a naval force sufficient to secure it, because 
a hostile squadron of twenty or thirty sail of the line and war steamers, would 
fall with equal ease on either of the important points, and could with no more 
certainty be expected at one than at another; so that, to resist successfully, we 
must be ready at each and all, with a force not less than that of the enemy; if 
less, an unavailing resistance would but augment the calamitous consequences. 
An enemy's squadron, assembled at Halifax or Bermuda, must be equally 
looked for at every important point from the Penobscot to New Orleans, inclu-
sive, for it could with equal ease fall upon either. The same would be true, 
moreover, of such a force assembled in any Atlantic port of Europe. 
Having seen the modes in which we may be assailed, and that no navy we 
are likely to possess can supply the requisite guarantees, the first question of 
the Secretary of War leads us to inquire, to what extent we may be aided by 
our numerous and multiplying railroads. This question is in the following 
words : 
. How far the invention and extension ef railroads have superseded or dimin- _ 
ished tlie necessity ef fortifications on the seaboard ? 
If there are cases in which fortifications will be aided by these roads-cases 
in which works of less strength and efficiency may be relied on, because such 
aid can be afforded in moments of need-there are many others in which any 
such aid as they could supply would be useless, and many also to which rail-
road can have no application. 
In very rare cases, a fort lying near existing or probable railroads may also 
occupy a _position exposing it to a besieging army. In such a case, undoubt-
edly, a railroad would have a direct influence; and the strength and cost of the 
fort would of course be materially lessened, in consequence of the rapidity with 
which the railroad would bring succor . 
. In most cases, however, forts are not liable to a siege, nor to any attack that 
will keep a~ enemy more than a few hours before them ; they are required, by 
su~den action, to defend the passage of a river or a channel leading to important 
ohJect ; or to prevent an enemy's squadron fr9m seizing, or cannonading, or 
bombarding ships, navy yards, cities, &c., duties to be accomplished only by 
h:3-vy artille:y in it~ various forms. The question whether the various forms 
o~ heavy artll!ery will . be better placed for this purpose within forts or v~ssels, 
will be exam11:ed hereafter; but that this artillery, however arranged, !s t~e 
only effectual mstrument of defence, admits no doubt. This artillery bemg m 
ad_ef1uate numbers, properly placed, sufficiently manned, out of the rea~~ of 
~e1~e by the enemy, and too powerful to be silenced by him-all cond1t1~ns 
indispensable, whether in communication with railroads or not-is prepared with 
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all useful accessories and ready for its great functions, independent of any aid 
to be supplied from without. 
It happens, moreover, that few of the points necessarily occupied for this 
defence are so situated as to be benefited . by railroads, unless the latter be con-
structed with the exclusive purpose of communicating with them ; and some are 
wholly unapproachable by such means, were they ever so necessary. 
As it is undoubtedly true that these communications, even as they now exist, 
may bring with much rapidity militia and volunteers from the interior, and from 
lateral sources, to many points of the coast, it may be worth while to examine a 
little more in detail, whether such use could be made of these superadded num-
bers as to justify dependence on them for defence against a powerful enemy. 
Suppose a hostile fleet to be in front of the city of New York, which nothing 
would prevent if the channels of approach were not fortified ; in what way could 
the 100,000 or 200,000 new men poured into the city and environs by railroads, 
although armed with muskets and field-pieces, aid the half million of people 
already there 1 It seems to me very clear that these additional forces would, 
like the population proper of the city, be utterly powerless in the way of resist-
ance, with any means at their command; and if resistance were attempted by 
the city, would but serve to swell the list of casualties, unless they should at 
once retreat beyond the range of fire. If the enemy's expedition were intended, 
according to the second supposed mode of attack, for invasion or occupation f?r 
some time, of a portion of the country, then in many places this resource of rail-
road~ would be of value ; because then the duty of defence would fall upon t~e 
army and militia of the country; and these communications would swell their 
numbers. 
But of all the circumstances of danger to the coast, this chance of an attempt 
by an enemy to land and march any distance into a populous district,. is_ lea t_ to 
be regarded, whether there be or be not such speedy mode of receivmg rem-
forcements, and our system of fortifications has little to do with any such danger. 
In preparing ag·ainst maritime assaults the security of the points to be covered 
is considered to be greatly augmented, whenever the defence can be so arran~ed 
as to oblige an enemy to land at some distance; for the reason that opporturuty 
is thereby allowed, in the only possible way, for the spirit and enterpri e of the 
people to come into play. 
Instead of being designed to prevent a landing upon any part of the coa t, a· 
many seem to suppose, and some to allege in proof of extravagant view on the 
part of the system of defence, the system often leaves this landing a an open 
alternative to the enemy, and aims so to cover the really important and dangerou.s 
points as to necessitate a distant landing and a march toward the object tb:·ou~h 
th~ people. It is because the expedition would otherwise ea ily accompl:t:h it: 
obJ ct, without landing and without allowing the population to partake m the 
d fence, that the fortifications are resorted to. For in tance, without F ort Del-
aware, or some other fort low down in Delaware bay, an enemy could place hi5 
fl t of steamers in front of Philadelphia by the time hi appearanc on ~the 
coa t had b en well announced throughout the city. And in pit~ of. all - e 
J r · y, lawar , and lower Pennsylvania he could levy hi contribution:-_ an 
burn th n vy yard hipping, and be away in a few hour . But bein 17 l,h~ 
by the f~rt above mention d, to land full forty miles b low the city, the _r '.' · 
an to _h1 march may b a£ ly left to the courage and patrioti m that will tin 
am1Jle ~ime to an:ay ~hem Ive in ppo ition. . 
d1 ·t nt landmg 1 d m d t b a gr at advantag to the defenc m 
ca: ; and in p ul u cli ·ti-i t , if the fi rts be uffici nt for th" particular duty. 
it make the ecuri y compl t . 
I · no part of th . k a um d by the y tern of fortification.: t -
a 00nin t th invasi n and pr r t cup ti n f c w 11-p pled di. trict, r 
a p int ar und which the£ r of th country ould be oon ralli d. In ' 
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attempts railroads would accellerate the issues ; but even the common modes of 
conveyance would soon bring forces enough to overwhelm them. 
But there are places important in themselves, or necessary to the general 
welfare, that have not the advantage of a large population at hand or within 
call, and which may nevertheless be very tempting objects to an enterprising 
enemy. The navy yard at Pensacola will, for instance, in time of war, be of 
infinite value in reference to the commerce of the Gulf of Mexico. Its destruc-
tion would therefore be a great object with a maritime enemy, and it has ac?ord- .. · 
ingly been so fortified as to be safe from a coup de main, or, at any rate, will be· . 
so when the little remaining to do is complete. A hostile expedition adequ~te 
to the reduction of these defences would, however, be able to exclude all rehef 
approaching laterally from the Mississippi, and there is no help to be supplied 
from the neighborhood, and none but very tardy succor to come from the inte-
rior; so that an enemy would find time to reduce the forts established on the 
islands at the mouth of the bay. 
This case illustrates one aspect of the influence of railroads on the coast de-
fence of the United States. While there is no such road by which succor can 
come from the interior, the security of the harbor and navy yard of Pensacola 
must depend wholly on the strength and state of readiness of the defences, naval 
and military, at the mouth of the harbor, there being no neighboring population; 
and these defences will be liable to a somewhat prolonged as well as powerful 
attack, giving time for sieges of several days duration. 
With a railroad extending into the interior of Alabama, an attacking force, 
though large, would have to confine itself to comparatively brief and hurried 
operations, even though a short siege may be considered out of the question. 
But although such a railroad were made, a sudden onslaught would suffice for 
the destruction of the naval establishments (if there were no fortification) when-
ever the attacking naval force were larger than that which might be present for 
defence; that is to say, whenever we had not a large squadron present. As 
before said, the railroad can supply none of the means of resisting such attacks. 
Without fortifications no existing or projected railroad would do anything 
towards the protection of New Orleans against a squadron of armed steamers; 
and not more could such communications do for Mobile or for the hundreds of 
large vessels that lie in the mouth of Mobile bay awaiting cargoes. There are, 
~oreover, very great points in our system of sea-coast defence that derive their 
unportance much more from their general relation to and bearing on general 
commerce and the security of large portions of the coast than from local inter-
esL Narraganset road, Delaware Breakwater harbor, Hampton road, Cum-
berland sound, (Georgia,) Key West, and the Tortugas, are points of this 
character; and neither of these would derive material aid from any existing or 
prob~ble i-ailroad communications. It is proper here to say something of these 
relations. 
Xarraganset bay.-As a harbor this is acknowledged by all to be the best 
on the whole coast of the United States, and it is the only close man-of-war 
h~rbor that is accessible with a northwest wind, the prevailing and most violent 
wmd of the inclement season. Numerous boards and commissions-sometimes 
compo~ed of naval officers, sometimes of army officers, sometimes of officers of 
both ervices-have at different times had the subject of this roadstead under 
Cvnsideration, and all have concurred in recommending in strong terms that it 
be made a place of naval rendezvous and repair, if not a great naval depot-
one_ ~r more ~f these commissions preferring it for the latter purpose t_o all other 
po~inons. 'Ihese recommendations have not been acted on, but it 1s next to 
certain that a war would force their adoption upon the government. With the 
<Jpenina- of this anchorage properly defended, hardly a vessel-of-war ?f ours 
crJuld come, either singly or in small squadrons, upon the coast in the boi~terous 
eea..."On without arming at this port, on account of the comparative certamty of 
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an immediate entrance; and this would be particularly the case with vessels 
injured by heavy weather, or in conflict with an enemy-with vessels bringing 
in prizes, or_pursued by a superior force. 
The use of the port would almost necessarily bring with it the demand for 
the means of repairing and refitting ; and the concentration of these upon some 
suitable spot would be the beginning of a permanent dock yard. 
For the same reason that ships-of-war would collect here, it would be a favorite 
point of rendezvous for privateers and their prizes, and a common place of refuge 
for merchantmen. 
From this, as a naval station, the navigation of Long Island sound and the 
communication between this and Martha's Vineyard sound or Buzzard's bay 
might be well protected; New London harbor would be covered; this navy 
yard would command southwardly, as that from Hampton roads northwardly, 
the great inward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras, the 
influence of which command over the blockading operations of an enemy will 
be apparent when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge left to him 
will be the Delaware, Gardiner's, and Buz?Ard's bays and Martha's Vineyard 
sound. 
'The bays just mentioned belong to the class which, being too wide for com-
plete defence by batteries, must call in such auxiliary defence as the navy may 
sup'ply; and, in reference to their defence by these means, nothing can be more 
important than the fortifications of N arraganset roads, because all but Delaware 
bay, including an anchorage for ships-of-war under Block island, would be com-
manded by a single squadron of those floating defences lying in these _ road~. 
To a squadron of steam batteries, for instance, lying under the fortifications, it 
would be a matter of little consequence into which of the above anchorag~ ~ 
enemy should go, all being within reach of three or four hours, and some Wit~ 
sight. We will here observe, by the way, that this use of floating defence" 13 
in accordance with the principle before insisted on. They are not expected to 
close the entrance into these several bays-that would require a squad.Ton for 
each at least equal to the enemy's ; but as the enemy goes in merely for re tor 
shelter, and there is no object that he can injure, he may be permitted to enter, 
and our squadrons will assail him only when the circumstances of wind, weather, 
&c., give all the advantages t.o the attack. The fortification of Narraganse: 
roads is, therefore, in effect, a most important contribution towards the d~ence 
of all the neighboring anchorages. But the same properties that make l\arra-
ganset roads so precious to us would recommend them to the enemy also, and 
their natural advantages will be enhanced in his eyes by the value of all the 
objects the e advantages may have accumulated therein. 
If this roadstead were without defence, an enemy could occupy it withon· 
oppo ition, and by the aid of naval superiority form a lodgment on the ish~d 
o~ Rhode I land for the war. Occupying this i land with his troop , and mth 
h1 fl ct the channels on either side, he might defy all the force of the ea-:t~rn 
St t ; and while from thi. po ition hi troop would keep in alarm and mrtio .. 
th population of the ea t, feigned expeditions again t New York or again t mo 
outh rn cities would qually alarm the country in that direction; aud th ;, 
thotwh h might do no mor than menace, it is difficult to e timate the em 
ra .. m nt and xp n into which he would drive th government. 
t ha b n alleg that . .imilar con equencc would flow from the occupa 
of oth r po.·iti n , ( u h f r in. tance a ru· afford d in the bay ju t mention · 
an 1 th, t th r for th d fi•n · , in a trong manner, of .... arrao-an et r ad-. i, - -
1 . Ev ·n all wino- that th r ar oth r inacce ible po ition. wh r n 
en my mio-ht place l1imH lf'. i it a r a on, h cau~c the foe can, in pit• o · 
I .· . him. If of omp, rativ ly un,af and open har ors that we houl 
apply to our own u. , but yi l l u to him the very bet harb r on th c - · 
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that we should submit to capture and destruction the valuable objects that accu-
mulate in consequence of the properties of the har?or 1 . 
But it is believed that none of the outer and wider harbors will answer for 
s11ch an establishment as we have supposed, nor for any other purpose than an 
occasional anchorage for ships-of-war, and for these reasons, among others : that 
although ships-of-war might possibly ride in these broad waters at all seaso~s, 
it would seem to be a measure of great temerity for transpo!ts to attempt _it, 
ex.cept in the mildest seasons; and there can be but little douDt tha~ a hostile 
ex:pedition would resort to no harbor as a place of rendezvous, unless_ it affor~ed 
sure pr otection to its transports, these being the only means by which ultenor 
purposes could be executed, or final retreat from the country effected. 
If, moreover, Narraganset roads became a naval station, or at least the sta~ion 
of a floating force designed to act against these outer waters, such an estabh~h-
rnent by an enemy on other positions would at once be _put upon the defensive 
aitd require the constant presence of a superior fleet, thus measurably losing the 
object of the establishment. Independent of deficient qualities as harbors, how-
ever, none of these bays would answer our purposes: :First, because they can-
not be securely defended; and second, because they are difficult of access from 
the main, the communication with them being liable to interruption by bad 
weather, and liable to be cut off by the enemy. 
I t seems quite evident that the circumstances involved in the occupation and 
defence of Narraganset roads will not be materially changed by the facilities of 
railroad communications; so far as numbers can aid in defensive arrangements 
they could be supplied in due time and to the extent needed, by the surrounding 
district and common modes of conveyance. 
D elaware Breakwater Jwrbor.-In the long stretch of coast between New 
York bay and the Chesapeake, a distance of about three hundred miles, there is 
no other entrance from the ocean ( except for small vessels) than that at the 
mouth of Delaware bay. This circumstance led the commercial men of the 
country to call, with great unanimity and earnestnes~, for the creation at this 
place, which was without a safe anchorage and was full of dangerous shoals, of 
an artificial harbor. This call had reference mainly, it is true, to protection in 
stres of weather; but for the same reason, namely, the great distance on either 
hand to any place of shelter, it must become a place of refuge from an enemy. 
Ves els near that coast, whether bound north or south, will be liable to be cut 
ojf from other refuge and forced into this only entrance ; and vessels bound up 
the Delaware must seek it, of course; so that as this artificial harbor provided 
by the government must be resorted to in time of war for security of both 
klnd , thereby becoming a place of rendezvous, it will be an attractive point for 
an. enemy. It would, moreover, since it now yields a safe anchorage, most cer-
tainly become the habitual resort of an enemy's vessel cruising on this coast, in 
order to command the great channel of commerce that sweeps in near these capes. 
'These considerations show the necessity of defending this harbor, and its 
ecure defence would afford the further great advantage of providing a port 
Whence our cruisers, whether steam or sail vessels, might keep watch over this 
ame channel of commerce whenever they were not confined within the defences 
by the actual presence of a superior enemy. 
Thi. case also is one in which the objects in view do not depend on the use 
of railroad~; they can all be achieved without such aid. And it is also a case 
ill hich railroads of themselves would do nothing, and in which nothing could 
be i.~p ·n ·ed with because of their existence. If the enemy landing an army 
°\\'ere to lay siege to a fort on the shore side of the harbor, then a railroad would 
certainly be u eful in expediting the arrival of succor. But though an enemy 
"'ould certainly use this harbor for the purposes above stated, if it were not de-
fm cd, it is not to be supposed that for the conquest of these advantages he 
\liould bring a great land expedition that might find much richer booty else-
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where. Forts capable of resisting a coup de main would no doubt, therefore, 
fulfil their purpose and be respected, and accordingly no siege is to be antici-
pated, and any auxiliary force that great caution might demand could be easily 
and speedily forwarded by the numerous and fast steamers on the bay. 
Hampton roads and Chesapeake bay.-The board of naval officers and 
engineers intrusted with the selection of sites for a great northern and a great 
-iouthern naval depot, recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, 
i3urwell's bay, on James river for the one, and Charlestown, in Boston harbor, 
for the other. 'l'hey also recommended Boston harbor and Narraganset bay at 
the north, and Hampton roads at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In these 
reports the commissioners entered at large into the consideration of all the mat-
ters relating to these important objects, and reference is now made to those 
reports for many interesting details. 
Such an expansion has, however, since then been given to the present navy 
yard at Gosport, ( opposite Norfolk,) that there is little probability of any other 
position on these waters being occupied for such purposes. 
The great importance of retaining Hampton roads during a war, and of cov-
ering the navy yard, is conceded on all hands. But the bearing of this harbor 
upon the general defence of Chesapeake bay is not generally understood. 
Being the great naval depot station and rendezvous of the southern coast, it 
may be safely assumed that this harbor, during war, will never be without a 
number of ships-of-war, some ready for sea, others just returned from sea, ang. 
others held in condition to be suddenly despatched. '.rhis being so, should an 
enemy with a small or moderate force venture up Chesapeake bay, with designs 
upon any of the rivers, harbors or towns, his capture would be inevitable by the 
squadrons of sailing and steaming vessels issuing upon his rear from Hampton 
roads. This certain result would keep back any enemy from any such preda-
tory venture. If, then, we provide adequate defences for the more important 
places upon the bay and its tributaries, there will remain no temptation to large 
expeditions, and the peace~i0f this wide-spread navigable water and the safety 
of the great amount of business and commerce traversing it in all direction" 
will be secured. Thus, by covering the anchorage of our squadron, the defence 
of Hampton roads become to a most important extent the defences of all the 
upper waters. 
The following very important relation existing between the defences of Hamp-
ton roads and the security of both Norfolk and the navy yard, independent of 
closing the channel to those places, is also not generally understood, and ha5 
been overlooked by cities. 
If we suppose no defences at the mouth of the roadstead, or only such a can 
be di regarded or easily silenced, an enemy might debark his troops in Lynn-
haven bay and despatch them against N 01folk, while his fleet would pas up the 
harbor to the vicinity of the town, not only covering the flank of hi troop5, 
but landing parties to turn any position that might be taken by the army a_· 
tempting to defend the place; or, instead of landing in the bay, he miO'ht, at hiE 
opti n, land the main body quite near to No1folk, and having po se ion of Jam 5 
riv r, he would prevent the arrival of any succor in steamboats or otherwise by 
that channel. 
' h r ar two or thr e d fil s on the route from Lynnhaven bay to T orfolk 
cau · by th inter! king of tream , that with the aid of field-works nl 
po. ... o-r at ,.tr ue-th; and b ino- occupied in ucce ion, would undoub 
d la T if n t r ul. , n n my a ailing them in front. ince th naval d 
m," fix d a 1 o:p rt, th ~ mu. t in e cl be chi fly r Ii d on for it~ nriry 
fr m land atta k , nd tim ly a t nti n mu t giv n on the br akin~ on 
war, to the occu ·inll" of th ~ fil with appr priate defi nces. Th ... 
ti n: h wev r, p · n valu wha v r if th y can be turned; and 
d 1uatc fortification at th utl t f ampton road , there would 
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no security for Norfolk or the navy yard, except in the presence of a large 
military force. . 
On the completion of the defences at the mouth of Hampton roads, _the cir-
cumstances will be very different. Then those defiles must be attacked m front, 
because no part of the enemy's force can be landed above the mouth of the 
roads. But this is not all. The moment an enemy advances towards Norfolk 
from this point of debarkation, his communication with his fleet wHl be jeop-
arded; because, as the defiles do not require a large body to defend them 
against an attack in front, the greater part of the reinforcements arriving from 
above by way of the river may be landed upon his flanks or in his rear. An 
offensive land movement by the enemy, under such circumstances, could be jus-
tified only in the case of his finding an entire want of preparation caused by 
the unexpected commencement of hostilities. In connexion with this disposition 
for defence, it may be expedient on the breaking out of a war, to throw up a 
field-work on the shore opposite the position of Fort Calhoun, which would 
besides contribute to the exclusion from the roadstead of vessels of small draught. 
The above rema~:ks show that the fortifications in progress are not less neces-
sary to the security of the navy yard and the city of Norfork from a land attack 
than from an attack by water; and that both these important functions are su-
perse:ied to the task of defending the only good roadstead of the southern coast, 
and of contributing in a very important degree towards the defence of the 
Chesapeake bay. 
As in the case of Narraganset roads, it has been objected to this system of 
defence, that although it may shut up this anchorage, it leaves others in this 
region open. May we suppose, then, that if there were no other than this har-
bor, its defence would be justifiable 1 If so, it would seem that the objection 
re ts on the principle that, in proportion as nature has been bountiful to us, we 
must be niggardly to ourselves; that having little, we may cherish it; but having 
much, we must throw all away. 
The same criticism complains of the unreasonable magnitude of one of these 
work , (Fort Monroe,) and it is conceded that there is justice in the criticism. 
But it has long been too late to remedy the evil. It may not, however, be im-
proper to avail of this opportunity to remove from the country the professional 
reproach attached to this error. When the system of coast defence was about 
t.o be taken up, it was thought best by the government and Congress to call 
from abroad a portion of that skill and science which a long course of active 
warfare was supposed to have supplied. Fort Monroe is one of the results of 
that determination. It was not easy, probably, to come down from the exag-
gerated scale of warfare to which Europe was then accustomed; nor for those 
who had been brought up where wars were often produced and always magni-
fied_by juxtaposition or proximity, to realize to what degree remoteness from 
belligerent nations might diminish military means and qualify military objects. 
Certain it is, that this experiment, costly as it was in the case of Fort Monroe, 
would have been much more so but for the opposition of some whose more 
moderate opinions had been moulded by the circumstances and wants of our own 
country. 
The mistake is one relating to magnitude, however, not to strength. Magni-
~de in fortification is often a measure of strength, but not always, nor in this 
mstance. Fort Monroe might have been as strong as it is now against a water 
attack, or an assault, or a siege, with one-third its present capacity, and perhaps 
a not more than half its cost. I do not think this work too strong for its posi-
·on, nor too heavily armed; and as the force of the garrison will depend mainly 
on the extent of the armament, the error which has caused an excess in the first 
o tlay will not involve much useless expense after completion. 
The railroad coming down from the interior of the country to Norfolk navy 
yard might unquestionably render service in bringing forward troops in the 
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event of a powerful and persevering land attack on the defences of Norfolk and 
the navy yard, and in like manner useful reinforcements might arrive rapidly in 
the steamers of James river. But we have seen that without the defences at 
the mouth of the roads there would be no time nor opportunity for any such 
force to arrive, or to act when arrived. The enemy would proceed from sea 
directly up to his object, and need not necessarily lose a tide nor land a man. 
If a sudden attack with a large squadron of armed steamers-for this great 
naval depot presents an object worthy of a great expedition-is to be repelled, 
it will not be by crowds of volunteers rushing in from the country with muskets 
and rifles on their shoulders, but by fortifications of some sort, or by naval 
means ; and if by the latter, by a force not materially less than the enemy's. 
Cumberland sou?J,d, at the moutli ef St. Mary's river.-It is an important 
principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole southern coast, that 
. on a shore possessing few harbors it is at the same time more necessary to pre-
serve them all for our own use, and more easy to deprive an enemy of that 
shelter without which a close blockade cannot be maintained. r.rhis principle 
is enforced in the instance of our southern coast by the two following weighty 
considerations, viz : first, its remoteness from the naval rendezvous, the Chesa-
peake, which is, on a mean, six hundred miles distant, and to leeward both as 
to wind and current; and second, its being close upon the larboard hand as they 
enter the Atlantic of the great concourse of vessels passing at all seasons 
through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the 
concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection of some sort, naval 
aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off 
from all retreat by a superior enemy. . 
All the harbors accessible to vessels-of-war on this part of the coast will 
sooner or later need defences, because otherwise they will be seized by an 
enemy, in order, for one thing, to paralyze the valnabJo commerce that circu-
lates within the rivers, sounds, and internal lateral communications. The pro-
ducts of a considerable portion of Georgia find outlet only by these channel · 
P erhaps it may require a war to demonstrate the necessity and advantage of 
such protection; but there are reasons already alluded to, and of much weight, 
for securing the mouth of Cumberland sound at any rate, independent of those 
just mentioned. One of these is particularly important, namely, the situatio~ of 
this point with respect to the commerce flowing t hrough the Gulf of Mexico. 
E very vessel bound northward from the Gulf must pass close up by Cape Cana-
veral before she can bear away clear of the Matinilla reef, and hence two ?r 
three cruisers may take such positions at this outlet that all passing ve sel will 
be seen. While we occupy Cumberland sound our own steaming or ailinO' 
crui ers can hold these posts permanently and fearlessly, assured of a place of 
refuge from a superior enemy . 
Wh n the best and deepest of these Georgia entrances shall be fortified, the 
op ration of investing the coa t and watching the great outlet of commerce 
through the Florida pa age will be a difficult and hazardous one to an enemy, 
to whom no per everance or kill can avail to maintain a continuou blockade, 
while on the part of our mall ve el -of-war, steam f:rio-ate , and private rs. rhe 
am ort of upervi ion will be at all tim sea y and afe. In the meantime 
th fi rtification of Cumb rland ound alone will nable u , with the h Jp of a 
floatiuo- for c, to prot ct th wh 1 of thi part of th coa t from all mall xp 
diti n , and t hara. and di turb the op ration of larg r one , without endan-
g rino- th .. fi•ty of ur wn mi. r . 
Thi ound wa cupi cl y th Br:iti h during th war of 1 12 and nm· 
rland i.Jand mad h ad 1uart r ·, a gr at ollat ral urpo. b ing a· it wou1 
o-ain b , to xcit th lav to in.:un-, ·tion, if po ibl at 1 a ·t to d n. 
T railr ad now ·i..,t t iuflu n in any way th curity of thi:- hnr r 
ut both railroad and canal hav n talked of, whi ·h would greatly nhan 
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the value of defences on the Georgia coast, and especially those of Cumberland 
..,ound. . · · l 
Key West and the Tortugas.-These are th~ :fir_st important pos1t10~s t iat 
present themselves on doubling round Cape Flonda n~to the Gulf of Mexico. 
Strong opinions have been several times expressed m favor of these :fine har-
bors, and I beg leave particularly to refer to a letter from Commodore Rodg~rs 
to the Secretary of the Navy, July 3, 1829, (Senate documents, 1st session 
21st Congress, vol. I, No. 1, page 236,) and letter f:om the Secretary of the 
X avy, :March 25, 1830, (Senate documents, 1st sess10n 21st Congress, vol. II, 
X o.111,pagel.) . . . 
A naval force designed to control the nav1gat10n of the Gulf could desi~e no 
better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon t~e very wayside of 
the only path through the Gulf, it is at the same time well s1t~ated as to all the 
great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the mouths of 
the :Mississippi, and both the inlet and the outlet of the Gulf. 
The Tortugas harbor and that of Key West affords perfect shelter for vessels 
of every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can 
be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would with 
great ad vantage make them his habitual resort and his point of general rendez-
,ous and concentration for all operations on this sea. With an enemy thus 
posted, the navigation of the Gulf by us would be eminently hazardous, if not 
impossible, and nothing but absolute naval superiority would avail anything 
against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer than the nearest 
shore of the continent. rrhere are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable 
with these that an enemy could resort to with his large vessels. To deprive 
him of these would, therefore, be interfering materially with any organized sys-
tem of naval operations in this sea. The defence of these harbors would, how-
ever, do much more than this. It would secure to our own squadron, even 
should it be inferior, the use of these most valuable positions, and would afford 
a poin t of refuge to our navy and our commerce at the very spot where it would 
be most necessary and useful. 
I forbear to enlarge on this point, merely adding that certain and complete 
defence will be easily secured, and that we shall thereby possess ports of refuge 
in the middle of the Gulf whenever we have to fly, and points of rendezvous 
and r efreshment in the very midst of all passing vessels whenever we hold the 
ma:c:tery. Every vessel that crosses the Gulf of Mexico passes within sight of 
the two forts commenced under the sanction· of Congress and now in progress, 
one at Tortugas, and one at Key West. 
It is needless to say that with the possession of these advanced posts, and 
with the control of the commerce of the Gulf thereby insured, no railroads upon 
the m ain can have any relation. rrhe forts must rely solely on their own effi-
ciency an d power of resistance. Happily the local circumstances allow these 
conditions to be easily secured. 
I could adduce many other illustrations of the truth of the assertions made in 
the commencement of these remarks, that though occasional benefit will result 
to the y. tem of fortification on the seaboard from the construction of railroads, 
th ·y in general will have little or no bearing on the immediate means of defence. 
Tl · ·e, whether they be forts or ships, must be put in a state of preparation and 
keJ:Jt so by the use of means that railroads do not supply, or at least that can be 
\n· l upplied without them. 
~ -umerous and facile communications, whether by railroad or steamers, or 
common road:1, arc important undoubtedly to the general activity and vigor of 
\\-ar, whether offen ive or defensive; but it is as communications that they are use-
ful, not a· bring of themselves instruments of warfare, or as supplying any that 
can be sub ·titutcd for ships or forts. 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--16 
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I ought here to advert to the idea often announced, though always vaguely 
and in general terms, namely, that by the help of these railroads large bodies of 
men may be thrown from the interior of the country upon the ,exposed points of 
the coast, and there erect, and arm, and serve temporary batteries adequate to 
repel any mari6me attack. 
If we have waited for the opening of a war to do this, our enemy, who knows 
the fact as well as we, will surely not allow time for the completion even of such 
works as these. And in adopting this policy, we undertake to afford a prote~-
tion to the country in the first days and weeks of the war, that nations expen-
enced in warlike affairs have considered as hardly accomplished after year.., and 
years of labor during peace. 
In many important cases, the contemplated batteries could not be erect~d 
hastily, because they would have to be supported by piling and grillage; and_ m 
others, even the very sites would have to be raised out of the water. The m-
feriority in efficacy and equipment of such batteries, when erected, would have 
to be compensated by an increased number of guns ; but in many instances, a 
good defence could only be made in positions where there is not room for the 
1·equisite number of guns, except by placing them tier above tier, an arrange-
ment wholly inconsistent with sudden preparation. 
But even if the sudden arrival of a number of men brought by railroad could 
supply the want of duly-prepared batteries, there are important defensive pointil 
to which railroads do not approach, and are not likely to approach. And it also 
happens that wherever such railroads reach the coast, it is already peopled be-
yond all p_robable wants for laborers upon sea-coast batteries. ~If such bat;e~ies 
were requned to be erected as speedily as possible at Boston, 1' ew York, I h1la-
delphia, Baltimore, Charleston, 8avannah, &c., they could be much sooner and 
better executed by calling in the laborers and mechanics of these cities, than by 
r elying on the heterogeneous aid of regiments of volunteers and drafted militia. 
The second question of the honorable Secretary is in these words : "In 1.r~at 
manner and to wlzat extent tlie namgation ef the ocean by steam, and pa'.tzcu-
1 arly the applfration ef steam to vessels-if-war and recent improvements mar-
ti"llery and otlwr military inventions and discoveries, affect tile question?" 
.And the third question, which it will be convenient to consider in connexion 
with the second, is in these words, namely : "IIow far ussels-qfwar, steam-
batteries, and ordinary merclwnt skips and steamers, and otlter temporary ex-
pedients, can be relied upon as a substitute for permanent fortifications for the 
clrgence ef our large seaports ?" 
'l'he application of team to vessels-of-war acts upon the question of sea-coa~t 
defenc?, both beneficially and injuriously. It acts injuriously in several wa~~: 
but chiefly, first, by the suddenness and surprise with which vm,sel may ia!l 
upon th ir object, and pa from one object to another in pite of distance, ch-
mat , and sea on; and secondly, by their ability to navigate hallow ,rater.: .. 
. 'l'h fir "t property, hy which quadron; may ruu into our harbor ', out,tnp-
pmg all waming. of their approach, afford.. 110 chance for impromptu pr<>pam-
tiou · ; accordi11gly, wliat ·vcr our pr 1wrations arc to be, they hould pr c rl the 
var. It m p:-u,t all bcli ·f tlrnt a nation havino- in commi::::::ion-as Franc£ 
an<l England alway::- lww-a laro-e numbn of w~~r- ·t am r · ready for di,tanl 
1~v~ ·c i_n tw •Jlt ·-four hm~rfl, rcccivi1in- their ord ·r by t lcrr-ra1,h, c~1mbl £,f 
umtmg m. Cfu·iclron ·, au~l m h't·o or thn'c day· at mo:-;t .;p di11g on their:- ,. ral 
patht- to fall upon unclefencl<'d port:-it is not to b .·p ct d I ·ay, that tl1cy 
h?uld d ·lay n ·h •nt ·rpri •. until t mporary r .'Ort· · ulcl b, ot r a«lJ· t _rr-
'lY th ru. And ' t tli r • am tho· who iu:-;i t that w hould} •av d fo1Hv 
·1te of ·n.r-thnt w ::h,,uld 1 ,t th da • . uppl · th n d. 
, 11 uch mca. ur •. mu pr n·, th •r, woulcl not b tim t , r-
r 1 ° • ·v m th . <'. ] • the ·c 11d pr 'l' •rt • duo t th ir Jin-ht draw•l1t f • t r. 
th ·c vei;. •ls , ·ill oLJj,.. th d ·f u · · t L · xt ud d in :::omc form to p ,, 
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or channels, or shoals, that before were adequately gu:1.rded by their shallowness. 
The bars at the mouth of th~ Mississippi formerly excluded all bu_t _small ves-
els-of-war, and the strong current of the river made the ascent of sailmg~vesse~s 
exceedingly uncertain and tedious. Now these bars an_d ~urrents are 1mp~d1-
ments no longer; and all the armed steamers of Great Bntam and France m1g~t 
be formed in array in face of the city of New Orleans, before a rumor of their 
approach had been heard. 
Had the English expedition of 1814, attended by a squadron of lar~e armed 
steamers, arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi, a few transports might have 
been taken in tow, and in a few hours the whole army would have been before 
the city; or twelve or fifteen such eteamers could have carried the whole army 
up in half a day, without the delay of transports. Will it be contended that 
the attack in that form would have been repulsed with the means then in Gen-
eral Jackson's hands ? Would th~ landing, or even the presence on board these 
steamships, of the British troops have been necessary to Lum the city or put it 
under contFibution 1 Is there anything now but 'the existence of forts on the 
river, to prevent the success of such an attack by fifteen or twenty steamers-of-
war, allured thither by the vastly increased magnitude of the spoil ? 
But there would have been, even then and with those means, one reason with 
the enemy for avoiding the channel of the river, namely, the existence, seventy 
miles below New Orleans, of old Fort St. Philip. I will not venture to say 
that in the then condition of that fort it could have repelled such an expedition, 
though it did very manfully resist a protracted bombardment; but I do not 
doubt tha.t the existence of even that feeble work would have had weight in 
,_cttling the mode and channel of approach, and in turning off the attack into 
<:ircuitous and tedious avenues, and thereby gaining some time, for preparation. 
I am confident, however, that on the completion of the repairs to that work, 
now well advanced, and on the completion of the exterior battery of l!'ort Jack-
:--on, (a new fort opposite,) no attack of that nature, . even of twice the force, 
eould penetrate by that avenue to the city of New Orleans. 
The use of war-steamers against New Orleans may take another phase. If 
<leterred by the forts above mentioned from an attack by the river, an enemy 
:might again take the anchorage off Ship island, and transport his army, either 
on board steamers of light draught or in boats towed by such steamers, to the 
f')ot of Lake Borgne, whence his march to the.city (a distance of twenty-eight 
n1iles through an unpeopled district) would be over one of the best roads in 
Louisiana. 
There is nothing in the shallowness of Lake Borgne to prevent this, nor are 
there now any defences on the way, though it is to be hoped that the erection 
of a tower and battery at Proctor's Landing, which has been strongly urged for 
~ome years, ancl which would effectually close this aperture, will at once be 
ordered by Congress. 
If, a during the war of 1812, it were now necessary to pass the troops from 
the ~hips to the shore by means of tow-boats, we might, perhaps, considering 
the auQ"IIlented population of the city and environf-l, trust for sufficient notice 
and J_Jreparation to the time that must elapse before a considerable number could 
be land ·d; but with ten or fifteen light-draught war-steamers, fifteen thousand 
men could be landed and on their march toward the city within twenty-four 
hour: of dropping anchor. 
A.ll other avenues to New Orleans from that quarter have, since the war. of 
1 12, been well closed by permanent forts and batteries. 
1 ~ e have another illustration on the Gulf of this action of hostile steamers 
throu""h hallow channels, and that may be worth adducing. l!-,ort Morgan, at 
Iobile Point, defends very well the main channel into Mobile bay, and there 
i no o her entrance for sailing vesscb-of-war. But the sm1ller class of war-
- teamer· would find water nough near the end of Dauphin island, and, keeping 
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out of reach of the guns of l?ort Morgan, could pass up into the bay. They 
could without difficulty ascend as high as the ci y of Mobile, and reach that 
place moreover in three hours. A dozen such vessels could in that short time 
carry up, if they were needed, fiye thousand soldiers. It is surely not too much 
to say, therefore, that Mobile, one of our greatest depots of cotton, is by this 
new inlet for an enemy's cruisers, much exposed. But this is not all the dan-
ger. The large fleet of ships, often one hundred in number, and of the largest 
class of merchantmen, that lie for months awaiting their cargoes in the lower 
part of the bay, are within an hour's run of such steamers from the open Gulf, 
and might be destroyed either by the same expedition that ascends to Mobile 
or by one sent for that particular purpose. 
J<...,or this and other serious consequences of leaving open this entrance to Mo-
bile bay, the sure and the cheap remedy is the placing of a small fort at the 
east end of Dauphin island, a work already wisely ordered by Congress. 
When it iR said in general that the light draught of these vessels opens avenues 
of attack before defended by 'nature, it must not be supposed that therefore it 
is part of the system of defence to fortify all shallow channels. Whether shal-
low passages will rt'quire defences or not, will depend entirely on the importance 
of the objects to which they give access and the power of the attack that may 
be directed through them, and not all on the circumstance that an enemy's 
steamers may enter them without difficulty. 
There are a great many entrances and harbors on the coast, not shoal harbors 
merely, but many affording water enough for the largest vessels, that will re-
quire, if any, no other d~fences than such as can be prepared in time of war, 
because there are no objects upon these waterB of a nature to provoke the 
cupidity of hostile cruisers: having nothing to lose in this way, they will have 
nothing to fear. rrhe shallow and difficult avenues to great and valuable objects 
are those for which we have to provide defences in addition to defences that 
were necessary before the introduction of war-steamers. 'I'he danger of tbe 
Hell Gate passage to New York sufficed to keep any man-of-war from attempting 
to sail through, but it proYes to be no impediment to steamers. rrhe "Broad 
Sound" channel and afoo the "Gut" channel into Boston harbor are easy tracks 
for large steamers, though next to impracticable to line-of-battle ships and 
frigates ; and so with other channels and other places. . 
In considering to what ext nt the introduction of teamers into war service 
may help the coast defence of the country, should we assume that we ought to 
rdy upon them to repel the enemy's steamers, so dangerous in coming with?ut 
warnjng and penetrating promptly through all natural obstacles up to the y1tal 
point. of the coa t, we should commit a very gTeat error, though it i perhaps a 
natural one on a cur. ory examination, as it certainly is a frequent one. It would 
b a fatal rror if practiced upon by a nation having more than one or two_ im-
portant ports, and even with such nation it would be the mo t expen ive oi all 
r ~ort . 
'l hi: cannot be a afi reliance with war-steamer any more than with ail in" 
v s:C'l -of-war, and a f•w word may make thi clear. 
I do not a: •1t that arm d v · eJ would not be u ful in coa t d fence. f-.lllh 
an icle, would L ab:-urcl. I hall c•v •n have oc a:--ion to ..,how a n c,,ity t " 
thi:-1 kincl of for c in · rtain •xcr.ptional ca . It i the ('f' n ral propo,ition. 
viz : that arn_1 ·cl vc•:."el:- au~l . not fortification ar the prop r defi•nc .. _for ur 
vulnembl po111t ·-a propo,' 1t1on th,, mor dano-prou b can~ · •ming1Y rn ,uch 
a ·orclan · with th· wPll-tri<•d 1>row •:. ancl lieroi1,; achiev m •nt · of th 11 ':'" 
tha w • hnv · now to ·ontrovcrt. 
l o. ton, ~ • .,,, • ork Philaclc•lphi:r B.tltimor , 'linrl :-ton, and i: ~ , 
ar , w will ·uppo,p, to I, rrunr<l d not by fort , lm bv tho· • v '" I 
·urr n · of a war with n nation p c:: iurr lnr uaval m an... , • kn 
that i i .. no ftort fi r uch nation to d pat h a fie •t f tweaty Jin -o - t 1 
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ships and frigates, or an equal number of war-steamers, or even the combine~ 
mas , both fleets in one. 
The United Service Journal shows that in the month of August last Great 
Britain had actually in commission in their navy, in a time of profound peace, 
thirty-eight line-of-battle-ships and frigates, thirteen sloops-of-war, and upwards 
of fifty smaller armed sailing vessels, together with forty-eight armed war-
steamers and near forty unarmed steamers. 
What, then, shall we do at the above-named ports severally 1 Each is justly 
felt to be an object worthy of an enemy's efforts, and each would be culpable 
in sending elsewhere any part of the force required for its own defence . . Each, 
therefore, maintains a naval force equal at least to that the enemy is judged to 
be able to send promptly against it. Omitting any provision for other places 
scarcely less important, what is the result 1 It is that we maintain within the 
harbors of, or at the entrance to, these places, chained down to this passive de-
fence, a force at least six times as large as that of the enemy. 
He does not hesitate to leave his port, because it will be protected in his ab-
sence by its fortifications, which also will afford him a sure refuge on his return. 
He sails about the ocean depredating upon our commerce with his privateers 
~nd small cruisers, putting our small places to ransom, and in other ways follow-
mg up appropriate duties, all which is accomplished without risk, because our 
fleet. although of enormous magnitude, must cling to ports which have no other 
d~fence than that afforded by their presence. 'l'hey cannot combine against 
him nor attack him singly, for they cannot know where he is, and must not, 
m.oreover, abandon the objects which they were provided expressly to guard. 
It would really seem that there could not be a more impolitic, inefficient, and 
dangerous system, as there certainly could not be a mrwe expensive one. 
A navy, whether of war steamers or sailing vessels, should be aggressive in 
it action. It should, by carrying the war into the seas and upon the coast of 
the enemy, direct its calamities from our coast and commerce; but the system 
we are now considering involves the absurdity of relinquishing all the incalcu-
lable advantages of mastery upon the ocean to an enemy who nevertheless may 
possess but a sixth of our naval power. 
To bring other means even in partial substitution for this defence by ships 
and steamers, or to give it local auxiliary aid, by way of reducing its inordinate 
magnitude, would be to confess its inappropriateness for harbor defence. We 
know that other comparatively cheap means may be substituted, but this is just 
~\-hat the proposition denied. Naval means would be useful undoubtedly. 'l'he 
que. tion is whether they would be suJficient ,· and we see some of the conse-
quences of making them sufficient. We come thus to examine the defensive 
arrangements that can be made in aid of or substituted for armed sea-going 
ves~els. 
rrbese arrangements may be of two classes, namely: first, fixed forts and 
batteries on the land, and in some cases movable batteries of heavy guns; and 
se:coRd, upon the water-floating batteries of all kinds, gunboats, etc., fixed or 
movable. 
rI'here are doubtless situations where it may be necessary for us to present a 
defeu ·ive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be 
impracticable ; and it is not therefore prejudging the question we are about to ' 
examine. I t is neither underrating fortifications nor everrating floating defences 
to ay that these last are some or all of them indispensable in such positions . . 
Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance 
from the hores, greater than effectivP. gun range, and where no insular spot, 
natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of ships, will pre-
.;ent _uch a, ituation ; and we may take some of our great bays as exampl es . 
Broad ·ounds and wide roadsteads affording secure anchorage beyond good 
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gun range from the shores will afford examples of another so~t, and harbors with 
very wide entrances and large surface exhibit examples of still another kind. 
As in all such cases fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and nevertheless 
Tecourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a 
recommendation in the several reports_ on the defence of the coast since 1818, 
that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate floating de-
fencrs. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution 
in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be 
resorted to, not however, because they are means intrinsically good or suitable 
under like circumstancee, but because they are the only means applicable to such 
cases. In the circumstances just referred to there is no alternative, and there-
fore no point to be discussed. The remaining question is, whether these float ing 
defences Hre to be relied on in cases that admit of defence by fortifications. 
And first, as to gun boats. Although of undoubted use in peculiar circum-
stance:.,, it will hardly be contended that gunboats afford a safe reliance in har-
·bors that can be entered by vessels of magnitude. . Ships becalmed or aground 
might be sorely harassed, if not destroyed by a spirited attack from this force, 
and there are other situations wherein it would be very effective. But harbors 
defended by gunboats will not be attacked in calms nor in adverse winds, and 
it is not easy to believe that any probable array of these crafts would impede or 
l1incler for a moment the advance of a hostile fleet. Nelson, at 1.1i·afa1gar, bore 
down in two divisions upon the combined fleet, each division being exposed to a 
Taking fire; and although suffering considerably from that :fire, he was able, 
notwithstanding, to break the hostile line and defeat his superior adversary. 
·what, comparative1y, with the raking fire of the combined fleet, would be the 
:fire of a fleet of gunboats? Opposing no effectual obstacle to approach or 
entrance, these smaU vessels, scattered and driven upon the shoals, could be 
kept by the broadside of a few active vessels at too great a distance to produce 
:my serious effect upon the main attack by their desultory :fire. 
Although they might afford useful means of annoyance during a protracted 
occupation by the enemy of harbors containing exten ive shoal grounds, and 
t!hallow bays and inlets, they would be nearly useless in resisting the first assault 
and in preveniiug the brief operation of levying contributions, or burning or 
spoiling national establi ,Ji men ts. . 
The true reason of this defence must not, however, be misunderstood. It 1~ 
not th,1t the boattt do not carry guns enough or men enough for the object, but 
it is because, from the comparntiYe weakness of the vessels, the gun and the 
m n cannot be kept in an effective position. 
'l'here are, moreover, many harbor requiring defence, in which there are no 
1,hoal whereon the Lont. could take refuge; and in such th ir captnrc or de-
truction would be inevitable hould there be, at the sam, time, no river up 
,~hich th y might fly, or Jat •ral i ue through which they cou1d e cap to a afc 
d1 tance. 
Floating batt ri R, of wl1ich n good u. e micrht be ometimc made in p culiar 
ituationt1, would, I .-u1ipo e, diff •r from gunboat , in h ing larger, containin~ 
m ny gun <'ac·h, ancl iu h ing .-trongcr; that i to ny, haYi1w thicker :-irlc~ or 
bulwark.- · anc1 it 11a t!Omc·timc even b n propo ,d to cont-truct th •m wi h 
ball-p:oof parapct::l, and with platfonm1 open above-like, in th :: n•,p ·c ', 
~tt r1:, npnn th<· ::-hor . Jfot in whatc,vcr way form d, it i. n c -.:-arily a pai · 
of tl.1 1<l ·:~ that th1·y lw . tro1w and maf', iv ; and, ont1cqu ntly, tha tlu y l 
unw1 •ldy, m ·apal,I • of ncld, n drnng of p1a and in , pacitut cl •itber ad-
an · upon n cl frat ·cl fo' r to .vncl · : vi ·t riou n . \\ arc no,· o c ur ·. 
tip aking f hat <·ric mnvccl h. · , tPam. pj (7 cl ni c1 th powrr f 1 
at 1 ·a for an: pnrpo of m 11 "un-in"' in fa·• of th en m •, w ar 
the att riP a· m r •<1 in po. i ion c ncl awaiting hi a v n , h 
l, 1 r"' r •quirin(J' · p , at r t fl at th m, r ·h uld 
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across or near the channel, for the sake of proximity to the track of s~1~ps, the 
enemy would engage them at close quarters. A:-11 advanta9·es of mob1hty--:of 
concentrating his whole fleet upon one or two pomts, to which, under these cu--
cumstances, no relief can be sent-of greater elevation and. commn.nd, would. be 
on the side of the assailant, with no counteracting advantage to the batteries, 
but greater thickness of bulwarks. Whether this exc 'SS of thickness should be 
considered a material advantage, since the introduction of large bomb-cannon 
into the armament of ships, is a very doubtful matter. 'l'he batteries if anchored 
across the channel would· have the further advantage of a raking fire; but we 
~ave seen that the raking fire of one squadron of ships upon another advancing 
1s by no means decisive. 'l'he power of throwing the whole assailing force upon 
one or two points, of pouring upon the decks of the batteries a greatly superior 
force of boarders, would, of themselves, seem to leave little room to doubt as to 
the issue. 
If, now, we suppose these floating batteries to be smaller, so that having a 
lighter draught they might be placed near the shores or upon the shoals, they 
might certainly be thereby saved from the kind of attack which would prove so 
fatal if anchored more boldly in deep water; but they would at the same time 
lose much of their efficiency from their remoteness; and positions wherein they 
wo:1ld be secure from being laid alongside, while they would be in a proper 
attitude to contriLute materially to the defence of the harbor, are afforded but 
rarely. It is doubtful whether, as a general rule, these smaller floating batteries, 
notwithstanding their greater capacity of endurance, would afford a better 
defence, gun for gun, than gunboats; or, in other words, whether this capability 
of endurance in the one would be more than a compensation for the power of 
locomotion in the other. But whether near the shore or in the channel, whether 
large or small this description of defence, owing to its fixedness connected. with 
the destructibility of the material of which it must be made, will be exposed to 
attacks analogous to those made by gunboats on ships aground. The enemy 
knowing of what the defensive arrangements consist, will come provided with 
the requisite number of sailing or steam vessels armed with bomb-cannon, 
against which the thicker bulwarks of the floating batteries would avail nothing. 
He would, besides, hardly fail to provide himself with bomb-ketches armed with 
heavy sea mortars; and as there could be no guarding against the effects of the 
long ranges of these, a few fmch vesself'. would, with great certainty, constrain 
the floating batteries to quit their position, abandoning every disposition ap-
Proaching to a concentrated array. Not to mention other modes of attack, which 
would seem to leave the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed 
that this kind of defence, whether by gunboats or floating batteries, has the 
ame intrinsic fault that an inactive defence by the navy proper has; that is to 
say, the enemy has it in hiN power to bring to the attack a force of the same 
nature and at least as efficacious as that relied on for defence ; hence the neces-
sity not of mere qua1ity, but of superiority on the part of the defence at every 
point liable to be attacked; and hence also the necessity of having an aggregate 
force as many times larger than that disposable by the enemy, as we have im-
portant places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten such places, and the 
enemy threaten us with twenty ships of the line, we must have, in all these 
place-, an aggregate of gunboats and floating batteries more than equivalent to 
two hundred P.hips-of-the-line ; for it will lrnrdly be contended that these defences 
can be transported from one place to another as they may be respectively in 
danger. 
But what will be the relative state of the parties if, instead of gunboats or 
floating batteries, we resort to team batteries. 
Althouo-h much has been said of late of the great advantage that defence is to 
d'.:rive from thi description of force, I have not been able to discover the advan-
tage ; nor do I see that sea·coast defence has been benefited in any particular 
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by the recent improvements in steam vessP.ls, except that in the case before ad-
verted to, where from the breadth of the waters defence from the shore would 
be unavailing·, a more active and formidable floating defence than by gunboats 
9 
and floating batteries is provided. 
It must be remembered that by far the greatest improvement in steam vessels 
consists in having adapted them to ocean navigation; and one inevitable con-
sequence of this improvement will be, that if the defence of harbors by steam 
batteries be regarded as securing them from the attacks of ships-of-the-line and 
frigates, or at least of placing the defence quite above that kind of attack, they 
will no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vessels similar in all 
warlike properties to those relied on for defence. 
Not only is there no impediments to transferring tl1ese vessels across the 
ocean, but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enjoin a 
state of the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times; and also a com-
plete independence of arr;mgement at each particular point, both the state of 
preparation and the independence of arrangement being much more important 
than when the enemy's motions were governed by the uncertain favor of winds 
and weather. 
It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging to steam 
batteries acting defensively, that the attacking steam vessels may not bring with 
them, or at least may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon tlie coa~t, 
unless it should be thought proper to give to the former a greater thickness of 
lJulwark than would be admissible in sea-going vcsseb. 
But the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the faculty of moving 
with promptitude and rapidity, and any attempts to strengthen the harbor vesse! 
by thickening their bulwarks considerably would unavoidably lessen therr 
mobility, thereby partially neutralizing the advantage sought. At the same 
time it is extremely doubtful whether any benefit would be derived from the 
thicker sides. It is probable that the best kind of bulwarks for these vessels 
and all otlwrs, is that which will be just proof against grape and canister-~hot 
fired from moderate distances, because with such bulwarks a shell fired from a 
bomb-cannon within a reasonable distance would pierce both sfrles, that is to ay, 
would go in one side of the ship and out at the opposite side, producing: no 
greater effect than a solid shot of the same calibre, while with thickened ides 
every shell would lodge in the timbers and produce terrible ravage. by burstin". 
In the practice with these missiles in this country it bas beeu found diffi cult 
to lodge a shell in thin targets, even ·when the load of the gun wa o r duced 
a. to increase materially the uncertainty of aim. .A. it is probable, therefor , 
that the protection from olid shot afforded by mas ive bulwark would be mo1e 
than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal ~·hell would inflict ~y 
mean. of th e bulwarks, we may conclude that the harbor team batt •ry will 
not di:ffi r in thi, respect materially from the attacking team hip .. ; and if they 
do diffi r in having more solid and imp rvious bulwarks, that no advanta(J'e onr 
th . f'nemy wi11 r ult ther from. 
,v e om th refor to the i-ame rrsult as ·when con. idering the application 
f the oth r kindfl of floatino- force to th d fenc ()f harbor ; and thi ' rc:,ult i~. 
that tl1 r i n ·way of J>lacino- the coa t in a condition of r a..,onabl ' " ('urity 
1 ut b. l1aying at :m ' point the n<"my may ha.ppm to 1 ct a force in p rt' 
n ·:1Clin L•, whi ·h :hall h ' .-n1wrior to that brouo-ht to th attack. 
Ther not onl • pr v_nil the id a, that w oncrl1t to rely upon the~ flo:ui_n_ 
r1P~ nc . , hut al. o th· Hl!'a that we may po:t1>011 th fittin°· th m for rn 
till th comm •n ·c·m •11t of wnr. '1.'nruitw acraiu to th :-ix port~ L for m ·nti n. , 
nr "bole 1wac nav. • that may lrnpp<·11 t b in port and r ady f r u, . L 1 -
npp1 pi-int ·cl to l cal cl<'fon · ' in it: . <""C'ral . tnti 11,.;, imm , 11 . • addition · ul 
liav to be made at ach port · ancl wh ther the• e a<ldition. · w ·r t b ,uppJi 
from the hip-yard r hy · uv r ·ion of mer hant v l an<l cnic ;::t 
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into -floating batteries, a considerable time must necessarily elapse ~efore there 
could be anything like readiness. In the meantime the enemy, sendmg a small 
squadron of war steamers against each-nothing being ready large squadrons 
would not be needed-would nip all preparations in the ?ud. We ?ave to keep 
in mind a fundamental principle of this system, which _is, not to n~cur ~he ex-
p ense of preparation till the certainty of war has arnved, or, as 1t might be 
phrased, till there will no longer be time to prepare. . . 
I should not have gone so much at length into a branch of one subJect wherem 
the general conclusion appears to be so obvious and incontrovertible but f~r the 
prevalence of opinions which I consider not erroneous merel;y-. ·1:mt h1Phly 
dangerous, and which, I think, must give way before a foll exh1b1t10n of the 
truth. I do not anticipate any formidable objections to the . positions assumed, 
nor to the illustrations; but even should all these in the form presented be ob-
j ected to, I may still challenge oppo:sition to the following broad propositions, 
namely: 
1st. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the de-
fensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal 
1·n power to the attacking force. 
2d. .A.s from the nature of the case there can be no reason for expecting an 
attack on one of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring 
our state of preparation from one to another after an attack has been declared, 
each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means; and 
3d. Consequently this system demands a power in the defence as many times 
greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered. 
Believing that a well-digested system of fortification will save the country 
from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and the in-
tolerable expense of a full provision of these means, I will now endeavor to show 
that such a system is worthy of all reliance. 
There has been but one practice among nations as to the defence of ports and 
harbors, and that has been a resort to fortifications. All the experience that 
history exhibits is on one side only-it is the opposition of forts or other works 
comprehended by the term fortification to attacks by vessels ; and although 
history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, we see that 
the re ort is still the same. No nation. omits covering the exposed points upon 
her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates in confiding in them. 
B ut it has been asserted, in a way to convey incorrect and hurtful impressions 
to the country, that fortifications for such purposes are obsolete resorts ; that the 
improvements in the instruments and appliances of vrnr within late years have 
caused the abandonment of such reliances. 'l'bis, however, is far from being 
true ; and it is quite important in respect to the quarters whence such assertions 
ha,e "'omctimcs proceeded not only to sustain but to enforce this denial. 
If con. iderable additions have not been made lately to the defences of many 
well-known European harbors, it is because they were fully fortified long ago. 
And it might here be asked in passing what would have happened to the sea-
port of France during the long wars between her and Great Britian, and with 
mc:h naval supremacy in the hands of the latter, if the French ports had not 
been ·well forfeited 1 Can it be supposed that anything but these fortifications 
kept the English out of the great ports and naval depots of l!""'rance, and per-
mi Pd la rge fleets to grow, great expeclitions to mature, flotillas to manceuvre, 
under the eyes of the blockading squadron and almost within reach of its guns 1 
Bu it happens that even in well-fortified France any improvement or change 
in a harbor that affords opportunity and place for new defences is sure to pro-
duce them; the Oherbourg breakwater, a work of late years, is supplied with 
formidable batterie , perhap even now not quite :finished . 
It happen , moreover, that iu Great Britain, which of all the nations of the 
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earth has most reason to rely for defence on naval power, fortifications are the 
reliance for habor defence, and of late years particularly. 
'.rhe application of steam to ocean navigation has done much and is likely to 
do more to lessen the naval ascendancy of that power, and the ports which 
formerly found security in rather indifferent fortifications under the overwhelm-
ing numbers of her men-of-war, have, in the present liability to be surprised by 
fleets of war-steamers, received and are at this moment receiving large additions 
of strength in forts and batteries, and new "harbors of refuge " are being formed 
and strongly fortified, in order the better to protect her coast and her commerce 
under this change of naval relations. 
Great Britain sees that she cannot effectually guard her coast and her ports 
from this particular dang·er by the number of her war vessels, great as thi:; 
number is, and greatly as it may be augmented from her vast commercial ma-
rine. She does not run into the folly of posting at every dock yard a squadron 
of steamers as larg·e as any that can be brought against it, but she improves and 
adds to her old fortifications to m:tke them adequate of themselves, and she 
creates new (artificial) harbors for the sake of having fortified shelter near the 
probable field of activity of her navy in its various forms . 
Instead, therefore, of lessening· the utility of fortifications, we see that, in the 
opinion of the high military authorities of that government, the late changes and 
improvements have made the increase and improvement of fortifications indispen-
sable. There are some particulars of her late course in this respect. 
Refening to parliamentary estimates for 1847-'48, 1848'-49, and 1849-'50. 
I find that for fortification alone, 1:ncluding new works and repairs ef old u-orh 
upon the coast of Great Britain and Ireland, ( chiefly along the Bnglish channel,) 
and excluding estimates for barracks, quarters, storelwuses, ~c., there was ~e-
mancled for those years, severally, $578,766, $282,892, and $439,036, bem" 
$1,300,694 for the last three years. . 
I find that important colonial ports have received accessions of strength m the 
same way lately, and that, for examplt>, on the water front of the reclonbta~le 
Gibraltar the same batteries that repelled and destroyed the formidable fl.oatrn" 
batteries of France and Spain in 17 2, expenditures exceeding six hundred 
thousand dollars haYe been made within four or five years, and $367, 7 mor' 
are rstimated to be necessary to pnt them in equilibrium with new mean °1 
attack. 
At Malta, already possessed of very strong fortifications, about $180,000 ha.e 
already been voted, and $696,000 is called for in addition, to b applied to harbor 
defence particularly. 
'l'he ame nation is meanwhile placing in her new coa t batteric eight-inc_h 
and ~fty- ix pounder., and thirty-two pound guns; and, at a great exp_ m,e, 1' 
ubF1tituting thi hcavie t kind of ordnance for twenty-four pound r and 117ht · 1 
pound r in th old batteri . . Bctw en the year 1 39 and 1 49 he ha:,; ·u11-
p1ir I, or ha isflu d ord r to upply, to ea-coa ·t fortific, tion at 1 a:-t t,~o 
thou. and new pi<·c ,N of tl1 larget1t calibr . Th , increa e of heavy ordnanc ' m 
th' batt ri<'.' of fihraltar within th, t period, wa iO'hty-two piec -::: ; and 3 
l rt. mouth and vitinity it wa. two hundred and •icrhty- Y n pi cc .. 
/ir 'rhoma~ Ha ·tin ..,.14, of th Royal .J.Yary, under xamin. tion befor a c m-
mitte of th. Hou.:e of 'ommon~, ·aicl: "I wa a.,ked ju t now wheth r h 
<run· at P ort. mouth or otlwr pla ·e h:ul he n fired in ano- •r. I :-honld bed 
to ln-incr unclc•r the con.·icl •ration of the· committr that the introdn ·tion of -.1 • 
mal· ·: it mnc-11 more pot ihle now to make attack upon any ertain p iu · 
'rom th ditt<•r •nt point all alonrr tlH! c-hann •I : •one ·ntrnti n may b m l 
a v ·ry Jar"', hocl. of frnm •r , and uncler . u ·h cir ·um. tan ·e · an quiprn n · 
(h i: ' JH~akin"' of ·ra-<·o t batt ·ri' ,) "which. would ha,· , n~w r cl Y )' • 
wh en - u had nly in icl ·nt,tl : tt ·k · t · nt mplat . from iliurr v ... 1-., m1_ 
h' iu uffi ·icnt wh •n you · uld brincr tw uty-fiv • r thirty y ,;-: 1 h 
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heaviest possible gu~s to bear upon your works. I will take, for example_, if 
rou will permit me, the port of Falmouth. In the event of any v.:ar occurrmg 
,rith this country the probability is, being the most western port, i~ wo:uld be-
com~ the refuge of our merchantmen running into the channe! t~ avoid pnvateers 
and teamships. If that port were left in its present state 1t 1s clear_ th~t. ten 
powerful steamers might destroy everything in it, without any material rnJury 
to the assailants." 
In answer to the question whether, in his opinion, the merchant steam_ers 
would be as available for the defence of the coasts as war steamers, he said : 
"Certainly not; I think this country (England) would derive an immeils_e power 
from her merchant marine ; but I look upon it to propose to contend with mer-
e' :ant steamers against the poweiful vessels whicli are in existence in France 
,rnuld be a very unwise thing." 
In April, 1850, the Hon. Uolonel Anson, in explaining the ordnance estim_ate 
to the House of Commons, said, in reference to the estimates for "works, build-
i11gs, and repairs": '' rrhe whole of this vote had been most carefully considered 
by the master general of the ordnance and her Majesty's government ; and 
though large in amount, the house would see how small a sum was asked for new 
works, such as fortifications, &c., either at home or abroad. That reduction 
was, however, attributable to the large amount that ha<l. been spent on those 
works ju previous years. It was needless for him now to point out to how low 
a state, he might say, indeed, to what a state of degradation our works of de-
fence had fallen till within the last few years, and in what condition the means 
we possessed of protecting our shores from aggression and insult were in 1835. 
It was enough to say they were totally inadequate for the pur}Jose. They 
remained nearly in the same state till 1845, and were in the very lowest possible 
condition in that year. But, in the meantime, the l:'tate of things had not escaped 
the observation of tho1.<e who turned their attention to our relations with foreign 
powers, and many honorable gentlemen found fault with the government for 
not providing more effectually for the defence of the country. In 1845 the 
aspect of affairs became threatening; the few fortifications we had to rely upon 
dismantled, dilapidated, and decayed. If a squadron of steamers had chosen 
to make their way to any of our principal naval stations, either Portsmouth, 
Plymouth, or Pembroke, or up the 'l'hames, they were completely open to attack, 
and an enemy might have committed any act of aggression he pleased. There 
Was nothing to prevent his vessel coming up the 'l'hames and insulting her 
J[ajesty in the very heart of her dominions. These considerations pressed 
th.emselves so seriously at the time that the attention of the right honorable 
lllember for Tamworth and the existing government were called to it, and they 
a.t once et to work to remedy the neglect. They proposed that a sum of money 
•hould be set apart to improve our defences, and their example had been fol-
!owf:d by the present government to a very considerable extent. r.rhe result 
Was, that very much had been accomplished during those four years, and he 
\rn- happy to say the country might be proud of it. At Portsmouth the sea 
<leftncc · had been completed and made very powerful; at Plymouth they were 
1_'1]_ ually complete, and he believed great improvements ha<l. taken place at 
,'hecrne;_:.,, and in the defences on the Thames. They had commenced similar 
\\ro k at }Jembroke, which was one of the finest dock yards and harbors in the 
World, and he was sure the house would be prepared to meet any reasonable 
dem:md upon them for its defence. It was impossible to say what might come 
I) as : in a few year , and though the. expense might appear to be large now, 
w h n he house considered the ultimate advantage to the country from ~he state 
and the £,eling of security against aggression, they would, be was certam, agree 
\ti 1 him that it far out-balanced any temporary inconvenience from the grant 
of o much money.'' 
An 1 'ngli h officer of rank and distinction discussing, in 1849, the system of 
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defence necessary to Great Britain, after recommending large iuland fortifica-
tions to be erected against the possible m/1rch of an enemy's army upon London, 
estimates that it will require £1,500,000 ($6,G00,000) to complete existing 
fortifications upon tlie coast, including new batteries to be constructed there, and 
to supply them with artillery and stores. That js to say, in his opinion, the 
sum of $6,600,000, in addition to what had within these few years been ex-
pended, was necessary to be arplied to the coast de · ences of that country, in 
consequence of the changes lately introduced into the means of carrying on war 
from the ocean. 
When I had advanced thus far in this report, and was still seeking facts in 
illustration of the course pursued by Great Britain, I met the following summary 
of remarks made in relation to fortifications by Mr. Pitt, sixty-five years ago, 
(1786.) The principles for which he then contended are now and ever must be 
as sound and as applicable as when he pressed them on the consideration of 
p1,rliament with so much earnestness. The only change is one of degree. And 
we have just seen that the statesmen and military men of that country, at the 
present day, take the same view and press the same policy. During the wars 
of the French revolution the vast naval superiority of England enabled her to 
hold the closest blockade of all the ports of her adversary. This crippled 
}..,rench naval enterprise in a twofold manner-by shutting up the commerce 
which alone could supply seamen, and by shutting up the few war vessels that 
they were able to man. But even then, with such little apparent cause to fear 
anything from that navy, large sums were expended by England upon new sea-
coast ports, towers, and batteries. Now, when France can suddenly send out 
large squadrons of steam war vessels in spite of the strictest blockade, Great 
Britain feels the need of still greater strength at home. But it is we see alway' 
on fortifications that England relics for the safety of her ports; in no case do 
we see her resorting to a parade of war vessels within or at the entrance to her 
ports. Where her largest assemblages of men-of-war of all sorts take place, 
and where there must at all times be a considerable number, there she place.-, 
not small batteries and insignificant forts and towers, but her stronge t and 
heaviest fortifications. Her hi tory demonstrates that she knows how to em-
ploy her fleets better than keeping them moored within her harbor and 
roa<lstead . 
In urging upon the House of Commons, in 1786, crrtain propositions in 
relation to fortifications, Mr. Pitt, "to prove the utility of fortifications, appealed 
to the unfortunate and calamitous situation in which we wer placed in the late 
war. A considerable pnrt of our fl et was confined to our port in order to pr 
t ct our dockyard,, and thus we were obliged to do what reat Britain had 
11cv r do before-to carry on ad fen ivc war-a. war in which we w re under 
th n cc~ ity of wa. tino- our re onrcc and impniring- our Rtreno-th, without a~y 
pro p<'ct of and po1-1 ibl b nefit by which to miti<>'ate our distre ~- )Ir. l'it 
fi·lt the quc,:-:tion to be a portion of that mom ntou, ·~tern which cballrnll' ·d. 
from it naturr, th vigilance and upport of ev ry admini.'tration." • • 
• "'\Ya th Hon r acly to ·tancl rcKpon, ibl to po t rity for a repe· 
tition of imilar mi.Jort_un . and diFigrnce? ·w er thry willing to tak 11 n 
thPm elv . thP hazard of tran:-imittin th<' dan,rc•r and alamitie which hey 
th ·m •Ive• .. o l,itt r1 ' . p ric•n · rl?" • • • ")fr. Pitt ob err 
that tlwr • wi · a ron. iclnation whi h ouO'ht to hav mor w io-ht than oth I"! 
and thi"' wa ·, that fortifi ·a ion:-! b,·in"' al ·nlated to afford ompl tc, ecurity 
dockntnl , wou1C1 nahlc- our flt•c:t. to n-o on r mot rvi •., and caiT,\" on th 
JH: ·ation of war at a ,1i. tan withou .·p :-inO' th mat rial and .. 
fotnr , uavi • · t d tru ·ti1111 hy th· inva. ion f an t·n my," • • 
' Hut it wa uot only Ly fon•i•rn .·pC' ition tl1, t w· mi..,.ht Jo-. tlw i 
ur He ·t; in c~e of inv ,.,j n i might o happ n that th Lip , thoug-h in th 
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,ery channel, might be prevented by contrary ~inds, tides, and other contin-
gencies, from arriving to the assistance and relief of the dockyards." 
" Were it to be asked why the sum to be required by these fortifications had 
not been demanded for strengthening the navy, he would fairly answer that t!1e 
money which would prove sufficient to accomplish these works would not bmld 
so many ships as would serve for the defence of our most val_uable h~rbors. 
There was, besides, a certain degree beyond which we could neither build nor 
man any more. 'l'he true limit he could nnt, nor would it be prudent for him to 
assign, yet in the nature of things such a limit must exist; but there could 
nenr be any line drawn to restrain the security which we ought to provide for 
our dockyards." 
" Mr. Pitt called upon the House to beware how they suffered themselves 
lightly to be drawn into a line of conduct which might involve their posterity 
in accumulated evils; and he suggested to their recollection the remorse which 
they must feel if they should hereafter find that they had, by an ill-timed per-
tinacity upon the present occasion, brought upon the country calamity and 
ruin." 
I regret that I have not time to find and adduce a few pertinent facts from the 
practice of the French nation in this respect, and especially within the last few 
years. We know well, however, the general result, namely, that France has 
always kept herself well guarded by sea-coast fortifications; and, as before said, 
that she owes her exemption from many heavy calamities to a steady adherence 
to that policy. • 
Believing that the statements just presented must conclusively show that 
nations having experience in war have made fortifications their main reliance for 
the defence of their ports, reserving their navies for offensive purposes, and that 
the greater energy and activity imparted to the latter by modern improvements 
ha,e compelled a still more powerful preparation of such defences, I turn again 
to the particular point of our present inquiry, namely, the use and influence of 
steamers in coast defences. I have to add, that steamers as substitutes for 
fortifications would be inferior to other armed vessels, because the efficiency of 
the defence must depend, other things equal, on the number of guns; that is, as a 
large number will be brought to the attack, a large number must be employed in 
defPnce, and steamers carry very few in comparison. The power of rapid loco-
rnotion characteristic of steamers, is for this purpose nothing in itself, nor the 
poy·er of t ransporting quickly bodies of armed men; there must be the power 
of heavy and numerous guns, whether moving or anchored. Though very use-
ful in reconnoitering an advancing enemy, in carrying orders, in conveying relief 
to l1atterie, , in transporting quickly large bodies of men, and in such like duties, 
,teamers could not constitute a good defensive array except against steamers 
only ; and, accordingly, against such an array the enemy's fleet of steamers 
'lrou1d bring in tow a few line-of-battle ships or frigates. . 
Even, therefore, should there be time after a war shall have been opened to pre-
pare in each of the gr at harbors a hurried display of this kind out of the light 
tiver and bay t amers, it would be no match for sea-going steamers and heavy 
arm d ve el brought into the attack; indeed, it would not be easy to say what 
:xce.; · of numbers, in favor of the defence, could establish an equalibrium. As 
JU::,t ._aid above, there could be no resistance of moment made, except by 
rnany heavy gun ; and to supply the e a great multitude of steamers or of 
tner ·hant ·hip. would have to be converted into floating batteries. What the 
e~ult of uch a re ort would be may be learned from the battle of Copenhagen. 
Thi._ w· · in no sense a contest between ships and fortifications, as is generally 
uppo .... ·d; it wa the attack of a fleet of sailing ships upon a line of floating 
Lat cri · f one kind or another. 'l'he Dan s had anchored on the edge of a 
hoal a line of the e battcri , parallel nearly with the wall of the city, and at 
'he distance of at least three-fourths of a mile. This line could be attacked 
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only on the outside, and, when attacked, was interposed between the enemy and 
the walls, and consequently for the time entirely extinguished the fire from the 
fortifications. 
The line consisted of blor.k-sliips and praams-by which are understood to 
be meant vessels converted into mere floating batteries and more or less strength-
ened for the purpose; and rafts, supposed to be floats of timber with a timber 
parapet towards the enemy-in all eighteen batteries. A squac1ron of four sails 
of the line, one frigate and two sloops-of-war, wei·e anchored higher up the 
harbor-where there was also the "three-crown" battery. Lord Nelson carried 
to the attack twelve line-of-battle ships, twelve frigates, and a number of smaller 
armed vessels. All this force he concentrated upon the line of floating batteries; 
every vessel of which was taken or destroyed, except one or two smaller vessels, 
which cut their moorings and ran in under shelter of the fortification. 'fbis 
concentration included the Danish squadron · above mentioned, and also the 
"three-crown" battery from any material participation in the action. Some 
English frigates within reach of the latter were greatly injured and obliged to 
r etreat. 
This faculty of concentration ( applied with success on several memorable oc-
casions by that great naval commander) is an inherent one in an attacking 
squadron, and is not to be evaded by a line at anchor- especially not by a 
line of floating batteries. 
If, however, we should allow batteries of this sort whether aided by steam 
or not-to be equal, gun for gun, to the attacking sr,1rndron, ancl that they can 
be got ready in time, we nevertheless should :hereby throw au enormous expen-
diture of money upon the country at a moment of great fiscal difficulty. Let 
us make a rough estimate of that expenditure. 
Lord Nelson's fleet, just mentioned, was rated at 1,158 guns, and it is only 
reasonable to assume that we should be liable to a visit from a force as great. 
Assuming that the merchant vessels taken for conversion into floating batterie,. 
would, on the average, carry ten guns on a broadside, which will be assuming 
that they arc as large as sloops-of-war, we should need fifty-eight such ve~sel:- . 
and estimating thrse at fifty thousand dollars each, which, including purcba~e. 
armament, alteration, &c., is a moderate allowance, we shall have a total fi~t 
cost of two million nine hundred thousand dollars for one part, and for the ~ix 
ports before mentioned, a grand total of seventeen million four hundred thou~an • 
dollars-a. sum much greater than has been expended in preparing for mon 
than four thousand of the heaviest guns in permanent fortifications upon th,• 
great points of the coast. 
If we attempt to supply the 1w1uisite force in guns by the u e of river and 
bay tearners, in. tead of sailing vesselB, we cn.nnot allow more than five gun,, 
in th' average, to a broadside; so that we. hall require one hundred and ;-;ixt n 
t am rR, which, at thirty thou. and dollars for purcha e, armament and altera-
tion, will o-ive thrcr million four hurn1rccl and ighty thou..,:mcl dollar~, for th 
fir. t co. t in a ·ingle harbor, and for the ,·ix port~, twenty million eight lnrndretl 
ancl <·i,rht • thon.,ancl dollar . 
I do uot c,ivc thP:::c cstimatr,_ a exact, though I believe them to b below th 
co:t that woul<l h1w · to be incurr c1, but a: afforcling hint, of the co.-tline~~ •' 
of that natmc·. n r.xp nditurc for thi purpo:c qually !!'T • • 
would h:w to Le rc•peatul, morr.ov r, at th commcn ·emcnt of ·Y 'IT w, r r 
.. till "'n t ·r outlay .. woulcl L iu ·urrccl iu kc pitw up thi p ri..:habl annam · 
during p a· . • 
·what conclu. ion. follow from th , })l'C edinO' con. id r tion.., 1 Why. th t in 
nclo1Jtin"' thi .·p ·dicnt w houl,l involv w-.· Iv . , at th openin"' of ,· . 
war in a va t outlay for th c~cfl'11 · of th,,. port. · that th r would _ · 
proba iii · tha th pr pamn n. nlthotwh inv h•in,.. that norm u .. 
c uld not h m·Hlc in tim • i that, •y ·11 if pr •p r cl in tim nrything 
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put at the hazard of a single battle, with m~s~ ~mportant advantag~s on the si~e 
of the enemy, and consequently few probab1hties of successful resistance; _o: _1( 
by more extended preparations, we should endeavor to. turn these proba?1ht1es 
the other way, it would be at the greater risk of not bemg ready, and with the 
certainty of greatly enhanced cost. . . . . . 
It has been deemed necessary above all tlungs, cons1dermg 1mpress10ns that 
have been made on the public mind as to the influence of steam vessels upon 
sea-coast defence, to show at large that while the introduction of the vessels 
into naval equipment has greatly facilitated attacks, either by steamers alone or 
in conjunction with sailing vessels, it has done more to avert or repel the~n, 
leaving fortifications, wpich these vessel::! can in no case replace but at great dis-
advantage, more inclisp,ensable than ever. 
In my desire to co~vey my own strong convictions, I am conscious that I 
have tediously prolong¢d this part of the report. 
Although what has been said above is undoubtedly true in reference to steam-
ers or other floating defences as substitutes for fortifications, there remain impor-
tant functions in defence, which must be committed to floating defences of some 
kind, as has before been fully set forth ; and in some of these cases it is quite 
certain that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be the most suitable. 
It must not be forgotten, however, that the very quaHties which recommend 
this particular kind of force, will equally characterize the steam vessel of the 
enemy, and that wheth1'r steam vessels or sailing vessels, or both, are relied on, 
unless there are well-secured points on the shore under which they can take 
refuge, they "'ill themselves constitute an inviting object to a superior force of 
the enemy. 
If, for example, we were to deem one of our open waters of such importance 
as to assign eight or ten steam batteries for its protection, we should thereby 
place within the reach of the enemy an object worthy of the efforts of a squad-
ron of twelve or fifteen vessels of the same description. Even, therefore, in-
tances where these naval means must be resorted to for defence upon the water, 
there must be works at hand upon the shore, to the shelter of which, if likely to 
be overpowered, they can retire. 
A branch of the second question, namely, that portion which inquires, "In 
'lf"hat manner recent improvements in artillery and other military inventions and 
ill coveries affect this question," require some separate remarks. 
The only invention and discovery, so far as I am aware, that can affect this 
question, one way or the other, is that which has introduced the practice of firing 
shells from guns ; and which has involved the use of guns of comparatively 
large calibre, so that guns which discharge missiles of eight-inch and ten-inch 
diameter, arc rather extensively used, especially eight-inch guns. Even guns of 
twelve-inch bore have been made in this country, and I believe also in other 
countries. 
It i · of course understood that even larger shells than these were long ago 
thrown in the attack and defence of fortified places, from the mortars of land 
hatri-:ries and bomb ketches. rrhe shells now spoken about, instead of being 
projected under a high angle, as from mortars, are discharged from guns l'tt low 
angle~, or nearly horizontally, like solid shot; these guns of large calibre being 
rJften called Paixhan guns, after the J?rcnch officer who first succeeded in se-
curing the favor of the military authorities for the idea-the idea having been 
ugge..:ted long before, and even successfully tried. 
The.:e ._hell-guns are now introduced by maritime nations in all vessels-of-war, 
~hether "'ailing ve sels or steamers. Those latter vessels, which carry but few 
gun~ in number, are much augmented in power by their introduction, but not 
tu.ore ..,o than sailing vessels, to which these guns are equally appropriate; and I 
have no do bt that their numbers will be every day increased, until perhaps 
there will be few or no armed sailing or steaming ships of which the guns will 
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not be modified in their calibre for this purpose, and provided with shells as 
well as shot. 
A.s to the injury sustained from an enemy's shells, that will undoubtedly be 
more ::ierious in steamers than in sailing vessels, pecause, in addition to all the 
liabilities to injury that belong, inherently, to vessels of all kinds, there are 
several superadded by the machinery, the wheels, the boilers, &c., of steamers. 
In contests between vessels, whether sailing or steam vessels, the effects of shell-
guns will no doubt be very destructive on both sides; but between forts and 
ships, the peculiar injury inflicted by shells will be suffered by the vessel exclu-
clusively. 'l'he fort will suffer less from hollow shot than from eolid shot. This, 
though true beyond all question or caviling, may need a few words of explanation. 
How are the batteries to be affected by them 1 It can be but in two way : 
first, the ship's gun having been pointed so as to strike a vital point-that is to 
say, a gun or a caniage-the shell may explode at the instant of contact. 'l'bis 
explosion may possibly happen thus opportunely, but it would happen against 
all chances ; and if happening, would probably do no more than add a few men 
to the list of killed and wounded.. · For rea:::ons that will soon appear, it is to be 
doubted whether the probability of dismounting the gun would be so great as if 
the missile were a solid thirty-two pound shot. Secondly, if it be not by dis-
mounting the guns or killing the garrison, the effects anticipated from these mis-
siles must result from the injury they do the battery itself. Now we are per-
fectly informed by military experience as to the effects of these shells upon forts 
and batteries; for the shells are not new, although the guns may be so; the 
eight-inch and the ten-inch shells having always been supplied in abundance to 
every siege train, and being perfectly understood, both as to their effects and the 
mode of using them. W ere it a thing easily done, the blowing away of the 
parapets of a work (a very desirable result to the attacking party) wouH be a 
common incident in the attacks of fortifications; but the history of attack ' by 
land or water affords no such instance. The only practicable way yet discov-
ered of demolishing a fortification, being by attaching a mine to the foot of 
the wall; or by dint of solid shot and heavy charges fired intermittingly. 
during a long succession of hours, upon the same part of the wall, in order 
not only to break through it, but to break through it in such a manner that 
the weight a11d pres:;;nre of the incumbent mass may throw large portiow ot 
the wall prostrate. 'l'his, the shortest and best way of breaking a wall, rc-
quireH, in the first place, perfrct accuracy of direction; because the amc num-
ber of shots that being clistriLuted over the expanse of a wall would mercl_y peel 
off the face, would, if conceutrated in a Ringle deep cut, cause the wall to foll; 
and it requires, moreover, great power of l)Clletration in the missile-the chnr" 
of a breeching gun being, for that reason, one-third greater than the common 
, crvice ·hargc. Kow the requi 'ite precision of tiring for thi effect is wholly 
unattainable in vcs cl , whether shot be solid or hollow; and if it were attai1 -
hle, hollow hot would be entir ·ly u. clc. for the purpo e, becau .. e every on· 
th ·m w ulc1 break to pieces again t the wall, ev n when fired with a ch 1_ 
mueh I·~.· than the common ,.ervice charg<'. Thi i8 no n wly di 'coverccl f:ct· 
it i. neitlt ·r nc:w nor doubtful. Every hollow . hot thrown ~waiu t the w, 11 of a 
fort or hatt ·ry, if fir cl with a v lo ·ity affordi1100 any pen tmtion, will unqu --
tioualily h · hmken into fr:i~ncnt.: by th<> :-hock. 
At't<·r o muc-h hacl Leen c·1TOJH·011r,Jy i-aid about the effect of the:-e ._hc,11 u n 
th ' ·a. tlP of, an J u:rn cl' -uoa, it wa d •emed advi:::able, althouo-h the r ·-ult 
} .. urop<'~lll ·1w1i1_m·nt _wc•rc~ J>l'rfc•ctly well known, to r 'l' at, in our own rvi . 
m trial tou ·lung tlu pomt. A tar,ret wa: tl1 r<•for, con. tructccl, hin-inz 
third p, rt of th• liwrth fr.11111 ·d of "ranitc,, 011 -third of brick and th r m. inin-
tliir1 of fr· . ton . Thi. wa firPCl at hy a. J>ai .·han oonn, au l LY a thirty· 
pouwl •r, from the di. tauc' of h tlf • mil·, and th autici1Jat d r ",ult , · 
u.tiu cl, uamcl y : 
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1st. Whether it was the granite, the brick, or the frees.tone that was struc~{, 
he solid thirty-two pound shot penetrated much deeper mto the wall, and chd 
much more damage than the eight-inch hollow shot; and, 2d. These 13:st_ broke 
against the wall in every instance that the charge of the gun was sufficient to 
give them any penetration. 
The rupture of the shell may often cause the explosion of the powder it con-
tain', because the shell, the burning fuse, and the powder are all crushed up 
together; but the shell having no penetration, no greater injury will be done to 
the wall by the explosion than would be caused by the bursting of a shell that 
had been placed by the hand against it. 
From all this it appears incontrovertible that, as regards the effects to be pro-
duced upon batteries by ships, solid shot are decidedly preferable to hollow 
..,hot; and the ship that, contemplating the destruction of batteries, should 
change any of her long twenty-fonr or thirty-two pound guns for Paixhan 
guns would certainly weak.en her armament. Her best missiles, at ordinary 
di·4ances, are solid shot ; and, if she can get near, grape shot to fire into em-
brasures and over the walls. The best shells against the batteries are the sea-
mortar shells, fired at high elevations ; which, being of great weight and falling 
from a great height, penetrate deeply; and, contaiuing a considerable quantity 
of powder, cause material ravage by their explosion. Such shells, however, can 
only be fired by vessels appropriately fitted; namely, by bomb ketches. 
The use of these same hollowed shot or shells, by batteries against vessels, is, 
however, an affair of a different character. r.rhe shells do not break against 
timber; but, penetrating the bulwarks, they, in the first place, would do greater 
damage _than solid shot, by making a large hole and dispersing more splinters ; 
and havmg, as shot, effected all this injury, they would then augment it many 
fold by exploding. 
In all cases of close action between ship and battery the shells will pass 
through the nearer side ; and, if not arrested by some object on the deck, will 
pr1 bably lodge and explode in the further side, causing by the explosions a 
m 1ch greater ~oss among the crew, and greater injury to the vessel, than by 
the mere transit across the vessel i as before suggested, the vessel would suffer 
le., q injury were her sides made so thin as not to retain the shell, permitting it 
t~ pa ~ through both sides, unless fired with a small velocity. It is not impos-
sible t~at an extensive use of these horizontal shells may lead to a reduction in 
the thickness of ship's bulwarks. It is unquestionably true, therefore, that the 
advantage of this invention or improvement starnls, as between forts and vessels, 
~ holl;y on the side of fortifications; as between sailing vessels and steamers, it 
is _behev~d to b~, as they are now prepared, on the side of sailing vessels; but 
thr: la 't 1s a pomt with which we are not now particularly concerned. 
Ar:other invention or improvement of modern days was for a time thought to 
offer unportant advantages to vessels in contest with forts; not as making the 
fort more valuable, but the vessel less so. It was the substitution of iron for 
1:ood as the material of vessels' hulls . Experience thus far, however, is un-
fa~?o~able. To make the sides of a thickness to repel shot demands great cost 
~d involves a material loss of buoyancy, and shot passing through the sides of 
n-on "'"essel are apt not merely to make a hole of about their diameter, as through 
wo d, but to tear whole plates of iron from their rivets. There is good reason 
to uppo e that the use of this material for war vessels has or will be abandoned; 
if adher d to, to say the least, it will not lessen the advantages possessed by 
fortification. 
h conre of the preceding remarks-in discussing the effects upon sea-coa~t 
nee, of numerous railroads, and of the use of steamers as war vessels-led 
o o many incidental ob ervations on the relative influence of fortifications, that 
he _particular point of thi influence has already, perhaps, been sufficiently 
e 1dated. 'Ihough the relative superiority of fortifications over any other 
H. Ex. Doc. 92-17 
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suggested means has been often enough asserted in these observations, some-
thing more must be said as to their sufficiency for the security of the great in-
terests on our coast. If willing to trust for their sufficiency to the example of 
other nations, we should find abunaant proof in the practice of all that ha-re 
taken part in or been exposed to the hazards of war. All have resorted to forti-
fications, and many have, for long periods of time, owed to them alone exemp-
tion from some of the worst of its calamities. 'I1he example of other nations at 
the present moment, as has before been stated, shows, moreover, that they find 
no other satisfactory reliance under the increased energy now given to the instru-
ments of warfare than an increase of the number and an augmentation of the 
force of fortifications. 
In opposition to this mode of defence much stress is laid on certain guccessful 
attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed strong. I have no 
doubt that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent 
of the naked question of relative strength, but at any rate, when carefully con-
sidered, how little do these results prove in comparison with numerous other 
instances in which there was an immense disparity of force in favor of ve sel:~ 
that have been signally defeated. These latter instances are those that should 
be received as a test of the actual relation between the two kinas of force; not 
certainly because they were successful, but because the smaller the works, it~ 
armament, its g·arrison, the less the probability that any extraneous influence 
has been in operation. A single gun behind a parapet, provided its position be 
a fair one and the parapet be proof, need, as regaras its contest with ships, 011c 
nothing else to the art of fortification; and its effect will be the same whetl1cr 
the battery were fresh from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age or ·were 
erected at the aawn of the art. 'l'he gun is in a position to be used with cflcc_t: 
the men are as fully protected by the JJarapct as the service of the gun will 
allow; they are brave and skillful, and there is nothing to prevent them from 
doing their duty to the utmost. 'l'llCse are all conditions easily fulfilled, and 
therefore likely to be so. The state of things is not lcs just aud fair toward; 
the ves"el; she chooses her time and opportunity. 'I1hr battery goes not to the 
ship, but the ship to the battery, taking the wind, the tide, the sea-all a · ~be 
would have them; her condition and discipline arc perfect, and her crew cour· 
ageous and adroit. Nothing, undrr such circumstance , can prevent the ju~· 
is ·uc of battle but some extmorclinary accident, po sible indeed to either 1iarty, 
but ca.-,ily recognized when occurring. . 
'J'hc contest between larger works and heavy squadrous may be much ID re 
complicated affairs; tlie cause of di.-,m1ter to thr former bein°· often traceahle o 
potc-11t, though not always o1vion,· influ nc R. 'l'Jic, fortification mny han 
ab:-nrdly planned originally, or Laclly executf'<l, for tl1rre ha,-1 at all time" b en 
in tl1i. profo~.·ion, a~ i11 othn~, rnnch f-Cope givm to qnackcry; they may h, r 
hr •n c·rc•cfril at a time when .·liip:-of-war, again:-t which tlwy were 1irovidcd, 
WN<' very diffi,rcnt thing: froin the lofty linc-of-hattl • ;l1ip, of modern tim ,_ 
Ion~ p •ace or long impunity may have 1 >ft tlwm in a , tatc wholly unprepa 
for the . nclcl ·u mw of thc·ir t-trc•ntrtli; th, command rn:iy han! b '11 intru,tcd t 
111·r on· ig-11or:mt alih· ot' the mno1111t of po" •r iu their hancl,1, and of th m 
of l'.· ·rti. i1_1" it; tl1e ~arri. on may han! bc>c·n nrnli ·eipline<l or mutiu n:-; th 
p J ul.t<· · <11 cont •JJtc·d or di loyal; the ·lmnor of frj,rht •11 ·cl citizen. may h, 
·•iu cl a pn•m1.ltm' , UJT<·1ul<•r · all thc:e, or :my of thPm maY hav J>r due d 
i:-,11 I fl ·in" tlu• <{lit' tion of 1 •lativ«> po v ·r n;1tou ·hc>tl. ., 
\\ hilc tl1l'n :m lL n > d, uht tlmt tlu l' ancl othPr d,•tc·rioratinrr influ nc , 
haY r ·, i n 111: p rntc-d t > t1ic 1m:judicc· of fortification., :mcl th.it t11 , 
like! • to b m r nuuwr u nnd morP ·,mtrnlliiw ·1, thl' work w r m re 
fr · it i rtt in tha th r :m l (• 11 influ nt· • a -iin,,. i;1 a r ? r dir j n 
tlwm, tliat i t ·a.~ n n mukitw tlwm tro11:; 'rand m r. •ffici nt J1, 1 
u,•!Jt t b . h r c n JJ • JH fay rnbl • inHu •u ·: f u ·h a natur, or 
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as to make the simple one-gun battery, before mentioned, equivalent to a battery 
(say) ten times as large. . . 
It must not be supposed from what is said in relation to larger fort1ficat10ns 
that their magnitude necessarily involves imperfection or weakness, nor because 
I have considered small and simple works as affording the best solut~on to the 
question of relative force must it be inferred that small works are suited to all 
circumstances. I speak here in reference merely to the judgment we are en-
titled to form of the relative power of these antagonist forces from their contests 
a exhibited in history. In instances of the latter sort there cannot, from the , 
nature of the cases, be any important influence operating of which we are igno-
rant, OT for which we cannot make due allowances, while in examples of the 
form.er kind we may be in the dark as to many vital matters. 
These observations have been deemed necessary because, in judging of this 
matter# it might not be so obvious that certain brilliant and striking results 
should not be adopted as affording the true test of relative power. It would be 
more natural to turn to Copenhagen and Algiers as indicating where the power 
lies, than to Charleston and Stonington, and yet these latter as indices would be 
true and the former false. · 
We will now turn to certain examples. 
" The name of Martello tower was adopted in consequence of the good de-
fence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in the 
year 1 794, which although armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two 
B~t:is~ ships-of-war without sustaining any material injury from their fire. But 
th1 circumstance ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on 
shore must always in certain situations possess over those of shipping, no matter 
ll·hether the fo1mer are mounted in a tower or not. r:rhat this is a just decision 
will perhaps be readily allowed by all who are acquainted with the following 
e9.ually remarkable, but less generally known fact, which occurred about twelve 
year afterward in the same part of the world. · 
« Sir Sidney Smith, iu the Pompee, an eighty-gun ship, the Hydra, of thirty-
eight guns, C:tptain Manby, and another frigate, anchored about eight hundred 
yards from a battery of two guns situated on the extremity of Cape Lecosa, and 
protected from assault by a tower in which were five-and-twenty French soldiere, 
commanded by a lieutenant. 
u The line-of-battle ship ancl the frigate fired successive broadsides till their 
ammunition was nearly expended, the battery continually replying with a slow 
hat de tructive effect. 'I1he Pompee ( at which ship alone it directed its fire) had 
fort_, hot in her hull, her mizzen topmast carried away, a lieutenant, midship-
lll.an, and fireman killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving in-
r:ffec•ual, negotiations were resorted to; and, after some hours parley, the officer, 
a Or r.,ican and relative of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the 
carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had 
.\lb::,eq_uently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure; so that, in fact, the 
:itta ·k of an eighty-gun ship ancl two frigates had been resisted by a single 
piec · of ordnauce."-(,Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John r.r. Jones.) 
"Th Corsican tower above mentioned, which had in like manner completely 
l1affled a n:1val cannonade, was very soon found to surrender when attaclrnd by 
land; not, however, before a small battery had been made ( erected) to reduce 
it."-(Pai~ley'f:l Oomse, vol. iii.) 
Here are two exa~ples: 1 t. A single heavy gun mounted on a tower beat off 
011e or wo Briti .. h ships; 2cl. A barbette battery, containing two guns, beat off 
aBritish ighty-gun ship, supported by two frigates. 
I would . cem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance as 
tia.L of relative power. There is no complication of circumstances on one side 
fJt t e o her; nothing to confnr-e or mi.l'lkacl; all is perfectly simple and plain . 
.\ ~ all b dy of artillery judiciou.Jy l_)O, ted on the shore is attacked by armed 
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vessels bearing forty or fifty times as many guns, and the ships, unable to pro-
duce any effoct of consequence, are beaten off with loss. 
The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side of the batteries, either as 
regards position or quality, for both works were immediately reduced by a land 
attack- that which the eighty-gun ship and two frigates were unable to effect 
being immediately accomplished by landing two :field-pieces with a very small 
portion of the crew of one of the vessels. On the other hand, there was no 
peculiar disadvantage on the part of the ships, as the time and mode of attack 
were of their own choice. 
In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessels in the 
manner of representing the affairs, the language of British mnitary writers (the 
ships being British) has been exactly quoted.-(See Paisley's Course of Ele-
mentary Forti:ficatiom, Yol. ii, and Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jone •. ) 
Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victorious party, 
the result, probably, would have appeared still more to the disadvantage of tl1e 
ships. 
'l'he circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, in April, 
1801, have already been briefly stated. A more minute description will be 
found in House document No. 206, 1st session, 26th Congress. 
I now proceed to examine a great instance of naval success, in which there is 
HO room to doubt the extent to which fortifications were engaged. This in-
stance is the attack on Algiers, in 1816. The attack was made by the com-
bined English and Dutch fleets, mounting about one thousand guns, under the 
command of Lord Exmouth. 
In the fortifications that looked towards the water there are enumerated, in a 
plan su pposcd to be authentic, three hundred and twenty guns; but not more 
than two hundred of these could act upon the fleet as it lay, The ratio of the 
forces engaged, therefore, as expressed by the number of guns, (saying nothing 
of the calibres, of which we know nothing,) was about as five to two. The ac· 
tion continued from a 'lnarter before three until nine, without intermission, and 
did not cease altogether until half past eleven. 
It is very certain that the effect of the :fire upon the Algerine shipping and 
town was very severe, because we know that all the shipping was de troyed ex-
cept some small ve~sels; and ,ve know, also, that Lord Exmouth dictated the 
terms of the treaty that followed. 
Ilonorable as this result was to the combined fleets, and happy as it wa~ for 
tlic cause of humanity, there arc, nevertheless, technical circum, tance~ con-
]l(~cted with it that excite doubts as to how much of the :final re~ult ·wa' due to 
pliy:-ical chm,frcment, to moral eff ct, to inherent defects in the defence:-, and to 
ig-11orance in the use of tlie e dcfi•ncc,, such as th y were. That the lo~.: in 
killed and wounded. in the city and works wa o-reat i probable, because we are 
inform cl that a very great addition ha<l h en ~adr to the o-arri~on, in }H' para· 
tion for the atta ·k, under Hom impr ·s:-don. no doubt, that a l:mdino- would be 
att<'mptecl. For the .er i c of the gun tlwr w re n eded but thr or four 
thou: ancl men a.~ the utmo1-1t. An accumulation beyond that numb r woulll . dd 
~otlung to ~he vwor of c1 •frnce: while, by cau:-;ing an increa.. of the ca--~l 1 -
1 _w_,,ul~ h '1ghtcn tl~ t ·rror. ~f th com?at. Th . cl yre :si~g. fli t of tl_u I --
ot lifp m th lmtt ·r1 · aucl of th Lurnrng of bml<lmo-: w1tlnn th t , n _n 
a.hont the mole wa , of cour. r., in -re a.· d Ly th cntir, d •:,truction of th 12' nn 
fl t anc-hor •cl within th · mol . 
,, hav 110 nwm1 of ,indrring of the actnal condition of th work,· n r 
th ir itu ,,., · for the k of contc11,li11•,. with the h ·aYY. hip~ of mocl m tin 
'I h • fort. and batti-ri, !}1 hon• were probahlj· too !'l -vat •cl t b 
mand <l ·wn u: th 1 ri!: tot th· ailing hip ; and, provided th ...:t, !!'llll- -
v r •cl with a proof par:111 t: tl1 y ma: I, re ,rardNl a: h •iu"" w II 'tu. t • 
ut mor' than half th · "'UU 'll'":1',. •d w r in th • _fol •h al b 1tt ry. n 
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mude of attack adopted, especially by the Queen Charlotte, of_ on~ hundred ~nd 
ten guns, was calculated to test, in the severest manner, the prmc1ples on which 
tbis work had been planned. She so placed herself, within "fif~y yards" of the 
extremity of this battery, that she could either rake or take m re~erse ever:y 
part of it. If she at the same time commanded the battery-that 1s to say, 1f 
from her spar-deck she could look down upon its platform-then she must at 
once, with her grape and canister, have driven the garrison from that pl~tform, 
leaving only the lower and covered tier of guns, if there were such a tier, for 
service. With our imperfect knowledge of the fortifications, all this must, how-
ever, be left to conjecture. 
But there are matters connected with the service of batteries which are not 
conj ectllre. Not a shot was fired until the Queen Charlotte had anchOl'ed. 
1Vhat a different vessel, when she anchored, might not this ship have been if 
the Iolehead battery had employed its fire, of more than one hundred guns, in 
raking her from the time she arrived within· a mile and a half until she had an-
chored within fifty yards! How different might have been the condition of the 
fleet, generally, if they had been subjected during the approach, and while as-
suming their stations, to the raking fire of all the two hundred guns! 
It does not appear that a single red-hot shot was fired from the batteries. 
We might almost rest on this fact, and assert that a defence w h~ch had failed 
o provide itself with this auxiliary means must have been carried on in disre-
gard if not in violation of all rules, all knowledge, and all experience; that it 
,vas probably without plan or comLination, and not less probably without prepa-
ration m other particulars of importance scarcely inferior. 
Before leaving this example it may be we'll to inquire what, after all, was the 
effect of these batteries upon the ships, compared with the effect of ships upon 
ships. 
In the battle of the Nile the French fleet, rated at one thousand one hundred 
and ninety guns, caused a loss in Nelson's fleet of eight hundred and ninety-five 
killed and wounded, which is in the proportion of ten :E'rPnch guns to less than 
eight Englishmen killed and wounded. In the battle of Trafalgar the French 
fleet carried not less than three thousand guns, and they caused a loss to the 
En~lis~ ~f one thousand five hundred and eighty-seven killed and wounded, 
·wlnch 1s m the proportion of ten guns to less than six killed and wounded. In 
thi::: affair 0f Algiers, with a force not exceeding two hundred guns, the batteries 
c· i...,ed a loss of eight hundred and eighty-three killed and wounded, being in 
the proportion of ten guns to forty-four men; and if we take into account every 
gnu th~t w~s pointed over the bay, (say three hundred and fifty guns,) the 
proportion will be ten guns to twenty-five men; being an effect more than three 
ime a great as that produced by the JI'rench ships at the battle of the. Nile, 
a d more than four times as great as that produced by the same nation at Tra-
f: gar. . 
\\-bile reflecting on the circumstances of this battle the mind is not satisfied 
-irh any reasons that present themsel-ves for the withdrawal of Lord Exmouth, 
he moment the land wind enabled him to do so, on the supposition of entire 
"-' cce::s on his part. It is not understood why he should feel the great anxiety 
he state:-5 himself to have been under that this wind slioulcl spring up. " Provi-
dence at thi interval," (between ten and eleven o'clock at night,) "gave to my 
a xi u wi ·hes the u ual land wind common in this bay, and my expectations 
-ere completed. We were all hands employed in warping ancl towing off, and, 
- the help of the light air, the whole were under sail and came to anchor out of 
· r •acl1 of :hell. about two in the morning, after twelve h ours of incessant labor." 
~ - v if anything had been decided by the action it must have been one of 
-o hiug: : either the ships were victorious or the batteries were so. If the 
· p ·w ·r · completely victorious it wouid seem to have been judicious for thE>m 
r roaiu where they were, in orcler, if there was to be any more fighting, to be 
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ready to press thejr advantage, and especially in order to maintain the ascend-
ency, by preventing the remounting of guns,'repairing batteries and re-supplying 
them with munitions, &c. 
Had the people possessed the inflexibility report ascribed to the Dey, and had 
they set zealously about the work of preparation for a new contest, it might not 
have been easy for Lord Exmouth, in the condition to which his ships are 
acknowledged by authentic accounts to have been reduced, to enforce his 
demands. It is not understood, therefore, why, if he had been so successful as 
to be certain that his end was attained, he should be so anxious to get ont of 
gun-shot, when by so doing he involved the issue in more or less doubt and 
hazard. 
He relied on the effect produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade, 
and the result proves that he was right; but his anxiety to clear the vessels 
from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, which _he 
thought it best to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city 
th!ln keep in a stat':' of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was 
this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries 1 .. 
'l'he true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of I?Jury 
done on the one side or the other-particularly as there was, OB the one side: a 
pity to suffer as well as the batteries-as the relative efficiency of the part1eti 
when the battle closed at about eleven o'clock.. All political agitation and 
popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been con-
tinued, or even hacl tord Exmouth renewed it next morning 1 
These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture; but the manner 
the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, bad the sub-
sequent demands of Lord Exrnouth been rejected, he liad it in his power to 
enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he 
would not have been signally defeated. 
On the whole, this batLle, although it stands pre-eminent as an example of 
naval ~ uccess over batteries, presents no argument to shake the confidence 
which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, deserve as the 
defences of a sea board. 
Gibraltar.-'rbe attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar, in September, 
1 782, by the French and Spanish floating batteries, is a well known in tance of 
the power of guns on shore. 
'l'he e floating batteries had been rendered, as was supposed, shot pruof and 
hell proof, by several additional thickne ·ses of timber to the side , and by 
COVC'ritw the deck with a roof of sloping timbers. 
Th ·y mounted one hundred and forty-two guns on the engaged ..,ide, -with 
~· vcnty in reserve to replace any that might Le di mounted. They wer 
anchored at the distance of about one thou and yards from the wall , and were 
oppo.: ·d b ~ about ighty-five guns . 
.1. ftc·r a protracted c:umound nine of the floatincr batt ric> were burnt h:- Lo 
hot from the .-bore, ancl the t ·11th, havi1w becn° taken po ·e ..,ion f by th 
vietnr. , wa: i-et on fir· by th •rn. 
~ o mnt<·rial injury was don to the ,vork · of the town hy tl1 .,ir fir , and 
c•ighty-fin: m ·n and oflic-n.-. w<:rP. killed and wound ·cl Ly the fir from th · ,- --
. •L tog •t h ·r with a nry viol •nt cannonacl • ancl bmnbardment from th ' ,i -
l,att11i . . 
Ball/· r!f Alt:r• im . . - n thP ith of Jul ·, 1 01, tJ1c :E rc•ncl1 admiral 
, ·n · lyi11~ at a11C'hor off th town of Alge·. ira.- with two .-hip~ of i~hty ~ u .. 
on f ·n·nt. ·-f ur "1111 • and 1111 fiigat •. 'l th :outh of him. on a ,m: I 
i:lancl, wa a bntt<'l-Y, · JI ·d th ( :r •1 n i. lan<l hatt ·1J·, mou11ti110- •v ~n ·~h 0 
and tw nt ·-four pound r · and to tl, north of him, on tlu, m, in nn th r · 
tery, ·allc;cl ~t. ,fo 'fJll • ' l,att ry, mountin,,. fiw ·i"'ht · n-p und •r . 'l'h 
w ·r , L .id , fi urt u ._paui-.h ,,.uuL at. au ·h r d n · u, makino- to I o t 
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hundred and six guns afloat and twelve guns in battery-altogether three hundred 
a.nd eighteen guns. 
Sir James Saumarez hearing that Leno is was in this position, advanced 
against him from Cadiz with two ships of eighty guns, four of seventy-four 
guns, one frigate, and a lugger-in all five hundred and two guns. On his a_p-
proach, Lenois, who was anchored in a line nearly north and south at some chs-
tance from the shore, cut his cables, and ran into shoal water to prevent being 
doubled upon by the British line: this manreuvre at the same time entirely un-
masked the fire of the batteries. 
The Hannibal, one of the British seventy-fours, in attempting to close with 
the French admiral, touched the ground and could not be floated off. She, how-
ever, continued the fight with great obstinacy, even for a considerable time after 
she was deserted by her consorts. Not being able to double upon the :E'rench 
line, an attempt was made to assault the Green island battery, which, being 
badly served by the Spaniards, had nearly ceased firing. 
But this attempt was anticipated by the arrival at the island of a party sent 
from the French frigate lying near; and the assault was defeated with the loss 
to the English of one boat sunk and another taken-the Frenchmen renewing 
~th vigor the fire of the battery. At the north end of the line the French admi-
ral wan aided by seven gunboats, which took so active a part in the fight that 
five of them were sunk or rendered unserviceable. rrhe St.Jacques battery being, 
h.ow-ev-er, served sluggishly by the Spaniards, the French sent a party from the 
De:c;saix to impart greater activity and effect. 
After the combat had continued about six hours, the British squadron drew off 
greatly damaged, leaving the Hannibal seventy-four alone and aground; and she, 
after suffering great loss, was obliged to strike. 1'he French insist that the 
Pompee, an English ship of eighty guns, had struck her colors; but as they 
could not take possession, she drifted off and was towed away: it is believed she 
w-a entirely dismasted. 
We do not know the loss in the French squadron, but the killed, wounde<1, 
and missing in the English fleet amounted to three hundred and seventy-five 
m.e_n; being more than twelve men for every ten guns against them, and being 
tWI.ce as great in proportion as the English loss in the battle of 'rrafa1gar. 
In this battle of Algesiras there were five hundred and two English guns 
afloat acting against three hundred and six French guns afloat. As the English 
cho::5e their own time for the attack and had the wind, it is only reasonable to 
,uppose that three hundred and six of the English guns were a match for the 
thr ·e hundred and six guns of the French vessels. 'l'his will leave one hundred 
and ninety-six English guns afloat, opposed to the twelve guns in the batteries; 
or, reckoning one side only of each ship, it shows ninety-eight guns in the Brit-
ish fleet to have been overmatched by the twelye guns in the batteries. 
There never was a more signal and complete discomfiture, and it will admit of 
no other explanation than that just given; namely, that the two small batterieP, 
one of five and the other of seven guns, partly eighteen and partly twenty-four 
pounder·, more than compensated for the difference in favor of the British fleet 
of one hundred and ninety-six guns. 
The Hannibal got aground, it is true; but, she continued to use her guns, with 
the be;:;t effect, until she surrendered; and even on the supposition that this ship 
'l1ta.3 u~ele . after .,he grounded, the British had still an excess of one hundred 
and twenty-two guns over the French fleet and batteries. 
The.;:;e LatteriC': were well placed, and probably well planned and constrn~ted, 
bu h r, wa nothing extraordinary about them; their condition before the fight 
,ras comvlainecl of by Admiral Lenois, and they were badly fought in the ca,rly 
part of the action; still th twelve guns on shore were found to be more than 
equivalent to two seventy-fours aud one frigate. 
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Battle if Fucnterabia.-This recent affair introduces steam batteries to our 
notice. 
On the 11th of July, 1836, six armed steamers, together with two l3ritish and 
E1everal Spanish gunboats, attacked the little town of Fuenterabia. The place 
is surrounded only by an old wall, and two guns of small calibre, to which, on 
the evening of the attack, a third gun of larger calibre was added, formea the 
entire of its artillery. The squadron cannonaded this place during a whole day, 
and effected absolutely nothing beyond unroofing and demolishing a few poor 
and paltry houses, not worth, perhaps, the ammunition wasted in the attack. 
What may have been the number of guns and weight of metal which the asflail-
auts brought is unknown; tho11gh the superiority, independent of the superior 
weight of metal, must have been at least ten to one; but not the slightest military 
result was obtained.-(See United Service Journal, August 1836, p. 531.) 
We will now turn to affairs of a similar character on our own coast. 
In June, 1776, Sir I'eter Parker, commanding a squadron of two ships of :fifty 
guns, four of twenty-eight guns, two of twenty guns, and a bomb ketch-in all 
(according to their rate) two hundred and :fifty-two gum-attacked Fort l\Ioultrie, 
in Charleston harbor, South Carolina. 
It is stated that the fort mounted "about thirty pieces of heavy artillery.'' 
Three of the smaller vessels were aground for a time during the action, and ?ne 
of them could not be floated off, and was in consequence burnt by the Enghtih. 
Deducting this vessel as not contributing to the attack, and supposing the other 
two were engaged but half the time, the English force may be estimated at two 
hundred guns; or reckoning one broadside only, at one hundred guns againt 
thirty guns. 
'l'he English were defeated with great loss of life and injury to the ve ~eb; 
while the fort suffered in no material degree, and lost but thirty men. The killed 
and wounded in the squadron were reported by the commodore to be two hnn· 
drcd and :five; being for every ten guns employed against them more th~n 
sixty-eight men killed and wounded-a loss more than eleven time a great, m 
proportion to the opposiug force, as the loss at the battle of Trafalgar. 
In September, 1814, a squadron of , mall vessel., consisting of two ~l1ip and 
two brigs, mounting about nin ty gun , attacked Fort Boyer, at the m?uth 
of Mobile bay. A false attack was at the same time made by a party of marm ~ 
artillery, and Indians, on the land side. The fort was very ismall, and could 
not have mounted more than twenty guns on all ides, nor more than fifte n g\lfu 
on the water fronts. 'l'be action continued between two ancl three hour.:, wh n 
one of the ships, being· o injur d as to be unmanageable, drifted a hor undn 
the gun , and was abandoned and burnt by the English; the oth r ve.:;.:;cl-- r'· 
tr atec1, after uffering severely. 
rl here w re ten men killed and wounded in the fort; the los .. on the oth r part 
i · not known. 
T~1 affair of Stonington, during the la, t war, nffords anotl1cr in,·tanc': --u · 
C<'.', fnl cl fenc . Ly a battery. In thi: cat:1 there were only two o-un-. (P1d1t 
poundc1 ) in a batt ry which wa only thr fo •t hio·h, and without mbrazu ..... 
The: batt ·ry b i11 00 manned •.·clu:ivc·ly Ly citiz n° volunteer:- from th t · 
n·p<'llecl. a per:- veriug attack of a loop-of-war, cau ino- criou · lo::,.: and dam -
but . ufl ·rin,,. non·. 
11 orcln uot to <·-·tend thi · 1,ranch of tl1P r port fnrthf'r, I b ,,. I :n· 
for a c1Ptail1 cl ac ·otmt of the; atta ·1· of thf' Frc·nd1, in l 3 , on the · , l 
.J i_m11 • ·110 to tlw_ cl, ·11~11P11t 1, •fore n•f<•rn·cl to.-(Ilou:-- • o . 20 ~ 
· hth 11gn·-- , p. 2;J.) I· r th· 111111· r :i. on I al, .. t.1in from introdu ·m!!' ... 
, 1h r. i1i--tan · wl1i ·Ii th uzh iut · t> tiu,,. :rnd in..:trn ·tiY ·, , · uld 11 t ... 1 
: ff C' t }ip :lr"'llifll'llt. , 
In th· fa ·t '111 ted al ov tl1 r • 
x · 1' iu th, ·a c ,ibralt: r. u t11· 
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made proof against cold shot, and, as was thought by the constructor, p_roof 
against hot shot also; and so, indeed, for a time, it seemed. It was conceived 
that the hot shot, when buried deep in the closely jointed timbers, would 
, carcely communicate flame, and that it would not be difficult, by the use of the 
fire-engines provided, to subdue so stifled a combustion. 
By making these floating batteries impenetrable to shot, it was supposed they 
had been rendered equal in perfectly smooth water to land batteries, gun for g·un . 
... ~nd so they might then have been, nearly, had the incombustibility of the 
latter been imparted to them. But now l'esistance to firf: would not s~1ffice; 
the...,e :floating batteries must either repel these horizontal shells from thell' _bul-
'1\-arks, or if that be impossible, permit them to pass though both sides. 
K othing can be better calculated to exhibit the tremendous effect of these shells 
than a ve sel so thicksided as to stop every shell, allowing it to burst when 
nu-rounded by several feet of timber; and there can be no greatrr mistake than 
"upposing that, by thickening the bulwarks of vessels-of-war, or fitting up steam-
batteries with shot-proof sides, the effects of land batteries are to be annulled 
or in any material degree modified. 
This branch of the subject will be summed up with the remark that the facts 
of history and the practice of all warlike nations are in perfect accordance with 
the conclusions of theory. 'rhe results that reason anticipated have occurred 
a.gain and again. And so long as on the one side batteries are formed of earth 
and stone, and on the other, ships are liable to be swallowed up by the element 
on which they float, or to be deprived of the means by which . they move-so 
long as they can be penetrated by solid shot, set on fire or blown up by hot shot, 
or torn piecemeal by shells, the same results must inevitably be repeated at each 
succeeding trial. · 
But after all, it may be urged that the general principle herein contended for, 
namely, the superiority of batteries in a contest with ships, might be admitted, 
and till it would remain to show that batteries constitute the kind of defence 
best adapted to our peculiar wants. 'I'his is true; and I will now proceed to con-
sider, severally, the cases to which defence must be applied. It may be well, 
h.o'\vever, first to recal the general scope of the preceding argument. It has 
been contended that floating defences should not be relied on-not because 
they are actually incompetent to the duty, but because they cannot fulfil thjs 
d.u y unless provided in inordinate numbers, and at a boundless expense; and I 
have endeavored to show that thjs remark is generally true, whether the defen-
.ive fleet be made up of sea-going vessels, of floating batteries, or of steam bat-
teries. I have next urged the point that properly planned and constructed 
ba 1;eries are an overmatch for vessels-of-war, even when greatly inferior to 
them in armament-sustaining the opinion by many striking examples, and 
ex lai ing sati. factorily instances that have cast any doubt on such contests. 
th· 
f the facts and reasoning presented do not convey the same strong convictions 
way my own mind, it must be because I have obscured rather than illus-
d th m; for it would seem to be impossible that facts could be more uuex-
l!e iouable or reasons more beyond the reach of cavil. However that may be, 
I 1.1w leave them to candid and dispassionate revisal, and proceed to examine 
th roode of applying these defences to our own coasts. 
I may be well to divide these into several distinct classes. 
1. 'J.'here will be all the smaller towns upon the coast, constituting a very 
erou:.: cla. :. n 
_ he :"ame time that no one of these, of itself, would provoke an enterprise 
of :rna.t.•11itude, it is still nece sary to guard each and all against the lesser 
· k : A .-mall ve , cl might , uffice to g11ard against single vessels that w~uld 
,n 1::, he tempted by the facility to burn the shipping and exact a contn~u-
; bu .:omcthing more than this i. necessary, since the amount of te:11ptat1011 
out l,y a numh r of these towns would be apt to induce operat10rn:1 on a 
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larger scale. It might often happen, moreover, that our own vessel -of-war 
would be constrained to take refuge in these harbors, and they should find cover 
from the pursuer. 
Although the harbors of which we now speak afford every variety of form 
and dimension, there are few, or none, wherein one or two small forts and batteries 
cannot be so placed as to command all the water that a ship-of-war can lie in, 
as well as the channel by which she must enter. While the circumstances of 
no two of them are so nearly alike as not to modify the defences to be applied to 
them severally, all should fulfil certain common conditions, namely: the passage 
into the harbors should be strongly commanded; the enemy should find no place 
after passing wherein he would be safe from shot and shells; and the works 
should be inaccessible to sudden escalade-tbat is to say, a small garrison 
should be able to repel such an assault. With works answering to these condi-
tions, and of degrees of strength in accordance with the value of their respective 
trusts, this class of harbors may be regarded as secure. I cannot, however, here 
avoid asking what would be the mode of defence, if purely naval, of these 
harbors 1 Suppose the circumstances are deemed to require the presence of a 
fr~gate, or a steam-frigate, or an equivalent in gunboats; would not two ho~tile 
frigates or two steam-frigates infallibly arrive in quest 1 Could there be devised 
a system more certain to result in the capture of our vessels and the submi ion 
of our towns 1 
2. Another class will consist of great establishments, such as larger cities, naval 
depots, &c., situated in harbors not of too great extent to admit of good defence 
at the entrance, and also at every successive point, so that an enemy could find 
no spot within in which he could safely prepare for operations ulterior to the 
mere forcing an entrance. 
In this class are to be found objects that are in every sense of the ?ighe~t 
value. On the one hand, accumulations of military and naval matenal, and 
structure for naval accommodation that could not be replaced during a war. 
which are of indispensable necessity and of great cost; and on t~e other hand._ 
the untold wealth of great cities. As these objects must be great m the eye· of 
t~e enemy-great for him to gain and for us to lose-corresponding ~ffor~:':l on 
~IS part must be looked for and guarded against. If he come at all, it will be 
m power; and the preparations on our part must be commensurate. 
'l'he entrance to the harbor and all the narrow passes within it must be occu-
pi d with heavy batteries ; and if nature does not afford all the position dceml'O. 
requisite, some must, if practicable, be formed artificially. Batterie hould 
succ ed each other along the channel, so that the enemy may nowhere find 
shelter from effective range of ,.hot and shells while within the harbor'. e.e_n 
~10ul~ ~e , ucceed in pa ·sing the first batteries. Provided the shore adrmt th15 
d1..,poi:;1t1on, and the defence be suppliPd with an armament uumerou , b ~,Y, 
a~d ,. 1 cted with reference to the pffects on hipping, the facts quoted tr m 
hi t~ry ,·how that the. e defonc may b r lied on. 
If th m re J)a, incr under , ail with a leading wind and tide one or e, n 
s t of Latt rie~, and th n carryin · on operation· out of the reach of th or an_ 
o.the~, wer al~, the . rn•my might perhaps accompli.·h it; but th ~re~ent ~upp + 
hon 1~. that with tlu. cla~:, hi ulterior proc eding , and finally h1 return ar ' 
b ,_ubJ · ·t to th ince:~m1t a ·tion of the dcfi uccs. 
3. Thi: hri110- u: to ·011.-i<l<'r a third cla~ ·, on. i, tino- of c tabliJ1m ut-
importnucc :itnat '1 at a di:--t: llC'C up .-ome rivrr or ba ... , there b iuo- int •nn · 
. pace too wide to h · ·nmmanclecl fr m the ·hor :. In ,:nch ca:-·:; th d · n 
mn..:t b · ucc;ntrat cl upon the· narrow pa::e~, , ncl mu,t, of ·our:- . L Ip r-
tion cl in nrmam nt to th· vain• nf tlw obj · ·t.: ·over d. 1Vh n the va!u i-
Yf'r • err ·at, a :tout an:,/ of hatt1·ri1·. at th h<·st po. ition woulcl l t ·r ,m ·II 
from an att ·m1>t to f r · the pa:. :we . in hi.: advantao-e, in ca~, f ,u 
· ulcl not be comm n.:urat , ith uy immin nt ri--k. But with the m re 
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able establishments it might be otherwise. The consequence of succe_ss might 
jll~ tify all the risk to be encountered in rapidly passing in face of _batteries, how-
ever powerful. This condition of things reqnires peculiar precaut10ns under an_y 
system of defence. If, after having occupied the shores in the n~rrow pl~ces 111 
tb..e best manner with batteries, we are of opinion that the temptation may rnduce 
the enemy, notwithstanding, to run the gauntlet, the obstruction of t~e passage 
mu...,t be resorted to. By this is not meant the permanent obstruct10:3- of the 
pas~age; such a resort, besides the great expense, might entail the rum of the 
channel. The obstruction is meant to be the temporary closing by heavy float-
ing masses. 
There is no doubt that a double line of rafts, each raft being of large size and 
ancho:i:ed with strong chains, would make it impossible to pass _witho~t first 
removmg some of the obstructions; and it might clearly be made impossible to 
effect this removal under the :fire of batteries. Such obstructions need not be 
resorted io until the breaking out of a war, as they could then be speedily formed 
should the preparation of the enemy be of a threatening nature. 
There would be nothing in these obstructions inconsistent with our use of part 
of the channel, since two or three of the rafts might be kept out of line, ready to 
move into their places at an hour's notice. 
'I he greatest danger to which these obstructio11s would be exposed would be 
~om explosive vessels, and from these they might be protected by a boom or a 
line of mallcr rafts in front. 
From what has just been said, it will be perceived that when the induc~ments 
are ucb ?,S to bring the enemy forward in great power, and efficient batten~s can 
be established only at a few points, we are not then to rely on them exclusively. 
Iu such a_ case the enemy should be stopped by some physical imp?dime:1ts, and 
th.e batteries must be strong enough to prevent his removing these impediments; 
aud also to prevail in a cannonade, should the enemy undertake to silence the 
Works. Not to encumber this report with details in relation to these channel 
obstructions, I beg leave to refer for them to the same document 206, page 34. 
It may b? repeated here that such expedients need not be resortecl ~o, exeept 
to cover O~Jects of the highest importance and value, such as would i_nduce an 
enemy to risk a large expedition. l!,or objects of less importance battenes would 
afford _ample_ protection. It will be remembered that this last power is, whe_n once 
esta lu-hed :n any position, a constant quantity, and although it should be mcom-
petent ~o effect decisive results when diffused over a large fleet, may be an over-
~atch for any small force upon which it should be concentrated. At t~1e san_ie 
tim , ther~fore, that there is the less liability to heavy attack, there will be m 
the attenes the greater capacity of resistance to others. 
I . mu~t not be urged, as a reproach to fortifications, that in tlrn case we are 
eon 1dermg they are obliged to call in aid from other sources, so long as these 
ai . s ar cheap, efficient, and of easy resort. By the mode suggested the defence 
,nn undoubte~ly be complete, every chance of success being on the side of th_e 
def; nc ; that is to say, if any confidence is to be placed in the lessons of experi-
en.ce . How, on the other hand, will the same security be attained by naval means 1 
Onl:y! a-: before shown, by keeping within the harbor a fleet or squadron, or what-
ever 1t may be, which shall be at all times superior to the enemy in number of 
gll.Il3. 
a naval defence there will be no advantage in obstructions of any sort,_for 
th.e · I: be no lessening of the array of guns in consequence of such obstructwn, 
hr:cau~ • if thei, ob 'tructions are under the fire of the floating defenc~s, the enem;y-
'H fir t ·.ubdue that fire and then remove the obstructions at his leisure. If this 
6re prl)v ~ too powerful for th enemy, the obstructions will have been unnece~-
a • : and will ,·erve only to shut up our own fleet, preventing the prompt pursmt 
i:,f b · ten fo . 
• ,. h re is a fourth class, consisting of harbors, or rather bays or estuaries, of 
268 MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. These have 
been before spoken of. If the occupation of or passage through these must be 
defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the shore. 'l'he reliance 
must, from the nature of the case, be a floating defence of magnitude at lea:-t 
equal to the force the enemy may bring. The complete defence of each of tbe.-;e 
bays would, therefore, involve very gTeat expense-certainly, in most case&, 
greater than the advantages gained. The Chesapeake bay cannot, for instance, 
be shut against a fleet by fortifications; and if the entrance of the enemy is to be 
interdicted, it must be by the presence of a not inferior fleet to bis own. Instead 
of such a system, it will be better to give up the bay to the enemy, confining our 
defence to the more important harbors and rivers that discharge into the bay. 
By this system not only will these harbors be secured, but the defences ,rill 
react upon the bay itself, and at any rate secure it from predatory incursions, 
becam~e, as before shown, while Hampton Roads and the navy yard at Norfolk 
are well protected, no enemy would proceed up the bay with any less force than 
that which could be sent out from the navy yard. In certain cases of broad 
waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire to rendezvous in order to 
prosecute a blockade or as a shelter in tempestuous weather, there may be p~~i-
tions from which sea-mortars cab. reach the whole anchorage, although nothmg 
could be done with guns. A battery of sea-mortars, well secured from escalade. 
would in such a case afford a good defence, because no fleet will lie at anchor 
within the range of shells. 
In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general 
classes, according to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not fin_d that 
anything can be substituted for fortifications, where fortification are apphcablr. 
and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last, and in the la ·t ve 
shall find them indispen, able as auxiliaries. In this last class there are, no doubt 
some cases where naval means mu ' t constitute the active and operative force; and 
it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be most uitable. 
as before stated. 
Before proceeding to a specification of the positions on our coast reqnirin~ 
fortifications, something more should be ..,aid on the general ubject, though on 
another branch, namely: the proper magnitude and strength to be giYcn t 
these fortifications . 
The present system ifl founded on this principle, to wit: That the fortifica-
tions houlcl be strong in proportion to the value of the objects to be ·ecured. 
The principle will not, I suppose, be controverted, although the mode of apply-
ing it may be. 
There will hardly be n difference of opinion a to the mode of guanling th 
le.: important points. There beiug no great attraction to an enemy work: 
:impl in thrir fratures, rc•quiring· ftmall garri. ou only, containinrr a mod rat 
armmn •nt, hut at th same time inacce::i:;ible to th <la hincr eut rpri~ ·:, tl_i • 
,·hip.· ·an .·o ea:sily land, a.ncl which can be per e,·ered in for a f w l10u1: , 
rnnc·lt yjrror, will :-1ufficc. ~ircum:-ltan · ,, mn:-lt, howev •r, materially moth Y h 
propc•rtic·.~ of thc::-:c worki-1, even wh ·n the poiutH to bC' guarded ar of qual 
In rm , th cli:advautag- of po.·itio11 muHt b cornp<>n:-:atccl b T gr ·atcr pow r: 
auc,th •r, natural :-:trc·ngth may n ·c·d littlt: aicl from art; in m10thcr, gr•: r , 
in the gnardc·d chaum·l may dc·mancl a lar•r r armament; and in a u 
pc ·ulinr .,_ ·po ... ur, to foncl attack may e.·act mur • than u ual inacc ,-;-.ibili :: 
all th ... rnri1 tiP lie ~\·itliiu_ limit. that will probably b ·one d ·cl. 
\ t th larg ·r nhJP ·t , it Jin. l,c·c·n cont ·ndc·cl that th re ha b en 
tion in d vi ing w rk. to · n· •r tlu c> the: work haviurr n calculat d 
f rmidabl alt l ·k than tl1 ·: will h . ·po· ·cl to. 
1 t j, n · to utt ·r ·a!!'ll 1·1iti ·i tn of thi: natur ancl it i:, not , ,v 
t1wm without goill'~ int) an .·nminntion a minul. :1. if th' critickm, ·w 
11r · i • ancl l' rtiu nt. 
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But let us look a little at the material facts. What is the object of an enemy 7 
'What are his means 7 What should be the nature of our defences 7 · 
The object m::ty be to lay a great city under contribution, or to destroy one 
of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbors, &c. 
It was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York in the 
,ear 1835, the property destroyed within a few hours was worth upward of 
017,000,000, although the fire was confined to a very small part of the city, and 
did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate the loss that would 
accrue from the fires that a victorious enemy could kindle upon the circuit of 
that great city, when no friendly hand could be raised to extinguish them 7 or 
is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay for exemption from that 
calamity? Can we value too highly the pecuniary losses that the destruction 
of one of the great navy yards would invoke 7 and the loss beyond all pecuniary 
,alue of stores and accommodations indispensable in a state of war, and that a 
state of war could hardly replace 1 
But what are the enemy's means 7 They consist of his whole sea-going 
force, which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow. 
"From the nature ef maritime operations, such a fleet could bring its wlwle 
strength to bmr upon any partzcular position, and by threatening or assailing 
1:arious portions qf the coast, eitlier anticipate the tardy movements ef troops 
upon land and effect the object before th,eir concentration, or render it necessary 
to keep in service a force far superior to that ef the enemy, but so divided as to 
be inferior to it on any one po-int."* 
We have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude, and the means of the enemy 
coneist in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these objects. 
With the highest notion of the efficiency of fortifications against shipping, 
these are not cases where any stint in the defensive means are admissible. 
Having, therefore, under a full sense of the imminent danger to which the great 
objects upon the coast are exposed, applied to the approaches by water an array 
of obstacles worthy of confidence, we mnst carefully explore all the a-,enucs by 
land, in order to guard against approaches that might be made on that side in 
order to evade or to capture the works guarding the channels. 
But before deciding on the defences necessary to resist these land attacks, it 
will be proper to estimate m0re particularly the means that an enemy may be 
expected to bring forward, with a view to such land operations. 
History furnishes many examples, and' the expedition to Flushing, commonly 
called the W alcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly instructive. 
From an early day N apolcon had applied himself to the creation of a maritime 
force in the Scheldt; and in 1809 he had provided extensive dockyards and 
naval arsenals at Flushing and at Antwerp. On his invasion of Austria that 
~·ear he had drawn off the masses of his troops that had before kept zealous 
rnkh over these naval preparations, relying now on forts and batteries, and on 
the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of the naval 
c~tabli .. hmcnt, and of a fleet containing several line of battle ships and frigates 
and a numerous flotilla of smaller vessels. 
The great naval establishment at Flushing, near the mouth of the Scheldt, 
and of Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles up the river, with the vessels 
afloat on the 1·ivcr or in progress in the yards, presented an object to England 
worthy of one of her great efforts. 
The troop embarked in this expedition consisted of upwards of thirty-three 
ho rand infantry, three thousand cavalry, more than three thousand artillery, 
and ~ome hundred of sappers and miners, constituting an army of about forty 
hou·and men. 
o Mr. Secretary Cass. 
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rrhe naval portion consisted ·of thirty-five sail of the line, twenty-three frigates, 
thirty-thn.e sloops-of-war, twenty-eig·ht gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, thirty-
six smaller vessels, and eighty-two g·unboats, making a total of one hundred 
and fifty-five ships and other armed vessels, and ejghty-two gunboats. The 
guns, mortars, &c., provided for such bombardments and sieges as the h'oops 
might have to conduct, amounted to one hundred and fifty-eight pieces, with 
suitable supplies of ammunition and stores of every kind. 
'fiie idea of sailing right up to their object, in spite of the forts and batteries, 
seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the fleet. The 
plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the landing a portion of the army on 
the island of Walcheren, to carry on the siege of Flushing, while another portion 
proceeded up the Schelclt, as high as Fort Bartz, which was to be taken; after 
which the army would push on by land about twenty miles further and lay 
siege to Antwerp, all of which it was th ·mght might be accomplished in eighteen 
or twenty days from the first landing. 
The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, was re-
duced within fifteen days ; and in less than a week from the debarkation (which 
was on the 31st of July) Fort Bartz was in possession of the English, havi~u 
been abandoned by the garrison. Bnt it was twenty-five days before the marn 
body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were assembled at this point and 
ready to take up the line of march against Antwerp. Since the first descent of 
the British matters had, however, greatly changed. . 
The French were now in force; they had put their remaining defences m 
good condition; they had spread inundations over the face of the country; and 
not only would there be little chance of further success, but the safety of the 
expedition, formidable as it was, might have been compromised by a furt_hcr 
advance; it was therefore decided in council to abandon the movement agam~t 
Ant,verp ; the troops accordin~;ly returned to the island of '\V alcheren, which 
they did not finally leave till the end of December. 
1.,he failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to the 
omission to seize, in the first instance, the south i:-hore of the river ancl caphrre 
the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was prevented by the 
difficulty of landing enough trool_Js at any one• debarkation in the bad w atber 
then prevailing. 'I,he capture of the e batteries would have enaLled the exp · 
dition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first week; aud, in the then 
unprepared state of the l!·\·ench, the issue of a da,"h upon Antwerp can hardly 
be doubted. 
Thr dreadful mortality that as ailed the British army i wholly unconnect 
with the plan, conduct, or is,·uc of the entcrpri:w a,· a military moYcment; unk '• 
indeed, it may have fru:trated a scheme for occupying the i:,land of W alcher 
a a poi-ition durincr the war. 
Po. ·.·e;-;. ion ,va held of the i~land for five month ; and it wa· finally aba~-
donr.cl, from no prc~.-nr · upon it by th, French; althoucrh, after the fir--t 
w C'k:-, th Briti. h force con, i:tccl, in th :t"'crr 1 •rntc, of le~, than ' ,. •u 1 
thou:a11,l men, of 1d1fr.:h, for the grea.ter rm.rt ~f the time, more than half w 
. ick- ·fli ·tivc~ lH'i11cr often reclncC'cl lwlow fiv, thou:-and m •n. 
'\Y . ' th rl'forc, that an ,•fli.•('tiv, fore of le·:-. than t •n thou and ID ll m in-
taincd JI :. c· ·:-ion of t1H· i la11cl i11 the fo ·e of, ancl in ·lo. c pr ~·imityto, th m · 
fonni<labl militarv JJOW<·r h1 Enrop for mor than tlir c month-.. • nd .1 
rea-.on c·an lw p ·re· iw«l why it mi<>ht n t hav • r main cl an ind •fiuit" p · 
whil po ... ..., cl of nnval 111wri11rity. 
'l h proximity of Lncrlan<l uurl ubte Hy 1 · n d th p n of th .·p ltI 
1 ut it foflu n · ·d the r · ul ill 11<1 oth •r wav 111, t ·rial to th• ar!!um ut. 
I will allud • to IHI thC'r i11 lllJC'1. of J;u:,,. • <'.-p<'ditio11 nt li: the ·:ndi,h 
<Ji tant ountri th, n th tw . p diti n , P'l ·h , f ah ut t n th u,nnd m 
•nt. in t11c y ar 1 1 , n'" in. thi · uutr ·-on h · th" 
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othe1· to the Gulf of Mexico. United, in a single force of twenty thousand men 
against our sea-coast, the expense would have been less and the result more 
certain. 
The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found 
opportunities to embark. in great undertakings of the same natl:re. In 1802 
Leclerc proceeded to St. Domingo with thirty-four line of battle ships and large 
frigates, more than twenty small frigates and sloops, and upw~rds of twe~ty 
thousand men. We learn from these points in history what constitutes an obJect 
worthy of vast preparations, and it is impossibl~ to resist the fact _th~t. our own 
coast and rivers and bays possess many establishments not less mv1tmg to an 
eaemy than Flushing and Antwerp. 
We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition; in other words, 
what is the amount of force we must prepare to meet. And, more than all, we 
are taught that such an expedition, seizing a favorable moment when the military 
arrangements of a country are incomplete, when the armies are absent or imper-
fect in their organization or discipline, does not hesitate to land in the face of 
the most populous districts; and availing of the local peculiarities, and covered 
and upplied by a fleet, to undertake operations which penetrate into the country 
and consume considerable time. 
It seems, therefore, that whenever the object we are to cover possesses a value 
likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desite to inflict a 
serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water are guarded against 
hi~ ships; it will be indispensable to place safeguards against attacks by land 
aJ~o. A force considerable enough for very vigorous attacks against the land 
sides of the fortifications may be thrown upon the shore; and, if these yield, a 
way is opened for the ships, and the enemy carries his object. 
In certain positions the local circumstances would favor the land operations 
of an enemy, permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, to be 
aided by the fleet and covered from the reaction of the general force of the 
country. In other positions the extreme thinness of the population in the 
neighborhood would require the forts to rely for a considerable time solely on 
th.eir own strength. In all such cases a much greater power of resistance would 
be requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In all such circum-
stances the works should be of a strength adequate to resist an attack, although 
persevered in vigorously for several days. But when these land operations lead 
a~ay from the shipping, or when the surrounding population is considerable, or 
-when considerable numbers of volunteers or regulars can be speedily drawn in 
by ..:teamers or railroads, or the enemy is unable to shelter his movements by 
local peculiarities, then it will suffice if the work can withstand vigorous attacks 
for a few hours only. 
. The mag:nitude and strength of the work will depend, therefor~, on the joint 
lnfluence of the value of the objects covered, the natural strength of the position, 
and the succor to be drawn from the country. ,Ve may introduce, as instances, 
.1:~ ew _York and Pensacola. The former is as attackable as the latter; that is to 
ay, it equally requires artificial defences; and, owing to its capacious harbor 
and ea:-y entrance, it is not easy to place it in a satisfactory condition as to the 
ap roaches by water. But, while an enemy in approaching any of the principal 
,,rork: Ly land could not well cover himself from the attacks of the concentrated 
population of the vicinity, the rapid means of communie;ation from the interior 
would daily bring great accession to the defence. A land attack against the 
ci y mu~t con. equently be restricted to a day or two, and the works will fulfil 
their ouj ct if impregnable to a coup de main. 
Pen.:,acola, an object in many respects of the highest importance, and growing 
in con:::eq_uence every day, is capable of being defended as perfectly as the city 
~ru: m ·ntioned_. rrhc principal defences lie on a long sandy island which closes 
ln. the harbor from the sea. An enemy landed on this island (Santa Rosa) would 
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be in uninterrupted communication with his fleet, could, owing to the sparseness 
of its population, have nothing to apprehend for some time from any reinforce-
ments arriving at the place, and would be well protected by position from the 
effects of this succor when it should arrive. 
While in possession of naval superiority, he might, therefore, not unreason-
ably calculate on being able to press a siege of many days of the work which 
occupies the extremity of the island and guards the entrance to the harbor. And 
even before coming into possession of this work, his gun and mortar batteries on 
the same island could destroy everything not bomb-proof and incombustible at 
the navy yard. 
An attack not less persevering, and with equal chances of success, might be 
made from the other side of the harbor also. 
If, therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred on 
the works at Pensacola, their object will be attained only through the forbear-
ance of the enemy, it being obviously indispensable that the principal of these 
works be competent to resist a short siege. If this liability resulted from the 
thinness of the neighboring population, it would still be many years before this 
state of things would be materially altered. 
But it does not depend on this alone: the peculiar topographical features will 
continue this liability in spite of increasing numbers and ever so easy and rapid 
communication with the interior, it having been proved that a fleet may lie broad 
off this shore and hold daily communication therewith during the most tempe0 • 
tuous seas0n. 'l'he Engfo;h fleet of men-of-war and transports lay, during the 
last war, from February 7 to March 15, 1814, anchored abreast of Dauphin 
island and Mobile Point, where the exposure is the same as that off Pensacola. 
Between the cases cited, which may be regarded as the class of extreme cases, 
(a class comprising, however, many important positions,) almost every conceivable 
modification of the defence will be called for to suit the various conditions of the 
several points. 
'rhe fortifications of the coast must therefore be competent to the double ta:--k 
of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks-two distinct and 
independent qualities. The first demands merely an array, in suitable number: 
and in proper proportions, of heavy guns covered by parapets proof again t ~hot 
and shell~; the second demands inaccessibility. As there i. nothing in the :fot 
quality necessarily involving the last, it h:u, often happen<>d, either from the 
little value of the po.'ition or from the suppo:-;ecl improbability of a la~d attac~-
or from the want of time to construct proper works, that this property of macce:n· 
l,ility has been neglected. 
·whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a battery. 
we . houl<l bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the ohject , -
well a our, <'lvc ; that it i a very ea y thing for him to land a party of ~en 
for an <'xprditiou of an hour or two; ancl unle we take the necc ~ary preventffe 
mca:-um hi.- party will b nr to take the battrry fir;-;t, after which nothiu~ 
will pr ·vent hi vc. chi con ummating the design it wa the purpo..,e of th 
hattc·ry to prevent. In general, the ame fortification that guard the ,~:at r 
approach<·.~ will protect th avcmm by land also; but in certain ca · ~ a fore 
may be . o Janel cl a to rvad th<' channel defence. , rcachino- th objc•c t Ly a 
route ntirc-1 · inland. f cour.·e tl1i. dan"'Cr mu~t b o·nardrd ao-ain::-t bv uit · 
l,l · work. wiwm·v<'r tli · JH'OJll' annot come promptly to th re, cue. · 
After the pr c ·c1i11g c.·po::-ition of view:-< on the general . uhj ct of the defcn -
of th coa. t, it maY not hP ont of place her to indicate the mod by which th 
y t ·m of f'ortifie:tti nn. ·an he 111 :nnwcl nncl , crvecl without an angmentati n r 
that particular pnrpo::-r , of th,, rc•gnJar nrmy. . .. 
r 'Ji for ·c~ tlrnt ·houlcl h1; ·mpln:nd for thi . cn-ic in time of war is the m1hua. 
(l~,;ino- th· t rm in.' compn·lll'JJ, iv· . c·n.- ,,) th probability b iug that. i_n m _ -
f th • cl f ·ud •d p mt · on th ''lhoar l, th uniform d and volunteer compam -
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will supply the garrisons needed; and it may be shown that ~t is a service to 
which militia are better adapted than to any other. 'l'he promment defect of a 
militia force results from the impossibility of so training the men to field mov~-
ment~ in the brief period of- their service, as to give them any confidence m 
themselves as manreuvrers in the face of regular troops. The little they learn 
merely suffices to show them that it is but little; every attempt of the kind 
proving, by the disorders tha,t they know not how to avoid, how much greater 
would be the disorder if in the face of an enemy and under fire. 
Without the knowled()'e to be obtained only by long and laborious practice, 
the militiaman feels that lie is no match, in the field, for the regular soldier, and 
it would not be surprising should he desire to avoid an encounter. But there is 
no rnch difficulty in the service of fixed batteries; the militiaman has there to 
be taught merely the service of a single gun, than which nothing can be more 
"'imple. He must learn to use the rammer, and the sponge, the handspike, and 
the linstock ; to load and to run to battery, to trail and to fire; these are all. 
Each of these operations is of the utmost simplicity, depending on individual 
action and not on concert, and they may all be taught in a very short time. 
There is no manamvring, no marching, no wheeling. The squad of one gun 
may be marched to another, but the service of both is the Bame. Even the art 
of pointing cannon is to an American militiaman an art of easy attainment, ,from 
the skill that all our countrymen acquire in the use of fire-arms, "drawing sight" 
or "aiming" being the same art, modified only by the difference in the gun. 
The mode of applying this force may be illustrated by the case of any of our · 
cities on the seaboard. The forts and batteries being put in perfect condition~. 
,_hould be garrisoned by a small body of regular artillery, such as a moderate 
military force could supply, and sufficient for the preservation of the publi.c: 
property, and to afford indispensable daily guards. 'l'o these should be added 
two or three men of the ordnance department, especially charged with the con-
di ion of the armament and ammunition, and two or three engineer soldiers, . 
wLose sole duty it would be to attend to the condition of the fortifications, keep-
in;; every part in a state of perfect repair. In certain imiiortant works, however, . 
that would be liable to a violent assault, or exposed to siege, or to analogous . 
operations, it would be necessary, especially on the approach of a war, to keep 
up a more considerable body of regular troops. 'rhe volunteer force of the city 
..,hould then be divided into d!';tachments, if possible, without disturbing their 
company organization, and should be assigned to the several work~ according to 
the war garrisons required at each-from four to six men, according to circum-
~tance:: , being allowed to each gun. rrhe larger works might require ten, fifteen, 
or eYen twenty companies ; the smaller ones, two, three, or more companies; . and 
in ::ome cases even a platoon might suffice. Being thus occupied, each por-. 
ti n of the city force would have its definite alarm post, and should be often. 
ta -en to it and there exercised in all the duties of its garrison, and more 
e ecinlly in the service of its batteries, and in its defence against assault. . 'l'he 
1 ltipli<-i ty of steamboats in all the cities would enable the volunteers to reach 
ev n he most distant alarm posts in a short time. In order that all these troops 
u J- become expert in their duty, one of the works most convenient to the city, 
b ~-id 1 ·ing th, alarm post of some particular portion of the volunteers, should, 
during peace, be the ordinary school of drill for all; and in this the detachments 
~ u1 in tum· a ·semblc and exercise. 
B ~-ide the mere manual of the gun and battery, there should be frequent 
:rg ~ practice, a· being not only necessary in teaching the proper use of the 
ery, hut as imparting intere t and excitement to the service. 
1 t micrht be neces. ary for a time to submit the volunteers to the drill of a 
t<'ut 01:ic:er or non-commi;"t:1ionecl officer of the regular artillery ; and in 
i ·ular, to conduct the practic<' with shot and shells under such inspection. 
I. Ex. Doc. 92--18 
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The portion of the military force of the city not stationed in the fixed batter-
ies would constitute, ·under an impending attack, a reserve posted either in one 
or several bodies, according to circumstances, ready to cover exposed points, 
to co-operate in offensive movements, or to relieve exhausted garrisons: this 
portion having- connected with it the mounted force, the field artillery and the 
heavy movable guns. 
This appropriation of the volunteer force to the immediate defence of the city, 
would operate in the most favorable way upon that force; superadding to the 
impulses of patriotism, every feeling connected with family property and social 
and civil relations; and while making military service the first of duties, re-
lieving it of hardship and privation. 
'.rhe organization of volunteer force here contemplated may comprehend the 
whole maritime frontier, and be applicable, also, at the more populous points 
upon the inland borders. 
'.rhis arrangement, while it might be an enduring one, would be the least ex-
pensive by far of any that would be efficient. 
'l'he days of exercise drill and encampment should be fixed and invariable, 
in order that they may the less interfere with the private occupations of the 
volunteers. During an impending attack, greater or less portions should be con-
s tautly at their posts; but still the service in the batteries would comprise but 
a very small portion of the year. . 
According to the value of the interest to be defended, and the extent of the 
works to be occupied., would be the rank of the chief command; which should 
be intrusted to an officer of the regular army, whose control might often be ex-
tended, advantageously, over a certain extent of seaboard to the right and left, 
constituting a maritime department. 
'l'he existing fortifications of the sea-coast-includjng a few useless remain5 
of the revolutionary works, are due to three distinct epochs, namely : 1. Tho~c 
that grow out of the political ngitations attending the French revolution of] 7L9, 
and the wars consequent thereon. As all the principal harbors had to be protecteil 
at once, the contracted fi, cal means of the country required that the works should 
be small; and they were also generally of a temporary character; but they 
proved sufficient. :France, then a weak naval power, was moreover fully occu-
pied ut home, and in pressjng her continental campaign. . 
2. On the approach of tbe war of 1812, the ·obvious inadequacy of exi ·trn~ 
forts led to large appropriation for fortifications, so that when the war brokr 
out there ·was not a town of any magnitude upon the coast not provided w_ith 
one or more batteries. Every place within the reach of an enemy's mnrandrn~ 
e,·peclitions called for thi · kind of protection; and there is no doubt that the ck-
fi •ncc· supplied, aved the country from great los 'CS. 'l1hese defence of the 
second system were al o small and weak, and beiug built for the sake of pre~rn• 
economy, of cheap rnat<'rial and workman hip, were very peri:-habl . Th 
g v rnmc•nt, aware of this wcakne...,,, called out to their ·upport, during the war. 
va t boclie of militia at normou exp n c-covering the e troop~ with cxtcn-
iv line~ of fi Id-work .. . 
. The war with England bcino- over, the governm nt promptly entered upon 
, perman<:1d y.·tem of c a.-t cl ·f •nc , and to that nd con 'tituted a hoard of en-
gin ' r..;, with in ·tructions to mak xamination and plan,', ubject to th<: r \'i--
ion of th· thic•f c·11gin ·('r, Hnd th .:auction f th '<'cr•tary of ·war. And it i-
thi:, th· third y.-t ·m, that ha.· uc·cn vc·r ·inc 1 16 in th, cour 'C of ._·peuti n, 
ancl i. now, a w • . hall .- 'C', w ·11 advanc· cl. 
"\Yh ·n ·Yer th' ·.·aminatiou: of the hoard of nrri1H·1·r:-
·k 'arch-, naval clcp t , CC'., n:n-. 1 ofli · ·1-.. of rank and 
·iat d , ith th ·m. 
'l'h b arcl d ,,. t ·d cnral · ar ·· u interrupt dly to th cluty-pr · •ntinz-n · 
ive r port , and ubmittinrr-, fir ·t, pl n of the fortifi ation n d •d t the 
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most important points. Afterward, they w~re ~ufficiently in _advance of the _ex-
ecution of the system to apply most of the1r time to the duties ~f construction, 
giving in occasionally additional reports and plans .. In ~-are cases it h_as hap}?ened 
that plans have been made under the particular d1rection of the chief engmeer, 
O\\,- ing to the difficulty, at moments, of drawing the widely dispersed members 
of the board from their individual trusts. 
The board and the chief engineer arranged the defences into cla~ses, according 
to their view of the relative importance of the proposed works, m the order of 
time. This order has been generally well observed in the execution of the sys-
tem, with the exception of some cases in which, by the action of Congress, cer-
tain forts were advanced out of the order advised by the board. 
~-,or many years gran,ts for fortifications were made, annually, by Congress in 
a gross sum, which was apportioned according to the discretion of the President. 
But since March 3, 1821, the appropriations have been specific, the grants for 
each work being particularly stated. }"'or many years every new fortification 
ha~, before being made the object of appropriations, been sanctioned by a special 
act of Congress upon recommendation of the military committee. 
The classes are as follows, giving now merely the names of forfs and places: 
the cost, armament, &c., of the several works executed or projected will be given 
at the end in proper tables. 
Cl ass A includes certain old works of the first and second systems. Some 
of these are already repaired, some undergoing repairs, and some subject to re-
pair, should a war impend before better works shall have been substituted. 
Fort Sullivan ........................ Eastport, Maine. 
Edgecomb ...................... Wiscasset, Maine. 
Preble ......................... Portland, Maine. 
Scammel .... ~ .................. Portland, Maine. 
~IcClary ....................... Portsmouth, New Hampshire. 
Constitution .................... Portsmouth, New Hampshire. 
----- ..................... Gloucester, Massachusetts. 
Pickering ...................... Salem, Massachusetts. 
Lee ........................... Salem. Massachusetts. 
Sewall .... .................... Marblehead, Massachusetts. 
Independence .................. Boston harbor, Massachusetts. 
Winthrop ...................... Boston harbor, Massachusetts. 
West Head Battery ............. Governor's Island, Massachusetts. 
Southeast Battery .............. Governor's Island, Massachusetts. 
------..... . ............ New Bedford, Massachusetts. 
Wolcott ....................... Newport, Rhode Island. 
Greene ........................ N ~wport, Rhode Island. 
Trumbull .. .................... New London, Connecticut. 
Hale .......................... New Haven, Connecticut. 
Columbus ...................... Governor's Island, New York. 
Ca tle Williams ................ Governor's Island, New York. 
South Battery .................. Governor's Island, New York. 
Gibson ...... .................. Ellis's Island, New York. 
Wood ......................... Bedlow's Island, New York. 
Richmond ..................... Staten Island, New York. 
T ompkins ......... . .... ....... Staten Island, New York. 
'8at cry Rud on ..................... Staten Island, New York. 
Iorton .... .......... .... ...... Staten Island, N cw York. 
l'o fay tte ...................... Narrows, New York harbor. 
~ iffiin ........................ Delaware river, Pennsylvania. 
cHenry ...................... Baltimore harbor, Maryland. 
adi on ....................... Annapolis, Maryland. 
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Fort Severn ........................ Annapolis, Maryland. 
Washington ................... Potomac river, Maryland. 
Johnson ....................... Cape }-,ear river, North Carolina. 
Castle Pinckney .................... Charleston harbor, South Carolina. 
]Tort Moultrie ....................... Charleston harbor, South Carolina. 
Battery ............................ Beaufort, South Carolina. 
Fort Jackson ....................... Savannah river, Georgia. 
Marion ........................ St. Augustine, Florida. 
Barrancas . . . . . . . . . . . .......... Pensacola, Florida. 
St. Philip ...................... Mississippi river, Louisiana. 
Class B includes new works (third system) completed, or so nearly com-
pleted as to be able to use all or ne:;irly all their batteries, viz: 
Fort Warren ....................... Boston harbor, Massachusetts. 
Adams ........................ Newport, Rhode Island. 
Schuyler ...................... Throg's Neck, New York harbor. 
Hamilton ..................... New York harbor, New York. 
Monroe ....................... Old Point Comfort, Virginia. 
Macon ........................ Beaufort, North Carolina. 
Caswell ....................... Oak Island, North Carolina. 
Pulaski ..................•.•.. Cockspur Island, Georgia. 
Pickens . . . . . . . • • . • • • .. . . . ...... Pensacola, Florida. 
McRee • . . . . . . • • .. . . .....••... Foster's Bank, Florida. 
Morgan .....................•.. Mobile Point, Alabama. 
Pike . • . . . . . ............ , ... Rigolets, Louisiana. 
Macomb (formerly Wood) ........ Chef Menteur, Louisiana. 
Battery Bienvenue, Bayou Bienvenue, Louisiana. 
Tower Dupre, Bayou Dupre, Louisiana. 
Fort ,Jackson ...................... Mississippi river, Louisiana. 
Livingston .................... Barrataria bay, Loui. iana. 
Class C includes works now under construction, and more or less advanced, 
viz: 
Fort Knox .......................... Bucksport, Maine. 
Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... Delaware river, D la ware. 
arroll ........................ Soller's Point, :Maryland. 
alhoun ....................... Hampton road., Viro-inia. 
, umter ........................ Charle ton harbor, South Carolina. 
1inch ......................... Cumberland , ound, Georgia. 
Ta lor ........................ Key \V ·t, Florida. 
J ff •r:--on . . . . . . . . . ............. Garden Key, Tortuga , Florida. 
R don 1 t f Fort ananc:v ............ Pen, acola, Florida. 
:E ort ain ......................... Dauphin Island, labama. 
la . D in ·lmlc worh~ the fir t to be commr.nc cl, arranO'e<l in 0-eographic:1I 
ord r, viz: 
fr •1111 • ·k riv "r, and • ort 'camm ·I (n ·w.) Portland h. rbor. 
oint, Ii rbl h d · 
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Fort on Sandy Hook Point, New York. 
Fort on 'l1homas's Point, Patuxent river, Maryland. 
~'"'ort at Proctor's Landing, Louisiana. 
1V orks at Galveston bay, and Brazos Santiago, Texas. 
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Cl ass E includes works to be commenced after those in Class D, in geo-
graphical order, viz: 
New Fort Preble, Portland harbor Maine. 
Works at Gloucester; Closing Broad Sound Pass, Boston harbor; works at 
Gurnet Point, Plymouth, Massachusetts. 
Works at Cedar Point, Potomac river, Maryland. 
Works at Georgetown, and in Port Royal roads, South Carolina. 
Works on Tybee island, Savannah river, Georgia. 
Tower at Pass au Heron, Alabama. 
Fort at Ship island, Mississippi. · 
Works at Pa~sa Cavallo, Matagorda bay, Texas. 
Class F includes works to be commenced last of all, also in geographical 
order, viz: 
Works at Eastport harbor, Machias, Mount Desert island, Castine, St. 
George's bay, Damariscotta bay, Broad bay, Sheepscot bay, Hog Island chan-
nel, (Portland harbor,) mouth of Saco river, mouth of Kennebunk river, York, 
Maine. . 
"'\V OI'ks at Newburyport, Beverly, Nangus Head, (Salem,) Fort Sewall, (Mar-
blehead,) Nantasket head, (Boston harbor,) redoubt on Hog islancl, (Boston: 
har01·,) Nantucket, Edgartown, Falmouth, Holmes Hole, Tarpaulin Cove, Mas-
sachusetts. 
"'\V OTks at Oananicut island, and works closing west passage of N arraganset 
roads, Rhode Island. 
Fort Griswold, (New London,) works at mouth of Connecticut 1·iver, Fort 
Hale and Fort Wooster, (New Haven,) Connecticut. 
Works for harbors and towns between New Haven and New York ; works in 
Gardiner's bay, Long Island sound; works in Sag Harbor; fort 011 Wilk.ins's 
Point, Long Island; redoubt in advance of Fort Tompkins, Staten island, New 
York. 
Fort at Delaware breakwater, Lewes; Fort opposite Fort Delaware, Delaware 
riYer, D elaware. 
Fort on Elk river; works on Hawkin's Point, below Baltimore; fort on Point 
Patience, Patuxcnt river; works at St. Mary's, Potomac river, Marylaud. 
"\York at Bald Head and Federal Point, Cape .Fear river, North Carolina. 
"'\.York. at mouth of ~antce river, Bull's bay and other inlets, Stono sound, 
~ ~ orth Edisto s0und, South Edisto sound, St. Helena sound, South Carolina. 
\Vorks at Wassaw suuncl, 01:,sabam sound, St. Catherine's sound, Sapelo 
sound, Doley inlet, Altamaha sound, St. Simon's sound, St. Andrew's sound, 
Georgia. 
\Vorks at Charlotte harbor, 'l'ampa bay, Appalachicola bay, Appalachie ba.y, 
t. Jo. eph' bay, Santa Rosa bay, Florida. 
~ ork., at Pcrdido bay, Alabama. 
B ·ing arranged in the precediug classes , on the principles before stated, it 
~ill b · een that tho e places which arc deemed to be least important in the 
~y t m, and which may be po tponed till all others are executed, constitute 1y 
ar the mo t numerous class. Within this class (ln there are, no donb_t, great 
iffi renc ~ a to the claim for defences, and in the course of y~ars hkely to 
elap-e before any of them can be taken in hand, several may rise in the scale 
of r ·lative importance. 
There are al o in cla s E differences of the same sort, and it is not unlikely 
278 MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
that before they can be commenced, at the rate the system has heretofore 
ad vanccd, there may be interchanges between this and class F. 
In class D, however, it is less probable that there will be a material change, 
as all the positions are important now, b,•ii1g designed to cover large towns or 
~ities, or national establishments, or the outlets of valuable commerce or impor-
taut roadsteads. 
I proceed now to examine the coast in detail, proceeding geographically, 
beginning at the northeastern extremity and referring to accompanying tables. 
It may be well to observe here, onci· for all, that much confidence is not asked 
for the mere conjectures presented below as to the number and cost of the 
works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been sur-
veyed. In some cases there may be mistakes as to the number of forts and 
batteries needed; in others errors will exist in the estimated cost. 
Eastport and Mackias may be mentioned as places that will unquestionably 
be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative impor-
tance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There 
a.re several small towns eastward of l\fount Desert island that may, at that 
period, deserve equal attention; at present, however, the places mentioned will 
be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 w'ill be assumed as the cost of 
each. 
Class I·i'-Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, 
having a capacious and close liarLor, affording anchorage for the highest cla~s 
of vessels, and easily accesRiblc from sea, ofiers a station for the navy of an 
enemy superior to any other on this part of the coast. From this point hia 
cruisers might act w ith great effect against the navigation of the eastern coa:it, 
especially that of Maine, and his enterprises could be conducted with great 
rapidity against any points h e might select. These consideration::;, added to the 
very great advantage, in certain political eventR, of our occupying a naval 
station thus advanced, ·whence "·e might act offensively, together ·with the 
expedience of providing places of succor on a p:u't of the coa<::t where ve..,i:;cl~ 
arc so frequently perplexed in their navigation by the prevailing fogs, lead to 
the conclusion that the fortification, in a strong manner, of this road:4tcad may. 
before long, be n ce sary. A survey of this island was begun many years ago, 
but the party being calle<l. off to other duties it was never completed. 'l'he 
proj ct of defon. ive works bas not been made. The entire cost may be, a a::-
sumed by the engineer department "'Orne years ago, $500,000. . 
Class F-Castine.-It would seem to be impo dible on thi. coast to depnw 
an nemy enjoying naval superiority of harbor,, or prevent him u ing them a~ 
l4tation <luring a war, in, ular situations, which his v ssel would render unap-
pr achabl , b ing so num rou ; but it eems prop r that such of the e po. ition~ 
a ar • th it of town. , hould be ccured. lJuring the la t war, the Engli::,_h 
h •Id the po ition of a tin for om time, and 1 ft it at th ir plea ure. It 1~ 
pr Labl a w rk co tino- about 50,000 would d ter an enemy from ao-ain makin?: 
·hoi ·r of thi po:,1ition. 
Gia s F-P·nobscot bay.- Tpon thi: bay, and upon the river of the .aml' 
nam · flo~rin": into it, ar , evrral ffouri:-1hing town and villacr . f th manr 
ba. ', wh1 ·h mt(•r,·r · th ·oa. t, tlie P •nob ot i. th on whi ·h pr ::: nt.; th t• 
,,.r •a_te:-t nmnlwr of :mfo and apa ionl'! anchorng . A. b for ohs 1T d a lar!! 
portion of th .... ,. harbor._ mu:t, for tl1 • pre ent, 11 I ft without d f ·nce~, hut th t• 
valunhln ·ommf'r ·e of tli hay and rin·r mu t b c:ov •r cl· and t afford a 
n tr at for ·u<·h ,·"· :-<•1:- a. m;t_. he 1m11hh· to pla · them,.'·h· :- und •r th pr 
tiuu of' th , , ·ork th· "n. t or wp,t of the> ha ·, th pa.·,.ao- of th<· rivPr urn, 
1, • I< fi•n,l '<1. 'l h lo · t poiu! at whi ·h thi: tan 1,p don without great c.·p n, · 
i oppo. it• Buc·k ·port. at tlu· m row . Port 1/"i ox, at thi · po:--ition i,.; now u -
l ·r · H~tm · ion, ·. tima cl a . '; 
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Class C-St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Slteepscot.-
,y est of the Penobscot occur the above-mentioned bays, all being deep inden-
tations le.1,ding to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry and 
enterprise. The bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans have been 
formed for their defence. $400,000 are assigned to the defence of these waters. 
The Sheepscot is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every size.-
( Class F.) 
Kennebeck river.-This river (one of the largest in the eastern States)_ enters 
t?-e sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It 
ri ~es near the source of the Chandiere, which is a tributary of the St. Lawrence, 
and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and 
extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several 
very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excPllence of the har-
bor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. The surveys 
begun many years ago, were never finished. 'l'he estimated cost of defences, as 
formally reported by the engineer department, was $300,000. Positions near 
the mouth will permit a secure defence.-(Olass D.) 
Portland harhor.-The protection of the town, of the merchantmen belonging 
to it, and of the ships-of-war that may be stationed in this harbor to watch over 
!his part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of them important ob-
JectsT) may be sec11red, as an inspection of the map of the harbor will show, by 
occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledges, and Fish Point. 
If the two channels to the west and east of Hog island can be obstructed at 
small expense, (to decide which some surveys are yet necessary,) there will be 
no necessity for a battery on the ledge, and Fish Point need be occupied only 
by such works as may be thrown up in time of wRr. The expense, a,s now esti-
mated, of the works planned for this defence, will be $155,000 for Fort Preble 
and $48,000 for House island; for Hog island channel, say $135,000.-(Classes 
A, D, E,F.) 
In addition, there must be repairs immediately applied to the old works at 
Fort Preble, including the rr,building of a sea-wall lately overthrown, at an ex-
pen Ne of $7,500. 
Saco, Kennt:,bunk, ancl Yorl.:.-Small works, comparatively, will cover these 
place ; $75,000 is ~ssurned as the ao-greo-ate cost. 
Class F-Portsmouth lwbor and ·
0navi 7;ard.-The only good roadstcad or 
harbor, between Cape Elizabeth and Cape Ann, is Portsmouth harbor, within 
the m0uth of the Piscataqun. river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend as high as 
:Fox Point, seven miles above th e town. rl'his situatiou, sufficiently commodious 
f. r a naval depot, should be maintained; out it is to be regretted that, the bay 
t0 the south of l!'ox Point was not chosen as the site of the na,7 yard, instead 
o Fernald's island. Being where it is, it will be necessary, in time of war, to 
make some particular dispositions for the protection of the navy yard from an 
a tack from the north shore of the river. 
The position of Fort Constitution will certainly, and that of Fort McClary 
"' -ill probably, be occupied as the defence ; though the works themselves should 
give place to those that would better fulfil the object. The other positions for 
t· ,rt-· or batterie8, are Gerrist's Point, Fishing island, and Clarke's island, some, 
i not a11, of which must be occupied. Surveys have been made an<l. projects 
1· r the defence are now under the consideration of the board of engineers. 'rhc 
>~timates have not been furnished, but there iA reason for 1elicving that the en-
- e co:--t for fortifying this harbor will not fall .:1hort of $300,000. 
Cla. a D- Newburyport lzarbor.-'rhc points forming th e mouth of the harbor 
a ·e continua1ly changing, and it . ecms necessary, therefore, tu re1y, for the de-
. -nee of the, haTbor, on work· to be thrown U}J <lurino- a war. rrhcrc is only a 
- 10a.l draught of water. It is thought $100,000 wi11° defend this harbor ade-
<. ua cl ... ·. 
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Class F-G1oucester 1iarbor.-The position of this harbor, near the extremity 
of Cape Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts 
bay, and imparts to it considerable importance. No surveys have yet been 
made, but it is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for $200,000.-
(Class E.) Should tl1ere be any occasion for defensive works before the pro-
posed new works can be commenced, an expenditure of $10,000 in repairs of 
the old fort will be requircd.-(Olass A.) 
Beverly liarhor.-'l'bis harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the 
works designed for Salem. $50,000 in addition will secure it.-(Class F.) 
Salem lwrbor.-'riie port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, and 
separated therefrom by a peninsula. 'I'he occupation of the extremhy of Winter 
island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering) on one side, and Nangashead on 
the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been presented for 
this defence, estimated to cost $225,000.-(Classes D and JT.) On a sudden 
emergency old .Fort Lee may be put in an effective state for $2,000, and Fort 
Pickering for $5,000.-(Class A.) 
JJ!Iarbleltead l,arbor.-Beside covering, in some measure, the harbor, of Bos-
ton, Salem and Marblehead possess an important commerce of their own, and 
also afford shelter for vessels prevented by certain winds from entering Boston 
or pursuing their course ea tward. 'I'he proposed mode of defending i\larblc-
head harbor consists in occupying, on the nortli side, the hillock which com-
mands the present Fort Sewall, ( which will be superseded by the new work,) 
and on the south, the po ·ition of Jack's Point. The two works will co t 
$318,000.-(Classes D and F.) 
'l'o repair old Fort Sewall which may be necessary if the new works are not 
soon begun, will require ten thou~and dollars.-(Class A.) 
Boston lwrbor.-We come, now, to the most important harbor in the eastern 
section of tho coast, and considering the relations to general commerce and the 
interests of the navy, one of the most important in the whole Union. 
After a careful examination of all the necessary com1itions of such a problem 
the board of naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gavr this 
harbor a preference over all other positions to the cast and inclusive of ~cw 
York bay and the Hudson as tlie seat of the great northern naval depot; and 
the government, by the great additions and improvements that have from year 
to year Leen since made to the navy yard on the Charlestown side, have virtu-
aIJy sanctioned the recommendation of tho board. But independent of the navy 
yard, Bo ton is a city of great wealth, and po Qesses an extensive and active 
commerce. 
'l'h old works defended merely tl1e interior bai;in from attacks by water, but 
m~ it often happens that ve. :-1el ent r Nm1ta~k t roads with a wind too ~cant to 
take, tlH·m to the city, or arc d tain d in l)rcAident roads by light wind: or au 
adv •ri:,; ti<lr, a th form r i-pecially i a very convenient auchonwe whence to 
pro Ped to < a, and above all a Nauta1-:k •t rond · afford the h<' ' t possible :::tation 
for a Llo ·kadino- 14<fU:Hlron, it wa. cl cmed indi:-1pen~aLlc to place pcrmanrnt de-
f,~n ·c·: at _thr mouth of tlJ · harbor. 'l'he projC'ct of defcncr r •gard · the ·xi~ti1117 
work:, with th nee ·::-1ary repair and modifications, a cou ·tituting a t>ccontl 
barril'r. 
H<·. id· 'a pP.rman<>nt work now aJmo:t fini. 11 d on Gcoro-r' i~1anc1, it cont m-
plat · p mHrn<·ut work· on ·anta. kC't Hrad, and :filJing up tl1c Broad ;~om tl 
·hat111 ·I, :o a. to l<':t\'<· 110 pa . :t""' in that dirc•ction for ;hips-of-war. 
U11til tl1 · l,c:-t ,1r1111"'ltt for !Mm "•,sd:--of~war ,·hall L , well a:cNtainerl. i 
will not h r-:.ifo to ay to w11at cl1•pth th· Droad 'onncl hmm I .J10uld h 
tri ·t<·cl, nor inclc •cl ·an it he: po. iti\' ·ly a· ·,·rted that tJ1i: d .. 'l'iption ot Y •, I, 
·an l, • ·01n'Pni ntlv ,_·d1ul ·cl h! u ·h mean.. ( tlH·r ve: .. ·1. NIil, howt'Y . I 
t hu . duded and t1 am vc• ·L hw thi . 1iann •I w ulcl . till liaY t p," 
th · inn r · rri r. 'I h · · timat cl of th• work for thi harbor io l,j54,,-,3 
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Besides the works of a perrnnnent character, it will be ne_eessar;r_ in t~e be-
~unin o- of a war to erect several temporary works on certam pos1t1ons m the 
harbo/and on the lateral approaches to the navy yn,rd.-(Olasses A, B, E and Ji'.) 
Plymouth, and Pro1Jincct01cn h.arbors.-These harbors have a commerce of 
rnme consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference 
to the port of Boston. While these are undef~nded, an enem:r:'s squad1:on 
blockading ::Massachusetts bay ·will have ports of refuge under lns lee, winch 
would enable him to maintain his blockade even throughout the most stormy 
seaBons, knowing that the winds which would force him to seek shelter would 
be adverse to outward bound and fatal to such inward-bound vessels as should 
venture near the cape. Were the enemy deprived of these harbo:·s he would 
be unable to enforce a viO'orous investment, as he must be constramed to take 
an offing on every approa~h of foul weather. Our own vessels comi~g in from 
sea, and finding an enemy interposed betw<.>en them and Boston, or berng turned 
from their course by adverse winds, would, in case of the defence of these ports, 
find to the south of Boston shelter equivalent to those provided in the east at 
)Iarblehead, Salem, Gloucester and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not 
been fully surveyed. Provincetown harbor has been surveyed, but the projects 
of defence have not been formed. The former, it is thought, may be suitably 
covered by a work of no great cost on Gurnett Point, while to fortify Province-
town harbor in such a way as to cover vessels taking shelter therein, and at the 
same time to deprive an enemy of safe anchorages, ·will involve considerable ex-
pen~e. Probably no nearer estimate can be formed at present than that offered 
by the engineer department some years ago, which gave one hundred thousand 
dollar to Plymouth and six hundred thousand dollars for Provincetown.-
( Ula~ses D and K) 
~he ~oast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern 
~_ection m possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great por-
non of sandy shore, in its milder climate and clearer atmosphere; and it differs 
from all the other portions, in the depth a.nd magnitude of its interior seas and 
sounds, and in the distance to which deep tide navigation extends up its numer-
ou · large rivers. 'l'he circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great 
bay:, measures about six hundred and fifty miles. 
_ ~ lartlia's Vineyard so,und.-'l'o the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of 
~ antucket and .Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on the 
,.on h, and the projection of Cape Ma.la.bar on the east, enclose the above-named 
0 0u:nd. rl'he channels through this sound being sufficient for merchant vessels, 
and one of the channels permitting the passage even of small frigates, are not 
onl;v _the ~onstant track of coasting vessels, but also of large number of vessels 
arnvrng m the tempestuous months from foreign voyages. rrh(~re are within 
the .-ou1;1d the harbors of Tarpaulin Cove, Holmes Hole, Edgartown, Falmouth,, 
Hyann,s, :t?d Aantuclcet, besides small anchorages. 
~n add1t1on to the many thousand vessels pas::iing this water annually, of 
"b1 ·h there are sometimes forty or fifty (a portion containing very valuable 
cargoe..,) to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed 
to l- ·, at lea t forty thousand tons of whaling vessels owned in the towns of this 
eOUI.d. 
, l · th_e h_arbors ju!'lt named are to be defended at all it must be by fortifications. 
fhere _ 1 ~ httl~ or no population except in the towns, and even this is believed to 
he < ut1rely without military organization. A privateer might run into either of 
tbf::--c harbors _and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure. 1.'he use 
rif he ...:ound itself a an anchorage for vessels-of-war cannot be prevented by 
~.,rtificarion alone. '~wo hundred and fifty thousand dollars may :rerhaps s:iif· 
tice for th defence of all the harbors against the kind of enterprise to wlnch 
the_~ are expo ed.-(Class l!.,.) 
_ ~ew B e<iford and Fairliaven liarbor.-Projects and estimates have been 
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made for the defence of this harbor, on wl1ich lie two of the most flourishing 
towns in the eastern States, New Bedford being, as regards registered tonnage, 
the third harbor in the United States. Estimate $208,000.-(0lass D.) 
Buzzard's bay.-Interposed between the main and the island of Martha's 
Vineyard are the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay on the south. 
This bay covers the harbor of New Bedford, and might be used as an anchorage 
by an enemy's fleet, but it is too wide to be defended by fortifications. 
Narraganset bay.-Some of the properties of this great roadste~d have been 
stated in the preceding remarks. 
The defence adopted for N arraganset roads must be formidable on the im-
portant points, because they will be exposed to powerful expeditions. Although 
the possession of this harbor, the destruction of the naval establishment, the 
capture of the floating· defences, and the possession of the island as a place of 
debarkation and refreshment, should not be considered as constituting of them-
selves objects worthy a great expedition, they might very well be the prelim-
inary steps of such expedition; and defences, weak in their character, might 
tern pt rather than deter it; for although unable to resist his enterprise, they 
might be fully competent, after being captured and strengthened by such means 
as he would have at hand, to protect him from offensive demonstrations on our 
part. 
There arc besides, in the local circumstances, some reasons why the works 
should be strong. 'l'he channel on the eastern side of the island being perma-
nently closed by a solid bridge, requires no defensive works; but this bridge 
being the upper end of the island, the channel is open to an enemy all along the, 
eastern shore of the island. Works erected for the defence of the channel ot 
the west side of the island cannot, therefore, prevent nor even oppose a landing 
on the eastern side. The enemy may, consequently, take possession, and bend 
llis whole force to the reduction of the forts on the island, which cannot be re· 
lieved until a force has been organized, brought from a distance, conveyed b! 
water to the points attacked, and landed in the face of his batteries; all thi~ 
obviously requiring several days, during which the forts should be capable ol 
holding ont. 'l1o do this against an expedition of ten thousaud or twenty thou-
and men demands something more than the strength to resist a single a" ault. 
Unless the main works be competent to withstand a siege of a few days, they 
will not, therefore, fulfil their trw;t, and will be worsa than useless. 
It mu t here be noticed that, althoug-11 the work. do not prevent the lan?in!!' 
of an enemy on Rhode Island, th y will, if capable of resi:;; ting his efforts f_or 3 
fow day , make hi, rr,jdence on the island for any length of time impo s1blr, 
. ince fi rec, in any number may be brought from the main, and landed under 
covc•r of the fire of the work . 
'lo come now to tl1 e particular d ·fences propo. cd for thi road tead. It mu~' 
b Rtat d that there ar thr e entrance into T arrao-:w ·ct road : 
1:-t. 'l'h •astern ·hannel. ·whi ·h pa. cs upon the ea,_t ide of the H and ,,t 
Rhode faJancl. Thi·, a. b •fore tated, b ino- hut by a olid brid 00e, n ed-i no 
cl<·fc·u · b ' fortifi ·a.tion., oth r than a field-,~ rk or two, which may b th rown 
up at thP- 01> ·nincr of a war. 
2cl. 'l'hP .,,mral chan11 ], which rntrr from ca by p:1. incr betw en Rhm1 
I.land ancl 'onani ·nt i:-1:mcl. 'l hil'l i h far th hr ·t entrnnc ', and leads to th 
lJ ·~t anchora 1~P-; and thi:-1 it i. propo,ecl to c1C'fonc1 by a fort on th a:-t :oi1lc oi 
th C'ntr:rn ·c', clh-i<r1wd to l, tIH' pri11<:ipal w rk in the , y. t m. Thi:- w,_ r~. 
callc-d F01t .A.clam:, i. n r.ar]y compl<·tc·cl. n th , wt-. t ;:d • of th n tranc' Il 1-
propo r.cl to pla ·<' :uwth<•r lr ork, and on an i. lancl, call d R o,,: i ·Janel. fa ·in~ th 
Pntrnn ·r. a thirrl work. It i al.-o propo..; ,c1 t repair th ol<l fmt on TO.'lt i,Ja.11 !. 
ju--t within th<' mouth· ancl ab olcl .} ort h·C' •n, which i .. a littl bizher up on 
th e i.la11d of Hhocl<· I. la11<1. 
3cl. A: to thew · t ·rn J..>U . . a,,. ·, thr m d • !Jr . cnt th m · h- : fir, t by · 
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ducing the depth of water by an artifical ledge, so as, while the passage shall 
be a" free as it is now for the coasting trade, it shall be shut as to the vessels-
of-war, including steam vessels; second, by relying on fortifications alone to 
cl ~e the channel; or, third, by resorting in part to one, and in part to th_e other 
mode just mentioned. Either is practicable; · but, being the least expensive and 
most certain, the estimates are founded on the first. 'rhe total cost of the N ar-
raganset defences is estimated at $1,699,000.-(0lasses A, B, D, F.) 
G firdiner's bay.-It is uncertain whether this harbor, which would be a very 
-valuable one to an enemy investing this part of the coast, is defensible by forti-
fications alone. After it sha11 have been surveyed, it may appear that, from one 
or more positions, the whole anchorage may be controlled by heavy sea-mortars. 
In ~uch a case, the defensive works would not be costly. If it be found expe-
dient to fortify some particular portion of the bay, as an anchorage for steam 
batteries, (which, however, is not anticipated,) the expense would probably _be 
ru; great as was anticipated some years since by the engineer department, viz : 
S4O0,000.-(Class F.) 
~ ag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Conner:ticut.-Neither of these har-
bor3 hai:i been surveyed with reference to defence. rl'he first is possessed of 
con3iderable tonnage; and the second, beside being engaged in commerce, is the 
terminus of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the first, and 
820~,ooo to the other.-(Classes E and F.) 
- ew London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound; 
and, as. a port of easy access, having a great depth of water, rarely freezing, 
a.n bemg easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also 
,aluable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a 
blockading squauron off Sandy Hook.. 'l'he plan of defence includes the re-
lmilding of Forts 'l'rumbull and Griswold-the former having been already done, 
,ei:;~ nearly-remaining expense estimated at $198,000.-(0lasses A and F.) 
..... 'lloutli of Connecticut river.-This river has been shown to be subject to the 
exp ditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to its defences. 
81.0~,OO0 is introduced here as the conjectural cost.-(Olass F.) 
- ell: Haven harbor.-It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and 
enlargrng Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected 
during the last war, called Fort Wooster. 'l'he expense of both may be set 
do ·wn at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of old Fort Hale.-
(Clas~e .A and F.) 
,...There are several towns between New Hm,en and New York, on both sides 
of the ound; none of them are very large as yet; still, most, if not all, are 
pro;;.. perou and increasing. Although in their present condition it might not be 
deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of 
th.e pre.:;cnt object is to ascertain, as near as may be, the ultimate cost of com-
pletely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time when 
som of these towns may become objects of predatory enterprises of some mag-
nitu. e . Bearing in mind the probable increase of population in the meantime, 
attd th situation of the places generally, it is thought that $200,000 will be 
et10 uh to provide defences for all.-(Olass :F.) 
.1 -PW York liarbor.-The objects of the projected works for the security of 
~e-~v .,.. rk are to cover the city from an attack by land or sea; to protect its 
llum. ~rou , hipping; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of this great 
Jio a d to cover the interior communication uniting this harbor with the D ela-
\\·are. 
T er · ar two avenues to the city, namely, one by the main channel, direct 
fr0 , and on by the , ound. 
'I e r dect d sy tern of d fenc closes thi. last avenue at the greatest diRtance 
p055ible from the city, nam ·ly, at 'l'brog's Point. 'l'he occupation of this point 
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will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles from the city on one side, 
and still further from the navy yard on the other . 
.A work now in progress and nearly finished at Throg's Point will prevent 
any attempt to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to 
land at a considerable distance from the object; and, as he will then be unable 
to turn the strong position afforded by Harlem river, the cover on the New York 
side will be sufficient. 
But should he land on the Long Island side, he might, by leaving pa)ities on 
suitable positions, with a view to prevent our crossing the river and falling on 
his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having no obstacle in his front. To 
prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, a work should be 
erected on Wilkins's Point, opposite 'l'hrog·'s Point. 'J.1his work, besides com-
pleting· the defence of that channel, would involve a march against the navy 
yard from this quarter in great danger, since all the forces that could be collected I 
on the New York shore might, under cover of this work, be crossed over to Long · 
Island, and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting off his communication with the 
fleet. 'I1he two works on Throg's and Wilkins's Points may therefore be re-
garded as perfectly protecting on that side the city and navy yard. 
Against an attack by the main channel there are-
lst. The works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an enemy's 
squadron only after its arrival before the place. 'I'hey consist of Fort Colum-
bus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's Island, Fort Wood, on 
Becllow's island, and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island. 
It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the 
lower barriers being forced, these would still afford a resource. It is a di.ad-
vantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might be 
going on simultaneously with the contest between the forts and the fleets. 'fhey 
caunot, however, be dispensod with until the outer barriers are entirely com-
pleted, if even then. 
2d. At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passage becomes 
so contracted as to pern;iit good disposition to Le made for defence. On the 
Long Island side of the Narrows is Bart Lafayette, which i a strong ~vatn 
battery, standing on a reef at f\ome distance from the shore, and immedmtely 
behind it, on the top of the bauk, is a small but strong· work, called Fort Ham-
t.lton. Some repairs being applied to these works, this position may be regarded 
a · well occupied. 
On the we t or Staten I sl· 1d ide of the Narrows arc the following work~, all 
of which were erected by the 'tate of New York, vis: Fort Richmond, which 
i a ·water battery; Battery Iludson, which is at some height above the water: 
Battery 1vlorton, which is a :-mall battery on the top of the hill, and Fort Tomp-
kins, which i; al:o on the hill, and is the principal work. All thc .. e work:-, a-
wc·ll a: the ~it common to thC'm all, ar now the property of the United, 'tatc~. 
b · pure ha, e from th tat<' of ..1..,. ew York. 
Batteries Ilurlsott and JIIorton lrnv, been put in pcrfi ct order, and aff~r~ 3 
fo~m~claLl arn y of gun:-. Fort Rickmoncl, which occupied the b , t _po~1~1o_n 
w1thm the whole harbor for c:hann ·I dcfen · , had fallen ntir ly to rum; it 1-
now l, iuo- r 011!-ltru ·t •d, and with th appropriation a k d for in th ,ti;n;1 · 
f In ·t · ·1r min·ht havp h<·P.n now rr·arly for 011 • tier of gun . 
''hp uatun· an,l •xt<•nt of n·pair: r ·c1nircd by Fort Tompkins ha, n?t r · 
l, ·<·n :-; !Ul<·cl, thi, not L •ing· cl< t·mc·cl ~o prc~:i110- a a ..,tat f r adinr., m h 
hatt •ric•.· ju ·t mPntionc•cl. B •. i<lc· th·. e work., th •re ha .. be n proj1•c· <I I r 
, tat n I land an aclvan · •d r •do11ht, whi ·h, howcv ·r, fall· within th cla" 
work · (F} la ·t to h r.rc• ·t ,l. 
"·ith th ... Tarrow, tl111 cl •ft ncl cl, an 1 th work n ar th citv in J 
or 1 •r, • w Y rk mif1'ht b } r .,,.ar a· pr tt ~ w 11 prot •t d aga.iu"-.t au , ta 
by wat r through thi pa~ a•,.·. 
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But there lies below the Narrows a capacious bay, affording good anchorage 
f r any number of vessels-of-war and transports. An enemy's squadro~ being 
in that bay, into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this outlet 
of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of the )'."ear. 
A.nd it would also intercept the water communication, by way of the Raritan, 
between New York and Philadelphia. 
The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, (the 
place of the landing of the British, which brought on the battle of Long Isla~d 
in the revolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its 
commanding height, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any 
sort. 
This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to be as 
folly realized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedition 
being in preparation in England, twenty-seven thousand militia were assembled 
to cover the city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences 
near the city and those at the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other pur-
poses, cannot be made to prevent this enterprise, which can be thoroughly 
guarded againt only by 
3d. An outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor. 'This would accom-
plkh two objects of great consequence, namely, rendering a close blockade of 
the harbor impossible, and obliging an enemy who should design to move troops 
again t the navy yard to land at a distance of more than twenty miles from his 
object, upon a dangerous beach, leaving, during the absence of the troops, the 
tran::;ports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter. 
The hazard of such a land expedition would moreover be greatly enhanced 
by the fact that our own troops, by passing over Long 1 sland under cover of 
the fort at Wilkins's Point, could cut off the return of the enemy to his fleet, 
which must lie at or somewhere near Rockaway. 1'ime, distance, and the direc-
tion of the respective marches would make, very naturally, such a manrenvre a 
part of the plan of defence. Against an enemy landing in Gravesend bay no 
such manreuvre could be effectual, on account of the shortness of his line of 
march, as well as of its direction. 
In view of these considerations, the board of engineers projected additional 
works, one for the east banlc, and another for the middle ground, these positions 
being on hoals on either hand of the bar outside of Sandy Hook. Before deter-
mi ing on the works last mentioned the board went into much research, in order 
to -:certain whether these shoals were unchangeable, and it was thought to have 
been fully proved that there had been no material alteration in more than sixty 
years. This apparent stability of the shoals encourage the board to devise the 
projec referred to. 
_ fore recent surveys have, however, discovered new, or rather other channels. 
If they, iudeed, be new channels, they show a want of stability in the shoals 
that forbids any such structures as the batteries formerly contemplated. And 
\\-hether new or not they would deprive these batteries of a material portion of 
their efficacy. Removing, then, these defences from this outer bar, they must 
occupy the position of Sandy Ilook; at which they will afford a very good 
d.tfcnce of the main chmmel, and prevent the entrance to or occupation of the 
lo ?er bay, for any ho.tile purpose whatsoever, and cover a secure anchorage 
th<·re for our own merchantmen and privateers, and for our steam and sailing 
crui.::er.-, . 
To recapitulate as to New York harbor. The security of the city of New 
r rJ k. Brooklyn, &c., and the navy yard requires, first, defences on the pass~ge 
fr<' :n tl1e ~ound ; namely, the completion of Fort Sclwyler on Throg's Pornt, 
(C ,a,5- B, anrl the erection of a fort on Wilkins' Point (Olaf' s :E')-cost of both 
. ·7 1,000; f-!econd, completion of repairs on ,vorks of Governor's i~land, B~d-
lo ~' .; i ·lanc1, and Ellis's island-c:;timatcd cost $42,689, (Class A;) third, repaus 
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of the works at the Narrows, including those formerly belonging to the State of 
New York- cost $326,834, (Class A and B ;) and fourth, the erection of outer 
defences on Sandy Hook-estimated by the board of engineers to cost $1,200,000, 
(Class D ;) the total cost will therefore be $2,332,523.-(0lasses A, B, D, F,) 
Delaware bay, Fort DPlaware, Fort Mifflin, Delaware Brealcwater.-'l'he 
coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the 
south side of Long island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated by several inlets; 
but not one, besides the Delaware, is navigable by sea-going vessels. The 
Delaware bay itself being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, 
and being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords no very good natural 
harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea. 
The artificial harbor constructed just within the mouth of Delaware bay sup-
plies this need, and must be securely fortified. No plans have, however, as yet 
been made with that object; and as to the probable cost, nothing· better can now 
be done than to assume the conjectural estimate made some years since in the 
engineer department, namely, $600,000.-(Claes F.) 
'rhe lowest point at which the bay is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about 
forty-five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on that island, to replace 
the one destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the D elaware 
shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware channel, and at the same time to 
protect the mouth of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal; a temporary work 
on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of a war, to assist 
in closing the channel on that side; together with floating obstmctions, to be 
put down in moments of peril, will effectually cover all above this position-
including Philadelphia and its navy yard, Wilmington, New Castle, the canal 
before mentioned, and the Philadelphia and Baltimore railroad. 
The rebuilding of Fort Delaware was long delayed by difficulties attending 
the settlement of claims to the island (Pea Patch) on which it is to stand; the e 
having been adjusted, the fort is in progress-the tedious and difficult process of 
forming· a foundation with piles and grillage being concluded. In the meantime, 
Fort 1Yl!/fiin, an old work, standing about seven miles below the city of Phila-
delphia had been put in good order. 
'l'he expeu.·e of .JTort Dela.ware is, n.ccording to revised estimates, $5 0,000, 
and of the fort opposite, 521,000.-(0lasse C and F.) 
Chesapeake bay, :Elamptort roads, James river, No1folk, and tlie navy yard.-
The worlut projected for the. are: :first, a fort at Old Point Comfort-thi'4 is 
called Fort 1Ylonroe ,- second, a ca ematcd battery called Fort Ca1hovn, in the 
Rip Rap hoal , oppoi--ite ld l)oint Comfort; and, tl1ird, a line of :floatino- ob-
tructions, xtendi1w acro:4 th channel from one of th e works to the oth •r. 
Fort Jlionroe i of it:,1 ·If complete, but an advanced redoubt on the land i-id i 
unfini~h d, and con ·id raLle work i yet ncce ary to ccurc proper ventilation 
ancl th n er 'ary dryn ', to th o-reat powd r miwazine' within the fort, de-
io-n d a a priu ·ipal d pot of that material. Atte~npt to ecure good w:iter 
by au art ·ian well ar' ·till p r ever din. Rrquir d to complet , ·15,00 .-
( 
1la B.) 
Fort Calltoztn cannot yet be carric·d forward for want of tability in th fi un-
clati 11. 'l'he artifi ·ial ma· on which it i to . tand havino- n rai; ·d on of 
th wat 'r, th walll'l of th · b:ttt<'ry w ·re b •o-un , om ~car incc · but it \"fl'-
,·oon found that th ir w irrht ·au-. ·cl con:-,icl rabl ,·ub~idc·nc . n an in,p ·ti n 
by ·n,,-in •c•r ffic ·r~ it wa tit II dt> ·i<l,•il to 1 •c•p th foundation loadNl wi h rn re 
tliau tlu· whole W<•irrht r,f th tiui-.h 'd work until all uL id nc Ind • , d. 
' h load ha<l hnrclly L ·n put 11, how •,·,•r lJC'for _ i wn injudi ·iou h· d 
rnin d to t·tk • i off, :md b ~in t 1,nilcl, :dthourrh the ttlino- rn · ... till !! in~ 
lap1 ii :t h tter p Ji ·y jll" ·vniJ ·d I, •fon· th · <.·011. trn ·tion wn r ,..,urn ] bu n 
I ' r • th v •ry c·on i 1 mbl ·1 •11 of r •moving the load had b II in u 
and th ·urth r p ·11 f r pin ·i1w it r •n ·r •cl n · ,.;:,ar . Th u .. j n 
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~a~ now so nearly ceased that it is contemplated to resume the construction at 
an early day.-(Olass 0.) Required to complete, $729_,3_32. . . . 
It may be expedient in time of war, by way of p1:ov1dmg 1?-ter10r barners, !o 
Erect batteries on Craney island, at the mouth of Elizabeth river, and to put m 
c nrlition and arm Old Fort Norfolk, which is just below the city. • 
Harbor of St. Mary.~The central situation ( as regards the Ohesapeak~ )_ of 
thi, fine basin, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the facility 
with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of refuge for !he 
commerce of the Chesapeake bay, and as an occasional, if not constant, station 
during war of a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but no 
project has been formed. The Engineer Department some years ago conjectured 
that the cost of defences in this harbor might amount to $300,000.-(0lass F.) 
Annapolis liarbor.-Port Severn has been put in an efficient condition, and 
repairs have been advanced on Fort Madison,· these will be continued until 
that work also shall afford an efficient battery.-(Class A.) Estimated at 
.:30,000. 
Harbor o/ Baltimore.-The proximity of the city to Chesapeake bay greatly 
endangers the city of Baltimore. In the present state of things an enemy, in a 
fe~· ho~rs march, after an easy landing, and without having his commun~cation 
wuh his fleet endangered, can make himself master of that great empormm of 
commerce. There are required for its security two forts on the Patapsco, 0ne 
at Hawkin's Point, and the other opposite that point; these being the lowest 
positions at which the passage of the Patapsco can be defended. Besides the 
advantages that will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distance, 
thereby gaining time by delaying his march, for the arrival of £uccor, and pre-
-renting his turning the defensive positions which our troops might occupy, it 
will be impossible for him to endanger the city by a direct attack by water. 
The operations on Fort Carroll-the work occupying the extremity of Soller's 
flats, ( opposite Hawkin's Point,)-are proceeding with all the rapidity allowed 
by the appropriations. Estimate, $865,000.-(0lass 0.) 
The work on Hawkin's Point belongs to class F, and is estimated to cost 
8376,000. 
The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt TiVood, a l1d Covington Battery should 
be retained as a second barrier. The :first-mentioned is now in good condition, 
aud the r<'pairs rrquired for the others may be applied at the beginning of a war . 
..,_llouth ef Elk river.-'rhe completion of the line of water commm;1ication 
~m t · l)Plaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it proper to place a 
fort "'omc, 'line near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an enemy from 
de~troyino-, by a sudden enterprise, the works forming this outlet of the canal. 
1'here have been no surveys made with a view to establish such protection, 
\\'hich i · estimated at $!50,000.-(0lass F.) 
Cities ef Washington, Georgetown, and Atexandria.-Fort Wasliington 
covers thc.'e cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land 
at some eight or ten miles below Alexandria, should that city be his object, and 
about t ;vic:e as far below Washington. It will also serve the very important 
Iiuri,,o,~e of covering troops cros:-;ing from Virginia, with a view to fall on the 
tlank:4 of an enemy moving against the Capitol from the Patuxent or the Ohesa-
Iieake. The repairs on thi work have been completed.-(Olaiss A.) 
c·Pdar Point, Potomac river.-But all these objects would have been better 
ftr.lfi le had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point. As it is, however, 
the contPmplated works being constructed in the Patuxent, and the militia of the 
:u.rrou1 <liug country in a due state of' preparation, an enterprise against Was~-
lti<rt-l1n w ul<l be a hazardou one. As giving complete security to the towns m 
th~ di:-- ri ·t, cov ·ring more than sixty miles in lcnoth of the Potomac; the river 
erminu of the great railroad from tbe south, anl a large tract of country lying 
het een the l>otomac and the Patuxent; the work on Cedar Point should not 
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be omitted. There have been no surveys made of the ground, nor projects of 
the fort, which~ in a conjectural estimate of the engineer department, was set 
<lown at $300,000.-(Class E) 
Patuxent ri·ver.-The more effectually to protect the city of Washington 
from a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation in the Patu:x:-
ent, and to provide additional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a fort has 
been planned to occupy Point Patience and another to occupy Thomas's Point, 
both a short distance up the river. 'l'he work on Tlwmas's Point is estimated 
at $259,000, and the work on Point Patience estimated to cost $246,000.-
( Classes D and F.) 
It will be perceived that the system of defence for Washington contemplates, 
first. defending the Potomac on Cedar Point, and maintaining· a second barrier 
at Fort Washington; second, defending the mouth of the Patmrnnt. This par-
ticular arrangement not having been al ways understood, a few words are added. 
in explanation. 
During the last war there was no fort in the Patuxent, and the consequence 
was that the British approached by that avenue and occupied the whole river as 
high as Pig Point, nearly fifty miles from its mouth, and less than twenty miles 
from the Capitol; while, in consequence of there being· no forts in the Potomac, 
they occupied that river as high as Alexandria, inclusive; by this latter occu-
pation peifectly protecting the left flank of the movement during its whole ad-
vance and retreat. Both flanks being safe, the British had nothing to fear 
except from a force in front; and that this risk was not great, in the short march 
of le::;s than twenty miles from the boats, was proved by the issue. 
On the ninth day from that on which the fleet entered the Chesapeake the 
English army was in possession of the OH.pitol, having penetrated nearly fifty 
miles beyond the point of debarkation. Ou the twelfth <lay from the time of 
landing·, the troops were again on shipboard, near the mouth of the river. This 
attack, exceedingly well conceived and very ga1lantly executed, owed its suc-
cess entirely to the want of defences, such as are now proposed. 
Let us suppose both rivers fortified as recommended, and an enemy landed at 
the mouth · of the Patuxent. If now he attempt this enterprise, his march would 
be prolonged by at least four days-that is to say, it will require more than six-
teen day , during which time he will be out of communication with his fleet as 
regards supplies and assistance. 
The opposition to his invasion will begin at the landing, because our troops 
having now nothing to fear as to their flanks, either from the Potomitc or Patux-
ent, will di, pnte every foot of territory; and although he should continue to 
advance it must be at a slower rate. "\Vhile he ii:, tlnu, pur;-uing hi::; route to· 
·ward '\YaHhington, the forces of Virginia, brought by railroad to the mouth of 
..A.c1uia creek, will be cros::;ing the Potomac and concentrating at Port 'l'oLacco, 
or some por-;ition b 1 tweeu that place and l!'ort ,Va hington, preparatory to fall-
ing- on hi:-- flank and rear. 1'his would ::;cc1i1 to Le co11clusive, for it i::: clifficult 
to couc·<'ivc of troops persevcrino- in an expedition when cn·ry moment will not 
01ily plac<· tl1em further from, uicor Lut greatly increase their 1wc<l of it. Hail-
ro:ul · n·:H:h from near the crossing plac<'S of the I>otomac to the Yery heart of 
the c·otmtry r-onth, ancl a very few day:; w.oulcl bring forward a larg·c force, all of 
whil'l1 woul<l arriv upon tl1e rear of thr e1H·111y. 
It ha. be ·u ...;aid that if ~hut out of the 1'.ltn.·ent the enemy might land h · 
twcl'n thP mrrnth of that river anll Annapoli8, aud thence proce('(l agc1in~t ,Ya--~-
i1wt1111. But thr r-:1me clifiiculti<·:-i belong to thi proj<·et, anrl a 11<·w diffi ·ulty 1; 
adcl1•1l. 'I h1! Yirg-inia fore•;; an-iv at-1 Lc·fore, mHl a:::,·ail hi: flank, cith r Letwc n 
th• Potoma · ancl 'atu.· ·nt or LctwN•n the Patu.·cnt :111cl the 'he. apcake; and 
th •n, i ·, Ii ,id<·., th· J>atn.·c·nt for the enemy to croi3., Lotl1 in er iw,.. ml r turn-
i11"-it · ·If a formi<lable military ob.:tac:le. 
lt i, nid, abo, that the luncliu•r may be maclc in the Potomac; but tlii-- on." 
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_ ,e, that the system animadverted on had not been studied, it being a fm~da-
al principle of the system th~t such landing must be prevented by fortify-
: the river as low down as possible. . 
The southern coast, stretching from Cape Hatteras to the southern ~omt of 
f1 rida, is inrnriably low, and for the greater part s~udy, much resemblmg the 
,t from the above-mentioned cape to Montauk Pomt, on the east e~d of Long 
L nd. A ridge of sand, here and there int~rrupted _by the _alluv10~1 of t_he 
riv rs, extends through its whole length. 'This ndge, m certam port10ns, hes 
n the main land; while in others it is divided therefrom by ba ins or "sounds" 
f nrious width and depth, and is cut up into islands by mun?rous ch~1mel~, 
which connect these interior waters with the sea. Wherever t1us sand nclge 1s 
· terrupted, its place is occupied by low and marshy grounds, bordering the 
_ rincipal and the many lesser outlets of the rivers. . 
Ocracoke inlet, N. C.-The shallowness of the water on the bar at this 
inlet effectually excludes all vessels-of-war-at least, all moved by _sails. ~ut 
, this is an outlet 'of an extensive commerce, and as, through tlns opemng, 
rtempts might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class of steam 
-re,~els, to destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of. interior water com-
munication, timely preparation must be made of temporary works, equal to 
efence against all such minor enterprises. 
B eaufort harbor, . N. C.-A work called Fort Macon has been erected for 
' e defence of this harbor. It is in a very efficient condition, though ome 
light additional work is needed, both for the fort itself and for the preservation 
01 the site, which is acted upon violently by the sea. Successful impediments 
o thi action have been resorted Lo, which require a little extension, however, 
d continual care. Estimate, $3,000.-(0lass B.) 
~lioutlls ef Cape Fear ri,ver, N. C.-The defence o( the main channel of 
·pe Fear requires, in addition to For~ .Caswell, (now completed,) on Oak island, 
an ther fort on Bald Head. And the defence of the smaller ehanuel will require 
a_ redoubt on Federal Point. 'l'he battery, magazine, block-house, &c., at Smith-
-.ille, houldremain as accessories. Fort Caswell, Oak island, $7,000.-(Class B.) 
Tltefor~ on Bald Head (class F) will require $180,000. The redoubt on Fed-
eral Foint (class F) will require $18,000; and the battery, &c., called Fort 
J hnston, at Smithville, (class A,) $5,000. 
Georgetown liarbor, S. C.-The first inlet of any consequence s<;mth of Cape 
.Fear river is at the united mouths of the ,v accamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers, 
:torming Georgetown harbor, which is a commodious and capacious bay, having 
5ufficient water within, and also upon the bar near the mouth, for merchant ves-
,e · and small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor was begun many years 
ago, l,ut never completed, and no projects for defence have been made. It is 
probaLle that a work placed near Moscheto creek, or on Winyaw Point, would 
give adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000.-(Class E.) 
Santee river and Bull's bay.-About ten miles south from Georgetown are 
he mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not known 
w-hether the bars at the mouth of this river have sufficient water for sea-going 
"t""e-;:,eb .. The same u_ncertainty exists as to the depth into Bull's bay. It may 
be ~ uffic1ent to consider these, and the other inlets between Georgetown and 
Oharl~ston, as calling for small works capable of resisting boat enterprises, and 
o ass gn as the cost $100,000. Should they prove to be navigable for priva-
e r -, they will require a larger expenditure.-(Olass F.)-$100,000. 
Charle.1ton, S. C.-This city, situated at the junction of the Ashley and 
Go p r river;:;, i about five miles, in a direct line, from the sea. Between it and 
the cean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon 
th bar, lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only 
w-a er enough for mailer frigates and sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--19 
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the harbor is James's island, in which are several serpentine passages, more or 
less navigable for boats, barges, and small steam vessels; some of them commu-
nicate directly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly 
passage from the Stono to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river opposite the 
middle of the city. 
Interior natural water communications exist, also, to the southwest of Stono 
river, connecting this with North Edisto river; the latter with South Edisto and 
St. Helena sound; this, again, with Broad river; and, :finally, this last with 
Savannah river. 
On the north side of the harbor of Charleston lies Sullivan's island, separated 
from the main by a channel navigable only by small craft. On the northwest 
side of this island is an interior water communication which extends to Bull's 
bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown. 
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences to 
the principal entrance of the harbor. 
The lateral avenues must also be shut. And it is probable that accurate sur-
veys of all these avenues will ,::;how that the best mode of defending them will 
be by works at or near the mouths of the inlets, as the enemy will be kept 
thereby at a greater distance from the city; the lesser harbors formed by these 
inlets will be protected, and the line of interior water communication will be in-
acce sible from the sea. 
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor can 
be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's islan<l. 
This is, at present, occupied by Fort lYioultrie-a work of some strength, but 
by no means adequate to its object; its battery being weak, and the scarp so 
low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by a 
modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a full defence 
of the harbor, has not yet been determined. But so long as it is the only work 
at this, the principal point of defence, it must be kept in good condition for 
service, and no alterations that will disturb this efficiency should be un<ler-
taken.-( Olass A .) 
On a "'hoal nearly opposite Fort Moultrie a new fort has been well advanced, 
which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort J.lioultrie. This is called Fort 
Sumter.-(Olass 0.) To complete this fort will require, it is estimated, $150,000. 
In the upper part of the harbor is Castle P inckney, on Shuter's Folly island. 
This r quire, r-;ome repairs, estimated at $800.-(0lass A.) 
'tono, Nortli Edisto, and S011,tli Edisto.-All these must be fortified, at lea~t 
in uch a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or ~mall 
ve , L. To tlrnt en cl $50,000 may be assigned to each.- (Olass F.) 
't. Helena sound.-'l'he proper defences cannot Le pointed out till 1he ound 
::;hall have b n urveyed. Although there i. supposed to be no great depth of 
water on the Lar, it i · known to be navigable for the maller cla s of merchant-
m<·n and for . team boat., ancl to have a navigable communication with the hearl 
of Broad river, or I>ort Royal-intcrsectincr the interior navigatiou between 
'hm l<·, ·tc,n ~ud 'avaimah. The e tirnate i , "150,000.-(0la,' F.) 
Broad nrer, or Port Royal roads.-'l'b value of this capaciou roadstead, 
a. a harL~r of refuo- , cl pend upon the depth that can b, carried over th har; 
n the ch:;t:m of thi Lar L yond the line of coa. t; and on the mean that 
ma · li · np11li ·al,] of 1 .·• ·nino- th clanger of cro,, ino- it. Thi. is uppo ' d tc, 
b · th cl: ·p _t-_t bar on thP . outh rn coa t. 'lwuld th •r pr ve to b wat ·r 
·nou d1 tor frwat 14, ai1d ,Ji uld it b pra ·ticabl to mak · th pa~ age OY r the 
lJar af • mid a.: l, 'the ·r ·tion of lio-ht-h u on tl1 ·hor ,, and lio-ht or oth r 
di...:tin ·t ~uid · on the bar, thir- harbor, ituat cl within ...:ixty mile of th city t 
'barl •. ton, and t" ut ' of ; 'avannah riv r, inter· ctino- th int rior wat r c m-
unicati n L ·tw en th · ·, citi ., , tl1 reby " curing th arrival of uppli :; of Y •ry 
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kind, would possess a high degree of importance not only as a harbor of refuge, 
but al o as a naval station. . 
The urvey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, sho_uld be made with 
the greatest care and a~l possible_ m~nuteness. Only when this shall have been 
done can the true relations of this mlet to the rest of the coast be known, and 
on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defe1;1-ces will depend. 
For the present the estimate made some years ago by the engmeer department 
is adopted, namely, $300,000.-(Olass E.) 
Savannalt, and rnoutli ef tlie Savannali river, Georgia.-Mention has been 
made of the natural interior water communication along the coast of South 
Carolina. A similar communication extends, south from the Savannah river, as 
far as the St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages, the city of Savan-
nah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the 
harbor or river; and, accordingly, its defence must have relation to these lesser, 
as well as to the great channels. 
'11he distance from the mouth of Wassaw, or even the Ossabaw sounds (both 
to the southward of Savannah river) to the city is not much greater than from 
the mouth of the river; and an enterprise may proceed the whole distance by 
water, or part of th.e way by water, and part by land, from either inlet or from 
both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, it 
cannot now br determined where they can be defended most advantageously. 
It is hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed 
near the inlets, because, thus placed, they will serve the double purpose of 
guarding the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, in time of 
war, cannot but be very useful. 
The defence of Savannah river is not difficult. A fort on Cockspur island, 
lying just within the mouth, and, perhaps for additional security, another on 
Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of the river, would 
prevent the passage of vessels up the channel, and cover the anchorage between 
Tybee and Oockspur. 
Old l-1 ort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, must be main-
tained as a second barrier, Loth as respeQts the main channel and the passages 
which come into the river from the south, which last would not be at all con-
trolled by fortifications on Oockspur or rrybee. Fort Jackson is accordingly 
undergoing the repairs and modifications necessary to give the proper strength 
and efficiency. Estimated to cost $45,000.-(0lass A.) 
Fort Pulaski, a new work situated on Oockspur island, is, in all the most 
important matters, finished. Some further work has to be done, however, on 
the ctikes of the island, on barracks, and quarters, and storehouses, ancl in the 
con truction of an advanced battery. Estimated to cost $35,000.-(Olass B.) 
To fortify Tybee island may require $120,000.-(0lass E.) 
TVassaw sound, Ossabaw sou,nd, St. Catliarine' s sound, at tlte nioutli ef 
Medway river~· Sapelo sound, Doby inlet, Altamaha sound, at tlze mouth ef 
Altamalla riter; St. Sirnon's sound, at the mouth ef BuJfalo creek; St. Andrew's 
sour.d, at tlie united rnouths ef tlie Scilla and 1 'antilla rivers; and Cumberland 
sound, at tlte moutlt ef St. Jvlary's river.-All these communications with the 
ocean are highly important as regards the line of interior navigation, and several 
of them as affording access to excellent harbors. 'l'he last and one or two 
others are known to be navigable to the largest sloops-of-war and merchantmen, 
and some of the others are but little inferior as regards depth of entrance or 
safety of anchorage. 
Fort Clincli, a work now in course of erection at the mouth of Cumberland 
sound, is a most important contribution to the defence of this, the most southern 
of the Georgia entranc('s . E ·timated to cost $180,000.-(Olass 0.) 
All the above-named openings, except that into Cumberland sound, have to 
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be surveyed. Some of them are probably easily defensible by forts and batte-
ries, while othei·s may need the aid of floating defences. 
Nothing better can now be done than to assume $200,000 as the average 
cost of defending each of the eight entrances, giving a total of $1,600,000.-
( Class F.) 
St. Augustine, Florida.-Thjs most southern of all the harbors of the Atlan-
tic, and the key to the eastern portion of Florida, is accessible to the smaller 
classes of merchantmen, to privateers, and to steam vessels, and requires a cer-
tain amount of protection from attack by water. It is believed that adequate 
protection has been given by repairs bestowed upon the water battery of the old 
Spanish fort, ( Fort Jliarion.)- (Class A.) 
SEA-COAST FROM CAPE FLORIDA TO THE MOUTH OF THE RIO GRANDE. 
Fort. Taylor, at Key West, is in a good state to be brought speedily into 
efficiency; the walls have been rajsed up out of the water almost to the sills of 
the lower embrasures; and with the sum asked for in the last estimates, the 
lower tier of embrasures might be got ready for the armament in a shott time. 
Estimated to cost $805,000.-(0lass 0.) 
Fort Jefferson, Garden key, Tortugas.-This fort, which will perfectly 
command the admirable harbor lying in the heart of this group of keys, is 
advancing without the slightest impediment. '1.1he outer or counter-scarp wall 
first executed, because necessary to prevent the flooding of the island in gales 
of wind, has been completed, and labors are now bestowed on the main scarp. 
Estimated at $989,862.-(Olass 0.) 
Turning now to the shore of the Gulf, we find a portion, namely, from Cape 
Florida to Pensacola, that has never been surveyed with particular reference to 
the defence of the harbors. ..Within this space there ate Charlotte harbor, 
Tampa bay, Apalaclticola bay, Apalachie bay, St. Josepli's bay, and Santa 
Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assume for these the esti-
mate formerly presented by the engineer department, viz: $1,000,000 for all.-
(Olass F.) 
It may be remarked, as applying to the whole Gulf coast, that, from the re]a .. 
tive geographical position of this part of the seaboard and the country inter-
ested in its afety, from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent 
country, and mjxed character of the inhabitants, it will be some time before that 
portion within upporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by an 
enemy, will be competent of itself to sustain a serious attack from without. 
Upon the Atlantic eaboard the Alleghanies crowd the people down upon the 
shore, every important point on the coast being surrounded by a population den e 
now, and every day rapidly increasing in numbers; while the ocean and the 
interior parallel communications transmit rapid aid to the right and left. 'l'he 
coa _t of the Gulf, however, is thinly peopled in itself, is remotr from succor from 
b hmd, and i. almo t inacce,.sible to lateral aR, istanc . Tho e rea ons, there-
fore, which tend to e tablish the necessity of au organized, permanent, and 
timely y tern of defence for the whole seaboard of 1he United State , apply to 
thi part of it with peculiar force. 
We now pa. on to th remaining point of defence on the Gulf. 
Pensacola bay.-'l'hr upp r arm of thi con ·idrrable bay receive the yellow 
wat r or P a river, MiddJ river, aud ERcamhi:i riv r. Th tiibntarie of the 
la. t int rlocking with th lab:una and 'hattahouchi , , em to mark tl1e route 
wh r by, at om futur , clay, ·anal ,vill convey a J:JUrt of the product of the~e 
1·iv r to }> n:,;acola · whil the cpialitie and po:--ition of th harbor, and the 
fav r bl nature of th ountry, hav already marked out lin of railroad com-
munication with a vast interior rl'o-i 11. 
anta Ro. a ·otmd .·t ·nd. a.,twar<l, from th lower part of the hay, into 
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2anta Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola,_ Perdiclo, and l\_fobile 
ays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to reqmre but a few m1les of 
c tting to complete a navigable channel from the fo:st ~o the last ~amed bay, 
and thence through an existing interior water commumcation to the city of New 
Orleans. 
Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is now accessible to 
friO'ates, and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanently deepened. 
The bar is near the coast and the channel across it straight and easily hit. 
The harbor is perfectly landlocked and the roadstead very capacious. There 
are excellent positions within for repairing, building, and launching· vessels, an_d 
for docks and dock yards, in healthy situations. 'l'he supply of good water 18 
abundant. 'rlrn harbor is perfectly defensible. These propertie:-;, in connexion 
with the position of the harbor, aF\ regards the coast, have induced the govern-
ment to select it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repair. 
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to form 
he cheme of defence for the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as an im-
portant naval station and place of rendezvous and repair which it now is, 
further surveys, extending a greater distance back from the shores, delineating 
accurately the face of the country, and showing the several avenues by land 
and water, are found to be necessary. · 
The defences of the water passage as projected are nearly completed. 
Fort Pickens, on St. Rosa island, is finished. 
Fort Jl;[cRee, on Foster's island, is also finished; as is Fort Barrancas, on 
the ite of an old Spanish fort. An old Spanish water battery has been 
t~oroughly repaired, and placed in connexion with the last-namecl fort, and con--
s1derable progress has been made on a redoubt, in aclvance of the same fort. 
Permanent barracks in the same vicinity are about half finished. 
The site of Fort McRee was, a few years since, seriously threatened by the-
abrasion of a new outlet from the lagoon that lies just behind it; but this danger 
ha" been averted, and by the erection of a low ramp~rt exterior to the fort a 
permanent security against any recurrence of the danger will be provided, and 
place for a heavy additional battery acting on the channel will be prepared. At 
a futu.Te day it will be proper to extend this exterior protection. At present it 
is de...,igned to execute only that part lying over or nearly over the outlet that 
wa lately so threatening and so difficult to close. Estimated at $204,000.-
( la ses A, B, 0.) 
Perdido l>ay.-'Ihis bay is intimately related to Pensacola and )fobile bays, 
both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully sur-
T""eyed with a view to those objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be 
8200,CJOO.-(Class :F'.) 
.1liobile bay.-'l1 he plan of defence for this bay requires a fort on Mobile 
Poi_n~, an_d another on Dauphin island. Fort ];Jorgan, at the first-mentioned 
pos1t1on 1. a finished work, in au efficient condition, but requiring, in the way 
of barracks and quarters, storehouses, &c., for the accommodation of its garri-
::;on, ...,ome further expenditures. rrhese improvements are in progress-estimated 
at .... .-30,000.- (0la~s B.) 
Fort_ Gafrtes, on Daupliin island, has been authorized Ly Congress, and the 
expenditure of the appropriation awaits only the settlement of title to the site, 
a to which there are supposed to be no remaining difficulties. Estimate, 
. -1 0,000.- (0lass 0.) 
- ~ew Orleans and tlie delta ef tlie 11/Jississippi.-The most northern water 
communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called 
the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. 'l'he next is 
the pa..,· of Oltef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. '11hrough these pas-
~age an en my entering Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he 
in. ercepted all water communication with :Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach 
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New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake; or he might continue onward 
through Lake l\faurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the 
Mississippi at the very head of the delta; or, landing within the mouth. of the 
Chef Menteur, he might move against the city, along the edge of the Gentilly 
1·oad. 
To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and towards the head of Lake Borgne, 
is Bayou Bien·venue, a navigable channel, ( tlie one followed by tlie Englisl1, army 
in tlte last war,) not running quite to the Mississippi, but bounded by shores of 
such a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarcation to the 
-city. 
These avenues are defended by Fort Pike, at the Rigolets; by Fort 1Vlacomb, 
formerly Fort "\Vood, at Chef Menteur; by a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue, and 
by a tower at Bayou Dupre. 
The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about 
-seventy miles below New Orleans-the lowest position that can be occupied. 
Fort Jackson is on the rig·ht bank, and Fort St. Pliilip a little higher up on the 
left. 
Forts Pike, Jltlacomb, Battery Bienvenue, and Tower Depri, have been put in 
the most efficient state, and will perfectly accomplish the objects for which they 
were de igned. They will still need some small expenditures in reference to 
security of site, extension of accommodations, &c. Fort Jackson is also in good 
condition as to its batteries, but will be much improved in that respect on the 
completion of an outwork now in hand. It needs also more barrack room. 
Fort St. Philip is a very old fort, and much dilapidated. Its position is o 
commanding and advantageous as to require the fort to be put in the best state, 
and much has been done to that end within a few years; still more is necessary 
for the fort itself and its dependencies; and all the barracks, quarters, and store-
houses have yet to be built. Estimated at $111,500.-(0lasses A and B.) 
The most western avPnue by which New Orleans is approachable from the 
sea passes on the ·west side of the island of Grande 'I'erre into Barrataria bay, 
which is an excellent harbor for a floating force, guarding the coa .. ting trade on 
that side of the Mississippi. :F'rom this bay there are several paRsage leading 
to New Orleans. 
Fort Livingston, has been erected on the west end of Grande Terre island. 
'I'his fort is kept from entire completion to await the cessation of a slight sub-
sidence which has been going on for some time. It could be :finished with the 
means now applicable at any moment by a fr·w ·weeks' work.-(Ola..s B.) 
Proctor's Landing, Lake Bmgne.-This po1-,ition, which was oYerlooked in 
the ori 0 'innl project for the defences of the city of N w Orleans, has been already 
adverted to. A ,:mall battery, enclosing a towPr, 8tanding on the shore, v,:ould 
eff •ctually clo,'e this avrnue. 'I'he tower could not be carried by aR ault, nor 
th' battrry while protected by the tower. No l:mcling could be made under it;. 
fire, and there i.~ no other spot for a landing, owing to the i'i"\Ymnpy natur of the 
ground, hut th site of th batt ry. Estimated at, 100,000.-(Clas. D.) 
1 'f'veral timrs in thi. r<'port we have alludrd to circum.. taucr. wJ1ich would 
<lPm,md the· P1~1ploym nt of floating defence. in addition to fixed defence:- upon 
the. horr. \\" hav hn· an iu;:-tance in which that kind of defence would lie 
Y('l'Y n--c·ful. Fortification. will 11alJle u1:< to prot ct N" ew Orlran.~ even from 
tlw mo-:t :1·rinn" and cl t nnin cl •ffort.; of an en 'my; but, owioO' to th irreat 
width of . om~ of th , ,·.· t,·rior paR~a 0 ·c:-, we cannot by fortification: a]on<' d -
privc· an c·w·my of :inchorao-P:-, ( RP<' ·ially that of hancl ]rnr i=-land,) nor covn 
cntin·l · tlu· exterior water onnnnuication b twc n the• Iligol t::i and )IobiJ . 
'\V<· mu, t. tlwrt>for · eitlH:r (Jllil.'tly :--nbmit to the annoyancP and injury that an 
1wmy in po -.,•:-:-ion of th . , pm,. a 0 • •, may infli t, or ;n nt th m by a tim y 
preparation of a tloatino- for ·1. adapt cl to th ir p culiar navio·ation, and •:tp bl 
uncl,ir tlu· . helt r of fort:, of b fog alway. on the al •rt, and f a, -.urning 
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offensive or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of 
he enemy. . . 
A. floating force of this nature would be ve:·y t~seful m ?verlookmg t_he coast 
eastward of New Orleans, especially the port10:1 JUSt mer~t10ne~, extend1~g from 
the Rigolet (Fort Pike) to Mobile bay. And m connex10n with the active ser-
Tice of such a force, and as a further defence of the approaches to New Orleans 
from that quarter, a fort on Ship island would be important. I~ would c~ver a_n 
excellent anchorao·e for the defensive flotilla and for other cruisers. vV1th this 
refuge at one end of the base of operations, and at the other the anchorage 
between Pelican island and Dauphin island, guarded by works at the eastern 
encl of the latter, a light steam squadron might, without being much exposed, 
be Y-ery effective. 
Projects have not yet been made for works on Ship island, but it may bG 
e~timated that an adequate fort would cost about $200,000.- (0lass E.) 
In this age of great improvements in the means of locomotion, it ~vould be 
unwise to decide, without pressing need, on the details of the floatmg force 
required at certain points on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts-perhaps 
even on the nature of the moving power. Although the probability undoubtedly 
is that the power will be steam, genius may in the interim devise something still 
better than steam . 
..And I may here remark, in relation to the preparation of steam vessels for 
warlike purposes generally, that wisdom would seem to direct a very caution 
and deliberate progress. Every new vessel may be expected to surpas in im-
portant particulars all that had preceded, and to surpass the more, as each suc-
ceeding vessel should be the result of careful study and trial of the preceding. 
It may be considered unreasonable to expect that steam itself will give way 
to some agent still more potent, and at the same time not less safe and manage-
able. But it certainly is no more than probable that steam vessels now under 
con truction may be regarded almost as incumbrances within ten years . 
..A deliberate advance in this branch of naval construction is recommended the 
more, by our ability to construct these vessels iu large numbers, when about to 
be needed, the timber being collected in the meantime. 
CO,AST OF TEXAS. 
In.November, 1845, a special board of engineer officers was appointed to 
examine the coast of Texas in relation to its defence. Their report, submitted 
in February, 1846, was to the following effect: 
The coast from the Sabine to the Rio Grande is about three hundred and 
ceventy-five miles in extent. It is composed for nearly the whole distance of 
long, nanow islands and peninsulas, ·which lie parallel to tbe main land, forming 
e-veral bays and lagoons, the inlets to which exhibit channels generally only 
suitable to the smaller classes of vessels. 
Galveston bay is the most important one on the coast. Besides a number of 
hayous and small tributaTies, it receives the waters of the river Trinity. This 
river i said to be navigable for six hundred miles for steamers of a light class, 
and. when improved., this navigation will doubtless be extended. 'rhe harbor 
is represented as being undoubtedly the best on the coast, the bar at the entrance 
having also the greatest depth of water. The charts submitted by that board 
how a depth of nine feet at low water and twelve feet at high water. 
_,\_ permanent work is propoeed for the defence of this harbor, of the class of 
that con;tructed on Grande Terre island, Barrataria bay. Its estimated cost is 
three hundred tbousancl d.ollars.-(Olass D.) The construction of some Mar-
telle towers along the shore and across the island is deemed. essential to the 
defence of the "Swash" channel and to the security of the town, Brazos San-
ti.a.go. The board deem this harboT of equal importance with that of Galveston: 
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it has not much capacity, but is the only one in the vicinity of the Rio Grande. 
The bay at the pass has eight feet water. 
The trade of the Rio Grande and of its dependent country passes overland 
thirty miles to Point Isabel, and from thence issues from the Brazos SantiaO'o. 
The depth of water over the bar at the mouth of the Rio Grande being oitlv 
four feet, admits the passage of very small vessels not suited to the purpo e of 
commerce. 
With reference, then, to the trade of the Rio Grande, and to a point from 
which military supplies could with the greatest facility be sent to the frontier, 
the defence of the Brazos Santiago is deemed by the board of equal importance 
with that of Galveston, and they recommend a permanent work, of the ize, 
character, and cost of the one proposed for the latter place, estimated at three-
hundred thousand dollars.-(Olass D.) 
Matagorda bay.-It is deemed due to the extensive country washed by the-
rivers tributary to this bay, that its entrance should be defended. The diffi-
culties, however, attending that entrance, and the navigation of the bay up to 
Matagorda and La Vacca, would seem to lessen, in a military point of view, the-
importance of its defence as · compared with that of Galveston and the Brazos 
Santiago; but as a very good harbor for vessels drawing no more than eight 
feet of water is exhibited within the bay at Porto Cabello, and as it would afford 
convenient rendezvous for the light flotillas of an enemy, it is considered that a 
permanent work of secondary importance to those proposed for Galveston and 
the Brazos Santiago should be constructed for its defence. A small work, 
mounting some twenty-five guns, and estimated. to cost $175,000, is accordingly 
proposed.-(Class E.) The remaining inlets on the coast, either from the shal-
lowness of the water, the comparatively little value of the harbors them clve~, 
or the nature of the country immediately depending upon them, are deemed to 
require, at present, no other defence than that of a temporary character. They 
would depend upon the ultimate opening of a line of inland navigation, comiclered 
practicable between the Sabine and the Rio Grande; and the necessary work 
would be thrown up only in time of war. 
GENERAL SUMMARY. 
It may be of convenience to have here a , ummary of the principle~ con-
tended for in the preceding remarks, and of the c sential points contained 
therein. 
1. As~uming that we may have wars with nations in possession of extcn ·i.e 
naval means, we must consider ourselves likely to be attacked wherever there 
are olJject tempting· to an enemy, either from the spoil he might hope to gather, 
or the injury that through them he might hope to inflict. \Ve mu, t also con-
' icler t1,at the po,ver of the attack -will be. proportioned to the value of the 
object; and that, consequently, the means of defence houlcl b of correspond-
ing strength. 
2. The mode of defence proper to our circum tances, a su tained by the 
con, ideration pre entcd in the preceding remark~, ancl other,· of analogon, nature; 
and as xcmplified by the prr, ent, as well as by the former practice of all na-
tion having an exJJoscd seaLoard, is believed to be a y tern of p rman nt for~ 
tification:'4, con.-i::;tinn· of work adapted re pectfully in theii: power to the ,alu~ 
of the objr·ct covered, and applied, in tim s of peace, . ev rally, in an order ot 
time al14o fix ·c1 hy th rclativ importance of the object:,. 
3. It i ju.-t thi:- mod of defonce that ha.. been, to a great ext nt, built up 
in thi · country ·inc<.' th war l 12, and that .., hould be carried to completion 
rapid! · a· the 11H·all. of th trca:ury will allow. The point that ar most ,al-
uahle arc a1r ady, to a v ry important ext nt, covered by the 'e d fenc is. But 
amo1w mau · }JOint..: th, t are valuable, a11 arc not equally o; '\vhil , for exam-
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ple, New y ork has had much done for it, Baltimore has had little, and_ New 
Bedford-the tliird city in the Union for registered tonnage-almost notlung:, 
)fore than four thousand heavy guns may, however, ns has before been saw.,. 
now be mounted for the defence of places which it was necessa~·y Jh:st to gua~·d, 
in permanent fortifications that are equal to any ir_i- the w~r!d, m thell" respecti:ve · 
grade.,, and placed, moreover, in the most effective pos1t10ns. These_ are m,. 
1rhat are called in this report, classes A and B, namely, old works repa1red and 
new ones completed, or nearly so, at a total cost of $16,756,70~. . 
Then follows the class of works in progress, ( class 0,) of ·which the remam- -
ing expenditures are estimated at $5,028,194 . 
.And then the class D, next to be commenced, in which there is no work that . 
can be dispensed with, as must be evident on consulting the list, page 92. The · 
cost of class D is estimated at $4,083,000. 
Then follows the class E, next in importance, of which the estimated cost is , 
S2,235,000. 
As to those in hand, all have received the approbation of the government ~nd 
Congress, and not one of those comprised in any other class can be begun with- · 
out the particular sanction of both. 
The last class, marked F, the most numerous of ull, cannot be begun for· 
many years, at any rate, and then only as the several positions shall, in the view· 
of Congress, have risen to an adequate degree of importance. The estimate for· 
that class is $11,829,000. 
4. Though facility of communication with the interior of the country, by-
railroa.ds, would be an advantage in all cases where an enemy might land and 
conduct operations for two, three, or more days, there are few such positions that . 
now have, or are likely to have, the advantage of. such communications. Gener-
ally, the points of the coast attained by railroads are not points at which the 
people are deficient in numbers, but where they most abound; and besides, the 
attacks to which the coast will be. liable, will be almost universally sudden 
attacks--attacks without warning-attacks that must be settled, one way or· 
the other, before relief could come, even by railroad, and to which railroads could 
not supply relief, even ·were there time- men not being wanted to resist these at--
tacks, but heavy guns, whether afloat or ashore. 
The use of existing railroads, or of any railroad likely to be constructed, 
cannot, in general, therefore, affect materially a system of forts and batteries 
upon the sea-coast. 'l'here may be particular instances of partial benefit, but 
none is likely to occur wherein their use could justify the reduction of the 
power of fortifications othenvise necessary, much less the dispensing with such 
works altogether. 
5. The application of steam to vessels-of-war is believed to act detrimentally 
to the defence of the sea-coast by opening new avenues of approach, and also , 
by the suddenness and surprise with which attacks may fall upon any 
pojnt. The first augments the number of the defensive works, and the second 
requires them to be at all times-at the opening of the war as well as during · 
it~ contin~ance-in a state of perfect readiness for action. w·ith the large 
steam navies now kept in commission by naval powers, there would be no state 
of transition between peace and war-no time for new defences to be prepared,. 
nor for substituting new expedients even if any such would answer. 
On the other hand, the use of steam vessels as a reliance for coa.st defence 
i~ attended with all the objections inherent in other modes of defence with ves-.. 
sel , and with some of the objections exaggerated. The objections that are 
inevitable are, inordinate expense and the perishable nature of the preparation;.. 
and to these are to be added uncertainty as to their proper state of readiness, 
and a to their su:5ciency when ready. Steamers should in no case, therefore,,. 
take the place of shore batteries, when the use of the latter is not forbidden by 
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local peculiarities. As auxiliaries of fortifications they will always be useful, 
however, and as substitutes in the cases just supposed indispensable. 
6. No improvements or inventions of modern times tend in any degree to 
lessen the efficiency of fortifications as means of coast defence, while the princi-
pal one, namely, the firing of shells from guns, unquestionably augments their 
.relative power. 
NORTHERN FRONTIER 
The Secretary of War presents another interrogatory (the fourth) in the fol-
]owing words : " How far the increase of population on the northern frontier, 
..and of the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates or diminishes the 
necessity of continuing the system of fortification on those lakes ?" 
The system of defence for these lakes recommended by the joint board in 
·1840 (see Doc. 206, page 100) comprised the following works: 
1. Fort Brady, at the straits between Lake Superior and Lake 
Huron. Estimated cost of repair .......... _ ................ , $75,000 
2. Fort Mackinac, at the junction of Lake Michigan with Lake 
Huron. Estimated cost of repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 
3. Fort Gratiot, at the outlet of Lake Huron. Estimated cost of 
-repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 
Note.-All these are old works, long occupied by United States troops, and 
it is designed to give them further strength and means of accommodation for 
~arrisons. 
4. A new fort and barracks near Detroit. Estimated cost of con-
·.struction (original). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $250,000 
Amount expended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171,7-55 
Amount required to complete ............................. . 
5. Defensive works and barracks at Buffalo. Estimated cost of 
.. construction ........... .................... ........... - . - -
Amount expended ...................................... . 
Amount required to complete ............................. . 
6. Repair of old Fort Niagara. Estimated cost of repair ..... . 
Amount expended ...................................... . 
Amount required to complete .......................... - - - -
7. R pairs of old Fort Ontario. Estimated cost of repair ..... . 
Amount exp nded ............... . ...................... . 













.1Yote.-'I he"'c two are ola work., the former having been alway garri on d, I 
·bclicw. 
, . Auel a fort at the outlet of Lake Champlain. E timated co..,t 
of con. tructi n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411,497 
.Amount t xp nu d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7,3.5; 
... mount requir d to ompl te ............................. . 224,14' 
-------
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The e, it was thought, should be executed as soon as the means of the 
ea:::nry would allow. . 
~-lnd it was recommended in the above report, and m others on the same sub-
ject. that at the approach of war with England- . 
9. Works should oe placed at the mouth of the Genesee nver. 
10. A fort should be built at Sackett's Harbor. 
11. Another at a narrow part of the St. Lawrence river. 
12. That a large barrack establishment should be prepared at Plattsburg. 
13. Stone house, &c., at the head of the Kennebec and Penobscot. 
14. A fort at Calais, on the St. Croix; and, 
15. A large barrack establishment near Albany. 
These last mentioned preparations for war (Nos. 9, 1.0, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 
15) may still be left (as was designed) to be reconsidered at any time that such 
a certainty may seem to impend. . -i • 
Xothing has yet been done to Forts Brady, Mackinac, or Gratiot, and, 
though the maintenance of these forts in a war with England would undoubtedly 
be necessary, they may, with less damage than the others, be left as the last? to 
receive all the additional strength their situations demand. In the meantime 
the indispensable repairs that small appropriations will accomplish !=:hould. be 
provided for; for instance, a part of the very old wall of Fort l\Iackiuac havmg 
fallen down, a small grant was asked last year for its repair, a request that is 
this year repeated. 
Fort Wayne, tlie new fort near Detroit, has, since the date of the report 
abo-ve referred to, been built and is now in perfect condition, and there remains 
therein only the re-erection of officers' quarters destroyed by fire just after being 
completed, and the addition of some other quarters, storehouses, &c., the bar-
racks being very nearly fiuished ; the remaining expense being estimated at 
866,000. 
Fort Ontario, at Osu:ego, has also been finished, with several entirely new 
quarters, storehouses, barracks, &c., together with a long sea-wall, found to be 
necessary to preserve the site. Only small grants, for slight repairs, will be 
needed for this work for some time, but of which one for nine hundred dollars 
is now a,_ked. This fort is not a permanent one, and, if required to be main-
tained many years hence, may need repairs somewhat extensive. 
Fort Niagara has received extensive repairs, and is in a defensible condition; 
but the expenditure having been restricted to the fortification proper and to the 
magazine, the accommodations for the garrison, ·which are remains of the old 
French work, are in a bad condition, and need repair for the health and comfort 
of the troops. A new hospital was hardly finished, a year or two ago, when it 
was destroyed by fire, originating in another part of the fort; which accident, 
with the similar one at Fort "\Y ayne mentioned above, shows that economy even 
exact that buildings be made fire-proof. The effect of this fire upon some 
palisading, as well as upon the hospital, and the decay of some wooden gun 
platforms, make a small appropriation necessary. The old stone houses will 
h.a Ye to be rebuilt, though they may be kept up for a t:!hort time, and some 
enlargement must be given to quarters; all which will, perhaps, involve an 
expen._e of $25,000. 
_.\_t Buffalo, Fort Porter has been built, and. is finished. It is a tower 
enclo""cd by a battery. It commands the entrance into Niagara river, and also 
the shore and anchorage in front of the city of Buffalo, nearly up to the mouth 
of Buffalo harbor. There is connected with the fort a good house for officers' 
quarters that wa.· purchased with the site. There will be needed, further, 
another Lattery and tower, to be placed at or near the mouth of the harbor, at 
an additional cost, beyond the means in hand, of, say, $33,500. 
uch barracks a. may be wanted at a future day may there be hired or hastily 
erected . 
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Fort Montgomery, outlet ef Lake Champlain.-This fort is not less than half 
finished; indeed, considering the difficulties and expense that attended the mak-
ing a foundation of piles under the whole fort, it may be said to be two-thirds 
:finished. The remaining expense may be estimated at $224,142. 
We see, therefore, that of all the new works designed to be executed on the 
northern frontier, in anticipation of a war, there remains tc, be expended-
At Fort Wayne, Detroit, for buildings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $66, 500 00 
At Buffalo, for tower and battery........................... 33, 000 00 
At Fort Montgomery, outlet of Lake Champlain..... . . . . . . . . . 224, 142 00 
On repairs of old works there is now, or soon will be, needed-
At Fort Niagara, say. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $25, 000 00 
At :Fort Ontario, say.. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 000 00 
At Fort Mackinac, say . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 000 00 
323,642 00 
50,000 00 
Making a total of.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373, 642 00 
If we add to this sum the estimates, before given, for-
Fort Brady .. · ................................ $75, 000 00 
Fort Gratiot.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50, 000 00 
Fort Uackinac, the balance after the above pro-
vision ................ _ ... ___ ...... _. . . . . . 30, 000 00 
There will be a grand total for the northern frontier of 
155, 000 00 
528, 642 00 
==-:.--:-_-----=--== 
I thought it best to show first the actual condition of things on the northern 
frontier, before proceeding with a reply to the specific inquiries of the honora-
ble Secretary of ,Var. 
The great length to which this report has extend <1, notwithstanding· that a 
sincere desire to keep it within more reasonable limits has induced me to omit 
considerations that I wished to adduce, must now restrict my remarks, refening 
to some previous reports wherein the subj ect of our northern defences have bee~ 
specially treated-I mean, particularly, first, a report of a special board of engi-
neer officers, addressed to the Secretary of War, December 27, 1838; second, 
a letter from the chief engineer to the Secretary of '\Var, of February 20, 
1 39; and, third; a report to the Secretary of the Navy, from a joint board, 
con ·i:,;tino- of Commodore l\Iorris and the chief ell~ineer, dated November 1 , 
1 45. ~ 
It is nndoubtedly true that the augmented population and extended navio-a-
tion of th npp r Jak , will afford great resource, in that quarter to the nati~n, 
ou th' occurrence of a war with England, and there eem to be a feelina- w1th 
many that in , uch an event a great flood of armed m n would sweep aero;:; the 
whol' ·mfacc of Uanacla, effacing all organized re i, tance, and trampfow down 
all oppo,·ition. That thi · is 1io il,lo may Hot, I ·uppose, be que, tioned, but that 
it ·will not h · clone i~ certain, if th re remain in our councils firmn to re:-i::t all 
. nch frnitlP, 'i-1 impul::; ·~, and wi ·dom to c · a.nd pursu · the prOJ!Cr cour,-e. 
All ~pper 1anaclt micrltt be tlrn· ,.w pt, from Lake 'uperior clown to Mon-
tr al, without a r<·nl conqn "t of th country, and, incleC'cl, without o-aining any 
aclvantacr of vital m m ·nt. ri1w;ton, in all that cli. tauc •, i the onl:· plac a 
which anythi11,~ lik · a:.: •ri n impre ·sion would l, • macl • upon th military 
m an: of cld',u · · · and, a. th flood . houlcl pa.::; away, all t]1at part of th· pr v-
iut if loyal b ·fore, w ulcl not b m, d • lei! o by th d .:olation spread around. 
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- .; J'd resistance would be made to such an inroad, and there being no fortifi-
-. \ ~8
1 
worth defending in a way to co~1promise the safety o~ the regula~· ~ro~ps, 
. e-e would retreat before it, accumulatmg, as they receded: mto the lo-" er prnv-
ince. where would be found, supported by the most formidable natur~l obsta-
ele.-:, not the force of Canada, merely, but also the army and navy of England, 
in daily cQmmunication with ~he mother country, and where would have to be 
. u!!'ht and won the battles wlnch alone would secure a conques~. Any place of 
ope~ation that contemplates overrunning U~per _Ca1;1~ua, or makmg such atta,ck 
upon it, would be costly, beyond all calc~lat10n, m h±e and trea ur~, and unn:ce -
-ar'"° and fruitless after all. A country 1s conquered by concentrated efforts of 
ell appointed armies upon vital points, often a single point-a l_evy en ma ~e 
i.5 the great resource of defence ; a well prepared and well ~ppo1_nted army 1 
the only reliable, as it is also, by far, the cheapest means of n~va.1011. . 
If we send a single army into Canada by Lake Ohamplam and the penm-
sula lying between the Richelieu ·and St. Lawrence, and posse._s om·'clv s of 
1Iontreal, or of both shores of the St. Lawrence at any place below t)rn,t city, 
here the channel can be commanded, all the wide extent of the Briti. h po -
s ·sions above that point will be paralyzed, being entirely cut off,_ not 0~1ly from 
he mother country, but also from all relief from Lower Oan~,da, :nclu~mg Qu~-
bec, and from the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. 'Io do tlns 
a. great battle must be gained-probably on the peninsula just mentioned, and, 
being gained, must be followed up by other victories, ending in the capture of 
Quebec-the last barri~r that can be manned by the British. 'l'he policy of 
the defence will be, while keeping an eye upon any preparations for the attack 
just mentioned, by every resort, device, and effort, to agitate the frontier above, 
and thereby draw the attention, and, as far as possible, the means of our gov-
ernment to the defence of that frontier. They will generally expose there but 
:few regular troop?, but will collect volunteers, militia, and Indians in as large 
numbers as possible. 'rhey will detach thither bodies of ship-carpenter and 
.sailors, and make great efforts to obtain and keep a naval ascendency, if not 
every-..vhere, at least wherever possible. 
This was exactly the policy followed by the English during the war of 1812, 
and with full success. By judgment, perseverance, and activity, they kept the 
"'trength of this country so attenuated by stretching along a frontier of many 
hu?-dred miles, that no great effort could be made anywhere; and upon the true 
pomt of attack reduced the efforts to means so feeble as to end only in discom-
fiture a~d disgrace. Our government had its attention always, more or less, 
turned rn the right direction, and several times attempted to assemble armies on 
the Champlain frontier, but always withdrew these troops, giving way to clamor 
rai ed by other frontier districts that were assailed, or believed themselves 
endangered by British enterprises. 
The British took Chicago, Mackinac, Detroit; besieged Fort J\Ieigs ; at-
tacked Fort Sandusky ; captured Black Rock and Buffalo two or three times ; 
they fou_ght the battles of Uhippewa and Lund~'s Lane; _besieged and assaulted 
F ort Erie; they captured Fort :N"iagara and 1! ort Ontario; attacked Sackett's 
Harbor; took Ogdensbuxg, French Mills, Malone, &c., &c. All these certainly 
for no design or hope of conquest and extended occupation, but for the purpose 
of keeping up an excited state of feeling and an energetic warfare that would 
fully occupy this government. When in 1814 the assembling of six or seven 
thou ~and men at Plattsburg, under General Izard, seemed to threaten their weak 
point, the English forthwith began to concentrate their best troops in opposition, 
and no sooner was that general withdrawn to re-einforce the Niagara frontier 
than t his English force dashed forward in hopes, by profiting of our weakness, 
to make themselves masters of the lake, and thereby cover for an indefinite 
period their vital point. 
If there has been a great increase of power and reasoning in the United 
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States since the war of 1812, there has on the other hand been a great change 
of the same sort in the population, and also in the military means of Canada. 
The Rideau canal opens a communication between Montreal and Lake On-
tario, and the Welland canal between Lakes Erie and Ontario ; and good roads 
and canals from Toronto, on Lake Ontario, to Lake Huron, all d~ep in the heart 
of the country, and not to be intercepted except by victorious armies. All t?e 
light draught war steamers of Great Britain can be sent fully armed, proT""Is-
ioned, and manned, directly from sea up to the very head of Lake Ontario; and I 
we can now do nothing whatever, and shall be unable to do anything, except 
by the erection of a fort at some commanding point on the St. Lawrence to "-' top 
this transit. War steamers or other armed vessels, though of smaller size, m::y 
branch off from this main line into Lake Champlain, and others into Lake Erie . 
.Besides, the number of British merchant steamers on Lake Ontario and the St. 
Lawrence, above Montreal, is greater than of American steamer~; and between 
Montreal and Quebec there are several of the largest size, so that as many troops 
as they might desire to send could be transported in twenty-four hours from 
Quebec to Montreal; in two or three days to Kingston; and in three or fom 
days to the head of Lake Ontario and the shores of Lake Erie. They have, 
moreover, a strong new fortification at Kingston which will require a siege to 
1·educe, and which, with other defences, covers a large naval depot and also the 
outlet of the Rideau canal. Under these and other circumstances favorable to 
the power of Canada, the relative numbers of the people of the two countries 
afford no measure of relative strength for military purposes, especially at the 
beginning of a war; and even as to numbers we shall :find the difference les 
when we call to mind that the people of the British islands are quite as near in 
time to this frontier as our more remote States, and that the help those islands 
will send will consist of war steamers and regiments of disciplined troops. It 
will not be with Canada alone that we shall have to contend, but with Canada 
and Great Britain-the latter a nation always ready with great military power, 
and prepared with naval means to throw a large army upon the lake shore a~ 
soon, at least, as we should be ready to face them with our undisciplined levies. 
Our plan of operations being to move forward from the foot of Lil,ke Cham-
plain as a base, we should not permit any demon;:;tration nor any real attack~ 
from Oanada upon the frontier above, to direct ui-1, althongh great efforts will 
undoubtedly be made to that end all along the line from Montreal to L ake 
Superior. 
\Ve have not now, and without great and costly efforts could not acquire, the 
naval a:;;cendency on Lake Ontario and on the 't. Lawrence. ,v e could no·. 
attain to it at all without putting our building Htablishments under cover ot 
fortifications. 
By the time one half dozen merchant steamer:-: on Lake hamplain could b 
})r parcel and armed, the Engli~h might pour into the lake throug'}.1 their canal.: 
ncl quate naval mean , uppliecl by .l\Iontn·nl, Jndiec, and the 't. Lawrenc". 
to make the struo-o-le for the mastery on that lake a doubtful one at lea:-t. lt 
tl1 •y could think it po ·iLle that we slwulcl fail to fortify th outlet of th lak ~ 
th cont ·mplnt cl enlargement of th canal from Chambly to t. John:-, (ab u· 
twelv mile ",) wh r by war teamers could pm~;· into that lake a tlwr n · 
may iuto Lal·e Ontario, woulcl uncloubt dly be ex cut d. 
pon Lakrs Erie, Huron, and :Michi ,·an w, unqu 'tionably have a -
up •riority in naval preparation, which i lik Iv mor over to increa:-- from). r 
t year; ancl if tim •1y car be tak •n to arm ai{<l man a uitabl portion o th·- · 
th ma t ry may b r tain •cl. 
ff th re be truth ancl force in the for a-oino- tat<'m nt and opinion,, 
with England ·will b · in with th naval ,·u1)r •macy iwai11.:t uti, alone, th . 
rano- of th t. Lawr nc aud the h ad of Lak 011tari ; with m ,:m, 
n my' hand of contending for at lea t, if not · •izing a like ,upr 
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Lake Champlain, with the power of throwing troops, _mechanics, and sa~lors in 
a few days upon the shore of the upper lakes, and with the strongest mduce-
ments to keep up then an active warfare_. . The possession of a 1:-aval depot at 
Penetanqueshin, on Lake Huron, which 1t 1s understood can readily be made ~·· 
,trong place, and where there is now one war st~amer, and the easy commum-
cation with it from 'I1oronto would allow enterprises to be prepared and sent at 
farorable moments against the establishments and commerce of the upper lakes .. 
But an anchorage under the defence of Fort Mack?:nac as a place of rendez-
vou" and watch for our own steam squadron, and a place of refuge in case of 
di aster, would be very important in counteraction of any such project. Fort 
Gratiot, when strengthened, would prevent any such hostile expedition from 
passing through the strait in Lake St. Clair and endangering Detroit, while it· 
would cover any of our vessels retreating to that end of the lake. Fort lVayne,. 
near Detroit, will prevent the passing of any vessel between Lakes Huron and 
Erie, while it would become the rallying point of the militia of that region 
a. embled to meet threatened attacks of a serious nature, or to organize expe--
ditions into the opposite territory, and its garrison would protect the neighborhood 
from all predatory inroads. 
Even on Lake Erie, where we might have the means of arming and manning· 
any number of steamers, we should derive important if not indispensable aid 
from batteries, duly prepared at Buffalo. 'rhe English now own several good 
teamers on this lake, and by the aid of the Welland canal they could bring in 
others, and they could also soon build a number within harbors secure and near; 
so that we may reasonably look for vigorous efforts of that nature if we leave 
our great places uncovered. The proposed battery and tower, in addition t() 
the one already constructed· at Buffalo, will place that city out of danger of 
conflagration, bombardment, or contribution, a security otherwise to be attained 
only by keeping it constantly covered by a number of war -steamers greater 
than the enemy can bring. 'rhere can be no comparison as to the expense of 
the two modes, while the naval defence will be subject to all the chauces of 
absence, at the moment of need, on other duty; of being enticed away by other 
:eal or fictitious attacks; of being dispersed for ::i, time by tempests, &c. Other 
Important places on the lake shore will be distant comparatively, not under 
constant supervision from the Canada side, less valuable,. and for these and othe:r 
rea ons may, with less damage, be left to such defences as temporary and hastily 
prepared works may supply. 'rhe two batteries at Buffalo would cover the: 
whole face of the shore, so that no vessel could lie within reach of the city 
without coming under their fire, and the towers would guard these guns from 
being Rpiked in any attempts at surprise. 
On Lake Ontario, with the exception of some slight repairs,. all has been done-
that ha been proposed for the present. But we have seen that we shall here 
be under the naval command of the English, and must, therefore, make timely 
preparation to avert the more serious consequences. 
On the St. Lawrence we should, as soon as possible after a war becomes 
probable, erect a work to command its navigation; and we ought, also, then to-
do , ornething for the protection of Ogdensburg. 
'lhe obvious advantages afforded by our occupation of the outlet of Lake-
Champlain would seem to require nothing to be added to the preceding remarks. 
I may "ay, however, that the fort now under construction, and more than half 
~ished, will give to us the control of the lake beyond all doubt, and retain it 
m spite of the energetic efforts that its great importance might induce an enemy 
to make for it cnpture or reduction. It will keep all the shores of the lake, as. 
well a. it surface, free from any hostile irruption, because no expedition could 
penetrate, on itber f-ide, without exposing itself to be cut off by troops landed 
in it rear, and it will secure the inappreciable advantage of taking the armies 
de.:.: tined to the conquest of Canada, together with all their supplies, up to the· 
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very frontier with all the velocity of steam; it will bring· all re-enforcements wjth 
the same rapidity and certainty; and1 moreover, in case of reverses it will 
establish a limit to retreat-a place of shelter, refreshment, and a base for re-
newed operations. 
It is necessary to consider that this point is so near to the point of concen-
tration of the English, in the case we have supposed, that no temporary work 
could be prepared in time, or if prepared would be competent to resist, unless 
very strong, extensive, and defended by a large body of troops. 
If these defences be not carried to completion we may look with certainty to 
see the English widen and deepen the Chambly canal, a trivial operation, and 
at the very beginning of a war throw a squadron of war steamers into the lake, 
from which they could not be driven but by infinite cost and much sacrifice of 
life and loss of time. 
I forbear to enlarge further on this and other important matters connected 
with this frontier system of defence, again taking the liberty, if the subject be 
deemed worthy of further pursuit, to refer to the special reports before men-
tioned, and also to that in document 206. In these reports will be seen views 
in relation to the embodying militia forces in support of the lake frontier, and 
also in support of the frontier eastward of Lake Champlain, as well as other 
ideas supposed to have an important bearing on the topic. 
No speculations are ventured as to a possible change in the political condition 
of Canada. Until Great Britain shall willingly relinquish her dominion we 
may be certain that all her energies will, if necessary, be exerted in its main-
tenance; and whether this be for ten years or for a century, the defensive system 
herein advocated, as dictated by forecast and prudence, should be steadily ad-
hered to; for, up to the moment of relinquishment, if such moment ever arrive, 
the defences may be growing more and more necessary. 
'l'he considerations detailed in the preceding remark~, and otlwr. with which 
it does not seem necessary further to burden thi. lon°· report, permit me to 
make no other reply to the fourth inquiry of the Hon. 8ccretary of War than 
that no change has occurred, or is likely to occur, that will ju .. tify the relin-
quishment of the system of defence for the northern frontier, of which ystem 
the portion designed to be first prepared and to be permanent is now nearly 
completed. 
NOL1.Tll ti;H,N W1l0N'l1J'MH. 
St(lfl'mcnt qf the ?1umbl'r qf.fortijications wllid,, hm,e been built i'nchulina {ho~e ne ·1 . z, z 7 1-,,( /\ , • , G B . . . 1 b . , /5 ' at Y compete< U>U l'r tlte general sy1:3tem ado ~tcd 
~ '! cer t,1c 11•ar w1ltl reat ntain, t,ie nu11i er in progress ef constructwn, a.nd tlte number not yet commenced b t d 1 b · l 7 1 'b · · z 1 S d rn . . . . · , u propose to e 
t:zj crl'ctcc; ell!< ex,n itmg, a so, tne tales an .Lerritories in wliick tlte sevcralforts are situated, or are to be located; wlien tliey were 
~ commenced, wlten completed, and wlien they are expected to be.finished.; tlie number and calibre ef tlie guns mounted or to be mounted; 
tl1,e estimated cost ef construction and armament, respectively .i tlw amount e:rpended for construction or repair, and an estimate 
ef the amount required tojim'sl1, or construct; and tl1,e total amount required to be appropriated to complete tlie armament. t1 0 
r-, 
(.0 --------------;----;------.--~-.---.----:-----;-----;-------------------------i---
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The inquiries embodied in the resolutions of the House of Representatives, and 
those specified in the letter of the Hon. Secretary of War calling for this report. 
have seemed to me to require that the several topics should be gone into with 
some minuteness. Certain of these, moreover, having been often of late placed 
before the public mind in erroneous lights, according to my judgment, it appeared 
to be a duty of my office to press such considerations as might be calculated to 
satisfy the inquiries of the unprejudiced and uncommitted of the necessity of a 
permanent system of defence, and of the adaptation to our wants and circum-
stances of a system of fortification. 
Were it not for the length and diffusion of the preceding remarks, of which I 
am fully conscious, but which I have not time to condense, I should have intro-
duced other considerations of like tendency and of much weight. 
As it is, in the full knowledge of our remaining weakness at many important 
points, and under a deep conviction of the grave consequence likely to flow from 
tardiness in the prosecution of the system, or interruption to hs progress, I feel 
constrained to invoke for it, with all admissible earnestness, the prompt and 
liberal support of the Executive and Congress. 
At the same time, I only fulfil a further duty in warning the same authorfrie~ 
against relying on means that, though inordinately expensive, will be hut tem-
porarily of use, and insufficient while they last, instead of those adopted by all 
enlightened, experienced nations as relatively cheap as permanent, and in all 
respects adequate. 
COAST OF THE P ACJFIC. 
Several works of defence will be required for this coast. The special board of 
engineers organized for its examination, whose province it is to project the nece~-
sary works, have but just commenced their sessions, and have had the time to 
examine and determine on the location of a single fort only. Thi i~ on the 
southern side of the entrance to San Francisco bay, where a work ·will undoubt-
edly be required. . 
]Tor the other points of the coast no positive information a to the locality, 
size, and cost of works can now be offered. The joint commi. sion of naval and 
engineer officers who recently made a reconnoisf-\ance of the coast, without t_h 
means of minute examination, suggest several points that will probably reqmrc 
defence in the course of time. '.I'hese positions they deRignate as requiring f~rti-
.fications to be commenced immediately, namely, San Francisco &ay, San Dte!!O 
ltarhor, and the moutli ef Columbia river; and thr clrpartment i dispo .. ed to r ly 
confid ntly upon the opinion of the intrlligent officcn, compo ing the conunis::io_n. 
i v ral other point they also suo-ge t a,· ultiurntrly requiring defence, ubm1t-
ting ~timate of cost. The numbe~ of these ,,·orks, a. well a::i the cost, m1Lt l 
takc,n a· conj ctural until a thorough examination can be made. 
Th localities, pecified, with approximate co~t of work:., arc a' follow~: . 
"'lhe · mmi sion of navy and engin er offi ·e1-.· .co11:-titutecl by th Pr ;::1d_ n 
for th purpo e of making an examination of the ·oa t of th United• 'tate lym~ 
on th_<' >acifi · ocean, with reference to points of drfcnc and occup: ti n, for h 
, c·ctmt ' arnl a· ommodation of tracl aucl commerce, and for military ancl narnl 
purpo:-<· · ' • • .tatr: 
'' 'l'li<· , rv ·ral vork:-- 1w1nirecl for the defence of harbor~, roacl:::tcacl,. rh- i:·· 
;· mnch-, e ·. up n th· coa~t of th -nit<·cl , 'tat·· on the· Pacific will l, -.h wn ID 
th· follm, i1w tab} :::, arran 1•· ·d in tlte ord<'r of th ir r ·lativ importune . in t~ 
cla · ·~ with appro.•imate <'stimatl-:4 of their co. t; ('ach clas: I, ino- -.h wn m 
"'·parat · talJl ·, and th ' h ·acling L inrr applicabl to all th tahh·,." 
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Approximate estimate of 
cost. 
Sites of fo1 tifications. Their denominations. 
On the At- On the Pa-
lantic. cific. 
FIRST CLASS.-TO BE BUJLT WITHOUT 
DELAY. 
outh shore San Francisco bay, chan-
nel entrance. ___________ •• __ .•••• Battery . _ •• __ •• _ •••• $400,000 $1,600,000 
Xorth shore San Francisco bay, chan -
nel entrance .••••••.••••••••••.••. •••• do .••••••••••••• 400,000 1,600,000 
Alcatrazas island, San Francisco bay •• •••• do .••••••••••••• 150,000 600,000 
Cape Disappointment, mouth of Co-
lumbia river •••...•.•.••••. ·----- Redoubt, with battery. 200,000 800,000 
PointAdams, mouthofColumbiariver. I!'ort, with battery •••• 300,000 1,200,000 
Punta de Guianos, San Diego ..• _ • _ •. Battery, with coverface 400,000 1,600,000 
----------
Total •••••••••••• _ •••• _ • ___ • 
___ , ________________ 
1,850,000 7,400,000 
SECOND CLASS.-TO BE BUILT AT A LAT~:R 
PERIOD. 
Santa Catalina island ................ Fort, with battery •••• $400,000 $1,600,000 
Entrance to Humboldt harbor ••••••• Redoubt and battery •. 150,000 600,000 
Eutrance to Klamet harbor. ___ ••• __ . •••••••• do.~·-----·- 150.000 600,000 
... 'eat island, (Scarborough harbor) .••. •••••••. do .••••••••• 100;000 400,000 
n Pedro roadstead, (island) .•••• __ . •.•••••• do- ••••••••• 100,000 400,000 
Monterey roadstead ••••• _ •••••.••••• •••••••. do •.•••••••• 150,000 600,000 
. okt. Barbara roadstead ..••••.•••••. Battery and tower •••• ,50, 000 200,000 
Estero bay ..••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••• do ••••••••• ' 50,000 200;000 
Entrance of Umpqua or of Cahons .••• ••••••• . do •••••••••• 50,000 200,000 
Bodega roadstead, (island) ••••••• __ •• Battery ••••••••••• _. 50,000 200,000 
Total ..•.••••••••• ___ ••.•••• ·------------------- 1,250,000 5,000,000 ------ ------
THIRD CLASS.-TO BE BUILT AT A RE"MOTf.l 
PERIOD. 
Port Lawrence, (Admiralty inlet) .•••. Redoubt and battery •• $150,000 $644,000 
Port 'l'ownsend, Straits of Fuca .••••. •••••••• do __________ 150,000 600,000 
{ West cape •••••• .••••••• do .••••••••• ------------ ----------~ Port Discovery, do. East cape ______ •••••••• do •••••••••• --------·--- ·-----------P1 otection island •••••••• do .••••••••. -----·"'··--· ______ ... _____ 
.Tarrows of Puget's tiound .••••..•••• •••••••. do .••••••••• 150,000 600,000 
Entrance of Hood's canal. .••••••••• •••••••• do •••••••••. 150,000 600,000 
Gray' harbor, mouth of Chiboby river. Battery and tower •••• 50,000 200,00U 
Point Jose, San Francisco bay. _ ••• _. Temporary battery._. 20,000 80,000 
An"el i land, San Francisco bay .••••. .••••..• do .••••••••• 20,000 80,000 
n Pedro .•••..•.•••• __ .•.•••.•••. .••••••. do •••••••••. 10,000 40,000 
nta Barbara ...................... •••••••• do •••••••••• 10,000 40,000 
---------
Total .••.. _ ••• _ •••••••••••• - -------------------- 710,000 2,840,000 ------ -----
Aggregate .•...••••• _ •.•••••. ' ·----•-•••----••W••• 3,810,000 15,240,000 
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In conclusion, I have to refer to a tabular statement of all the fortifications 
erected, under construction, or intended to be built on the Atlantic and Gulf fron-
tier of the United States, said fortifications being arranged in classes, according 
to the order of importance, and, within each class, according to the geographical 
order of the States in which they are situated. 
The statement exhibits the amounts expended, or to be expended, for fortifica-
tions and for the armament; as also a specification of the armament. 
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 
JOSEPH G. TOTTEN, 
Bre·vet Brig'r General and Col. ef Engineers. 
Hon. 0. M. CONRAD, Secretary ef JVar. 
E. 
Letter to tlte Secretary ef the Navy. 
WAR DEPARTMENT, Waslzington, June 17, 1851. 
Sm : I herewith enclose a copy of certain resolutions adopted by the House 
of Representatives at the last session of Congress. 
With a view to procure such information as will enable me to prepare the 
report called for by the House of Representatives, I have propounded to several 
officers of the engineer corps certain questions, to which they are desired to give 
their separate answers. 
I desire also to obtain the opinions of several naval officers, combining profes-
sional science with experience and practical skill on several points connected 
with the proposed inquiry. 
You will therefore oblige me by enclosing a copy of the within resolution _to 
such officers as you may select, and requesting their separate opinions, in wnt-
ing, on the following points, viz: 
l. '.ro what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the 
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of 
steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other 
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161 . 
2. What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war or of ,commerce, floatmg 
batterie , gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications 1 
3. I. it necessary or expedient to continue the :y tern of fortification on the 
shores of the northern lakes? 
Very re pectfully, your obedient servant, 
C. L CONRAD, Secretary ef JVar. 
Hon. WILLTAJH A. GRAHAM, Secretar!J qf the Kat!J, 
No. 1. 
Rrport ef ommodore Alorris. 
"'\\'".A. ' III \GTO\, J11ly 12, 1 51. 
, rn: I h, w th honor to acknowlNlp,·p tlH• n ·c ·ipt of a C'Op · of your l tt r of 
,Ju111· 17, 1 ,'.il to tlw , <'l'rf'tar • of th TaYY, with <lir"ction. from him t r 1 rt 
to )'O 1 lll • opinion upon C rtain point 'Ollll •ct cl with th Jff :-Cllt ,;,t Ill 
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orifications for the defence of the coasts and shores of the United States, as it 
, been recommended by boards of engineers and others appointed in 1816 and 
at snb~equent elates. 
The particular points to which my attention is directed by your letters are: 
•· 1st. To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the 
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of 
-team to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvements of projectiles, or other 
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161 
·'2d. What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war or of commerce, floating 
batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications 1 
"3d. Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on 
·he .. bores of the lakes 1" 
1. I have endeavored to ascertain, by an examination of some of the reports 
from the boards of engineers and other officers upon this subject, what system of 
Jefence they recommended, the bases of that system, the objects they proposed to 
Jccomplish by it, the particular measures which they suggested to secure those 
objects, and the data on which they determined the character and force of the 
respective fortifications which are embraced in their general plan of defence. 
2. 'Ihe bases of their system are: a navy composed of armed vessels capable 
of navigating the ocean with safety and of reaching distant points speedily. 
Fortifications, permanent and temporary, with the auxiliaries of floating bat-
eries, gunboats, and steam batteries, and both fixed and floating obstructions to 
channels. · 
Inte:ior communications by land and water, and a regular army and well 
organized militia, all to be so combined as to form a complete system. 
3. The objects of the system were to leave the navy free to protect our own 
commerce or to act against an enemy on the ocean or upon his unprotected 
co_a~t:-; to cloge all important harbors against an enemy, and secure them to our 
military and commercial marine; to deprive an enemy of all strong positions, 
where, protected by naval superiority, he might maintain himself and keep our 
frontier in continual alarm; to prevent, as far as practicable, the great avenues 
of interior navigation from being blockaded at their entrances into the ocean; to 
~o"er the coastwise and interior navigation, by closing the harbors and the several 
inlet from the sea which intersect the · lines of communication, and thereby fur-
her aid the navy in protecting the navigation of the country; and to protect our 
!!Teat naval establishments. 
_ 4. To seecure these important objects with all practicable sound economy, and 
m a manner which in time of war should require the least necessary interruption 
o the ordinary pursuits of our citizens, appears to have been the controlling 
motive in determining the position, character, and extent or force of the respec-
tive works which the boards have proposed. 
5. Of these works permanent fortifications are mainly relied upon, and have 
preference over any of their auxiliaries wherever due security can be given with-
out the aid of the latter. 
6. The dimension~, form, and strength of each fortification appears to have 
been determined by the local topography, the importance of the interests which 
i wa. intended to secure, the character and amount of force by which it might 
prr bably be a:sailed, ancl the time which would be required to concentrate upon 
it a ·~ ufficient number of militia to secure it from capture by such assailing force. 
7. Your fir; t que,Aion requires an opinion of the expediency of any modifica-
tion of the present system of fortifications in consequence of two specified causes, 
and of "any other changes that have taken place since it was adopted." It be-
come~ nece . ary, therefore, to a:certain what" other change.·" have thus occurred, 
and which would probably have lecl the boards of engineers to different recommen-
datir us, if the present tate of thincr:-; hac1 existed when the plans were proposed. 
. .Among the e causes and change: the most important appear to be the dis-
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covery of a channel leading from the ocean into the bay of New York, which 
could not be commanded by any of the fortifications proposed by the board; the 
application of steam power to armed and other vessels for ocean navigation; the 
great increase in the number and the size of the mercantile and packet st~am~rs 
which are employed on our interior lakes, bays, and rivers, and the subst1tut10n 
of shells for solid shot to be fired from cannon; the introduction of the electric 
telegraph for communicating intelligence, and of railroads for the transpo1:tati~n 
of persons and materials; and a greatly increased and more dense populat101?- m 
the vicinity of many of the points which were intended to be protected agamst 
an enemy. 
9. The operations of vessels which depend on the wind alone must always be 
uncertain, and the best devised plans will be greatly exposed to failure in execu-
tion by them. vVhen used as an assailing force against batteries or other :fixed 
objects, the winds which are necessary to carry them to their desired positions 
might frequently prevent the possibility of their retreat, if it should be desired. 
The present defences were calculated to resist a force of this character, or which 
depended on such vessels for its transportation. . 
Ships-of-the-line and anned vessels of smaller sizes are now moved by steam, 
either as the only motive power or as auxiliary to sails. 
These vessels, under ordinary circumstances and for special purposes, may 
have their movements regulated and combined, at the will of their commander, 
with almost the same precision and certainty as can be accomplished by troops 
on land. 
The capacity and armament of many of these vessels, connected with their 
light draught of water, enable them to operate with comparative ease and safety 
through channels and upon positions which would be almost secure against 
attacks by common sailing vessels. 
10. When the present system was proposed, the use of explosive shells was 
only contemplated from mortars, either for attack or defence . 
Arrangements are now made for the general use of such shells from large 
cannon, thus combining the superior accuracy of shot firing with the destructive 
effects of explosive shells~a change which greatly increases the dangers of a 
floating force when opposed to permanent fortifications of earth and ma onry. 
11. In determining upon the character and extent of many of the fortifica-
tions which were proposed by the boards an important element of their calcu-
lations was the facility or difficulty of concentrating troops upon the work in 
ca e assistance should be required to repel an attack by an enemy. T~1is 
cl m ut of calculation has been greatly chaug<'cl ince by the increa .. ed den 1ty 
~ud amount of available population, aud at many points by the gr atly 
mcrea · d facilities for communicating intelligence by tclegraphi: and railr ad:::, 
and for receiving reinforcements of men and suppli . by railroad and -teamer~. 
The purcha c of ]t lorida since the fortification, and defence for the 1ulf of 
I. , i ·o w r propo cd has given to us new and important position for ~tren crth-
. nmo- om~ defence. on that frontier, and for giving great r security to th 
1mm n:-1r mt r t connected with the valley of the l\Ii i ippi. ur more 
r •c t:t a ·qui ition , which have giv nu an extensive oc an frontier on th' Pacific 
o ran, ltav · hr ught with them new interest , whi h require fortificati n:- T 
qthr.r l\<lcr1u~tc m an for th ir prot ction and curity. 
12. l'h · m r a, d power wl1ich ha been iv n to v ,":-el. wh n m v •d by 
team to r o-ul:~t and , cm: their joint or parat a ti n a may h d ... fr. d. 
arnl t1J rC"lch with omparat1v a,· , and , afi ty pla 'l-1 which mio-ht b ·ou,1 -
r rl a-. 11 arl r 'C ·ure acrain,'t ordinm r .-ailincr vc.-" 1~. th additiorn 1 I ' r 
'·hi ·h i. o-j ' n to fortifi ·ation wh :n a ·tino· acrain:-,t . hi/ r oth r fio tin!!' 
b · the . nh:titntion f -·pl . iv' .-h ll. for , lid , h t · th dis · v r: 
·hmmcL· to and. fr 111 • om of our harbor, ; th• fa ·iliti " for 10r • mpid n 
r tion f tr np.- and .-uppli :- than wa: f rm rly pra ti ·: bl , an l tl1, ac<pii,i · 11 
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r larP'e extents of new territory, are changes or causes which, in my opinion, 
m, 1 ;ender some "modifications" of the details of the present system more 
d,:antageous. At least these changes appe~~- to be _of sufficient i~po_rtance to 
jllitify,ifnot to require, preparntory to defimt1ve act1~n, a re-exammat1on of the 
p. ·sent system, as recommended by former boa~·ds, with_ t!rn same thorough and 
(\'Ireful deliberation which was bestowed when 1t was ongmally proposed. 
13. In reply to your second question, "What reliance could be placed on 
w,~els-of-war or of commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary 
~ub~titutes for permanent fortifications 1" I respectfullJ: state that, m my 
opinion, no safe reliance could be placed on any of the kmds _of f~rce enume-
rated in your question, as "substitutes" for perman?nt fort1:ficat1?ns, unl~ss 
they should be multiplied to an extent that would reqmre an e~pend1ture wh~ch 
would be unreasonably great, and much greater than would give equal security 
by a judicious combination of permanent fortifications and a floating force as 
auxiliary to them. On any sudden emergency, private steamers and other 
merchant vessels might be usefully employed in aid of other means which had 
been previously prepared, either by having them armed to contend with. an 
enemy, or to bring forward reinforcements of men, materials, or other supplies. 
Little advantage could be expected, however, from the vessels for direct assist-
ance, unless all that was necessary for their armanent and equipment had been 
previously prepared, and kept ready for immediate use. 
14. 'l'he voluntary use of vessels-of-war, which are able to navigate the 
ocean, as substitutes for fixed fortifications, or even as direct auxiliaries to them, 
except in extreme cases, would, in my opinion, be highly injudicious. The 
proper employment of such vessels-of-war or of our navy is to afford all 
_i)OS ible protection to our merchant shipping, to destroy or harass an enemy's 
commerce, and either by itself or in conjunction with troops to assail an 
enemy's possessions at points where they would otherwise be inaccessible to us. 
15. 'I.1he protection which the coasts of our country may justly expect from 
the navy is that which it may afford by intercepting forces which may threaten 
attacks upon it ; or when unequal to that task, diminishing the means of an 
enemy for such attempts, by rendering it necessary for him to protect his own 
.commerce or his own shores against our ships-of-war. 
16. With a navy sufficiently powerful to compete fairly with that of an 
enemy, great additional security would be given to our coasts by it, and still 
~eater if our naval force wa1, decidedly superior. But even under these favor-
able circumstances the chances for avoiding the most vigilant watchfulness on 
the ocean are so great, that so long as we expect wars with nations having a 
r spc>ctable navy, sound policy and trne economy, in my opinion, requires 
perma_uent fortifications at all points necessary to defend our important national 
estabh.·hments, our populous and wealthy cities, against sudden attacks, and to 
keE:I> open, as far as practicable, our coastwise navigation and other com117-uni-
cat1on::;, which might otherwise be interrupted by any enemy who could elude 
xhe vigilance of om navy. The navy, if employed as here suggested, would 
not r ender it as substitute for fortifications, but would give an increased security 
to our seaboard, and in proportion to its strength diminish the necessity of inter-
rupting the ordinary pursuits of our population. 
17. To the third question, "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the 
'""~ · ··t m of fortification on the shores of the lakes 1" I state as my opinion that 
n future attacks from the Canada shores of the lakes, of a character sufficiently 
pow rful to affect the :final result of war, are to be apprehended ; still, the 
a va tages ·which are offered by the St. Lawrence and Rideau canals for the 
i ·r n e of a naval force on Lake Ontario might give to Great Britain a tempo-
.r ry ..:up riority of naval force on that lake. 'Thi:; superiority, ancl the presence 
of_ a c?n idcrable bod! of regular troops w~1ich are always kept in Canada, 
TI110-ht mduce and po :1bly enable an enemy m Canada, by a sudden incursion, 
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to injure our great lines of communication by railroads and canals, on the lake 
frontier, or to levy contributions on cities near it, all of which would be greatly 
exposed if there were no' fortifications to furnish military supplies for the sur-
rounding militia, and so aid them in repelling such attacks. 
18. Under existing circumstances it would, in my opinion, be expedient to 
continue the present system so far as to retain all the fortifications on the lake 
frontier which have been completed, and to complete such as have been com-
menced. The expense would be comparatively inconsiderable, and would no 
doubt be amply repaid by the increased security and other advantages which 
would be gained at the commencement of any war in which Canada would have 
the character of an enemy to us. 
It has been difficult for me to confine my remarks very strictly to the precise-
questions which were submitted, but it was believed that the reference to 
"other changes" in the first question would be a sufficient excuse for the-
latitude which has been taken. 
With much respect, your obedient servant, 
Hon. 0. M. OoNRAD, 
Secretary ef TVar. 
No. 2. 
U. MORRIS, 
Captain U. S. Navy. 
Report ef Commodore C. M. P erry. 
NORTH TARRYTOWN, July 25,. 1852. 
Srn: In obedience to your order of the 23d ultimo, covering a copy of a com-
munication of the Secretary of War, together with a copy of a resolution of 
Congress, calling for information upon the expedieBcy of modifying the system 
of national fortifications established in 1816, I have the honor to report--
In reply to the first inquiry, as follows: 
"To what extent, if to any, ought the present system of fortifications for the 
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of 
team to vessels-of-war, the inventions or improvement of projectiles, or other 
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in 18161" 
I may remark that, in my opinion, it is desirable that the system refen-ed to 
hould be ub tantially modified by an entire abandonment of the plan of exterior 
coa, t fortifications, and a confinement to the completion of the works already 
comm need for tL.e protection of our principal ports of trade and naval depot ; 
and that no greater number of works houlcl be r ·cognized a permanent mean 
of d f'_ nc of the more important points upon the seaboard than tho e that may 
be .'mtaLly garri oned and kept in constant preparation, whether in peac or 
war, for r ·p Hing an nemy. 
~n th i~tt mpt to n tain th po ition which I propo:e to as umc, b ino- at my 
r "'lf1Pnc· • m th country, without proper docum nt or oth r data to nabl me 
t ·nt r fully into d ·tail, I hall, with but two cxc ption., r frain fr m alludin (J" 
to th· pul,li, h c1 :tat ·m nt and r port of oth r upon th nbj ct; and wl1ile 
clt 1·1ful1 ' a· ordi1w to tho.<' who may difli r from me all credit for --in erity 
and patriofo,m I may c nt nt m ·:c·lf with a o- _n ral xpr ion of opinion up n 
th· 11m· .... tion uud 'r inv :tigation, callino- particular att ntion to th r port of - r. 
a, , wh ·n 1 1 <' -r •tar· of "\Var.-( 'pc . 29 , 24th 'ougr,. :-, April . 1 :J6.) 
'on<·m-ri1w, a:-- I m<d folly cli,1 at th p riocl of it:- datr., (1 3G) and ru I ~o 
now, i_n tlw >pinion, et forth in tl1at ma:--tn-1 , :,;tatc pap ·r, I mio-ht L ati _fi_ ~ m 
:i mm1w th· wltol • ran"<' of argmn ·ut of that di.~tingui h ·cl lllan a, . lub1fm2" 
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my own views upon the great question of national defence, bad not t~e imagina-
·on even of his prophetic foresight been outstripped by th~ extraordmary devel-
pments of the few subsequent years-developments wluch'. though tl~ey have 
·brown into bolcler relief the more prominent features of lus prophecies, have 
.;.10ne far beyond the anticipations of the wildest visionary, bri~ging to light im-
provements in practical science utterly astounding to the thconsts of yestercl~y, 
Jfranging all previous plans of war, whether by sea or land, and foreshadowmg 
vren further changes, perhaps ~qually remarkable; a?-d thus s_howing that ~ ~he 
-ystem, under things as they existed in 1816, was wisely devised, (a p1:oposit10n 
I have never assented to,) there is no longer the remotest useful obJect_ to be 
!fillled by persistence in the plan, but rather on the contrary. The erect10n of 
i,olated exterior works upon our seaboard would, instead of contribu~ing to our 
protection, hold out assailable points, inviting attention from an active enemy, 
in the possibility of carrying them by coup de niain-an achievement not so 
difficult since the use of steam for naval purposes; and when, moreover, it may 
be fairly presumed that these works, however extensive and complete in them-
0elves, would in fact be weak as defences, for want of adequate garrisons; that 
is, if we are to judge from past experience and the present desolate condition of 
"ome of those already constructed, made necessary, it is true, for want of troops 
to end to them. 
Let us suppose, for purpose of illustration, that the two works recommended 
in the original design to be erected on Sandy Hook b_ar,* (see report of War 
Department, House Doc. 206, 26th Congress, 1st session,) are completed, and 
garrisoned by the estimated number of rank and file assigned to them, say 1,760 
each, their isolated position would place them beyond the effective range of guns 
planted upon Sandy Hook, the nearest land; and being encircled by channels 
navigable for the largest war steamers, they could not prevent the ingress of the 
e_nemy, and unaided by a friendly naval force might be surrounded by the hos-
tile ships, who, if they did not surprise and carry them by escalade, woulcl have 
the power to cut off their communication with the land, and consequently their 
supplies. 
And let us suppose further, that in conjunctures like those growing out of the 
northeastern boundary and Oregon questions, where serious difficulties with 
Great Britain were anticipated by many, (and everybody knows that a similar 
contingency did happen under the administration of General Jackson, with 
Fra1:ce, and may again happen,) that these forts were completed, and armed, and 
garrisoned, as they probably would be in time of peace, with a single company 
?r half company each, and it might be the policy of the enemy to enter suddenly 
rnto war, and give us the first intimation of hostilities by the appearance off the 
port of a powe1ful squadron of war steamers, not only would the forts on the 
bars, inviting attack by their very weakness, be at the mercy of the enemy, but 
the safety of the city itself would be compromised. :E'or though by a delay of a 
day or two the inner line of forts could be garrisoned by militia and volunteers, 
a?d temporary steam batteries prepared in aid of the outer defences, if the oppo-
smg squadron were to be commanded by a Nelson or a Suffren, such precaution 
would be too late. 
From any of the inner forts, should they perchance make a lodgement, the 
enemy could soon be driven; but once in possession of the outer line of works, 
with the sea open to them, the port would be entirely locked up ; hence, in the 
pof: ibility of such an issue, is it not far better that they should not be erected 1 
But many other solid reasons may be adduced to prove the impolicy of their 
·rection. T'he impracticability of eovering tl1C whole extent of coast by for-
• I . ball apply my remark upon the sealioard defences more particularly to the port of 
~~ew York, though they are intended to have a general bearing upon the whole coast. 
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tresses, commanding every port, bay, and roadstead; the improbability of any 
future attempt by an enemy to land an armed force upon our shores, except for 
some marauding purposes ; and the perfect capability of the inner line of ·works, 
assisted by floating batteries to repel whatever force might venture an attack 
upon any of our principal cities or towns, except by coup de main, in which 
event, as I have before remarked, the outer line of works would prove of im-
measurable injury, ff captured, as some of them might possibly be by a dashing 
enemy.* 
And, besides, we have the experience of history to show that extensive military 
works are alike destructive of the prosperity and the liberties of the people, 
saying nothing of the enormous cost of construction and the keeping them in 
condition for service. I may instance the fortresses of Spain, of Portugal, and 
of the former republics of Genoa and Venice, as gigantic works: now of little 
use, and looked upon by the voyager only as monuments of the extravagance 
and peculating spirit which, at the time of their erection, characterized the people 
-of those governments. 
Experience moreover shows that while the fortifications of San Juan de Ulloa 
at Vera Cruz, the Moro of Havana, the castle protecting the harbor of Cartha-
gena upon the coast of Columbia, the Venetian fortress of Napoli de Romania, in 
Greece, the castle of St. Elino, in Malta,t and many others of similar extent 
and character, are considered by some impregnable. They command only a 
circuit embraced within the range of their guns, and cannot in any manner 
prevent a landing of the enemy upon the coast beyond the extent of such range; 
in a word, these works are useful only to command the entrances of the ports 
which they were intended to defend, and to cover with their guns vessels an-
.choring in their immediate vicinity. The celebrated fortress of Gibraltar neither 
commands the passage of the straits nor the anchorage on the Spanish side of 
the bay of that name. They are, in truth, like chaine.d monsters, harmless be-
yond the reach of their manacles ; not so with their fltram batteries-tliey have 
the means of locomotion, and tlieir power can be rrnull effective at any point 
upon the coast capable of being reached by an enemy's vessel. . 
f all the coasts of Europe that of Great Britain is the least provided with 
fortifications, and yet her soil has not been trodden by a uccessful enemy since 
the conquest-solely protecting her military and naval arsenals by 1)Clfect and 
well garrisoned works. She depends mainly for defence of her coast upon her 
navy and the warlike spirit of her yeomanry; and the very absence of fortified 
works prevents a d~ceitful reliance upon uch defence , and keeps alive the 
more gallant and more certain dependence upon their own personal prow '-'-· 
And thu it should be with us, man to man. Th Americans are, at least, 
qual to any other race, and they are fully ca1n1ble of driving back to their ..,hipM 
or captming a1.iy number of troops that might have th temerity to Janel upon 
our :oil. · 
Lc•t u. , uppo. e that New York is menaced with an attack by a force much 
0 In ·peak ing of militia and volunteers above I may add, by way of note, that tbe city of 
New Yo1 k could alone pr1ra<le, in six hours, one thou and, and in twelve hour., five thou-
nd uniformed troop , compo cd of men in the prime of life, who would, <louutle , do 
good •tYin: hefore th• enemy. 
Thi: body of troo1 i · w II ufficer<'il and under excellc11 t organiz tion, and embrace' fair 
pro ortion of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, with all the requi ·ite materiel and munition.-. 
'l he citie · and town, ' iu the immediate neigh borbood could furni ·h an equal num l>er with 
th · am expedition, and tber · can be little donut that with the facilitie ,,f tran•port tion 
hy railJ oad 11nd other mv<l<·., a. force ·uflici •nt for all purpo c: of <lcfenc." could IJ coucen-
tmt •din a. v ·ry hort .p, c · of tim • at any poiut up<in our ca. t no1th and ea:t ofT• .. - . 
I mor particu arly name th •.-e, among many other ·, for re ~on of bcin•r IJ ttt:r c-
qu dot ·cl wilh th em hyper. onal ·.-aminu.tion. 
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JarO'er than the English have ever yet been able to concentrate upon our coast. 
The only assailable point whi~h mi~ht promise any chance of success ·woul~ b~ 
debarkation upon the south· side of Long Island and to advance upon the rear 
of Brooklyn. . . , 
Thi mode of attack was contemplated durm~_the war of 181~- 13, ~nd _ex-
tensive entrenchments were thrown up by the citizens upon a cham of lulls JUSt 
be ·ond the town designed to hold the enemy in check until re-enforcements 
could arrive from a distance ;* but the rapid increase of the ~lace ha~ no_w 
brought these military sites within the corporate limits of the city, a~~ it will 
be necessary, in the event of another war, to select more advanced posi~10ns on 
which to construct redoubts to command the approaches referred to, and it would 
be at this day a measure of wisdom for the government to take steps for selec~-
ing and securing the fee of suitable points for military purposes_. These ~os1-
tions, judiciously chosen, would, at the moment of alarm, be oc~up1ed by myriads 
of militia and volunteers, who, judging from what was accomplished on a former 
occasion, would, in an incredibly short time, throw up and man the necessary 
works ; with these precautionary measures, and with a respectable number of 
steam batteries as auxiliaries to the permanent works already con.structed, New 
York would be safe from any foreknown attack of the enemy. 
With respect to the second inquiry-
" What reliance could be placed on vessels of war or of commerce, floating 
batteries, gunboats, or other temporary substitutes for permanent defences 1 " 
I reply that much reliance could be placed on all vessels-of-war, particularly 
those moved by steam, whether intended for ocean or harbor service, as auxili-
arie to the fortifications, thereby lessening the necessary number and extent of 
those permanent works; but there could be no dependence on gunboats or vessels 
of commerce, except for the temporary conversion of the latter into public armed 
..,hip . . 
But the most reliable force for harbor defence as auxiliary to the fortifications 
would be steamers of war, in addition to which temporary. steam batteries might 
be equipped at most of our principal ports. 
It may be presumed that there is at this time but one opinion among naval 
men as to the utility of steamers-of-war. The strongest and most unreasonable 
prejudice ;.. ·, ,"1J,1;0' out of professional predilections must now give way to the 
unmistakab r <',f~8011ces of their usefulness, and the absolute necessity of their 
employment at ·t1f('1pN:scnt day in all naval operations. 
These vessels sho:ulrl all be capable of traveTSing the ocean, and while efficient 
for ocean navigation, not the less effective for harbor or coast defence. 
Steam batt{ rie;-;, so talled in contradistinction to steamers-of-war, should be 
of a temporary charact(·r, and u t:ictl ·only for the defence of ports, or bays, or 
road._ teads, and of thesP there would be uo necessity of having many in com-
mission, excepting at times wlwn the enemy might be expected, as they could 
be prepared in a very short time-the cities and towns which they may be 
wanted to defend all furnishing the means of their equipment and the requisite 
crews. 
In a communication accompanied by drawings submitted to the Navy De-
pa~ent some years ago, I demonstrated the practicability of equipping and 
mannmg at the port of New York powerful and efficient floating batteries in less 
than three days. 
1\71erever steam vessels can be found to furnish the moving· power and small 
coa ter. to he used for floating the guns, as both can be found as well as guns 
at most of our largest ports, temporary batteries capable of attacking the largest 
ail -hip can he speedily equipped, care being taken to protect, by a mode pointed 
out, the machinery and the entire hull of the steamer which, without being 
0 These works covered the rear of the navy yar<l., Brooklyn. 
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her3elf armed, is to furnish the power of moving the batteries from one point to 
another. 
Modern discoveries in the use of warlike 1,rojectiles have shown, and espe-
cially in the use of explosive shells, that wooden bulwarks, however massive 
they may be, so far from giving protection fo those behind them, cause by their 
splinters greater havoc; hence the inutility of such defences in the proposed 
floating batteries, which, by means of the steam power attached to them, may 
be easily kept at long range with the enemy and beyond grape or canister 
distance. 
But no one can foretell or scarcely imagine the changes in the art of war that 
steam and other natural elements more recently brought into use are to produce. 
On a late occasion I had the hono1; of sug·gesting to the Navy Department a 
new mode of attack by steamers-of-war. 'The opinions then advanced have 
been more and more confirmed by further reflection and consultation with intel-
ligent engineers and ship-builders, and I am now well satisfied that, besides the 
use of an ordinary war steamer, as a striking body, in the manner explained in 
the communication referred to, a steam vessel, to be moved by a submerged pro-
peller and capable of traversing any of our inland waters, may be constructed 
and advantageously used solely as a projectile (using the term in this sense.) 
This vessel should be long and narrow, an:l of unusual proportional depth to 
accommodate the engines and boilers, and the crew, (if desirable,) below the 
water line. She should be of wedge-shape forward, with the most approved 
line. for speed, considering her depth and her whole construction, whether built 
of wood or iron, of sufficient strength to give the requisite momentum, and the 
power to withstand the most violent shocks produced by collision with other 
bodies. . 
A ve~sel of this description, say of two thousand tons measurement, would 
weigh, with her machinery, &c., nearly four thousand tons, and might be pro-
pelled with engines of extra proportional power at the rate of fourteen statute 
miles per hour. We have thus a projectile (still using the term) of this weight 
moved upon the surface of the water at the velocity of twenty feet per second. 
Can any one imagine the overwhelming effect of a contact of this moving body 
with anything capable of floating upon the ocean? 'l'his is no visionary project, 
but one of simple demonstration and practicable accomplishment. 
In reply to the tliird inquiry, as follows: '' Is it necessary or expedient to 
continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern lakes?" I an-
wcr fr1 the negative, and for the very obvious reason that we have now the 
command of the lakes so far as regards an aggregate supcric,rity of tonnage and 
seamen, and it would be strange indeed if, ·with the well-or;:anized militia of the 
'tn.te Lorclering on and contiguous to these waters, and tbr facilitie. for trans-
portation to the scene of war of any number of regular · and volunteer" with 
th_ r qui ite munition , we did not, at the least, preserve the integrity of the 
011, and th navy would be recreant to its former reputation did it not weep 
from thr inland sea every vestig·e of an oppo ing force. 
In r f 'r nc , th refore, to the foregoing remark , I re pectfully ubmit-
'l'hat n ad litional fortifi ·ation be commenced on the Atlantic eaboarcl, leav-
incr it <p1 .·tionabl whether tho ·e already commenced ·hould b completed to 
tlte exll-t2l orirrinally de. igned. 
'fliat v ·ry /Yr :it rclianc can b, plac cl upon st •am ·r~-of-war and :4t am bat-
t ri ' a · auxiliari to th• militar work now cornpl ·t cl or in pro<rr .. s f com-
1,l ·ti 11. 
And la tl · it i.- alto 0 ther unn · ~. ary and in .· •dient cvcm to pro!rre, · any 
furthn with th uncompl t d work which hav b 11 eomm ·need n th ·bor 
of th · 11orth ·rn lak :,. 
1' r m ·.; ·If cannot ut ·rtain th icl a that w an· alway· to act on th cl -
f n iY ·: n th · contrary, it i mor rea nabl to ,,nppo. that, in th ·v t of 
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other war, the power of the United States will be felt beyond their own ~m-
me<liate coasts; most certainly it ought to be, f?r we have the means of pla_cmg 
·elYes upon an equality of naval strength with any of the Em:opean nat10ns. 
Looking to the inexhaustible resources of the c~unt~y, the ~arhke and adven-
rnrous spirit of the people, its extensive and rapidly mcreasmg: commerce, and 
.he acknowledged superiority of the Americans in the_ c?nstructlon ~1:1-d manage-
ment of ships, whether navigated by sails or steam-is 1t not surpnsmg that all 
nr military plans have hitherto been confined to the mere defence of our fire-
,ide~ against an enemy, always supposed to be able, in order to 1:each us, to cross 
llith a superior force intact a wide expanse of ocean, and knockmg at our doors, 
·o cause the whole country to be thrown into alarm? 
Why should we barricade ourselves and wait within our defences the coming 
of the enemy 1 Why not do that which is more congenial to our national spirit-
meet them beyond the threshold, and thus preserve our waters and our soil in-
nolate 1 W c possess the power; why not exercise it ? In truth, the destinies 
f the nation are inevitably leading to events which will sooner or later make 
~ superior on the ocean, and instead of tamely waiting the approach of the foe, 
e hall be more apt to turn the tide of war eastward. 
The grea~ battles for national mastery are to be fought upon the ocean, and 
the ooner we prepare for the struggle the better. 
Hence it is evident that upon the navy the country should chiefly depend 
for its protection from invasion, not under its present organization, but upon a 
navy commensurate in extent to the commercial resources and wealth of the 
natiop.; we should have naval strength sufficient to protect our commerce in 
every sea, and in time of war to assume the offensive. 
Still it would be unwise to neglect a reasonable system of permanent defences 
apon the coast, but not by any means to the ex.tent contemplated by the system 
of 1816. 
In the opinions which I have ventured to advance upon the fortifications of 
the country I have intended to allude only to the Atlantic seaboard and the 
hores of the northern lakes. Believing that the seaboard on the Pacific ocean 
i infinitely more exposed to successful attack from either of the great naval 
powers of Europe-England, France, and Russia, and may require additional 
defi lC<'S; but not being well acquainted with that coast, I abstain from any 
rem~11k npon the subject. In connexion with this report, however, I propose 
"'ubrnit, at a future time, some remarks upon the importance of securing the 
naval command of the Gulf of Mexico, with special reference to the better pro-
ction of our Pacific possessions. 
With great respect, I have the honor to be your most obedient servant, 
M. C. PERRY. 
No. 3. 
Report ef Commander R. B. Cunninglwm. 
UNITED STATES NAVY YARD, 
Gosport, Virginia, September 29, 1851. 
• rR: In pursuance of an order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy, 
d June 23, 1851, enclosing a copy of a letter from you to him, with a copy 
·rtain resolutions of the House of Representatives of the last session of 
...,ongre,_s, pertaining to a propo, ed modification of our system of defences by 
C< n; of fortifications on horc; and directing that I should give to the subject 
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my best reflections, and communicate the result in season to be reviewed by you 
prior to your report in obedience to resolutions aforesaid in December next. 
With a diffidence I have never before experienced in drawing up an official 
communication, I will endeavor to give you my views on this important question 
of national policy with as much brevity as its magnitude will admit of; but I 
beg leave to state that, while I feel myself highly honored by the consideration 
so undeservedly bestowed upon me by the honorable Secretary of the Navy in 
selecting me for a duty of so much consequence, and which calls for scientific 
attainments in its execution that I do not aspire to, I must claim your indul-
gence when, in all sincerity, I state to you that my remarks are drawn from my 
very limited practical observation and experience only. 
'l'o the first inquiry, viz: "To what extent, if to any, ought the present 
system of fortifications for the protection of our seaboard to be modified in con-
sequence of the application of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improve-
ment of projectiles, or other changes that have taken place since it was adopted 
in the year 18161" 
I would respectfully reply that the important improvements in the application 
of ·team to ships-of-war and sea-going ships, and the certainty that railroads 
will be continuous in a few years from l\faine to Texas, and that by these 
facilitie, , troops, munitions of ,var, and stores of all kinds can be transported 
with such expedition tl1at in a very short space of time large bodies of men, 
with the necessary artillery, can be concentrated upon any intermediate point 
between permanent fortifications fully prepared to meet an invading foe before an 
invader could make any material progress in the erection of fortifications for his 
defence, hould, in my opinion, induce the government to direct its attention 
alone to those points in our seaboard where the protection of our cities and such 
roadsteach as are calculated for naval depots, and where large fleets can ren-
dezvous, be sheltered, and ride in safety at their anchors at all seasons of the 
yefil. . 
It can hardly be supposed that any nation would be so reckless as to attempt 
an invasion of our Atlantic coast at the present day; but a large and powerful 
fleet could approach within gun-shot and batter clown our cities if they were not 
prepared with fortifications in all respects adequate for their protection and 
d<>fcnce. 
The, ·e fortifications shoulcl be so located as to command the channel way; and 
at the inner extremity of every reach there should Le a batt<>ry erected, if prac-
tical>lc,, o a,· to commence a raking fire upon an enemy thr mom ·ut he approached 
within the rang of its guns. 
Th gun. for the batteries should be of the largest calibre and of the o-reate t 
rm1g-<', a the effect of the shot would be more de tructive ancl the enemy ooner 
r achc·d. 
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· en taken apart, and when carefully pac~ed, stowed in suitable storehouses_ and 
kept ready for use; and that the materials for the ~ulls of these steame1 be 
procured, and the timber properly stowed in well ventilated sheds 
The steamers should be built of logs, their length not less than two hundred 
a.ncl fifty feet, with sufficient breadth to admit of batteries a?ross a~ e~ch end of 
,ix ten-inch guns, and three mortar beds betwee~ the ba_ttenes. 1_he1r bottoms 
-hould not be perfectly fiat, but formed with a slight ellipse, the b1lg·e round?d, 
and their extremities handsomeiy tapered, so as to enable them to pass easily 
·h.rough the water. . . . . 
These steamers are intended to be shot-proof, as 1t 1s designed to have iron 
plate~ one inch and a half thick and six inches wide let into their ide from 
~tern to stern, and about two and a half inches apart, this to be extend d from 
!!'unwale to two feet below deep load line; and when it is remembered that they ~re 
to fight end on, and built of long easy lines from stem to stern, the couclu 10n 
i5 irresistible that a shot touching those plates will most assuredly glance off. 
In all works intended for public defence, as a system, two strong points should 
always be borne in mind, viz: simplicity and economy; and as these ves. els are 
to be of the simplest mode of structure, and built of the cheapest material, 
while at the same time it is as durable as any other, (white pine,) and the con-
_truction of them so simple, that carpenters, joiners, and, in fact, all who can 
use the broad-axe and adze, can be profitably employed in their construction 
when they are needed. 
Another peculiarity in these vessels is to have their sterns perpendicular, of 
~eat thickness, and an iron cut-water firmly attached thereto, and in a width of 
two and a half feet, bearded off to half its thickness at the stern, so that when 
in action, and the enemy at hand with his broadside presented, the steamer, with 
Ler greatest momentum, is to drive directly into him; and it cannot be doubted 
that this operation once performed would require no repetition, as nothing here-
tofore built in the shape of a ship could withstand the concussion. 
'l'he mortar beds are intended to be used in the event of an enemy's obtaining a, 
landing at a point where he could be sheltered from the operation of battery guns, 
but accessible to shells from mortars ; and as these steamers will be of light 
draught of water, they will be enabled to approach the shore much nearer than 
other vessels of equal size if differently constructed. 
It has long been my opinion that steamers are more to be feared from the 
power they possess of running into an enemy than from any other cause, either 
from their great weight of metal and consequent extended rnnge, the choice 
which they are enabled to make of position, or any other superiority claimed for 
them, for in all these respects ships-of-war can be built to equal them; but if 
con tructed as here described, and properly managed, they are not to be 
re isted. 
. "\\:ith one more remark I will close my response to the first branch of your 
inquiry. 
The telegraph, in the event of war, will keep them constantly informed at 
headquarters of the movements of our enemy's fleet on our Atlantic coast, and 
the old ru, e of making a demonstration at one point for the purpose of effecting 
a landing at another, can no longer be practiced with the usual success, as their 
movements will be anticipated, and the necessary preparations made to receive 
them. This great invention offers an additional argument for the discontinuance 
of intermediate fortifications. 
In reference to our possessions on the Pacific, a little deviation from the 
c ur..:e recommendecl to be observed on this side would be advisable. '.rhere it 
~ill be neces~ary to con. truct the permanent fortifications, so as to enable them 
:::tand a ..,iege, a. invaf-\ion in that remote quarter is probable, iu the event of 
·ar with a trong maritime power; but in all other respects the course to be pursued 
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should be the same as on this side, as it is to be presumed that the telegraph 
will soon be extended there, and in the course of time railroads also. 
To the second, viz: '' What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war, or of 
commerce, floating· batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitute, for per-
manent fortifications 1" 
'I.1he indispensable, and, in fact, imperative necessity of having strong permanent 
fortifications at the points before referred to, is a settled and decided conviction 
of my mind; they will admit of no substitute. 
Steam batteries, such a"' have been recommended in my reply to your first 
interrogatory as a modification, would unquestionably prove an important and 
powerful auxiliary, and in all probability would, in the day of battle, if properly 
managed, be the more destructive of the two; but, like all ships, the materials of 
which they must necessarily be constructed are perishable; and possibly, at the 
moment their services are most required, a broken shaft, or some other of the 
numerom; accidents to which all such ships are liable, would render them 
unavailable, if not altogether useless; and hence the riRk a nation would encounter 
in adopting any substitute for permanent fortifications when there existed a 
possibility of its failure. 
Third. "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications 
on the ·hores of the northern lakes 1" 
To this, your last inquiry, I would state, that the uuprecedented change 
which the entire shores of our northern lakes has undergone since the termina-
tion of the late war with Great Britain renders it very improbable that invasion 
will ever take place from the opposite shore. Certain destruction would await 
an enemy who attempted it. 'l.,hen the population was comparatively sparse; 
now cities and villages are to be seen in every direction, occupying places which 
were then an uninterrupted wilderness, and hosts of stout hearts ready to do 
battl , if needed; besides the numerous and increasing facilities for building 
, hip ai1d for transporting· munitions of war forbid the idea that the northern 
lakes will ever again constitute an arena for naval combats. 
In the vent of another war with Great Britain we would be able to build and 
equip five ships to her one; this fact alone affords a conclusive reason why the 
goYernment should run to no unnecessary expense in its preparation, for war in 
that quarter. 
ur tonnage will, as it is now, always be greater in the lakes than that of 
Great Britain, which mu. t secure to us the supremacy in the event of war, a 
many of those vessels, steamers and others, could be converted into crui"ers, 
whi~h would not only protect our shores from invasion, but push the war into 
the en my' country. 
Port. s 1 ctcd for na-.;-al depots .J1oulcl ha-.;-c heavy guu:-1 rcacly for their prot c-
tiou; and park.· of artillery, composed of heavy orclnancr, should be kept in rcadi-
rn·., at the cliffi rent military 1)0sts for immediat use or tran portation. Further 
than thi~, I think th government is not called upon to provid«· for defenc . 
In ·oncln. ion, I beg lea';-e to state that if there , houlcl be another war with 
on of th<' , trono- maritim nation of EuroiJe, the trial of trencrth must he upon 
tl1e or·cr,n, ancl it brhoov .· th United 'tate:-i to b wrll upon their o-uarcl. .A, 
to the· opinion" hi h is rife among us, that team alone can con. titnte an fli i nt 
11aYY, mul tha th - nation who can ommancl th o-r at ~t number of. team r i-
to l;olcl ,uprc•ni:tey on the oe •an, I r o-arcl a one of tho:- vi iouary , p ·ulation-
ha ·p1l l'Htin·l T upon the opinion. of m r throrists. Th ir flici ncy for towin!!' 
, hip. imo po:-ition ancl for tr:rn, portino- munition:,, of war, I admit. 
If we li:ul tm :-hip of two Jrnuclrccl mul forty fi ·t in length, with a propor i n-
n blc· lm aclth of bPam, ancl hnilt to ('arr T thl'ir uwtal upon two deck.· in ·t ·a · 
four, ancl their hattr.rir.:- throuo-hont to he• of t1·n-in ·h crun;·, b Ji v it w ul 
tak,. t hi c-omhin ·cl t ·am nav • of Ur ·at 13ritain to copr. with th m. 
'1 wo y ar. war, witl1 a laro- . t ·mn nav · to . upport and kr. p in con, an 
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rrice, would bring any power in Europe to bankr~ptcy ; and I trust_ our 
!0-rernment will not be drawn into so unwise and expensive a system of national 
:efence. 
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, 
R. B. CUNNINGHAM, 
Commander U.S. Navy. 
Hon. C. M. CONRAD, 
Secretary of War, Washington. 
No. 4. 
Report ef C?mmander S. F. Dupont. 
Report on the national defence, in reply to the following questions, submitted 
by the Department of War. 
First. "To what extent, if any, ought the· present system of fortifications, for 
the protection of our seaboard, to be modified, in consequence of the application 
of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other 
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161" 
Second. "·what reliance could be placed in ves-sels-of-war, or of commerce, 
ffoating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent forti-
fications 1" 
Tkird. "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications 
-0n the shores of northern lakes?" 
Whether treated distinctively or generally, these inquiries may be supposed to 
amount to this: Shall we expend as much as we have hitherto done for defence 
upon fortifications? and how have these been affected by the introduction of 
,ome new elements in war, such as steam power, and enormous projectiles of an 
ex:plosive character? 
This subject is one which involves the honor and safety of the country; it 
ha been critically examined by distinguished military men and eminent states-
men, and I do not venture to think that I can throw much new light upon it. 
In uch an investigation one's profession and esprit du corps would naturally 
lead in any scheme, for the general defence, to bring the navy prominently for-
ward. But this question is too broad and national to be viewed from any such 
narrow limits, and in examining it an officer should discard from his mind to 
Which arm of the public service he belongs. In my apprehension, however, the 
lllo t extended system of fortifications for the defence of our seaboard will still 
leave enough for the navy to do; a navy, too, carried far beyond its present 
number and strength. Indeed, this :;irm can only fill its special mission in war,· 
that of aggression, by being enabled to leave the great seaports and exposed 
points of our maritime frontier to a more certain and more economical system of 
~totection, in order to carry the "sword of the state" upon the broad ocean, 
'\\'"eep from it the enemy's commerce, capture or scatter the vessels-of-war pro-
tecting it, cover and convoy our own to its destined havens, and be ready to 
llleet hostile fleets; in other words, to contend for the mastery of the seas where 
alone it can be obtained, on the sea itself . 
. Y et it is not to be denied that theories have sprung up, assigning much less 
llllportance than formerly to fortifications, in a system of national defence, under 
the influence of opinions which doubtless have some truth in them, but which are 
liable to be carried to a dangerous extent. Various reasoni:; might be assigned 
for this change of opinion-speculation, supposed economy, a mistaken desire to 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--21 
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advance the interests of the navy, in short, the characteristic pursuit of theories 
into the field of extravagance. 
But it may be still more probable that these views mainly spring from some 
misconception. as to the extent proposed for a system of permanent defences. 
Some would seem to believe that our seaboard and lake frontier were to be 
bound by a Chinese wall, and that all the salient points on the coasts were to 
be crowned by castles, the cross-fires of which would cover the intervening 
space; in other words, that the system of fortifications proposed to protect some 
four thousand miles of sea-coast from the possibility of invasion or attack. But 
is there any cause to apprehend such extreme views 1 And if they should exist, 
is that a sufficient reason for rejecting a wise and practical system of permanent 
defences vitally essential to the safety of important points, and so clearly within 
the means of the country to provide 1 
In treating this branch of the subject, can we do better than examine the ob-
jections presented and the modification proposed, from sources entitled to the 
gravest consideration 1 
Holding the first position among these is the report of a -distinguished states-
man, then occupying the Department of War, and still holding a prominent place 
in the public councils- a gentleman, too, familiar with arms in early life, and 
one of the defenders of his country in the war of 1812. His views, set forth 
with great ability, received the indorsement of another distinguished personage, 
President Jackson, and were submitted to the national legislature in the year 
1836.- (Doc. No. 243, 24th Congress, Gen. Cass's report.) 
Now, it is submitted that there has been an equal misconception as to the scope 
and tendency of this able report, as with the views considered extreme, on the 
other side. In the one, modifications recommended in reference to special fea-
tures have been considered as objections to the whole system; in the other, an 
extended scale of defence, because we had an extended frontier, was looked 
upon as a desire to cover the whole surface of the land with forts and field 
works, and to rely upon these alone for defence. Whereas the only difference 
related to the character and extent of tlie works to be constructed, based upon 
the consideration that there was scarcely a possibility of the. e works bein<r 
called upon to repel attacks by land, as well as by water, and repeating the 
hypothe is that an enemy will ever attempt to make a more or less permanent 
establishment in the country. Such an establishment as would induce him to 
make a formal investment of some of the e first cla s works, requiring a larg 
army with its battering trains and other preparations for siege. View on theer 
points are presented in full, and with great force, yet the objection are trictly 
confined to what is conceived to be the unnece~sary magnitude of ome of these 
work , Lut not to the system of permanent defences, for the di tingui .. h d author 
of the report tells us with equal explicitness: 
"I con ider the duty of the government to afford adequate protection of th 
• · a-coa, ta ubject of paramount obligation, and I b lieve we are called up n hy 
v ·ry con icl ration of policy to push the necessary arrangem nt a ntpidly a~ 
th circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the w rk will 
allow. I think every town large enouo-h to tempt the cupidity of an n mv 
ehoulcl b d ·fi nded by works, fixed or floating, suited to it" local po ition and 
uffi ·i ntly .· t n iv to r i t uch att mpts as would probably be mad ag-ain-· 
it. Th r will of cou.r. c, after 1ayino- down ucb a gen ral rul , be much 1 i-
tud of di er tion a to it application. Upon this branch of the ubj I 
would criv to th opinion of the eno-ine r officer almo t controlino- w io-ht, 
prop r limit tion · are tabli bed." • • • • • • 
' All th <let nc hould b · proj ct d upon a scale proportionate to 11 
portance of th pl c , and hould b calculated to re i..t any naral atta · 
any sudden a ault that a body of land troops might make upon it." • • 
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·, is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a 
nu force from our harbors· this end they ought fully to answer." 
In truth, it cannot be que;tioned that our principal seaports, naval depots, _and 
important points on our seaboard, should recei:e commensurate pr?tect1~n; 
·mer should there be, in our judgment, a quest10n as to the mode m which 
• ·! protection should be given. It would seem unnece_ssar:z to set ~orth the ad-
tages for such purposes of fixed defences or fo~t1~cat~ons. 1~ese advan-
€ have been shown over and over again by our d1stmgU1shed engmeers, and 
... er controverted. To run over some of these once more, it may be said of 
s that they are the only permanent defences, and the mos~ economical, fo~, 
· h the present science in construction and choic~ of matenal, the outlay 1s 
ere once for all, for the repairs are next to nothmg. Forts offer means by 
which a small force is enabled to resist a large one ; a small number of men a 
o-e army. In the event of an attack by a competent power upon a place 
· hle to be put under contribution, the injury might·be accomplished before suf-
:ieient means of resistance could be assembled. ]?orts can be made impregnable 
gain t any naval force that could be brought against them, and are needed for 
e protection of our own fleets while preparing for hostilities on the . ocean. 
They are secure depots for munitions of war, and render defence certam and 
ea~y, and above all, a defence which rarely involves loss of life, leaving the or-
dinary tate of society undisturbed. No alarms are created ; no calling of men 
m their ordinary business. In short, by rendering success impossible, they 
lerive immunity from attack. 
It i impossible to view with favor the substitution of floating or steam bat-
lerie~ for permanent defences, the preparation of which will be ever deferred, on 
ace~:mnt of their perishable nature, until danger is pending; and if ready in time, 
1b.e1r value ceases with the occasion which called them forth, for their decay is 
te"rtain and speedy. Their unsuitableness and want of adaptation to the altera-
_'on c_ons~antly made in the means and implements of war are also elements of 
msecur1ty m these wood and iron defences for harbors. There can never be any 
tertainty that some recent discovery has not lessened our effective force, without 
aay remissness on our part; there can be no certainty that we may not be sud-
omly called on to renew our expenditures before our last appropriations have 
Deen spent. For example, a well-known, and scientific, and practical gentle-
man. obtained the contract, under a law of Congress, to construct for harbor de-
fe11ce an iron floating battery, which was to be shot and shell proof-in fact, 
invulnerable in every respect. A target, constructed after the manner he pro-
~sed for the sides of his battery, was subjected to the test of one of Commodore 
Stockton's large guns. It presented little or no resistance ; the ball passed 
lnrough without difficulty, tearing out large fragments formed of seven thick-
neE~e~ of boiler-iron, well bolted and rivetted together. There is no desire, 
nowever, to be understood as excluding altogether these costly and unwieldly 
lllachine ; they may serve as important auxiliaries to forts, in broad sheets of 
liater, or pecial localities not within the range of the fixed work ; though, in 
all probability, in most cases the hulls of stout merchant ships, strengthened and 
~tepared for mounting one or more pieces of heavy ordnance, would· be sooner 
)ot ready and answer an equally good purpose. But to leave the whole defence 
if our harbors to such temporary expedients, built of materials as vulnerable and 
!Jeris able a ships, would be expending enormous sums in order to invite at-
~ck . 
'rhrouo-hout this report I was at first disposed ~to take for granted that no 
l(Jea_ could prevail in this country, to any extent at least, that would desire to 
teta.i t~e "!avy proper-by which is meant efficient steam and sailing ships-of-
ar:--CWithm the harbors, for harbor defence; but it seems to be included in the 
~pe of one of the inquiries, and cannot be overlooked. 
W- at, then, is the first object and main purpose of a navy but the defence 
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and protection of our comme_rce? It is the only form in which that protection 
can be given; but this is essentially taken away when it has assigned to it the 
defence of our seaports. It may be said that the navy will be increased to such 
a size as to be able to perform this double duty. There is nothing in our past 
history to authorize such a belief; and in time of peace the people of the United 
States will never support such a naval force. They object to spending much 
money on the personnel of military establishments. Nor does it belong to the:ir 
temper, or their position among nations, to indulge in apprehensions of war; 
their time is too much occupied with the noble arts and pursuits of peace to 
feel such an interest in this subject as must be fel~ to bring them to such large 
expenditures upon perishable materials. 
If our country had to rely upon naval defences, it may well be questioned 
whether any portion of the navy would be suffered to leave our coasts for the 
protection and preservation of our foreign commerce, while we were under the 
alarm of war. However great the naval force might be, it would not be thought 
sufficient. 'l'he dangers nearest home would command our interest and sympa-
thy; the preservation of our great emporiums of commerce froin sudden devas-
tation would cause the single trading ships upon the ocean to be forg·otten. 
And how would a naval force, for home defence, be partitioned out to the differ-
ent cities and stations, without endless vexation, dissatisfaction, and dispute 1 
To employ our active navy, in whole or in part, to the entire or partial aban-
donment of our system of fortifications, would be to supplant impregnable bul-
warks by pregnable ones-a fixed security by a changeable one- placing perish-
able materials in lieu of those that are durable; it would be exposing ourselves 
to the chance of being suddenly left, for a time, without defence, through new 
discoveries in the art of war; it would be opening the way to expenditures of 
money which no estimate could count the sums; it would be depriving our 
commerce of its legitimate protection, and would be resigning our sense of secu-
rity, peace of mind, and continuance in our pursuits without interruption, in the 
event of war. But there are objections to such a plan still more fatal: it in-
volves the sacrifice of the lives of our fellow-citizens, and proposes to make their 
bodies, since they are br~ve and willing, the walls of defence for the enemy to 
:fire at, instead of stone or mortar; it is compelling the conclusions of science to 
give way to mere speculations, and rejecting the experience of the world. Nor 
is this all that is involved in so destructive a proposition: it would divert the 
navy from its highest duty; deprive it of its chief honor aud merit, and best claim 
to the respect and support of the people, that is, the vindication of the national 
honor, and the maintenance of the national freedom and independence upon th~ 
high seas. Again, if naval defences are relied on, they will either be mannea 
or not. If manned, what shall we say of the effects of such a life upon men 
and o:ffic rs ?-would it not be destructive of all those characteristics of kill 
daring, and endurance which give to the seaman his power and prestige upon 
the oc an? If not manned, then, compared to forts, they are what wooden cloc~-
are to ton docks. In either case, more men will be required to keep them u: 
r ,pair than fort . 
n th qu tion of economy, let us further consider the cost that would be 
ent, ~l d upon the nation, by the alarm of an inva ion or the appearance of & 
ho, tJl fl t on the coa t. · 
'Ih . udd n quipment and preparation of an army, and its maintainance' · 
fi i ntly lono- to remove all apprehen ion, would cost more, at every princi 
port none ino-le occa ion, than all the forts. Then what would be the firt 
tbino- that an army rould do, belched forth by the tens of thousand from e, . 
r~ ilr a tation a?d t rminu , but to et to work and throw up the be t fortili ,. 
1 n t uld m th cmero- ncy? Would not every musket be !!rounded · 
tak up pick and , hovel ? Again : hall we dwell upon the state of the pub 
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dnd, in one of our chief cities if its approaches were left without forts, equipped 
.:id manned 1 
I~ there any exaggeration in the picture of an enemy's fleet. of so~e ~hirty 
-:ramers watching an opportunity, and through the ever recurrmg v1c1ss1tudes 
n the ocean, familiar to professional men, eluding a naval force of our own, 
hich it would not have been willing to encounter, running up New York harbor, 
choring from the North to the East river, in a semicircle round the battery, 
»:rrling destruction with its new and gigantic projectiles, setting fire to the forests 
'i shipping, and burning the navy yard; and retreating the moment the tempo-
.-.:.ry and hurried defences began to tell against them, destroying more prop-
eny in a few hours than would cover the shores of Raritan bay, the Narrows, 
d the islands of the Sound, with fortifications 7 Now, this is the kind of 
arfare we must look to, and that we must carry on ourselves. 
The greater the injury we -0an inflict, the more rapidly this injury is repeated, 
and the sooner we will obtain redress and bring an unnatural condition of affairs 
t 11. clo c. The position of Halifax, Bermuda, and the West Indies, must ever 
be borne in mind, where fleets may wait for a fitting opportunity for incursions; 
:o suppose that there are to be no such thing as surprises, because railroads have 
been invented and hollow shot cast, seems to be taking for granted that human 
· e ha changed. Indeed, those who indulge in such theoretical securities are 
preparing for themselves surprises, perilous ones too. 
team will be the great agent in giving to the new elements of destruction 
powers of ubiquity. Wherever there is a vulnerable spot, there we must dash, 
and there an active enemy will dash at us. But it must be remembered that 
'-O far as the improvements in projectiles, specially referred to in the inquiries 
under consideration, are concerned, these have, relatively to ships, strengthened 
forts. Hollow shot crumble into fragments and fall harmless when directed 
a~..,t stone walls. At the siege of Antwerp, under Marshal Girard, they were 
thrown from heavy mortars without effect, and experiments at home have further 
e~rablished the fact. It takes solid shot to batter walls and make breaches-
plenty of them, and rapidly discharged, and concentrated upon or near one 
::pot. 
On the other hand, we have only to imagine a few eight and ten-inch shells 
pa,;sing through the side of a line-of-battle ship into the main or lower gun-deck, 
and 1:here exploding amidst the dense crowd at the batteries, every fragment 
multiplying itself in countless splinters of wood and iron as destructive as itself, 
and if it should fail to burst, still doing all the injury a solid shot could do. Or, 
le one enter on the orlop deck among the passers of powder; or, lower still, 
striking at the water line, tearing out large irregular fragments, and leaving 
opening. defying all shot-plugs. Change the scene to a steamer, with all the 
cu-cumstances above mentioned of pervious sides and crowded decks, and con-
ceive a few exploding in the engine room; for truly has it been said that, com-
pared to a sailing ship, a steamer has twenty mortal parts to one! No! when 
i comes to using hollow shot a ship will prefer engaging something similarly 
con;:;tructed. No ship or ships can lay under a fort at this day ; no American 
ort, at least, with its furnaces for hot shot in addition to these murderous 
shelL. 
In tbi connexion it may be well to make a passing allusion to the past suc-
ce-~e: of hips-of-war against forts. 
They are certainly striking examples of naval prowess, and should always 
catl.5e a thrill of profe sional pride in the breast of every seaman, let his flag be 
hat it may ; and they should be remembered and studied by officers to incite 
·o de cl.· of daring, to self reliance, and to faith in that "fortune which favors 
brave." But there is no foundation for the theory attempted to be raised 
n th, ·ucce.., .. es. 'I.1he attack on Algiers by Lord Exmoutb, commanding 
326 MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 
the combined English and Dutch fleets, take it all in all, is probably the greatest 
naval achievement in this line. 
About two hundred guns could be brought to bear against about one thousand 
in the fleet, and the fire of the admiral's ship, the Queen Charlotte, is considered 
generally by the profession to be equal to any on record; but she was permitted 
to come in close to the mole, take up her position, swing round her broadside, 
and make fast to an adjoining vessel, before- a shot was fired upon her. This 
fact alone gives an idea how the defence was conducted; the batteries were 
defective and unskilfully served, yet the ships hauled off, and the batteries were 
not silenced, though redress was obtained. Indeed, it is admitted by Lord 
Exmouth that he could not have continued the contest. 
Nearer the present day the capture of Acre is equally celebrated, and is inter-
esting, as the new elements in war, steam power and hollow projectiles, were 
brought to bear. 
The highest military authority in England expressed the opinion in Parliament 
that this was one of the greatest achievements of modern times ; but the same 
authority added it was also connected with peculiar circumstances which they 
could not always hope to occur, and warned their lordships that they must not 
always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant their 
seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully with stone 
walls. 
The works in question were in a bad condition and were undergoing repairs. 
Their position permitted an. approach through a channel where only a few guns 
could be brought to bear against the fleet, most of which took this passage. But 
few of the guns of the fort were heavy or effective, and only one battery of five 
guns well served. About :five hundred guns were brought to bear on the 
fort ; the walls were not breached, but a large magazine blew up, and, producing 
a panic, the fort surrendered, which, it must be remembered, was besieged by 
land also. 
We have merely alluded to these two justly celebrated attacks of ships against 
forts to invite an examin&tion into their details, and into the circum tance of 
other similar achievements nearly as striking, with the conviction that few per-
sons could be found who would use these instances of succe , as an argument 
again t the necessity of permanent defence . Surely we cannot mea ure w~at 
has been done in thi way, when the preparations for defence and the res1 t-
anc<' were conducted by those whose bravery, as in the ca. cs cited, wa left 
unaided by , kill or cience. Neither let it be suppo ed, where . hip have at-
tacked fort. , the result have always been the ..;ame; far from it; and it i.- only 
nee ,sary to allnd to the affairs of Fort Moultrie, an<l, latrr, to l\lobile Point, 
tonington, Fort IcIIenry, &c., from our o,rn national expcri(·nce. 
Arr w' entir<'ly to r<'j<'ct, in this qur tion, the r_·pericncc and practice of t~e 
gr<'at European powers, Eng·land and Franc ? The former, with h r O'ig-:m 1c 
navy, n.ccording to the modf'rn hypothr:-:i , would ·(;Pm to r r1uirc no p •11nnnen 
dcfrnc :e ; nor the latter, with her incrca ing mariw•, already brought to a very 
formidal,1 • ·onclition in numbers, mafrri ·l, ancl cli,ciJJlinc. 
Yc·t thP:-r two 11ation., while buildin"' without ccn:-iug war .. t amer.::, ar on-
tinnallv ac1c1inrr to tlie fixc•cl d ·follcf':'-l of their spaho:ml. arnl thi.:, too, with a Yi 
of makinu thr-ir n:n-i •:-: nH>r<' efficient in thr·ir ,lum· of tlH· national rl nc · 
} rant·f', iu ('Oll:-idPration of th<' chan°·p likrl ·v to nccnr fr11m th n w ,] m nt, in 
war 1111w 11u<lr-r eo11:-icfor:1tio11. ha:-: Jiacl r'c~1th· her. a- ·oa,t n•-cxamin d b_- , 
lti.rd1 c·ommi,:-i,m n·pr ·:-r>ntino- aJI arm:- in Ji,.r :rnpm1dou military or~:miz, i n: 
and th r ,ult wa to orclt r ,till furtllf'r 1n· t ction to nnm r11n, point n h 
no tml r rnl rerl nc ·1 . iblt' liy li!.d1t 1lra11ght :-tPam r-. m,mntin!?' h ,. • 
n, u . 1]1 ir fort, t b( ;.;-arri. 1111 d in titn1, of ll<'<'cl hv tllf' local militi,. ( !.! ~ 
i atirmal .) Ju Lll'~I. n] th ·all i: fo1· gr ater a •tfrit,: in matt ri:11 and p n 
m · u of de I'll · , par i ·ularlr iu th • ·a of r ·ftwe ~ harb r . ..:uch ~ > 
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and Dover, while the fortifications of her great arsenals have all recently been 
mengthened. . . . . 
After mature examination, I am of the opnnon that m a system of na~10nal 
defence forts cannot be dispensed with without entailin~ enormous_ expenditures 
for uncertain results. The invention of cannon and thell' constant 1mprovements 
have changed the form of fortifications, and added to the size, d'l.uability, and · 
massiveness of their construction. Now the invention of cannon was a greater 
change in the art of war than any that has occurred in_ this centt~ry, and with 
regard to one of the principal improvements of the day m destructive agents-
explosive slwt-the advantage has been given decidedly to fort . . 
On the other hand, if we cannot dispense with forts, can they not be modi-
fied? Is there no middle course i Fortifications in military science are regarded 
a a temporary means of resistance, by which an enemy is kept in check until 
relief is afforded. 
In this view of their functions it seems probable that as, on the one hand, 
they might be more effectually assailed by steamers-of-war towing in heavy 
~hips, both ships and steamers mounting the heavy ordnance which has be~n 
mtroduced, throwing solid as well as hollow shot, so, on the other hand, rehef 
being more easily procured, their style of construction might be more economi-
cal. . But this is a question belonging to the engineers. . 
_It 1s one, however, which may be interesting just now with reference to forti-
fying our new coast on the Pacific-a work which surely ought not to be delayed. 
~ere we are, as it were, building up another nation, and it must be built up 
with arms as well as arts ; for without arms :no nation was ever safe, much less 
great. 
The position of Halifax, Bermudas, and the West Indies have been alluded 
to above in reference to our Atlantic and Gulf coasts. In the Pacific we have al-
ready outposts on our flanks, in the hands of first class powers. The French 
h~-ve a protectorate government in the Society Islands ; they hold the Marquesas 
still nearer, with its superior harbors, and have been looking for years for some 
excuse for seizing the Sandwich group ; for this is the only way to account for the 
manner in which they have ever countenanced the unjust and ungenerous demands 
of their agents in those islands. 'fhat they have not now possession of them is 
due, probably, to what has been stated of the determination of the government of 
the _islands to hoist the American flag, and call upon the United States for pro-
~ection or incorporation. It is impossible to estimate too highly the value and 
rmp?rtance of the Sandwich Islands, whether in a commercial or military point 
of view. Should circumstances ever place them in our hands they would prove 
the mo:4t important acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific ocean-an 
acqui:3ition intimately connected with our commercial and naval supremacy in 
!ho'"'e sea·. Re this as it may, these islands should never be permitted to pass 
mto the pos~ession of any European power. Then we have British Oregon, with 
Vancouver's island, the Halifax of the Pacific coast; and last, though perhaps 
not the least, the Russian possessions of the Sitka, &c., in the north ; and all 
these in an ocean above all others adapted to the use of steam. 
The third inquiry submitted by the department is whether it be necessary or 
expedient to continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern 
lake~. 
The fir:-it view of thi, branch of the subject would probably lead to the con-
e m ion that, a· we di. pensed with forts during the war of 1812, we need them 
~till le::t:-- now ; that the contiguity of the two frontiers will enable us to keep 
pace ,vith any vidence of preparation on the other side ; that our progress in 
population and re ources, rendered ,·o immediately available by the increase of 
at r communication wjth all parts of the border States, especially with such 
nnportant point a the city of Albany, which, in its turn, is connected with all . 
ction: of the country by its great river, railroads, and canals, was far greater 
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than any progress within the CanadaR. Yet the advance there has been highly 
respectable, and very extensive public works, intimately connected with a sys--
tem of defence, have been completed. 
But this very progress on our lake frontier, showing itself in large and popu-
lous towns with a rapidly increasing commerce, all exposed to sudden assaults, 
naturally lead• one to pause well before advancing the opinion that the general 
government is absolved from giving adequate protection to all exposed and im-
portant points, whether on our lake or sea-coast. 
Why should not Bqffalo and Oswego be protected, as w~ll as Savannah and 
Mobile 1 Not by extensive and costly works, capable of resisting invasion or 
siege, but sufficiently strong not to excite the cupidity or daring spirit of an enemy, 
who, in a rapid incursion, might, as elsewhere, destroy an enormous amount of 
property before any resistance could be brought against him. To conduct a 
surprise may be difficult on the lakes; but we have had, within a few years, 
full proof that it is possible. 
In case of a war with England her provinces will, in all probability, be invaded, 
and this invasion, according to the declaration of a distinguished citizen, will be 
one almost en masse. He predicts that an army of a hundred thousand men 
will march upon the heart and capital of the country, and settle all at one blow; 
that neither forts nor ships will be wanted ; and that the rivers and lakes, in-
stead of obstacles, would become bridges to the invaders. One cannot fail to 
be stirred up by this captivating picture; but in the only trial heretofore made 
upon Quebec the river was not found to be a bridge, and the campaign failed 
for want of one. Suffice it, however, to say, if we carry on war on a large-
scale without being governed by the art of war, by science, and past experience, 
we may, and doubtless will, still be successful; but this res-ult will be obtained 
by an increased expenditure of blood and treasure. 
While an army, however large, was marching upon a vital point, millions of 
property might be destroyed along the lake shore , making a heavy discount on 
the fruits of the victory, which might be prevented by moderate expenditures. 
Our large frontier towns, where great injury could be suddenly inflicted, , hould 
be protected from liability to· a coup de main by forts of moderate dimen ion", 
to be garrisoned, in time of need, by those whose hearth they :4helter. All 
lake harbors, whose position, depth of water, and accessibility would render 
them important as refuge harbors to our own' hips or to tho, e of the enemy, 
should also be defended by adequate work, . All materials not peri bable 
should be gradually collected for the construction of ships and teamers. 'fhe_e 
preparations become invaluable where war threaten, or come, r neither are they 
Jo t if it should not overtake us, for they may have had an important part in 
averting it . 
. In many particulars, and according to the opinion of men of the most. ~xpe-
r1e_nce, On_tario is the mo t important in the erie of inland ea i~ n: military 
pomt of vi w, and at this time the English , team tonnag upon 1t 1s O'f atcr 
than our own. 'I'hi. fact alone i one for con, id ration. 
, I~ .. onn xion :vith th movement, of larg armir nothing ha be n. aid of 
fort1fymcr .s·traterrzc point on the line of offcnfliv · operation:--, brcau. th1-- <JU ,_ 
tion _i a. pur_ ly military one, ancl b •lonO'" o e. pecially to anotlwr branch of th 
·rv1c that 1t ,rould L • m •r !)resumption to touch upon it h r ·. 
Thou,rh not ·p ially r f rrcd to in th qu , tion: under C'Onsicl •ration it may 
b xp ·ct 1 that :-:om notiC'c will h · tak n of th facilitic:- to be d riv d, in a 
y t ·m of n: tional def •n · from rH}'id railroad intercommunication and tmn,-
portati 11. 'I h · c rtain]y can conf •r a err at and r al 1 n fit am untin_ 
p rhap · to po itiv · .· mption from the: I o:-:-ibilit,r of inva i m. ~ n arm. i 1i 
it. barrgao- ', can nccompli. h an ordinary march of twpnty-fiv • clay in on d . 
and r a h th t rruinu · without fatio-u , all r ady for firrht. Th · ·xp rim n o 
trnn portin"" tr 01, · in thi way ha· alr ady l, ·n trit<l in } ranc and. m 
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r cently, the emperor of Russia has been am~sing ~imself by sending h~s guar~s, 
"th their artillery, to and fro between h1s capital ~nd Moscow, with entire 
~cce~s. But it is a misapprehension of means and ideas to suppose that the 
eces ity of coast defences will be done away with because w_e posses~ the power 
c"" transporting the militia from the interior to the seaboard m the briefest space 
nceivable. Are our farmers, mechanics, merchants, doctors, and lawyers to 
on titute the defence of our maritime frontier? Are they, in time of war, to 
E eep with their knapsacks on their backs and their musket~ ?Y their si~es, and 
e ready at the sound of bell or steam-whistle to leave famihe~ and busme~s to 
man :floating batteries in or near our seaports, or sounds, or rivers ? Besides, 
mere numbers, though they may prevent an enemy from land·ing on ?ur shores, 
cannot prevent his ships approaching near enough to hurl destruct10n among 
.. hemselves, destroy cities, and burn shipping. . 
But if we are to rely upon railroads as one of the modes of repellmg s~dden 
attacks, having for their object the destruction of property or the levyrng oi 
contributions, it will be well to inquire as to the amount of dependence that can 
he placed upon them. The utility of a road may be destroyed in a few minutes 
b very little exertion ; a single rail removed will cause delay if not a serious. 
accident. During the last revolution in Paris troops were thus prevented from 
reaching the city from the departments. In time of war, for those roads at least 
which lie along the coasts, a system of frequent inspection may be necessary, 
and means of repairing injuries kept at hand. . 
In the first part of this report it has been stated th.at, however complete our 
3y~tem of fortifications may be made, a large sphere of action in a scheme of· 
national defence will still devolve upon the navy. rrhe general effect of fortifi-
cations is to exclude war from our borders, and contribute to the inestimable 
a_dvantage of leaving society in an undisturbed state, pursuing its usual avoca-
nons. A navy becomes efficient just in proportion as it is relieved from harbor 
defence; and in a war even defensive in its origin and object the navy in almost 
every case must assume an offensive attitude. We lose the vantage-grou:nd if' 
we wait the assault of an enemy. One would suppose there could scarcely be 
a dis"'e~ting opinion in reference to this point ; that the special function of the 
avy, m war, is to be aggressive. Our able engineers, and especially their 
present distinguished chief, in the admirable reports they have been making for 
years on this subject, invariably assign this high and all-important position to 
the navy. 
General Cass tells us, " Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought, 
a~d _we sl~a11 gain nothing by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle." 
) rm1lar views are held abroad as to the true sphere of a navy. The Duke of 
W ~ll~g~on, while urging increa8ed activity in the permanent defences of Great 
B_ntam, m the strengthening of forts, the construction of barracks, and place 
a annes to be walled in, still considers the navy of England, through its powers 
" a r.rgression, its most essential defence. 
The extraordinary expansion of this country and its development in every 
d ·partment, shown especially in a comm(;,rce which, long since whitening every 
::ea, ba received a marvellous stimulant recently, by the accession of a thou--
an_d m~ of coast on the Pacific, by new channels of trade, and by the modifi-
ca_t1on m the navigation laws of our great competitor, should lead all reflecting 
mI~d · to consider how great would be the revulsion in our prosperity if, through 
any u~toward event, we should lose the means of protecting this commerce .. 
+anding now in the front rank with our great commercial rival, shall we neglect 
Id aphorism of Sir Walter Raleigh, most cogent still : "Whosoever com-
nd · the ·ea commands the trade, and whosoever commands the trade com-
d the riche of the world 1" 
~ - ow, i our navy, in point of e:ffi.ci ncy and numbers, what it should be?. 
~ ate, men con. tantly allude to it as the right arm of the nation's power;, 
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yet has this arm been kept in any degree of vigor commensurate with the work 
it may have to perform or in keeping with our position among the nations 1 Is 
it equal to the ordinary exigencies occurring almost daily? The law passed 
some years since limiting the number of seamen still exists. Since its passage 
-0ur commerce has nearly doubled, and our squadrons are too small to give it 
adequate protection or to keep up a healthful spirit and experience in the naval 
profession. Recently the government had not at its disposal the means to pre-
vent an unlawful aggression on the territory of a friendly power; nor was the 
force sufficiently respectable afterwards to infuse, by its presence alone, a little 
mercy into Spanish justice. But are we yet through with this question of Cuba 1 
Are we not threatened with a foreign intervention 1 At any rate, does it not 
offer another striking instance to be added to the long list of dangers which, at 
.different periods, have suddenly sprung upon us, and to which this day of special 
international amity has proved no exception 1 The French claims, the north-
eastern boundary, the affair of the Caroline, the Oregon controversy, have all 
shaken for the time being our relations with the two most formidable powers of 
Europe-formidable to us only because they have powerful navies-a collision 
with either of which would be rather a different affair from that with our neigh-
boring republic, with whom similar disturbances ripened into actual hostilities. 
'J.1he naval power of England is greater than ever before in her history, and 
the disparity between us is yearly increasing, particularly in her steam navy. 
In the admiralty navy list for April, 1850, we find one hundred and fifty 
steamers of war; of course many of these are already obsolete in construction 
and machinery, but she is building new ones and launching numbers every year. 
In addition to these, especially constructed for war purposes, she has between 
;sixty and seventy mercantile steamers, capable of being armed with thirty- two 
pounder cannon, for which the guns, carriages, and ammunition are actually 
prepared. She has, still further, two hundred and forty more, capable of mount-
ing a lighter armament, and some six hundred besides, which might be of ser-
vice to resist invasion from her neighbors. Exclusive of her squadrons abroad, 
which are large and efficient, with a due proportion of steamers to each, in 
.January, 1851, she had in commission at home fourteen sail of the line, three 
of them screw steamers, ten frigates, four of them steamers, beside several 
steam sloops, all ready for sea. She has also ready for commissioning twenty 
other powerful steamers, viz : eight large frigates and twelve sloops. 
The training of officers and men is in full keeping with this colos al force. 
Her quadron of evolutions offers the :finest school for both, and the gunnery 
hip: are making her able seamen expert artilleri t , good wordsmen, and capital 
, hot with pi ·tol and carbine. 
Th navy of France is also powerful; it ha ri·en entirely from it ' almost 
total ·-·tinction during the long ancl bloody contests from 17 9 to 1 15. In 
t<'amPr of war, at the commencement of this year, . he hacl on line-of-battle 
·hip o~ nin_ety o-~m , witl~ crew propellers, fourteen Hteam frigate ' of fir:-t cla-~ ·, 
m1Jtmtrno- from ·1ght to s1xtc n guns of heavy ordnance; fiftren i;t am corvette.::-, 
ancl fort ' cle. patch 'teamer. , mo.'t of them mounting from two to four i::h 11-
o-un .. - (,'c Etat 11;neral c1e la )farine t de Colonie:-, for J:iebrnary, 1 51.) 
Both thl'~C n:rvie:- Jun-<' reach cl the highe.'t tatc of efficiency, .:kill, and <li~-
ciplin ·, ancl th ir morale 1wv r wa. hi~h r: that of E,wlan<l, rou. eel to th· 
maint nance of iL hoa,-tecl .-uprcmacy on the ocean; tlrnt of } ranee, lmmin2' 
f ran opp rtunity to :-how thr ,,·orl<l that it ' }Jractical :-kill i. now 'r1n, l to th 
· ·i nc•' ancl hrav ry which w ·r 0v •r C'on:-:picuou:. 
'\Yh ·n complet cl. wi . hall havf' in our navy fiv<' tmm fri<Ta.te:- anrt 
t am . loop. The•:- v I mount or will mount from i.· to t u ~un-., 
th ·m f I· rg-r. cnlihr ·; th ·y am ·trong, WPll-bnilt, anrl •ffici ·nt vc ··el., n 
m r f th1 m CJ.Hit· Pqnal. if not . up rior, to Hnything of th · same cl ~ a r 
ti tl1i . t. t .ment ·omp:ir ·<l with th two mnde abov~ of the rnn-i , of F~n!!'I 
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and France, shows terrible odds against us. It is well to remember this; but 
it is not exhibited here with the intention of making it the basis of an argument 
:ro show that we should set to work and erect such fleets here. The temper of 
-0ur people in relation to any such expenditures has already been spoken of, and 
here is no desire to advocate extravagal).t cost for contingent advantages. 
But this disparity between us and other nations in our means of offe_nce and 
defence, already so great, is yearly increasing. How is it to be go~ nd of _or 
le sened 1 The reply is often made : Has it not ever been so 1 was 1t not qmte 
great when we went into the war of 18121 And it may well be asked ho:"" 
that disparity was overcome in that memorable contest. In the first place, it 
was lessened by the skill, courage, and coolness of our officers, united to the 
fine spirit, good gunnery, and high discipline of the crews. In the second 
place, by a process equalling the greatest piece of strategy ever pei~formed_ on 
land by the greatest military captains. We built frigates which in size, calibre 
of guns, and in the brave hearts who took charge of them, literally struck off 
from the British navy list everything below a line-of-battle ship, at least so far 
a~ these frigates were concerned. 
The first encounter of our frigates with theirs astounded Britain. In account-
ing for her defeats, it was natural for her only to have seen the disparity in size 
and armament, but the official account of these frigates shows something more, 
and this is now acknowledged with becoming candor by some of her distin-
gui hed men. Sir Francis Head, in a recent work, says : "Gunnery was, in 
naval warfare, in the extraordinary state of ignorance we have just described, 
when our lean children, the American people, taught us, rod in hand, our first 
lesson in tlie art." Certain it is that the British admiralty board thought it 
necessary to put a stop to what they conceived to be a very unequal contest, 
a~d accordingly intimated confidentially to the capta~ns of their ships that they 
did not conceive that any of his Majesty's frigates should engage single-handed 
the larger class of American ships, which, though they may be called frigates, 
are of a size, complement, and weight of metal much beyond that class, and 
more resembling line-of-battle ships. 
:row, can we not once more render obsolete one-half or two-thirds of the 
Engli. h and French navies, and compel these powers to remodel their steam as 
well as sailing ships 1 It is the opinion of officers who have closely examined 
this subject, aided by actual experiments, that we have not yet reached the 
maximum point in the use afloat of heavy ordnance. 
It is proposed to build ships that will carry guns of larger calibre and longer 
range than any heretofore used; to have auxiliary steam power, with the ma-
chinery out of reach of shot or shell, to be disencumbered of side-wheels, and, 
when not using this auxiliary power, to be fast and manageable under canvas-
very much such a ship as the Princeton was, on a larger scale, and with the 
improvements which seven years have introduced. All candid minds will now 
admit that the conception and principle involved in the construction and arma-
ment of this ship was in advance of her day, for in casting round we have found 
nothing combining so ma.ny requisites for a steamer of war. 
Th~ advantage of guns with long ranges is feelingly dwelt upon by Sir 
Franci. Head, already q_uotecl. Speaking of the American navy in the last 
v.,.- r, l1e say. : '' They not only converted their seamen into pmcticed gunners 
an 1 <·xpert artillerymen, but, by , ubstituting long guns instead of our short 
one . they, ecured for th m. elve. the immense advantage of being able, without 
lo~ - or danger, luxuriously to pummel us to death, at ranges at which they had 
p e alculat ,a they would be completely out of our reach." 
It ·would ,·e m unnece.·~ary to mention that al1 improvements in the imple-
m ~n - <,f war, the moment th y are proved effective, will, of course, be seized 
u 01 by other powers, for concealment in these matters is no longer attempted. 
B th great point to be gained i. to compel these powers, as it were, to 
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start, de novo, with us, and to render comparatively valueless their gigantic 
naval establishments. In the building of a steam navy we have scarcely com-
menced, and it is rather mortifying to think that even Spain has as many 
steamers of war as we have. Candor compels the admission, however, that cir-
cumstances have greatly favored us1 and though this extreme economy or in-
difference might have cost us dear, certain it is that many millions of dollars 
have been saved by the delay. England and France have been going through 
the usual costly process in such matters before reaching a measure of excellence-
one improvement almost immediately laid aside for another, and this one as 
rapidly giving way to something still better; while all this time we have been 
dealing most sparingly with this very expensive agent, steam power. But now 
that a great degree of perfection has been reached in its application, that the 
science and mechanical skill of the country are at so high a point, that our 
wealth and resources have so increased, shall we continue to refuse a reasonable 
measure of preparation for future exigencies? 
Allusion has been made to the assistance England is prepared to receive from 
her mercantile steam vessels; and H may be said we have the same resources, so 
far as they go, of falling back upon our splendid mail steamers. These vessels 
would doubtless prove serviceable in many ways; they may carry a few guns 
of very respectable, though not of the largest calibre; built for speed, they would 
be admirable despatch vessels, serve to reconnoitre with safety the movements 
of an enemy, give warning of his approach, and the amount of his force-in 
short, be what Nelson termed his frigates, "the eyes of the fleet." But these 
steamers cannot form the basis of a steam navy; such an idea would be fatal to 
our naval efficiency. It is not intended by this to object to government's giving 
adequate protection to these mail steamers, in order to carry out the internationaJ. 
postal arrangements. But they are not such steamers as the government would 
now build for war purposes; the side-wheel may be said to be almost ob olete, 
and their machinery is altogether too much exposed to shot and shell; ships so 
costly mu 't, at least, be made less vulnerable. But if the mail steamers are to 
be depenclecl upon, as our steam navy, and not as auxiliaries to it, as the English 
and }.,rench mercantile steamers are to their navies, then another q ue tion 
presents itself. At what stage of an impending emergency i the government, 
in conformity with the right granted in the contract, to take the.;e steamer 1 
If thi8 be deferred until a late moment, there may b no time to fit them for 
war ervice, for very material alteration will Im vc to Le made. If further 
dcfi rred, until hostilities break out, they certainly will not be ready for the fir t 
bruJh, aud half of them may be picked up abroad by the malle t armed crui~er. 
hould they be taken by the government prematurely, their bu._ine s and profit 
arc broken up, and pa, s into the hand· of their rivals, who may run their teamer 
to the la:-it moment con is tent with afoty; for by the other power:-, a.· tated 
abov , th y are only held as auxiliaries. 
A f' ·w nlarrn.·, then, leadin(J' to no rupture, may , acldl th government with 
a cla: .. of teamer not :fit for tlrn navy pro1_wr, to be di po ·eel of at an normou-
lo. s; for th alt ration which will have b en mad to conv 'rt them into "men-
of-war" will hav wholly unfitt cl tll'm for th ir p ac fol pur,-uit:s; j?,t a ·. 
much ·o a th e~·orbitant exp nditur for th • luxuriout:t accommod: t1on ot 
pa· eu"' r i wholly 111111cc 's.·ary for a :-1t •am frio-ate. In truth, in th tran~fer 
of the., mail. t •am ·r; thi, itC'm may b, ·o r at that it ~hould not be altoo-·ther 
ov •rlo k ·cl. It ha· b ·c·n .-tated that th Raloon:, ·abini;, aucl cl ,comtion f on 
of th c lin . lH ve co::t from on, hunclr ,a thou,.;and to on · huuclr ·d and tw my 
1thou·and dollar p r J1ip, which, of c:onr e, nm t b paid f r, thoucrh not on 
dollar of it would b r ·quir cl for na al u,·c. Two iron hook· t win~ h. 
hamm ck, mak the birth of th . 'anum, , ml a fi·w pin b ard · comp ~ th 
bunk of th offic r .. 
1n couclu j n, what 1Y r may b d •cid d in relation to th · nation. d fi 
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ortification, whether these be continued, extended, or modified, I beg leave to 
express an emphatic dissent from all theories having for t~eir object the s~b-
.::titution of active ships-of-war for permanent works. This would be placmg 
the navy in a false position before the country; gi,:ing it duti~s to -rerform for 
which its organization is inapplicable; preparing for its future discredit and loss, 
-hrough failures to execute that which should never have been und_ertaken, 
which is not embraced in the general scope and design of a naval establishment. 
T o retain the navy for harbor defence was entertained at the commencement 
of the last war with England; the proposition to do so sprung from the appre-
hension that it could not compete with the vastly superior English forces upon 
the ocean. But at that time some brave and sagacious officers in the high ranks 
saved the navy from the fate that threatened it, and to these gentlemen it owes 
all its subsequent honors, usefulness, and prosperity. If any such ideas prevail, 
at this day, in or out of the profession, those holding them would do well to 
pause and consider what the navy would have lost, and what the country would 
have lost, if our ships-of-war had at that eventful period been deprived of the 
opportunity of filling so bright a page in the nation's history by their achieve-
ments upon the ocean. In this connexion an eloquent passage in the speech of 
a great statesman is recalled, delivered in the Senate of the United States in 
1 3 . After alluding to our being at war with England, at a moment when 
she had gained an ascendancy on the seM over the whole combined powers of 
Europe, and quoting the familiar verse of her poet, · · 
'' Her march is o'er the mountain wave, 
Her home is on the deep," 
Mr. Webster says: "Now, sir, since we were at war with her I was for inter-
cept ing this march; I was for calling upon her, and paying our respects to her 
at h ome; I was for giving her to know that we, too, had a right of way over 
the seas, and that our officers and our sailors were not entire strangers on the 
1:>osom of the deep; I was for doing something m0re with our navy than to keep 
1,t on our shores for the prottction ef our own coasts and our own harbors; I was 
for g iving play to its gallant and burning spirit; for allowing it to go forth upon 
the seas, and to encounter on an open and an equal field whatever the proudest or 
the b ravest of the enemy could bring against it. I knew the character of its officers 
and the spirit of its seamen, and I knew that in their hands, though the flag of 
the country might go down to the bottom, while they went with it, yet that it 
could never be dishonored or disgraced. 
"Since she was our enemy, and a most powerful enemy, I was for touching 
~er , if we could, in the very apple of her eye; for reaching the highest feather 
m her cap; for clutching at the very highest jewel in her crown." * * * * 
" The ocean, therefore, was the proper theatre for deciding this controversy with 
our enemy; and on that theatre my ardent wish was that our own power should 
b e concentrated to the utmost." 
It would be ill suited, indeed, to the spirit of this nation to retain its naval 
£orces in its own waters during a war, especially if that war was with a naval 
power. Steam, this new element in the affairs of the world, has very materially 
changed our position with reference to other nations. Our distance from Eu-
r~p. , mea ured in ti~e, is now reduced to a brief period of ten days. These 
n1ted tates have hitherto been advancing the general cause of human liberty 
y an active and progressive peace; but do not events abroad more and more 
indica te that we may, at no distant day, be forced into our own defence-to aid 
hi~ cau .. e of freedom by an active war 7 
Re pectfully submitted. 
S. F. DUPO:NT, 
Commander United States Navy 
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No. 5. 
Report ef Lieutenant J. Lanman. 
NEW YORK NAVY YARD, September 20, 1851. 
Sm: In obedience to the within order of the honorable the Secretary of the 
Navy, I have the honor to submit the following, as the result of my best reflec-
tions upon the subject referred to in your communication of the 17th June last, 
addressed to the honorable the Secretary of the Navy : 
1st. "To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for-
the protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application 
of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other 
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161" 
The great change produced upon all maritime nations by the application of 
steam must, of course, have a most important bearing in regard to the system 
of our national defences, as adopted in the year 1816, and that system most 
applicable to the same purpose at the present day. 
I desire to say that should a foreign power design hostilities against the 
United States, their steamers, with transport ships in tow, would not attempt 
to pass our fortifications, but could land thousands of troops upon our shores 
at the numerous points convenient for so doing, and free from the annoyance of 
any battery. 
At the same time, I conceive it all important that our seaports should be 
protected; yet the great improvements made in proj ectiles, and the advance-
ment in the science of gunnery would suggest that our fortifications need not 
be so extensive, and consequently erected at much less expense. Though I 
would not demolish any of the works now completed, yet those being erected 
could be so modified as to receive the heavy armament of the present day, and 
be :finished at much less expense than by canying out the designs of fortifica-
tions planned many years since and not yet completed. 
2d. "What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war, or of commerce, floating 
batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifica-
tions 1" 
In reply I would say that great reliance could be placed on war steamers of 
moderate draught of water, armed with our efficient eight and ten-inch colum-
biads, as they should at all times be in readiness to take in tow any armed 
ve els at the naval station, and in -a few hours from port could oppose the 
]anding of the enemy upon any part of the adjacent coa,_ t. 
ailing vessel of the commercial marine and river steamers, (suitable for the 
purpose,) would be available mean. of transporting troop,:; to oppose the landing 
upon our hor of any ho tile force. 
Floating batterie and gunboats, and other temporary ub titutes for perma-
n nt fortification ·, I conceive to be heavy expenditure of the public trea ury 
and not of the lea t po sible benefit to the government. Of course I vould 
xccpt such temporary means of defence a a ca c of emergency might demand, 
wh n th p ople of our country are ever r ady to look out for them elves. 
3d. "I. it n c s ry or xpedi nt to continue the sy tern of fortification~ on 
the hore f th north rn lakes 1" 
The sam , n ·wer will apply to tho e work that I have made in reo-ard t 
the fortifiC< tion on our eaboard. '1.'ho e unfini...,hed hould be modernized, and 
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:hose in service armed with projectiles and otherwise adapted to the improve-
ments of the year 1851. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
Hon. 0. M. CONRAD, 
Secretary of War. 
No. 6. 
JOSEPH LANMAN, 
Lieutenant United States Navy. 
Report of Lieutenant Jl:I. F. Maury. 
NATIONAL OBSERVATORY, Washington, August, 1851. 
Sm: I have received a communication from the Secretary of the Navy, cov-
ering the copy of a letter from yourself of June 17, 1851, requesting him t_o 
communicate certain resolutions of Congress concerning land defences and fort,-
fications to several officers of the navy, and " to obtain their separate opinions 
in writing " upon the following points, viz : 
L t. "To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for 
the p rotection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application 
of steam to vessels-of-war, the in-vention or improvement of projectiles, or other 
chan ges that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161" 
2 d. "What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war, or of commerce, floating 
batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifica-
· ons 1" 
3d. " Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on 
the n orthern lakes 1" 
The resolutions are : 
4
' 1st. Resolved, That the Secretary of War be directed to report to this 
House, the second Monday in December next, on the subject of the land de-
fences of the country, in which he will review the general system adopted after 
he war with Great Britain, and since pursued in regard to the permanent forti-
fications then deemed necessary for the national defence ; and that he report 
whether the general plan may not now be essentially modified by reducing the 
number of works proposed to be erected, and by abandoning some of the forts 
now in progress of construction." 
" 2d. Re olved, That the Secretary of W ar also report the number of fortifi-
cations which have been built, including those nearly completed under the gene-
ral ystem, the number in progress of construction, and the number not yet 
commenced, but proposed to be erected, and in such form as will conveniently 
how the States and 'l,erritories in which the several forts are situated or to be 
located, when the work was commenced, when completed or expected to be 
fini ... hed, the number and calibre of the guns mounted or to be mounted, the 
e:;;timated cost, the amount expended, and the sums yet required to finish or 
con truct, as the case may be, each work." 
I am directed by the Secretary of the Navy to give this subject my "best 
efl ction , and to communicate the result to the Secretary of War." 
To make clear the result of my reflections upon this subject it is first neces-
ary to pa s, at least briefly, in review the condition of the country immediately 
preceding the year 1816, when the present system of fortifications was adopted, 
and to contrast the condition and military resources of the United States then> 
~ith their condition and military resomc~s now. 
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In 1816 our population was eight millions; we had just come out of a trying 
and expensive war with ' the most po"'."erful nation in the world; our soil had 
been invaded, the Capitol burned, towns had been besieged, villages laid waste, 
and the people greatly harassed by the presence among them of an insolent foe. 
The application of steam as a motive power, even to river craft, was but an 
experiment, and men had not yet waked from their dream in which they first 
saw upon the ocean visions of steam navigation. Railroads had not then begun 
to thread themselves over the country, nor had the first telegraphic ·wire streaked 
the horizon. The country had been and might again be invaded; the alarm 
could be spread only at the rnte of one hundred miles a day; and to repel the 
enemy our generals could bring up their forces only at the rate of what, in this 
day of steam and railroad car, would be considered as a snail's pace; twenty 
miles was a good day's march for an army. 
Under these circumstances, with the horrors of war and the dread of invasion 
fresh in the minds of the people, it was natural that the attention of the govern-
ment should be directed to a system of defence along our borders which, in 
another war, should make the weak points strong, the salient impregnable, and 
the exposed, the rich, and the tempting secure; thus rendering the country in 
another war safe from invasion. Accordingly, the plan was to line the seaboards 
with forts and castles, which should oppose the advances of the enemy, beat 
him back, resist sieges, and support garrisons for defence, until reinforcements 
should arrive or the patience and the energies of the assailants should become 
exhausted. Under these circumstances the present system of fortifications was 
commenced. 
For defending the approaches to any particular part of the coast, the engi-
neer, in planning his works, had to take into account the importance to us of 
the place to be defended; the importance which the enemy would probably 
attach to its occupation by himself; and the force that he would or could, 
probably, bring against it. Also, an element which entered largely into the 
engineer's plans was the kind of force, the calibre of guns, &c., that his fort 
would have to withstand. 
But since that time great changes have taken place. The relative importance 
of ports and harbors, and places to be defended along the coast, has greatly 
changed. The implements of warfare and the means of attack and defence 
have changed; structures that were well calculated to resist the batteries of the 
best appointed ships in 1816, would now tumble down before the appliance of 
mod rn warfare. The improvements which have since taken place in hip , 
their armaments and locomotion, are vast; and therefore works may be found 
along our coast which, though sufficient in their day, would now br wholly 
inad quat to the purpose for which they were intended. . . . 
At be· t, a fort can actually defend so much of the coa t only a he w1thm 
th rm~O' of its guns; outside of this range an enemy may disembark an army, 
land h1. h avy ordnance in the very ,jo-ht of the stronge t ca tle, a we our-
. Iv . have ince done at V ra Cruz, and proceed to inve t, from the rear, ~he 
~tron°·holc1 of the country. It was therefore practicable for a bold and da hwa 
ncmy, notwith tanding the powerful and costly work at Old Point omfort, 
in Virginia, to land in . ight of the e work an army, in Lynn Haven bay, mar h 
up to -• orfolk without ·oming in reach of the protecting battery, and invc,t the 
city and the navy yard-th v ry place::- the guns of th e fort were intPnd 
to prot t. 
'l rue it wa practi abl to r ct work of d fence at Lynn Hav n b y: bot 
b inO' r ct d, the .. ao-acity of ur n°'in r p r eiv d th re wer ·till 01!1 r 
lac and tim at which an en my mi,,.ht land and mar h up to T orfolk . 
ut once coming in ran"' of th Lynn Hav n gun . 'I'he country a, th 
and p re ived that ffi tually to pr vent an enemy of naval r our ro 
landino- on our coa t in war would r uir a structur but little hort of 
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inese wall, with bastions mounting guns to range and rake every point, from 
e end of our extended sea-front to the other. 
"olomon's exchequer could not withstand the drafts w~ich such ~ complete 
;y~tem of defence would make upon the treasury ; a:1d ne~ther the m1~ds of the 
ple nor the purse of the public was prepared to mcur 1t. Acc?rdmgly, the 
nst important points were selected for fortifications, which, even 1f completed, 
uld not have protected the country from invasion; they would only have 
re,ented the enemy from anchoring with his fleet iu the most safe roadsten.ds, 
d from landing with his forces at the most convenient places, and from batter-
• II' down oN.r cities with the guns of his men-of-war. 
And upon the carrying out of this system, as incomplete as it necessarily was, 
· ere was involved, according to the estimates of the most skilful and accorn-
,khed engineers, a sum of money which it would be difficult for the imagination 
· conceive, for it required eight or nine places of :figures to comprehend it, so 
enormous was the amount. 
"\Vhile this system, expensive and defective as it was, was in progress, com-
need those changes in the country to which I have alluded; a change of 
pulation from eight to twenty odd millions, in the means of spreading the 
alarm of an intended invasion ; a change from the signal :fire on the mountain 
and the horse and his rider, to the fiery footed messenger of heaven, to raise the 
c-0untry. For the foot pace of twenty miles a day, as the weary rate of our 
ad-ancing armies, a change which ties infantry, cavalry, and artillery all to the 
t ; of the iron horse, mounts them on railroads, and speeds off with them at the 
rate ?f twenty times twenty miles a day, with the ability to land them at the 
apromted place at the appointed time, refreshed with the ride and ready for 
battle ; a change in ordnance and missiles of death, which are far more destruc-
tfre and much more terrible in battle than any ever known in the annals of 
military warfare, Anno domini 1816. 
The e changes are enough to revolutionize the system of coast defences. 
They have rendered effete in part the system of 1816. 
~ ilroads are now already completed, or actually in process of construction, 
leadmg from New York up among the granite hills of New England-back to 
the lakes and beyond the mountains-cuts the great Miami bottom, and spread-
ing themselves out over the rich prairies beyond. 
From No1folk they go north and south, and are ramifying themselves far 
away into the back country, with the intent of reaching the very heart of the 
nation in the good valley of the west. 
~ -ow, were it possible for an enemy, with the greatest army that ever was led 
into battle by the greatest captain, to take the country by surprise, and to land 
at Long Island sound, or in Lynn Haven bay, and to be disembarking his last 
piece of artillery before he was discovered, these railroads, the power of steam, 
,rith the aiJ of lightning, would enable the government, before he could reach 
the heights of Brooklyn, or the outskirts of Norfolk, to have there in waiting 
an.d ready to receive him and beat him back into the sea, a force two to one 
greater than his, however strong. 
:· uppo, e that in 184 7 there had been in active operation between Vera Cruz 
and the city of Mexico a line of magnetic telegraph and such a railroad as is 
the Erie road of New York, can it be supposed that our generals, being cogni-
Za + o the facts, would have so much as entertained the idea of landing 
here a~ they did and laying siege to the town. 
~ 1 the world knows where our railroads are, and that the. country is pro-
tect from military surpri:e and invasion from the sea by a net-work of tele-
~aphic wire. ; the mere knowledge of the fact that Norfolk and New York 
C::tn hriTw to their clefenc such re. ourccs will forever prevent even the thought 
in e inincl of an enemy of landing in force at Lynn Haven bay or on Long 
tland. 
H. Ex. Doc. £12--22 
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'l.,hose road~, therefore, render a siege to any of the works of defence before 
those places out of the question. . 
'I'o lay siege to any place along our sea-front involves not only the disem-
barking of an army, but the landing also of the siege-train. 'l,his requires time. 
From the time that the head of our invading column jumped out of the boats, 
up to their waists in the water, at Vera Cruz, till General Scott was ready to 
send his summons to the city, was thirteen days, and it was four days more 
before bis heavy artillery drew overtures from the besieged-total, seventeen 
days. 
Imagine an army, the best equipped it may be the world ever saw, that should 
attempt to beleaguer one of our strongholds for seventeen days. Within that 
time we could bring against him, by railroads and steamboats, millions of the 
freemen, which this country ever holds in reserve, to fight its battles. It might 
be Boston, before which this imaginary army is supposed to set down in im-
aginary siege, or it may be New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, or 
New Orleans-it is immaterial where. In less than half the Vera Cruz time 
we could throw millions of men into any on~ of these places, and subsist them, 
in the meantime, by a daily market train of cars and steamboats, catering for 
them in the abundant markets of the Mississippi valley. 
It is impossible that any army, however brave, spirited, and daring, should 
ever think of invading a country like this, and attacking us upon our own 
ground, when we have under our command such powers of concentration and 
such force in reserve as twenty millions of freemen, the electric telegraph, the 
railroad car, the locomotive, and the steamboat. 
The present system of fortifying the coast is founded on the principle of 
making the fortifications "strong in proportion to the value of the great objects 
to be secured."* 
This is the principle npon which every system of national defence must rest; 
and as to this principle itself there can be no difference of opinion. 'I1be ques-
tion is, in what shall the strength of a fortification consist 1 For a fortification 
that is strong against the most powerful weapons and modes of attack known 
to our age ma,y be weak before those that the inventions and improvements of 
another age may call forth. 
In the feudal times castles were built to enable those within to withstand the 
attack of spearsmcn and archers. These old castles were strong in their day, 
but in ours they are impotent and of no avail. 
'I'he fortifications of 1816 were built to with._tancl the armaments which were 
mounted upon the ships of that clay; and what were they? 
In 1, 12 the Duke of \Vellington, whrn pr<·parino- to be iege Badajos, wrote 
to Admiral Berkley, commanding th Li:-:hon station, to rcque~t the loan of 
twenty twenty-four pounders from the :fleet. Admiral Berkley, in reply to the 
r CJ n ·. t for twenty-four poundcrf-l, stated that no i-;hip under his command carried 
gun of . o lteary a naturr; hut offcrecl to upply twenty righteen pound r--. 
with cnrriagc:-: and ammunition cnmplctc.t It would be difficult to find now-a-
dayt-1 auy ;-;hip iu any fie t with gun o "mall a n, twenty-four pound r. 
Tow it hn. 00. n prowu, or m:ul probable·, that it i practicabl to put on 
board ~hip:-: carry to :-:<'a ·with . af ty, ancl manag with ·ffrct, ]mw o-tm with a 
·alihr for :-:hol of 01w lrnn<lr<>il nrnl thirty-five pound .. at 1 a:c:t · and it would 
a. n•a..:nn:d,lc to c·.·pe ·t a fo11ification wliid1 wa _ bnilt to re:-i,.t . hot of i!!ht 
or tw ·nt. ·-four, or <·V<·n of t l1irty-two or forty-two 1)om1clt' to with:-taucl th c n-
·n ·:ion of ·hit of 011 • hundn•(l anc1 tltirt c-fivc pound· w ight a:- ~t would 
• ' -~ r port of the lioa1d of army oftic r , 1 10, on the mi!Jitnry <l •fcoet- of th 
try- p11per that i. ,ha\\ n with "rt11 auiJity, nud to wh:ch I hall, cca. ooally r fer. I • 
ontairu·d in J>uli. Doc. 'o 2u1;, Hou ·e of Rt!J ., 1 ts·· i n 2titb ,uugrt . 
t Jo 111ml ol , ·i\: 't- in :i,aiu ullll Poitugal, vol. 11 p. 145. 
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pect a thirty-two pounder to strike harmlessly against a wall which was built 
nly to resist a ten pound shot. . . •. . 
In 1816 our fortifications had to be provided with the means of w1thstandmg 
,if!!e. Hence, they were required to be as strong in the rear as in the front, 
and to be equally invulperable from every direction. But now steam and elec-
tricity render our seaboard fortifications invulnerable in the rear and protect 
them against sieges. Attempts to carry by storm may be made; but as for an 
r:nemy who sees and understands, as the leader of every army must see and 
understand, the powers of concentration which steam gives us-as for such an 
enemy to think of setting down before one of our strongholds and proceeding 
regularly to invest it, by executing parallels, building fascill:es, ~ig~ing trenches, 
throwing up enbankments, making approaches and the hke, 1t is out of the 
que~tion. Our railroads perfectly protect the entire coast line from Maine to 
Georgia from any such attempt. We may be blockaded by sea, and harassed 
from ships, but we cannot be beleagured on the land. 
These are the changes which have rendered necessary a change in the whole 
,ystem of national defence, and the cliiif stationary works rf defence which we 
now want along the Atlantic seaboard, are those that will protect our cities and 
01J;ris from the great guns of big ships. 
1Ve may admit, in imagination, now, a dashing enemy again into the Ohesa-
:ieake; we may suppose him landed, with all his forces, and to be, without op-
' oflition, in the act of taking up his line of march again for this city. 
Now, is it not obvious-supposing the country to be in a reasonable state of 
reparation at the commencement of war-supposing this much, is it not obvious, 
· y sending telegraphic messages, and using the powers of steam for conveyance, 
rhe .American general might sit down here, in Washington, and at daylight the 
next morning commence an attack upon that enemy, both in front and in rear, 
with almo~t any amount of force, consisting of regulars, volunteers, and militia, 
that can be named. Retreat, for such a foe, would be out of the question, and 
r -embarkation an impossibility. . 
Therefore, so far as the system 0f 1816 was intended to defend the country 
from invasion along the Atlantic seaboard, steam, railroads, and the telegraph 
ham rern1cred it as effete as did the .invention of fire-arms the defences which 
the milit,:~·y ,·cicnce of that age had erected against the shafts of the archer. 
It is not ,~oii1g too fa,r to say that, as for invasion, we might raze every f01 ti-
fication c1lrm;; the Atlantic coast without exposing the country to the danger of 
b ing onnuu by an enemy in war. He might, in such a case, take possession 
of our , <-<1portH, destroy our clock yards and arsenals, and do an incalculable 
amount of mischief, lmt as for his venturing to leave the strongholds on the 
seabor<l, aud attempting to penetrate, even for a few miles into the interior, 
would be out of the que~tion. 
Ile would be besieged from the moment of his landing; he might return to 
us our cities in ruins, our dock yards in ashes; bnt as for invading the country, 
and marching his armies over it from place to place, our steam machines forbid 
it. H nee I maintain, we now want fortifications only to do what railroads and 
~ am never can, viz: as before said, to protect our seaport towns from the great 
mn.s of big ships . 
• ·uPl,o· e the system of 1816 to have been completed; that the fortifications 
·herein contemplated had a11 been built, provisioned, equipped, and garrisoned . 
. -o :\", ., '\-ino- only those which protect the large cities from the g·uns of men-of-
'"ar. suppo:;e the alternative should be presented to our military men, whether 
'he:- woulcl undertake to defend the country from invasion, with such a complete 
·rstcm of fortifications, but without the assistance of railroads, steamers, and 
~legraph, or with the aFJr-ristance of railroads, steamers, and telegraph, but with-
•llt he aid of the fortifications. 
I ~uppo e, could such an alternative be submitted to every officer of the army, 
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from the oldest down to the youngest, that there would be but one answer, and 
that would be, "down with the forts, and give us the railroad, the locomotive, 
the steamboat, and the telegraph." 
I do not mean to advance the opinion that railroads, steam, and the telegraph, 
with the military powers of concentration which they give us, have rendered 
fortifications entirel;IJ useless. By no means: steam and electromagnetism on 
the land can do but little against the tremendous power of armed ships on the 
water; and if these can bring any one of our large cities within the reach of 
their guns, its destruction is inevitable, despite all that the powers of the loco. 
our motive and the telegraph can do. It is chiefly to keep such ships from burning 
cities and liavens, within reach of their broadsides, that we want forts and castles. 
Therefore seeing that, in 1816, when the present system of defending the 
coast was planned, railroads and the magnetic telegraph were unknown, they 
now ought to involve modifications of that system. In military operations they 
are powerful auxiliaries. They introduce new elements and new features into 
the arts of war;· they bear upon the whole system of attack and defence. 
They, therefore, cannot fail to make necessary certain modifications in any 
system of coast defence which was planned without regard to them. 
With this exposition of my views, I proceed to answer your first question, viz: 
"1. To what extent, if any, oug·ht the present system of fortifications for the 
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of 
steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other 
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161" 
Let us first consider the modification applicable to the Atlantic seaboard, and 
.then those that are applicable to the Pacific. 
The only fortifications that are wanted along our Atlantic seaboard, except 
those at Key West and the Tortugas, at Ship island, and at one or two more 
uch places, are those which will protect our cities and towns from the broad-
&ides of men-of-war. 
The forts already completed, or well advanced towards completion, are believed 
to be sufficient for this. 1'hcy should, however, be mounted with heavier ordnance, 
and pieces of the most effective calibre for throwing explosive shot and shells. 
In 1840, the House of Representatives, by resolution of Avril 9th, called 
upon the War Department for a report-among other things, '· of a full and con-
nected system of national defence." 
The subject was referred to a board of engineer officers, who presented their 
views in a masterly manner. I have before referred to this well-drawn paper, 
and shall have frequent occasion to refer to it again. That report u:-:tain the 
y ·tern of J.816. 'rhe source whence it comes entitle it to far more ·weight than 
i. attach ·cl to any of my opinions. N cverth less, honestly differing with that 
board in ome of its position , I hope I may be permitted to expr s:-: that diffcr-
nc of opinion without laying my elf liable to the charo-e, from any quarter. 
of want of re pect for the di. tingui 'l1Cd officers who com po eel that board. 
'I hat r J>Ort, which is by far the mo~t abl paper that I have :-:e •n in favor of 
th sy:t m of 1816, does not contemplat any gun for our fortification. hea,·i~r 
th, n a forty-two pounder, or au in-ht-inch howitzer; of cour e I ~peak techru-
call •, and do not allude to mortar . 
It m • b con ider d a.- a fact pretty well tahli hcd, that two or thr ex-
plo iv nin or t n-inch . h 11:-:, w ,Jl aim cl and prop •rly plant ·d, ar ·nou~h ro 
t •ar out th ,·id of th largc.-t .-hip, and c mpl ·tely to dfrahl ·, i not wh II_v to 
d · tr y lm·. 
I <1uotc from th .·1wrinwnt. nrnd with nine-inch . plo ive shot, in th h, r-
1,<> • f r · t, upon th· 'a ·ifi ·Ht ur, an cio hty-n-u11 :-chip.• 
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The peice to be fired was mounted on a small pontoon, and planted ~ff. upon 
the water to the distance of about six hundred and forty yards from the eighty-
~ ship, which was to be the target. . 
The experiments were made in the presence of a number of the most emment 
officers in the French navy. 
The first shot sufficed to determine opinions; but, to complete the evidence, 
twelve shots were fired. 
The following is a summary from the official report on the occasion : 
"The first shot struck low, and, as soon as the explosion was heard the 
commission repaired on board. A thick smoke filled the between decks, where 
the bomb had burst. The fire engine was worked and the smoke lasted ten or 
twelve minutes; the bomb had made a breach of eight and a half inches in di-
ameter in the ship's side, which there was twenty-nine inches thick; it had 
torn off two feet of the inner plank and then exploded ; made a hole in the orlop 
deck of two to three feet square, kncoked away and shattered to atoms more 
than one hundred and sixty square feet of timber. 
"The second gun traversed the quarter-deck, carrying with it two peices of .. 
plauk, one of which was five and a quarter feet long, then striking the mainmast 
obliquely, it knocked off a splinter from three to four feet long and nine and a 
half inches thick, and bursting, tore away a mast band ten and a half feet in 
circumference, weighing one hundred and thirty pounds; this mass of iron was 
driven -with such a force that one of its halves struck the opposite bulwark, sev-
euteen feet distant, where it flattened and adhered. The splinters of the bomb 
shattered the bitts, cut some of the braces, and would have injured many men 
and articles of rigging if the ship had been equipped. The explosion also set 
fire to a coil of rope. 
" The third bomb entered the side, between two ports, struck and tore off an 
oaken knee seven feet five inches long and six and a half to thirteen and three-
quarter inches thick, which, with its iron fastenings, weighed more than two hun-
dred and six pounds ; then bursting, its splinters knocked down forty of the 
wooden figures nailed around the guns to represent men. r.rhe explosion also 
shattered one of the beams · supporting the deck f-1,bove, starting several 
planks, one of which was ten and a half feet long, and a:µother five and a quarter 
feet," &c. 
"To abriclge this detail, I will," says the reporter, "only refer to the two 
most remarkable shots of the remaining nine. 
"Perceiving that the bombs always passed through the side of the vessel, 
the charge of the gun was diminished each time. With four and a half pounds 
of powder, and always at six hundred and forty yards, a bomb struck in the 
,vood, between two ports, and burst, tearing away the frame and planking, and 
making a breach of several feet in height and width, so shattered that all pre-
sent thought that the slwt would lza ve endavgered tlie vessel had it taken effect 
near the water-line . 
. " Be~ides this, two pieces of the iron work, weighing sixteen pounds, were 
dnven m board by the force . of the explosion, and nineteen figures knocked 
down. 
"Fi1~a1ly, the twelfth and last bomb, with the same small charge and at the 
same d1::-;tnuce, struck the corner of a port, knocked away a heavy piece of iron 
work, and lodged on the other side of the ship against an iron knee five and a 
quarter inches in size and firmly supported; the blow made three fissures in 
the iron, two of which were four and a quarter inches thick; and the bomb 
..;till unbroken buried itself further in the sjde, burst, and knocked down twenty 
figure ." 
As to the havoc made upon a ship by these projectiles, the French commis-
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sion was of opinion that it was "so terrible and so great that it is thought that 
one or two bombs of this kind bursting in a battery would make such confusion 
as to cause the surrender of the vessel, or at least conduce materially to it;" and 
"to produce, by the power of the bomb and its splinters, such damage in the 
frame that if the explosion should take place near the water-line the vessel 
would probably sink. There is no doubt on this subject," it was added, "as 
may evidently be perceived from the result of bomb No.-, which, had it struck 
a few feet lower, would certainly have done irreparable mischief," 
That any ship "must unavoidably give over tlw attack on being struck with 
a few shells." 
"'I'hat it would be very useful to mount these guns either on floating pon-
toons, g·nnboats with sweeps, or steamers ; and it is thought that for the defence 
qf roads and coasts, or for attacking ships in a calm, or on a lee shore, the 
success of the bomb cannon would be infallible." 
Furthermore, that commission of distinguished men also expressed the unani-
mous opinion " that these ~hell guns would be of incalculable utility in coast 
batteries, gunboats, or launches, bombardment, floating batteries, steamers," &c. 
The subject was brought before the Academy of Science, and the opinion of 
the board were indorsed by that body after full deliberation. 
Subsequently a second trial was made upon the same ship in the presence of 
another board of officers, with like results. This board, after a full discussion 
as to the effect of these shells, gave it as their opinion likewise, that "their power 
is so terrible that should one or two bombs of this kind burst in a Lattery, the 
vessel would be rendered untenable; that the explosion of a bomb in the frame 
of a ship would be productive of great mischief; and if this occur at the 
water-line, the vessel must founder, as may be inferred from the effect of bomb 
No.8." 
Respecting the use of this kind of ordnance in fortifications the commission 
were unanimously of the opinion that these guns arc capable of prodigious effect 
in coast batteries, as no sliip r!f any force could possibly witltstand sur:lt a fire 
at 640 guns or l,300 yards; that it will also be _desirable to mount the new 
artillery on floating batteries, launches, gunboats, or steamers; and it is believed 
that the bomb cannon is well adapted to the defence of roads and coa ts, the 
attack of ships in a calm, or on a lee shore," &c. 
Moreover, the experiments which have been conducted by the Bureau of Ord-
nance and Hydrography of the United States navy, show that guns of this heavy 
calibre will carry further and truer, and penetrate deeper than 32-pounderfl; and, 
therefore, considering that the navie of thr world are substituting thc'e heavy 
gun .. , whenever they can, for the old 32-poun<l<·rs, and considering that it i.; 
ships, and not siege ... , that our fortifications arc to be called upon to withstand, 
it app ar · to me it would be both prudent and jndicious so to modify the plan 
of 1 16 a1, to furnish our forts, as far as practicaLle, with heavy ordnance, all of 
the mo.t effective and destructive kind. 
1Yhc·t1H·r a . hip's battery, throwino- 10-inch so]icl shot, woulcl not rcal~ly 
breach the wall of our str01wcst fort i. worthy of inquiry. The concn"~1011 
frorn :uch a broad ide woulcl be trcmcndou . It i, true• there arc no ::;hips at 
pr ,:- •nt that can throw :uch a broadside, yet it i.- thonrrht practicaLlc and d · 
·ir,~hln 1,y navy officer to build , nch shipl-l, nncl r.·p riment.' have been mad 
wlu ·h l ·ave no doubt that ~ nch ·hip will he !milt. 1\ h ·ther our rampart on 
. hor · c"ulcl with.-taml 1-luch ordnance i · 11ot for me to "ay. I therefor· tU..,.!!'C-.t 
th inr1uiry. 
It i a l'Uriou: fact that, a n ~r-11eral rule, the fir of lnr<re fort:- ha~ ahray .. 
c 1: proporti?uall · Jr ... .- c1_ •• trnctiW! than thrn- mounting o~ly n. frw gun:--, and 
lrn.vuw tho:-- m barLrtte, m opl'n liatt ry, •ith r with or without br •a. t work·. 
'l hi..: may L a count ·d for y th mok ; for wild firing applie uot only to 
MILITARY .A.ND NAVAL DEFENCES 343 
the guns of a fort, mounted in casemates, but also to the guns of double-decked 
ihips. 
A single broadside from the gun-deck of a man-of-war will so fi]l her between 
decks with smoke as to render the object at which she is firing invisible, and 
consequently, unless she will wait for her own smoke to clear off, which requires 
ome time, the rest of her firing, as all sea fights prove, is without aim, very 
much by guess, and therefore to little purpose. 
The same is the case with guns fired from casemates of forts on shore, for in 
no other way can we account for the random firing; the very shots, in proportion 
to the whole number cast, that tell in the engagements of double-decked ships 
and casemated forts. 
Two frigates or two seventy-fours will engage each other within pistol shot, 
or a fleet will attack a fort, and when we come to count the shot that have been 
fired, and to compare those that have told with those that have been thrown 
away, and then recollect the size of the target, we aie astonished. 
In the action between the Constitution and the Guerricre, which lasted for 
about half an hour, the two ships being within pistol shot, the former sufferrecl 
"very little in her hull, and lost but seven men."* 
In the fight between the United States and Macedonian, the two ships were 
at close quarters for one hour. The former had five men killed. "'l'he United 
States," says the same authority, "suffered surprisingly little, considering the 
length of the cannonade." 
In the case of the Constitution and the Java, the action lasted two hours. 
The Constitution lost nine men, and only "received a few round shot in her 
hull." Perhaps in this time the Java did not fire less than two thousand shot, 
and fifty of them, well placed in the hull of her antagonist, would have sunk her. 
The Hornet and the Peacock were single-decked ships; their smoke would 
clear, and the Hornet could see to take aim. In less than fifteen minutes sl1 e 
sunk her antagonist. 
In the battle of the Nile, where seventy-fours were principally engaged, and 
they in smooth water at anchor, and close, too, lasted through a part of three 
days. (No firing here like the Hornet'e, though her target was so small in 
comparison. The secret is, she fired with aim; they, blinded in smoke, without.) 
The action between the Wasp and the Frolic, also single-decked vessels, 
lasted forty-three minutes, in which time the killed and wounded aboard the 
Frolic amounted to between nine~y and one hundred. These · small vessels are 
more unsteady in a sea-way than large ones; they do not offer so large a target, 
and yet their fire is so destructive. How else is it to be accounted for 1 
In the battle of Trafalgar, which was of long duration, and mostly between 
ships-of-the line, the loss was only about six men to every ten guns engaged, 
not one-tenth part of what it was in the action of the Wasp. 
'l'he use that I intend to make of these facts may be objected to, on the 
ITTound that I deduce a principle from the sea and apply it to the land, viz : 
that, because at sea, guns fired in the open air are much more destructive than 
those about which the decks confine the smoke, it does not follow that guns, 
when served from behind sand bags or mud banks on shore, are more destructive 
than they would be if served in casemates, by a crew blinded with smoke. I 
will quote cases directly in point : our army in Mexico, with guns behind sand 
bag:;, battered down the walls of Vera Cruz, and lost only some half dozen men 
in the siege. 
At the battle of Fuenterabia, in 1836, the town, with two guns of small calibre 
behind an old wall, and a third of large calibre, which was added on the evening 
"Cooper's N::wn.l History. 
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of the attack, was successfully defended for a whole day from a ~ombined attack 
of British a11d Spaniards, in six armed steamers and a number of gunboats.* 
Then there was the famous case of the Martello tower, in the bay of l\fartello, 
in Corsica; one heavy gun, on the top of a tower, beat off in 1794 "one or two 
Britisli sliips-ef-war, without sustaining any material injury from their fires." 
"This circumstance," says Colonel Pasley. in his rules for conducting the 
prncticn1 operations of a siege, "ought merely to have proved the superiority 
which guns on shore must always, in certain situationF, possess over those of 
shipping, no matter 1dietlier the former are mounted on a tower or not." 
This is quoted with approbation by Colonel Totten, in his celebrated report 
of 1840, as an example of the superiority of forts over ships. But it appears to 
me only to prove and beautifully to illustrate the superiority of one gun, so 
mounted that it can fire witli aim, over many guns that are enveloped in smoke, 
and fired without aim. 
But if this Martello case affords grounds really for the "just decision" claimed 
by thet1e two distinguished military authorities, then why have any forts at all 1 
"Why Fhould our army engineers advocate so elaborately in 1836, and with so 
much ingenuity in 1840, the continuance of the system of 1816, if one gun on 
shore, "whether mountecl on a tower or not," can and ought to beat off" one or 
two Briti::;h ship::;-of-war 1" May I not, therefore, in proposing to reply, in part, 
upon open batteries on the shore for coast defence, urge the modification as a 
thing proved by actual experiment, and, by legitimate conclusion, quote in favor 
of , uch modification the opinion of our most distinguished engineers 1 vV e can 
never expect our works on the seashore to have anything stronger to resist than 
"Briti ·h ships-of-war;" and if one gun, in open battery on the shore, "whether 
mounted on a tower or not," be superior to "one or two" of those ships, surely 
our eaport towns of second and third rate importance may safely rely upon 
open batteries on the beach to J_Jrotect them from "British" or any other "men-
of-war." 
Colonel Jones, another authority of equal weight in military matters, quotes 
N el Ron' attack upon Copenhng·en, Sir John Duckworth 's daring passage of the 
Darc1annelles, the attack at Acre in 1840, and Lord Exmouth's cannonade of 
Algi 'r:-;, n. cases which lean to the supposition t11at land batteries cannot re 'i::;t 
an attack by fleets. The Queen Charlotte, bearing Lord Exmouth's flag, being 
brought within fifty yards of the lVIole, at Algiers, "poured such an irresistible 
fir on the works around," says Colonel Jones, "as to Hence every gun, and 
wa.' ultimately compelled to withdraw, with the loss of only eight men killed 
and 011e hundred and thirty-one wounded." 
'l'h' Hide::i of a hiJ_J are of wood; it i combustible, the walls of a fort are not; 
ancl 011 board hip, in a fig-ht it i the Rplinters that do the mischief. One gun, 
·v ·n in open battery on the hore, has greatly the advantage of one gun on 
b ard , hip. The former can take better aim, ha.· 11othi1w to fear from plinters, 
arnl pre:-:c•ut., a very small target; wherea it ha, the whole ·hip, with all it 
vuln ·ral,ility for a target. Hut as to the superiority of ships over forL, it 
app<'ar-, to me th re ifl carcely room for the question; each in it own sphere i 
·uperior to the other . 
.1 ucl that th ' \'. ur n lrnrlotte , hould . ilencc the molr battery, i to be ac-
ount •rl for upon the principle of firiiio- with and without aim. 'he wa. within 
tift_,. ·:ml:- of it; it tl,c·refor' occupiecl nearly or quite one-half of her horizon. 
and :-he ,:o,,lrl 110I 11,i.ss it, it wa:-1 :-o Jarg . ln omparfr1011 to the fort :-lw wa a 
mall targt•t, and it n·q 11ir ·cl . om ' attl'ntion to aim to hit h l" hut th , . mokc n 
Loth :-iclc·"'. prl'n·11t1-cl rlii:-. ' 
Th ·r ·fore·, . nppo ing that in tlir attack of hip againt1t fort., th guu, on 
·a ·h ·icl • lH· :- •n-t>cl with <' 1nal lml.Ycry, th qur tion of . np r:iority r ,oh· .... 
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·self almost entirely into a question of marksmanship. A shot that is fired 
without aim is generally a shot thrown away, . . 
Xevertheless, the gallant colonel very properly caut10ns the . '' engm:er 
tharged with the defences of maintainin_g a t:ortress, so to anange his batter~es 
.hat the defence may be from several pomts distant from each other, arll;ed with 
~ -six pounders as the lowest c,alibre." . 
The system of 1816, according to the report of the board of army officers rn 
:.AO, does not contemplate a single gun heavier than a forty-two ~ounde:, or an 
.:-:ght-inch howitzer. It contemplates mortars, but mortars agamst sh1ps and 
:andom shots. 
Previous to the attack of the junk ships in 1782, Gibraltar resisted a bom-
',ardment for two years.* 
In 1789, Admiral Rodney threw into Havre de Grace 19,000 heavy shells, 
.. nd 1,150 careasses, in fifty-two hours, "to destroy a few boats."t 
In 1792, the Duke of Saxe Tessehen threw into Lille, in one hundred and 
rty hours, "without effect, 30,000 hot shot and six hundred shells.":j: 
In 1795, Pichegree threw 3,000 shells into Manheim, and f>,000 into the Fort 
of the Rhine.§ · 
In 1807, at Copenhagen, in three days of partial heavy firing, 6,412 shells, 
be~ides carcasses were thrown.\! All these were thrown to no purpose. 
At Fort Browne, on the Rio Grande, our men dodged the shells thrown by 
the .Mexicans from Matamoras. · 
At Fort McHenry "the bomb bmsting in air" furnished the poet with a 
..,tanzas ; they produced no other effect. 
Bonaparte's opinion of them may be learned from the instructions which he 
caused to be issued to the governors of besieged towns. 
"Quant aux effets des born bes, et des autres projectiles incendiaires, nous ex-
a.minerons plus tard, les moyens de les diminuer; mais nous observerons des ce 
momen t, qu'ils n'ont jamais contraint une place, bien defendue ase rendre. Les 
anciens sieges, en offrent la preuve; et les examples tout reens de Lille, de 
Theonville, et de Mayence, la confoiment." 
Theref()re let us modify the system, so far as most of the mortars and all the 
6,309 pieces of ordnance, from a twelve up to a long forty-two pounder, required 
by the plan of 1816, are concerned, and substitute for them the heavy calibres 
of the present day-the nine, ten, and eleven-inch solid shot and shell guns. 
Tak ing the Martello tower for our guide, let us also, instead of building forts 
of the second and third class, contemplated in the system of 1816, send to every 
to"''"Il al~ng the seaboard, that an enemy could reach in his ships, one or more 
lieavy pieces, and plant them there in open battery upon the beach, for the de-
fence of the place, "no matter whether they be mounted in a tower or not." 
By a proper organization, easy to be effected and kept up without any draft 
11pon the treasury whatever, except for powder and ball to practice, volunteer 
crews for these guns may be procured from the towns themselves. Well-trained 
officers of the army should be sent to instruct them. In such hands each gun so 
planted and served out in the open air, having an embankment or a few sand-
bags for protection, will be more than a match for "two British ships-of-war." 
Sir 'idney Smith, whose dashing gallantry and skilful bravery have been so 
llluch admired, attacked and felt the force of one of these open batteries in 1806. 
lre was in the Porn pee, an eighty-gun ship, and accompanied by two frigates; 
he anchored about seven hundred yards from a battery of two guns, situated on 
the e:x.trenrity of Cape Licosa. 
u The line-0f-battle-ship and frigates fired successive broadsides till their am-
ll:iuni tion was nearly expended; the battery continually replying with a slow 
o Sir J. T . Jones's Journal of Sieges in Spain, vol. II, page 374. 
n,i<l. + Ibid. § Ibid. 11 Ibid. 
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but destructive effect. 'l'he Pompec, at which ship alone it directed its :fire, had 
forty shot in her hull; her mizzentapmast carried awa-y; a lieutenant, midship-
man, and five men killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving 
ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer, 
a Corsican, and a relation of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the 
carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had 
consequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure; so that, in fact, the 
attack qf an eighty-gun ship and two .frigates liad been resisted by a single 
piece ef ordnance."* 
vVhatever Napoleon's cousin could do with a gun, our officers, our soldiers, 
:md the yeoman of this country can do as well. 
This turning out of the citizens to defend their town, with a gun in open battery, 
against the attack of ships-of-war, is no experiment with us. The thing has 
been handsomely, gallantly, and successfully done. 
"The affair of Stonington," says General 'rotten in his report of 18-10, 
"during the last war, affords another instance of successful defences by a battery. 
In this case there were only two guns (eighteen pounders) in a battery which 
was only three feet high, and with embrasures. 'l'he battery being manned ex-
clusively by citizen volunteers from the town, repelled a persevering attack of a 
sloop-of-war, causing serious loss and dangrr, but suffering none." 
In the war of 1828, between Peru and Uolumbia, I was serving on the PacHic 
station. Admiral Guise, a dashing officer and brave Scotchman, attacked the 
city of Guayaquil with the Peruvian squadron, which consisted of a frigate, a 
sloop-of-war, and several brigs and schooners. The approaches to the city were 
undefended. He took up his position without molestation within musket shot 
of it and commenced his fire. 
Under cover of the dark the besieged threw up an embankment, and planting 
two or three field-pieces behind it opened a fire upon the ships at daylight, killed 
tho admiral, and beat off his squadron. 
'The annals of war, the written arguments of the most distinguished officers 
of the engineer corps, and the facts which I shall state, afford, to my judgment 
ancl reason, ample gr0unds for the position which I maintain as to the dispen ·ing 
with fortifications, in a large majority of cases, along the seaboard; and of 
sub tituting therefor a few pieces of this new, heavy, and de~tructiYe ordnance, 
without the protection of any mason work whatever. If these fact , annals, 
and arguments do not impre s conviction upon your mind a:; stron crly a they 
do upon mine, jt is not bocau e of their insufficirney-but because, in attempting 
to apply and illustrate them, I have obscured their bearing and weakened their 
force. 
"The fortifications of the coast," Flays the board of army officers, wbo-.e able 
report of 1 1 0 quieted the public mind, and fa tcnc<l for t n years loncrer upon 
th country the effete y tern of 1 16; "Th fortification of the coa~t:" ·?Y 
they, "must be compet •nt to the double ta,;k of int1·rdi ·ting the pa~, ao-c ot .,h1p~ 
and r .:i, ti1w land atta ·k~-two distinct and indepe,ufrllt qualities. Th~ fir,t 
dc11w,uls merely an, array in, suitable 1mmbers antl in, proper proportt(J11 ef 
ltca~·.'I ,::uns, con red by parapets, proef against slwt a11d slzel/s."t . . 
~ owl propo:-r t i-how that the railroad. ancl th, m ·an of locomo 10n m 
thi. conn tr · ~uflici ntly defend our fortification from land attacb; and that 
con r1n ·11tl.' the principal rcqui. ite lH·nccforward in a ~y. tern of fortific:u~ n 
for the ·oa t, i. mer •ly an array in ,;uitaulc nnmLcr ancl in proper proporn n 
f h ·av crun · alon" tho b •ach to cov ·r the approachc of ... hip fr lll .. 'a to 
•np rt town·. 
OJournal of ·ie"t .- vlond Jones. 
tPu c 41, Ooc. 206, Hou c Hep, l t ·e :ion 26th C:ongre·. 
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To upport the propof:>itions taken by General Totten in favor ~f the system 
of 1 16, both in his report of 1840 and 1836, there was a table m the latter 
e:timating the number of men that, according to. the cen_sus of ,1830, co1;1ld be 
concentrated in Boston, Newport, New York, Ph1ladelpl11a, Norfolk, Baltimore, 
Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans in eleven days. 
This table was made the basis of important deductions in favor of the present 
~y.,tem ; ancl as the state of things now is so entirely different f1:om what it was 
dien, I quote the table in order to show that the changes which have taken 
place in our means of concentrating and moving forces in war leave abundant 
room for many modifications in the old system of 1816. 
TABLE F.* 
Exhibiting the amount ef militia force that may be conr:entrated at Boston, 
.;.\'ewport, New York, Pliiladelp/1.ia, Nmfolk, Baltimore, Cluirleston, Sa,van-
nak, and New Orleans successi,vely,from the first to the ele,ventli day; each 
day's march being computed at.fifteen miles-founded on the census of 1830. 
Days. Boston. Newp·1rt, New York. Philadel- Norfolk. Baltimore. Charles- Savannah. New Or-
ll. r. p11ia. ton. !tans. 
-- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1 5,4:li 1,397 20,218 :J6, 132 1.864 J0.046 2,51::l I, 173 3.032 
2 28,35 L 2,37:3 28, 13L 26.521 2,880 18,042 7,160 3,960 7,836 
~ 3-t, 138 12,:J40 44,123 3'\,450 4.416 2!,266 9,475 5,948 8,716 
4 3!1,561 17,H::l 57,9J5 69,100 7,608 27,916 14,601 6,588 12,4!J9 
b 4!1,E!7 3::l,l12l 59,4 '8 711,608 11, lUI 31,e97 18,443 9,263 iN~; 6 59,R9:l 4'2,807 81,252 127,666 14,511 49,648 2il,4!JO 19,725 
7 8l.8ti7 61,:!35 104, 180 151,036 20,fi!J9 65,:J82 2-1,39:J 21,90::l 17:906 
8 97,tig? 65,583 137,048 167, 703 28,039 77,543 29,416 25,220 22,561 
9 lll,fi55 83, LI l 152,t!H 195,265 32,562 78,164 40,835 36,631) 26.433 
10 lil5,3:l6 lli9, 268 164,116 2 :9,983 36,446 87.520 45,582 41,345 28,140 
ii 144,076 13U,8J4 191,35::l 221,603 45,549 101,970 59,701 .60,42il 31,647 
This possible concentration of forces, which it required eleven days to make 
in 1836, may be now doubled and trebled, and made in as many houre; surely, 
therefore, this process of concentration-this immense artificial military aid 
1\-hich team and electricity now afford, and which was not anticipated nor 
wun · upon in 1816, when the foundations of the system were laid; surely 
!hey, by protecting our forts against sieges, call for modifications and suggest 
changes which it would be wise to consi<ler and prudent to make. 
In thi. country, more than in any other, the genius of free institutions compels 
lhe government to keep pace with the improvement of the age. The people do 
it, and they are the government. But in military establishments there is evi-
oently a cfo,position to lag liehind. 
" In 1 708 l\Iarshal Bouffiers, by authority from the King, given on the advice 
or the most experienced generals of that warlike age, ceded the strongest fortress 
i11 France to Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough, to avoid the risk of 
lh.e breaches being carried by storm; and in those day::i the superiority of the 
assailants was never doubted. The art of attack has since that period received 
~a.rinus improvements, and the art of defence remains the same."t 
The edition from which I quote was publishecl in 1846-the work is one of 
acknowledged authority among military men-and according to it, it would be 
hetter to give our forts away than actually to subject them to a siege. Neither 
\'era Cruz nor any other fort in Mexico could withstand a siege from us. How 
illl.portant therefore is it that we should introduce in our system of coast defences 
o Page 7 L, Doc. 293, firi:it e:ession twenty.fourth Uongre,:;s, 
t See Journal of Sieges in Spain, vol. 2, page 336. 
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some of the "various improvements" which the art of attack lrns received since 
1708, and of which the art of defence has received so few! That instead of 
fighting ships from batteries of old-fashioned carronades, long twelves, eig,hteens, 
and twenty-fours; instead of the old-fashioned mortars, which Napoleon put his 
seal against, let us have in our forts the improved shell guns and heavy ordnance 
of the present day, which will plant shot and shell where they are aimed, and 
ca1Ty destruction to a distance which not a gun with which our forts (according 
to the list by the army board in 1840) are to be furnished can ever reach. 
I am permitted by Commodore Warrington to quote from experiments which 
he l1as caused to be made in naval gunnery at the Washington navy yard. 
These experiments are going on there daily; any one who pleases may witness 
them. I cite from them to illustrate the position I maintain as to the destructive 
powers of this new and heavy ordnance, the accuracy of its fire, &c. 
The figures are copied from the note-book of Lieutenant Dahlgren, United 
States navy, the officer who conducts the experiments. 
'The target is built of one upright and two horizontal layers of stout oak logs, 
bolted and fastened together in the most substantial manner. It is two and a 
half feet thick. 'rhese experiments were not conducted to represent the effects 
of this heavy ordnance upon forts and their walls, but upon wooden walls and 
the sides of ships. 'rherefore shells were used in the eight and nine-inch pieces 
to contrast their range and probable effect with the range and probable effect of 
a solid 32-pound shot. 
rrhe charge of powder used with the 32-pound shot was twenty-eight per cent. 
of its weight. The charge used with the two shells was only about thirteen per 
cent. of their weight, or, in proportion, not half as much as that used with the 
solid shot. Figures 1, 2, and 3 exhibit a horizontal section of the target, made to 
show the penetration of the shot. 
Fig. 1. 
8-inch shell, seven pounds of powder. 
The penetration of the 8-inch shell was the lC'a ·t. It was unloaded. Had it 
bem charged it would bave been lodg ,a in the bc1-1t place; for, exploding in the 
rnidc1le of the target built to represent the sid of a man-of-war, it would ban: 
torn it to pieces. 
} ignre 2 i the 32-ponnd shot. The hole that it leave brhind it i so fille<l 
up with . plintcn, that a common knitting-needle cannot b thru t iu after it. 
uch a hot a figure 2 woulcl do no scriou hurt to a ::,hip' iu . 
Fig. 2. 
32-pounder ,lwl, nine pound, of pou:dtr. 
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· Figure 3 is the 9-inch shell. Here the shot 
went through and dropped down on the other 
side of the target, as shown in the drawing. It 
tore off the logs and scattered the splinters in 
the most frightful manner. Much more ·would 
it have gone through had the shot been solid 
instead of hollow, and had it been fired with 
a full instead of a very reduced charge of 
powder. · 
rrhese big hollow shot, and the bigger the 
better, are the things for our forts to use 
against ships; whereas it is the big solid shot 
that ships want to use against forts, for shells, 
after striking, are apt to explode without pene-
trating or breaking a stone wall. 
Figure 4 illustrates a common example of 
target firing in the open air. rrhis target is 
not one-fourth the size of that presented by 
the cross section of a frigate. One nine or 
ten~inch shell lodged in the ship's bows as 
she approaches, and exploding, would prob-
ably sink or destroy her. Neither of the two 
gentlemen named on figure 4 (whose balls 
were so well planted) ever saw a shotted 
gun fired before. They pointed and aimed 
it themselves; and it is a fair example of 
,,.,hat an unpracticed eye may do with a gqn 
when planted where it may be fired with aim. 
Certainly we have nothing like invasion by 
sea to fear from any nation on this side of the 
water, and it is hardly probable that any of 
the crowned heads on the other side would 
have the hardihood to send into this country 
invading armies from beyond the sea. 1'he 
very air we breathe protects us from any 
such liability. It is free air. Our republican 
institutions are dangerous to kings; and, in 
the minds of the kings, the effect of these 
institutions upon the soldiers of royal armies 
is far more dreadful than would be the sys-
tem of 18-16, witli all its panoply of big forts 
and great guns. _ 
It is, therefore, that our forts should be constructed and armed almost exclu-
sively for resisting and repeling the attack of ships. 
According to the Paixhan experiments and the opinion of the French officer, 
one or two shot from an eight-inch gun lodged in the side of a seventy-four 
, -ould di. able her. vVhat would be the effect, therefore, of one or two, twice as 
1 ~ rg", from a ten-inch gun, striking a frigate or a steamer 1 
In turn, and per contra, suppose the battery of this heavy ordnance intendeJ 
to k ep . hip off from all our towns, except the principal cities, to be planted on 
the beach without any parapet. The target that one of these guns and its crew 
"'--ould expose to the ship i:; very small, and when we consider the English mode 
o-f :firing, and their sea fight , it would not be oue i-:hot in a hundred that, being 
fired from a ship, would trike such a target; her own smoke would conceal it 
f'rom her. It affords no urface for splinters which do the mischief. So that 
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unless the shot would strike the gun or its carriage, and there is no necessity of 
having them. as exposed as in this hypothetical case I have represented them to 
be, a shot from the ship might pass, even among the men, without its striking 
any of them, and consequently without doing any mischief. 
Fig. 4. 
Experimental battery. Practice with 9-inc;h shell guni:;, January 2, 185 1. 
Scretn, 550 yards. Shell, 73 poimds. Oharges, 9& pounds. 
Present: Hon. Mr. Stanton (chairman) and Hon. Mr. White, (memher,) of tbr N:wal Com-
mittee of the House of .Representatives. Some of the shot were fired uy th, se g"nt le!.Ileu . 
. The lower shell,; were tired with the quadrant, (54'.) the upper by the sight" ~lone. 
On account of the above recited facts and circumstances, on account of the 
considerations and reasons which they suggest, I propose, in answer to your 
£rst question, modifications to our present system of fortifications, &c., in the 
following particulars, to wit: 
1st. That inasmuch as the new and improved hravy ordnn.nce for thro\ving 
shot, both hollow and solid, bas a longer range, giV<'s greater accuracy, ancl is 
far mo1·e destructive than most of the ordnance with which our fort are now 
furnished, or than that by which, according to the report of 1840, it is intended 
to furnish them; therefore, I recommend that most of this ordnance of inferior 
rang , penetration, accuracy, and destructiveness, be disposed of; that the sup-
pli ,· of more be discontinued; and that the new and improved ordnance be 
suh. titut cl in it stead. 
I would not recommend that any of the old ordnance hould be sold or melted 
down until tlrn supplies of the new are complet d, or nearly so, for occa:ion 
may ari"c, before we can be completely furnit,hed with the new, when the old 
would be of rrrcat "ervice. 
2d. 'I he t no further expense be incurred foi- preparing our fortifications along 
th tlan6 · , ra.hoarcl, to withstand sieges by land. 
3d. That nonr of the work ( exc 'Pt thosr in Port. mouth harbor) propo. cd in 
th army r port of 1 40, • tahlc D, "as worls to be first commenced," nor in 
talil , E a. ' work. to b ·ommrnced n<'xt after tho, e in D;" nor in taLl } ~ 
'' work: to hr. la t commcnc: c1," b comm en ·eel nt all. 
4th. 'I hat for th pr tr. ti n f th town..,, villa.er ~, ancl landino-:--, th 1·cin o 
h , provicl<· 1 for, cm or 11 re pie· :--, a· ·ording t th conditi n of th plac 
th · mo:t ·fl<· ·tiYc onlnan · , be 111:i.nt ·d at . uitaLl point b •hin<l. :-:impl · mL uk-
m nt r m·tlt ·n parap ·t . 
• •c p!\"C H-7, Doc .... o 206 Hou c Rep. 1st c· ·ion. 
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The carriao-es of the O'uns so mounted should be constructed with the view 
,f easy transportation f;om one point to another along tl~e shores of the harbor 
;o be defended; so that on rails, paved or plank roads bmlt for the purpose, these 
pieces mio-ht in fact constitute a locomotive battery along· the beach, and not 
'.eilrn it, a~ all shore-batteries have done, entirely optional with the assailants to 
choose position. As far as the defences of the town against ships are coneerned, 
diis improved ordnance may thus be converted int? a sort of ''. fly~ng artillery." 
5th. Instead of supporting garrisons at the pubbc expense, m times of peace, 
;or the care and management of these gun , it is proposed that they and their 
munitions, properly secured·, be given in charge of the State, or of the authori-
ies of the place to be defended; first taking such legislative steps in the. mat-
ter as will induce the formation of one or more volunteer artillery compames at 
0nch place for the purpose of exercising the guns, learning the practice, keeping 
,hem in order, and ready for use, &c. 
Officers of the army should be detailed to instruct the volunteers thus o.ffer-
mg, in the great gun exercise; to examine and report upon the state of these com-
pmies and batteries, and keep the government informed, at all times, as to the 
efficiency and condition of each. 
The whole seaboard defences of this kind should be classed in divisions, each 
in charge of an artillery, or engineer or ordnance officer of rank, with a proper 
-raff. 
The headquarters of each division should be the principal place in it, as at 
Old Point for one, New York for another, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, 
&c., for others. Each of these places should be provided with the means of 
great gun exercise, including a field of practice, targets, the kind of roads for 
manreuvring this kind of ordnance, &c. 
The commander of each division should have authority to invite, annually, or 
a;i often as necessary, these volunteer artillery companies, or the best disciplined 
(If them, to visit his headquarters and exercise in the practicing fielp., at target 
firing, &c.; the government paying the expenses of the trip, by allowing so 
much mileage, and so much per day during the visit . 
. 1Ve ~ee our volunteer companies now are continually in the habit of visiting 
d1:--tant towns and villages, as a body, in their military capacity, and at their own 
expense. The practicilig an<l. the exercise with such terrible pieces would draw 
together a large concours~ of people. rrhis would give eclat, and the presentation 
of a sword, or some other reward for the best shot, would invest this feature of 
the modified system of defence with much animation, and infuse into these 
volunteer artillery men a spirit, a nerve, and skill wl:iich, in the day of battle, 
, ·ould make their pieces as firm as "Bragg's battery," and far more terrible and 
dr,structive than they would be ·if casemated in stone walls and enYeloped all 
the time with their own smoke. ' 
So far my remarks, in reply to your first question, relate to the defences of 
tl e Atlantic seaboard only. I proceed now to consider how far, and to what 
extent, the system of 1816 may be modified with regard to the defences of 01N 
Gulf and Pacific coasts. · 
I will peak first of the defences for the Gulf of Mexico. 
,v e have seen that the system of 1816, as extravagant as it is, was never 
intended, in the mind even of its strongest advocates, to provide fortifications 
f r erer.1J port, harbor, and anchorage along the seaboard in which an enemy 
II.light find helter, take refuge, or form rendezvous in time of war. 
:Fortre.' Monroe ,vould not prevent an enemy from entering the 0hes~peake 
bay, nor hinder him from anchoring Rafcly with his fleet at 'l1angier island, nor 
at the mouth of the Rappahannock, the York, or tho Potomac river, nor at any 
rmc of the numcrou safe and commodious anchorages that are to be found above 
Old Point. As far as any pcrmn.nent fortifications that it is possible to erect at 
Fortrc~:, )Ionroe and the Rip Raps are concerntd, an enemy might select any 
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one of the above-named places as a rendezvous for his fleet, and make that his 
centre of operations against t.he whole bay coast, the rivers and towns alono- it, 
and carry on his depredating 'and marauding expeditions with just as much 
impunity as though no such fortress had been built. 
It protects Norfolk and the navy yard from a fleet, but it does not prevent 
that same fleet from running up to York river, or the Rappahannock, or the 
Potomac, or up the bay, nor does it prevent it from landing an army at any one 
of these places, and marching it off against Richmond, Fredericksburg, \Y a~h-
ington, or Baltimore. 'l'he railroad and telegraph do that. 
The circumstances that such a fortress as l\Ionroe, with an important navy 
yard under its cover, is between his fleet and the sea, might somewhat cramp or 
embarrass such an enemy in his operations is admitted, but it would not, there-
fore, prevent them, for if his naval forces in the bay were superior to our own, 
he would command the bay in spite of the fort. 
Even if the Chesapeake bay was lined with works from head to mouth, and 
on both sides, such a chain of military posts, however strong and costly, could 
not prevent an enemy from entering the bay with his fleet, aml saft·ly riding 
upon its broad bosom, out of the reach of their guns. He might still make it 
the centre of his operations; most of the time the anchorage is ::;afe in any part 
of the bay; these forts would be immovable; they could not go after him; and 
at most, they would only prevent him from selecting the most convenient places 
for shelter, and the best points from which to operate. That is all. 
The same is the case in the Gulf of Mexico. For ejght or nine month. in the 
year vessels may ride in safety at anchor off the shore, anywhere between Pen-
sacola and Galveston. The land there forms a lee, and affords a shelter from 
the northers. From two to twenty miles from the land, and iu depth varyino-
from three or four to twenty-five or thirty fathoms, the anchorage i:; good. 
Now, if we rely upon fortifications to protect that coast, it will be ob Nerved, 
the whole Gulf front might be lined with them, a11d still they would hr harmlesa 
against a fleet with its powers of locomotion. It could string it--elf at anchor 
along the coast, in sjght of the very works built for defending it; and if our 
reliance were upon them, it might capture or dam up in f-taguant ruin, all the 
commerce of the 1Iissi sippi vall 'Y· ln the Gulf, as well as in the 'hc-;:-.apeakc, 
and in our own waters generally, we must have the naval supremacy. lu :my 
plan of providing for the national defences that is an e cntial featun•, and it 
ought to be sine qua non with Congress. 
'l'hc plan, therefore, of providiug permanent fortification!"I for the (folf, ~ m~ 
to be thi : that we hould elect a f ·w of the poiut · which would he mo,t im-
portant for us a plac s of r fnge and r ·nd 'zvous, aud ·whi('h: if occupinl by an 
nc•my in w:ir, would nable him the most to annoy ut-1, ancl fortify thum. 
The.· poi11t; are Kry vV est and the Tortuga:-\, and p ·rhap:-1 tihip and at 
i land.:. In a commercial and military ,.f'n"e, the Gulf of )Icxico and th 
m;bb •an 'ca arc but an expan ion of the }Iis. iKsippi and Amazon river~. In 
thi.· vi w of the ubject, the mouth of the :Mi:,;i:·vippi is not at the Bali:t , n r 
that of th Amazon at Paia; they arc both in the Florida pa·., b twc n ~ Y 
\Y ' t ancl uba. 
1! or nc-half the y ar th r i a, . ort of mon, oon in th 1 ulf of ~I .·ico : urin 
thi p riod the wind ar from th :-outhea:-:t; at thi ·ca:-ion, tl1<•refore. th ,-in 
aucl thP. ·urrent in the Yu ·atan 1m:: ar ·uch a to pn•v ·ut th, p,t, ng · th 
wa • of n. 'C'l from th 1 ulf. 
• [ r ·ov ·r, th<' i-.Ianrl f J amai a, wh r th Eno-li:h h:n·<· n naval t i 
v rlook · th · Yucatan pa: . "\Yhc·n th northr.a. t wiu,l: prPvail th · 'u , 
pa .: i: op ·n to . ailino- vi·;:- 1. · lm a f ·w ;t ·am ·rs, with Jamaica a tJ1 
of op ·ration., w ulcl ·lo <· it to our 01nm r . 
·1i n th . 0utlwa:t wind~ pr ·vail th rout of a . , ilin,~ vc~.-rl bmm 
ulf t Jamaica, i n t throu 0 ·h th strait· of · u ·a rn; it i thr u:!h 
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orida Pass by Key West, and then back on the south side of Cuba. Now a 
ritime enemy seizing upon Key W ~st ~nd the r.rortuga~ could ~and a few 
heavy guns from his ship and make it difficult for us to dislodge him. Here 
railroads and the telegraph do not reach, an~ as long as he should ~ol_d ~ha~ 
po ition., so long would he control the commercial mouth of the great Mississippi 
,alley. 
In that position he would shut up in the Gulf whatever force inferior _to h~s 
own we might have there. He would prevent re-enforcements, sent to relieve it 
from Boston, New York, and Norfolk, from entering the Gulf. Indeed, in a war 
with England, the l'ortugas and Key vV est being in her possession, it might be 
more advisable, instead of sending from our Atlantic dock yards a fleet to the 
Gulf, to send it over to the British islands and sound the Irish people as to 
throwing off allegiance. 
This country is too rich and powerful to confine itself to a system of national 
defences which looks to a passive state for it in any war. It cannot content 
i ~elf by waiting for the enemy to come, that we may simply beat him off from 
our shores. Neither is it sufficient for it to have the ability to send out a few 
cruisers and armed privateers to prey upon the commerce of an enemy,. 
\Ve have seen its free institutions, by their silent operations in times of peace, 
.,haking the thrones of Europe, and causing the crowned heads that sit upon 
them to tremble. In time of war . it must liave the ability to re-enforce that 
influence with its strong "right arm." The sensibilities of the people every-
where are alive to that influence-their sympathies are so strongly with us, that 
hould it become necessary to carry war into any of the maritime States of 
christendom, the .American legions would be regarded by the masses as friends 
and deliverers, not as enemies. 
Therefore, instead of being content with the capture of a few men-of-war and 
unoffending merchantmen for prizes, we want a system of defences which shall 
enable us to send naval expeditions against the enemy's country, invite and 
a~~ist the down-trodden millions to throw off the hateful yoke, to break their 
bonds asunder, and to stand up as freemen, like ourselves. 
In an expedition upon Jamaica, Key West being in the hands of the enemy, 
it would be difficult for our Gulf and Atlantic forces to unite. 
Therefore the works at Key West and the Tortugas should be provided with 
shell-guns of the most destructive calibre, and their walls should be substantial 
enough to resist the concussion of a man-of-war broadside. rl'hey are wanted 
to give protection to our fleeing merchantmen, to afford a refuge to our fleets 
until time and opportunity and circumstances serve for striking the blow, or 
making a move. They are wanted by us, because they would be so immensely 
valuable to an enemy. 
The railroads that will be in operation from Pensacola and Mobile soon, and 
probably before any additional fortifications can be erected there, will secure 
these places from invasion and seizure; and the works already there, with a few 
more gun in open battery along the beach, would effectually protect them from 
the great guns of ships. Still, an enemy with a .fleet superior to the one we 
might h ave in the Gulf could anchor along the shore, as he can in the Uhesa.: 
peak , and greatly harass our commerce there. No system of fortifications can 
prevent that. 
In the next maritime war, (and in such a war we have nothing to fear from 
any quarter except one,) it i, not upon the Atlantic, properly speaking, that the 
gr at ea-fight i to take place: it i in the Gulf of Mexico, or near the English 
.,hr 
Jamaica i an important naval station; it commands one entrance to the Gulf. 
Th •re 'rcat Britain can as emble her fleet, and within three days have it off 
the Baliz , in po ition to strike a terrible blow at the commerce of that valley. 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--23 
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Shutting up the Florida Pass, she would have complete control of the Gulf· 
Norfolk and New York are inconvenient! y situated to defend it. Some years 
ago a man-of-war was sent with despatches from Norfolk to Pensacola; she was 
fifty-odd days in making the passage. 
The means of defence for the Gulf should be within tl1e valley that belongs 
to it. The resources of this valley are ample, its means most abundant, and it.s 
people are its best and most appropriate defenders. Pensacola should therefore 
be built up as a naval station, and the depot at Memphis fosteTed with care and 
solicitude. Instead of draining the treasury for forts, under the system of 1816, 
these two places should be put in condition for building, equipping, and fitting, 
upon a scale sufficient to secure to us, in war, the naval supremacy at least in 
the Gulf. 
In a war with England, and with those two places as the centres of opera-
tions, it probably would be found desirable to move upon Jamaica and other 
British islands in that quarter. New York and the Atlantic dock yards would 
probably be the centre of other operations; and if Jamaica fall in such a war, 
it must fall under the guns and before the gallantry of the west-the east will 
have need and occupation for all its forces in other quarters. 
Memphis is fast rising in importance as a place of construction. P1·ivate 
enterprise has already commenced to establish building-yards there; and in that 
teeming region there is no lack of naval and maritime resources. The ropewalk 
there is of no consequence. We want docks, storehouses, machine-shops, and 
founderies for casting, forging, making, and building anchors and cables, ships 
and engines; and for preparing and keeping in store, out of the excellent ma-
terials to be found in that valley, all the arms and munitions of war which would 
be required for the defence of the Gulf, the capture of Jamaica or any other 
British possession, if Britain be the enemy. 
The affections of these islanders for the mother country cannot, in the nature 
of things, be as strong or as abiding as those of our citizens for their own homes; 
and therefore it may be imagined that an attempt by us to invade and get po"-
ses ion of these islands would be quite a different affair from an attempt, on her 
part, at invasion and conquest here. A tower of strength has this nation in the 
brave hearts and strong arms of its gallant yeomanry. Small indeed would be 
the degree of aid and comfort which a national enemy would derive from dis-
loyalty and disaffection of American citizens. 
I have, on former occasions, presented my views at large with regard to the 
importance of Memphis a,.· a naval depot. These views are before the public, 
and therefore I deem it unnecessary to repeat them here. We have turned the 
corn r, and are now going ahead in the peaceful race for the commercial ~u-
pr macy of the seas; the next trial is to be for maritime upremacy of another 
ort. It i hoped that the day for that contest is far di.·tant. But every p ople 
ar liable to war; and it i a fact which we cannot blink, that, in providu1 g fi r 
th c ntingency, our tatesmen and warrior mu t, for many year to com have 
an y to th fore s which r at Britain, rather than any other po,ver, can brinrr 
ao-ain t u . But let that onte t come when it may, it is mo t lik ly t b d -
iclcd in th ulf of :i\I xico, and it· twin ba in, the Caribbean ea; they P th 
r ·ptacl of all that th two grand . t y t m of riv r ba ins in th · rid 
will have to pour int th lap of comm rec. Th vall 'Y of the Mi~~i. i1>pi on 
on ic1 , and the vaJl y f th ' Amazon on the other, will in time mak th ' 
wo a1 . of th a th comm ·rcial ntr of th world. 
'I h mouth of the .. \mazon, th m uth of the rin o, and th mouth f h 
fao-dal na ar , commer ·ially :-:peaki1w, almo. t a mu h in th :E lorida J> " ' 
i th mouth of th ... Ii :-i ippi riv r. 'u h i the cours of th CWT nh • 
, u ·h th dir tion f th wind. in that part of th worl l that < v ., ... l , iii -
fr m th mouth of an · n · of tlir.· riv r: for Ili d au •iro in Br, zil. r 
In i, , r for the mark t f th a ·ific around ap Horn, or for Africa. or r 
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Europe, has first to steer to the northward and westward until she reaches the 
parallel of 250 or 30° north. This brings her off our own shores; and it is_ im-
possible for her to pursue any other route, so long as the northeast trade-wmds 
prevail, or the great equatorial current which feeds the Gulf Stream continues to 
flow across the Atlantic. No vessel trading under canvas from the mouth of 
these· rivers to the markets of South America, Europe, Asia, or Africa, can go 
any other way. They must pass by our doors. 
Therefore, in planning a system of national defences, who can overestimate 
the importance of the Gulf of Mexico as a nucleus of naval means, the centre of 
naval operations 1 That centre is at K ey West and the r.rortugas; hence the 
great need of strong works there. 
Interests of the most delicate, valuable, and, to an enemy, of the most attractive 
kind, are even now daily springing up, and expanding themselves out upon the 
waters and about the borders of the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean sea-interests 
which , if they should be injured or put in needless j eopardy, will create a greater 
sensation throughout this country than would the landing of a hundred thousand 
men-at-arms upon our shores. These interests are maritime-they are Ameri-
can; their defences nnd protection are naval; they must be watched and guarded 
from the Mississippi valley. Memphis and Pensacola by nature are, by rights 
ought to be, and by legislation should be, the centres of operations in the case. 
Panama, Nicaragua, and Tehuantep echave, or are about to impose new obli-
~ations upon us. We must look. to them, and, in providing for the common 
~efence, take them into consideration. They are links in the chain which binds 
!he most remote corners of the republic together. 'l'hey are the gateways be-
tween distant parts of the Union; and they must therefore be cared for in peace, 
~ar ded and protected in war. . 
T he Amazonian basin, embracing an area more than twice the extent of 
our great Mississippi valley, fills too large a space in the world to escape at_ten-
lion from us, when we are in the very act of laying the foundations- for a perma-
nent system of national defence. With all the climates of India, with unheard 
of capacities of production, and the most boundless sources of wealth in the field, 
the forest , and the mine, that valley, so soon as it shall begin to feel the axe and 
the plough, will pour into our lap a commerce, the value of which is as limitless 
as are its own vast resources. Nature has placed us in the position to command 
that commerce. rl'he great business of fetching and carrying there must be ours. 
Por coming and for going, the winds are fair for us; and' we are the only nation 
for whose shipping they are so fair. 
'1,hat arm of the ocean which severs the continent nearly in twain, to make 
between the "Father of W aters," at the north, and the "King of Rivers," at the 
south, a receptacle for their commerce, is receiving from the Mississippi valley 
alone an amount of produce that astonishes the world. Yet the Mississippi val-
ley is not half peopled up. What, therefore, will this oceanic basin, this com-
lllercial receptacle for the surplus produce of the two grandest systems of river 
basins on the face of the earth be, when the great Amazonian valley, of double 
area, with its everlasting summer and its endless round of harvests, comes to be 
su.bdued and brought into cultivation 1 What the Gulf 0£ Mexico is now, is as 
nothing to what it is to be. It abounds with commercial elements that cannot 
be comprehended for their magnitude; and in proportion as it becomes the seat 
of maritime wealth and greatnes,·, so, too, must it become the centre of naval 
strength and power. As Columbus la.y sick., it was upon the waters of this sea-
ba~in that the angel visited him in a dream, an.d told him that God had made 
his name great and sent him to "unbar the gates of ocean.'.' ' 'l'he k eys to these 
gates are at Key W est and the T ortugas, Memphis and Pensaoola. . Nature has 
placed th m among the wonderful resources of the great valley; and to stand as 
ga.tck •ep ·r before them is the mission of those nav.al forces that naturally cen-
tre in the Gulf. 
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OF THE PACIFIC SEABOA'RD. 
No American statesman will, I imagine, rest content with any plan of national 
defence which does not contemplate for HS at least the naval supremacy in our 
own waters. rrhat is the starting point-and that is the point which, in the 
erection of military works on the land, in the construction of floating batteries 
for our harbors, or in the building of ships and steamers for the sea, should be 
constantly kept in view. It is the true basis to work upon. 
In a military point of view, California and Oregon are colonies. Far remote 
from the heart 0f the country and the strength of the nation, they are young and 
feeble, open to attack, and inviting to conquest. In war no relief can be sent 
them, however beset, unless at great risk and with an enormous expenditure of 
both time and money. 
The voyage by sea from the Atlantic to the Pacific ports of the United States 
is the longest voyage in the world. Within the whole scope and range ~f com-
merce, there are no two shore-lines so remote from each other, in time, as these 
are. 
The average passage of all the vessels which sailed from the Atlantic ports for 
California in 1850 was one hundred and eighty-seven days-six months. These 
:vessels went singly, each making the best of her way without regard to the oth-
ers. In a fleet, it is the dullest vessel which regulates the speed of all; the 
fastest must reduce canvas, yard, and stand along under easy sail, that the 
slow vessels may keep up. 
Bound hence with a fleet for the relief of California, our ships would have to 
pass no less than three important naval stations, all belonging to the same power. 
One of them, St. Helena, is on the wayside; the two others, Bermuda and the 
}-,alkland Islands, are right in the middle of the road. 
If the fleet should escape the vigilance and annoyance of the men-of-war sta-
tioned at those islands, there are still before it the storms of Cape Horn, the 
dangers of the sea, and the war of the elements for it to encounter and contend 
with. 
Such would be the length of the voyage, and such the difficulties and the risks 
to be encountered by the way, that the practicability of sending succor to Cali-
fornia around Cape Horn, in a war with England, may be considered out of the 
question. 
Single ships might find their way in safety around, but as for a large fleet, 
coverin °· as it goes miles in extent, and attracting the attention of the enemy 
with the multitude of its ships- escaping all the danger that would be et it by 
th way-surely no one would count upon it, and it would be folly to expect it. 
Calif rnia and Or gon must, ther fore, rely upon the mean of defence which 
can h ent forth from their own harbor in war; and the que tion i , how hall 
tho.· m an· be provided in p ace 1 
'hall tl1 "'y t m of 1 16, which ha. been tried and found too co tly and de-
£ ctiv for the .Atlantic seaboard, Le transfcrr cl to the Pacific, and engraftcd upon 
it. ,J10r , for anoth r third of a c ntury 1 r hall the o-ovenuncnt re::-ort to 
railroa l~, ·t am and th navy, and do for that country what ha be n found to 
an :w r ~o well for thi. ? 
1h · ·.·t nt of our. a front on th Pacific, compar d with 0 11r a front on 
th tlanti ·, i. a io-htrcn t twenty-four· that i:-, th acific i · three-fourth-. 
th ·-·tmt oi th tlanti · . ahoarcl. 'I' appl th :y ·t m of 1 16 to th£' form? 
would, ,in m • jnd!!ln nt, b' injncli ·ion. a. to polic ·, .·travao-:mt a. to exp 1~d1-
tur 1 ncl inad ·quat a to pnrpo. <'; aucl ther forr th . ·. t m of 1 16 c.·c ptm!!' 
in o far a tw or thrc• w rk. :tr one ru cl, houlcl not b n1>pli •tl t th 
l'a ifi ·. .\Y waut no fort alono- that , a front, ,av only tho.:c that arc 11 
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sary to keep hostile ships, with their great guns, out of the reach of our cities·, 
and to give protection to our dock yards. . 
There is not at this time a single dock yard upon the waters of the Pacific, 
belonging to any nation, at which even a fri_gate c~n be built and e~uipped. 
All the maritime powers are far removed, with then- naval resources, fro°:1 ~he 
eastern shores of that ocean. By establishing a dock ~ar~ there, and pro:1dmg 
it with the means and facilities for repairing and eqmppmg, we may , without 
difficulty, secure the naval supremacy upon that ocean; and once possessed, it 
will not be an easy matter for any power to wrest it from such hands. 
The most desirable means of defence for those regions are such as we have on 
the ..Atlantic-a navy, steam, the railway and the locomotive, with their powers 
of concentration. 
The characteristic feature which the improvements of the age have impressed 
npon military operations is mobility. To the degree with which armaments 
and armed forces' are invested with locomotion and with celerity in movement, 
to that degree and in that ratio are they provided with the elements of power 
and destruction. It is its mobility, imparting toil in the field of battle, a sort of 
ubiquity, that makes flying artillery such a tremendous arm in modem warfare. 
It is the swift foot of the armed steamer which has given her such tremendous 
force for battle that has appalled the most able sea captains, and left the mili-
tary men of the world at variance as to the extent of her powers, so transcendent 
are they in the minds of all. 
The part · that railroads and magnetic telegraphs are to play in the great 
drama of war with this country has not yet been cast, much less enacted. In 
a military point of view, they convert whole States into compact and armed 
masses. They can convey forces from one section of the Union to another as 
quickly as re-enforcements can be marched from one part of an old-fashioned 
battle-field to another. 
The money that is expended in the erection of a fort adds nothing to the 
national wealth, but the money that is spent in fortifying with railroads, while 
it gives the military strength required, vastly increases also the elements of 
national power, wealth, and greatness. , 
T here have been expended by the States and people of the States, on this 
side of the Rocky mountains, about four hundred millions of dollars in building 
ten thousand miles of railroads and canals. These works have not only effec-
tually provided for the common defence so far as invasion is concerned, but, 
besides reimbursing the projectors of them, in most cases, they have in all in-
creased the value of the land in their vicinity, advanced trade and commerce, 
promoted the general welfare, and in the aggregate added not less than a thou-
sand m illion of dollars to the gross sum of the national wealth. 
T he money that has been expended under the system of 1816 has added 
nothing to the value of the soil; it has afforded no facilities to commerce; it has 
not increased the national prosperity in any manner whatever; and, therefore, 
as to the alternative of providing for the defences of the Pacific coast by lining 
it with forts and castles, or by sending a railroad there and collecting naval 
means, it appears to me there is no choice, no need for deliberation, no necessity 
for argument. 
The strongest work that stone and mortar can make, being erected at the 
mouth of the harbor of San Francisco, would not interrupt a blockade, nor pre-
vent an enemy from starving California into terms. It is the navy alone that 
can do this ; and vessels, with munitions of war sufficient for the purpose, should 
be placed under cover there now. 
California does not produce breadstuffs enough for her own consumption, 
proba ly she never will. It is worthy of remark, that not one of our New 
England States, including New York, does that. Mining, commerce, and manu-
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factures, rather than agriculture, will probably ever constitute the chief indus-
trial pursuits of that distant State. . 
And until California has the means of deriving a support from the back coun-
try she must look for it to the sea; therefore an enemy, by taking up his position 
before the harbor of California in force sufficient to establish a rigid blockade, 
may, without striking a blow, starve the people into terms of surrender. 
The greater the number of men in garrison, in such a case, and the larger the 
army sent there by us for its defence, the greater the distress; for the rea~on 
that they would the sooner eat out the substance of the land, and so assist the 
enemy in his work of starvation. 
A. railway to California would make that country as invulnerable and as se-
cure from invasion as railroads have made the country on this side of the Rocky 
mountains; and with a railway a blockade would only annoy commerce, not 
starve the people. 
In a consideration of the soundest policy this railway is called for. I have 
studied the subject, and the result of my best reflections with regard to it has 
led me to the opinion that the general government cannot too soon take the 
steps necessary and proper for procuring it to be built, and for collecting at the 
other end of it the nucleus of a navy, with powers of expansion sufficient to meet 
any probable emergency. 
The vessels of our navy serving in the Pacific, instead of being brought home 
around Cape Horn for repairs, should be laid up in ordinary in California until 
sufficient numbers are gradually collected there to form this nucleus. The com-
merce of the country will supply the seamen for them whenever they shall be 
required. 
My answer to your second question, viz: "What reliance could be placed on 
vessels-of-war, or of commerce, fioating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary 
substitutes for permanent fortifications 1" is, to a great extent, included in the 
answer just given to your first. 
'.rhe defences upon which this country must and ought to rely are locomotive; 
therefore, to employ naval means to build floating batteries, which would have 
to be confined to the limits of the harbor, would be a waste of money, when we 
might, with that same money, give them wings or impart to them the breath of 
steam, and send them here and there wherever they would be of most avail. 
The money which a floating battery would cost might keep a steamer afloat; 
which, with its powers of locomotion, might reduplicate itself, as it were, along 
the coast, by appearing successively before a number of places, and arriving at 
each place exactly at the right time, If the enemy would not come to the 
:floa6ng battery it would be of little use; but as for the steamer, if the enemy 
would not come to it, it could go to the enemy; it could select its own time, 
maun r, and point of attack, and thus make up by activity, skill, and manreuvre, 
. wl:tt it wants in trengtb, 
Th reliance to be placed on vessels of commerce for coast defences i ca...,nal 
and ac ic1ental; upon an mcrgcncy they might be armed and ent to sea to 
h:m th comm rce of the n my; they might be u eel a. tran port or tr 
fir -:-hip~; r th y rnio-ht be unk in cbnnnel-way. to block up entrance.· -c., 
and to a:-. i, t the work on bore to prot ct th to1vi1s. When want d, they will 
be at hand; , nd in plan11ing military exp dition,, or preparino- for defence. it i~ 
n ugh for ur a captain and gr at g n ral to know tliat th commercial 
m~rin -olcl hulk , nd n w v I -are among th ir m an of attack and 
d ·fi n · and con titut an important part of th · military r ource which they 
h ld in r<·~ rv -whi ·h ar at all time availabl and which th r ·for , m,, be 
r )U<rht int 1 lay , rh 'll r quir d. ' ' • 
'I h .' r ·p r f the b , rd of nein er. of 1 40 tr at the ubj ct f :fl n in_ 
b tt ri .; at 1 ngth. It .how c nclu i ly that they arc ncith r tu m ~-
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efficient, effective, nor judicious shape into which the money voted for nationa 
defence may be put. . . . 
The arguments of the board upon this part of.their subJect appe~r to me c~n-
clusive; and, therefore, further remarks here with regard to fl.oatmg battenes 
would be useless . 
.A. prominent idea upon which the system of 18_16. appears to _hav~ ~een 
founded is, that we as a naval power were to remam m hopeless mfenonty ; 
and hence the burden of the argument for a system of national defe_nce has been 
"build stationary works-works that the enemy must come after; lme the coasts 
with forts and castles to save the country from invasion, our women and children 
from the violence of enemies." 
Railroads and steam have converted every village into a camp, every telegraph 
office into a watch-tower, on which is placed a sentinel more sleepless than 
Argus, for guarding and defending the coast from invasion. Steam, and rail-
roads, and canals have connected every forest in the land into a timber shed for 
the navy, and our merchants and ship-builders have established scores of dock 
yards along the sea shore, and upon the banks of :mr rivers, at which keels 
may he laid and vessels launched and equipped with a rapidity that has never 
before been known in any age or country. 
In 1836 General Cass, then Secretary of War, assumed the position, and 
General Jackson indorsed it,* that for tlte df:/ence ef the r.oast tlie cliief reliance 
should be on tkena·vy; and that t!ie system ef 1816 (that ef tlw board ef engineers) 
comprises works w~ick are unriecessarily large for the purposes which they have 
to fulfil. 
At that time steam navigation was a problem ;which had yet to be solved 
upon the ocean. Dr. Lardner had attempted it in the closet, and proved, as he 
said, that the conditions of the · problem involved an impossibility. He there-
fore pronounced it an absurdity; and so men generally considered it. At that 
time railroads were much less complete, and far less numerous than they now 
are. The electric telegraph was also unknown. 
Now the ocean is clouded with the smoke of sea steamers ; the country is 
laced with lines of telegraph, and fretted with a network of railways-all tend-
ing to make reliance upon the navy still more exclusive, dependence upon the 
system of 1816 still more needless. . 
The board of engineers, to show how erroneous, in their judgment, this opinion 
of General ,T ackson was, supposed a case in 1836, and cited it again in 1840 
as an illustration. 
'l'he case was well put; it produced a great effect upon the public mind ; ancl 
as it is the hinge upon which the continuation of the present system was made 
to turn, I beg leave. to quote the case now, that we may see how it will stand 
the te t of the new condition of things ; how the improvements that have since · 
taken place will affect it, and how far it may be modified by the , ground I have 
been endeavoring to make good. 
"In the report," says the board of 1840,t presented by the engineer depart-
ment in March, 1836, (Senate Document, 1st session 24th Congress, vol. 4, 
~ ~ o. 293) "there is a demonstration of the actual economy that will result from 
an efficient system of sea-coast defence ; which is to the following effect, refer-
ring to the document itself for detail.: 
" There is first supposed to be an expedition of twenty thousand men at 
Bermuda or Halifax ready to fall upon the coast. 1'his will make it necessary, 
if there be no fortifications, to have ready a force at least equal at each of the 
followjng points, namely: 1st, Portsmouth and navy yard; 2d, Boston and navy 
0 ee p,1.ge 5, No. 206 H. Doc., 1st session 26th Congress. See also page 1, No. 293 S. 
Doc , 1st se ;;ion 24th 1 ·ongress. 
t Pa.ge 70, No. 2U6 H. Doc., 1st se,;sion 26th Congress. 
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yard; 3d, N arraganset roads ; 4th, New York and navy yard; 5th, Philadel-
phia and navy yard; 6th, Baltimore ; 7th, Norfolk and navy yard; 8th, Charles-
ton, South Carolina; 9th, Savannah; and 10th, New Orleans, to say nothing 
of other important places. 
"At each of these places, except the last, ten thousand men drawn :from the 
interior, and kept under pay, will suffice, the vicinity being relied on to supply 
the remainder. At New Orleans, seventeen thousand men must be drawn from 
a distance. In a campaign of six months, the whole force will cost at least 
$26,750,000. 
" The garrisons necessary to be kept under pay for the fortifications in these 
places will cost for the same time $8,430,500. The difference ($18,319,500) 
will then be only $3,448,150 less than the whole expense of building these 
defences, viz : $21,767,656; whence it follows that the expense of these erec-
tions would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in a single 
campaign." 
This is the demonstration, first given in 1836, and repeated in 1840, to prove 
the very great economy and complete efficiency of the system of 1816; and in 
order to complete this demonstration, it was required that twenty-one millions 
of money and upwards should be first given to fortify only ten places along a 
Rea front of two thousand :five hundred* miles in extent; for there were " other 
important places," of which nothing was to be said. 
Now let us suppose that, in conformity with the modifications which I have 
suggested, and according to the idea of maintaining such a system of national 
defence tliat will secure to us tlte naval supremacy in our own waters, a portion 
of this $8,430,500 which the plan of the board requires to keep for six months 
only tlie "necessary garrisons" in the powerful works which are supposed to be 
erected at each one of the ten threatened places. Let us suppose, I say, that, 
according to the proposed mocli:ficati.ons of the system, a part of this eight and 
a half millions had been applied to the building of some twenty or twenty-five 
men-of-war steamers, such a force of steamers would be required, even under 
the system of the engineers, to serve as a coast guard in war, to brush from the 
outside of our harbors, which are protected on the inside by forts, any block-
ading ships that the enemy may station there, and to keep straggling cruisers 
from capturing and plundering our merchantmen in the sight of these same 
fort , and along our shores generally. 
To keep up the proposed garrisons for one year at the ten threatened places 
onl.lJ, would require, according to the estimate of the board of engineers them 
e1v , . 16, 61,000. 
Th teamers will last many years; and according to the estimate of th 
navy board,+ made at the ame time, would cost, for the twenty-five, $5,625,000, 
r oul • about one-third of the actual co, t of the ga1Tisons for one year, after the 
fort. w r built at a co t of $21, 767,656.f 
The tw nty-five steamers would be tationed along the coa t, and di tribu-
t c1, we may , uppo e, in the following manner, viz: two with their headquarter 
at JJ rt:--mouth, thr at Bo ton, four at ... ew York, two at Charleston, two at 
P n:--a ·ola an l two at the BaJiz . 
1 h a. put , uppo it to b known that this exp dition of twenty thou-
i-ancl m 11 wh ar about to fovad a country of more than twenty million~, ha~ 
r ·ndf·Zv u d c t alifax or B rmuda, , uppo e it to be at Halifax. 
r thr of' the tw 1 ty-fiv , mart, activ teamer are " nt to watch 
m v m nt . A ,· on h ut to ca and tak , hi departur 
ak . for th n ar t J) our coa t, and th r deliv r~ to the 
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magnetic telegraph the intelligence that the enemy has put to sea, and is steer-
0', with his expedition of twenty thousand strong, to:"ards Charleston. The 
effect is electrical; instantly bodies of armed men heedmg the summons wo1;1ld 
5pring up, not from bush and brake, in a single glen, as at ~he s_ound of Roden~k 
Dhu's whistle, but from every town and hamlet, mountam side_ and va~ley m 
the land. Harnessing up the iron war-horse, they would hold him, pantmg on 
the rail way, ready at the word to speed off with them for the appointed place, at 
the rate of thirty, forty, or fifty miles th_e hour, accor~ing to the ~mer~ency. 
In the meantime, and without confus10n, message 1s sent by hghtnmg for the 
look-out steamers and naval forces in the Gulf to proceed towards Savannah, 
and for those at the north to steer south and look into the Chesapeake for further 
orders. Or they may be directed to cross the enemy's hause and bring him to 
action, or cut off his stragglers, or otherwise harass and annoy him. 
At the end of three or four days, or it may be a week or more, according to 
the weather, and the great variety of circumstances that tend to retard the 
movements of such a force at sea, another of the guarda costa steamers puts into 
the capes of the Delaware or elsewhere, with the certain intelligence that the 
enemy is bound for Charleston. Because his rate of sailing is regulatec1 by the 
Epeed of the slowest vessel in the fleet, he is yet three days from Charleston at 
the least . 
..All our ships-of-war that have returned from cruises, that are just fitting out, 
or that may happen to be in port, together with the whole coast guard of twenty-
live steamers which, at the commencement of the war, were found on hand, may 
lhus appear off Charleston as soon as he: certainly they would be there before 
lie could disembark. And should he be so infatuated as to attempt a landing, it 
rnuld be practicable for us to have there, in force ready to receive him, an army, 
ritb a regiment even of foot, from every State in the Union, except perhaps 
California and Oregon. · 
Is it possible that an enemy could be tempted by any inducement whatever 
lo land in such a country, provided with such means of defence, invested with 
such armed ubiquity, and such powers of concentration 1 
Fort Moultrie, which has beleagured an enemy before, and has demonstrated 
that it can hold a force from sea in check long enough at least for the lightning 
to go for help, and for steam to come with it, is there to beleaguer him again; 
and our coast fleet, which we have supposed to be assembled there as a witness 
to this hypothetical attempt at invasion, would be ready at the bar to receive 
th.is discomfited and crippled foe as he attempted to escape. Great would be 
!lie disappointment to the country if such a fleet should fail to give an account 
of such an enemy. 
The present system of fortifications seems to have been planned upon the 
iu.ea that in all wars this country was to stand on the defensive, and that all the 
energies of the enemy would be directed to siege and invasion. 
But in the death struggle, what have we to fear from invasion 1 There is no 
pillar nor post in this country which, like the Paris of :b7 rance, when it falls, 
carrie the whole political edifice with it. There is no Paris in America. Unlike 
Burope, the armed occupation of a capital here would be no more than the oc-
c11pation of any other town by an enemy; unlike Europe, there are no disaf-
fected people in this country for a foe to tamper with. 'I'he government is by 
th.e people, for the people, and with the people. It is the people. And as for 
htva,_ion, there would be neither danger to the country, nor its government, nor 
it5 institutions. Our free institutions are our best fortifications to protect the 
country from siege, and the land from invasion. Captivating the minds of his 
Soldiers, the civil and political freedom enjoyed by all in these United States 
1vould convert the rank and file of an invading foe into friends. An enemy 
planting his foot upon our oil could at best hold no more of it than that upon 
which he actually stands and covers with his guns. If he attempted to move, 
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in whatever direction he shou,ld take up the line of march, the people in front he 
would find enemies, and those that he left behind, emboldened by his own deserters, 
would rise up in arms against him the moment his presence was withdrawn from 
them. 
What attempts at invasion did England make during the last war 1 She was 
afraid of desertion and the propagandism of republican institutions then. It is 
true, she made a foray upon Washington, but found a precipitate retreat neces-
sary, and that foray was as barren and empty of military result as a cloud 
without water. She attempted New Orleans, but there she encountered one of 
those sand-bag or cotton-bag forts, and her hosts fell Lefore it. 
In the war of 1812 we were young and feeble; England was at the summit 
of her power. The difference between the military condition of the two countries 
was immense ; yet upon what point along the seaboard did she attempt invasion? 
Against what battery did she lay siege 1 If in the defenceless state of the 
country then-a country that had a navy to build, that had yet to plan its sys-
tem of fortifications, to concentrate means of defence-if, under those circum-
stances, sieges were not laid nor invasion attempted at any point along an open 
sea front, with its indentations and windings of six thousand miles-if but with 
one-third of our present population-if with not one-tenth part of our present 
military resources, nor not the twentieth of our present powers of concentration, 
siege and invasion were not attempted then by a most haughty and proud foe, 
is it likely that in case of war now, when she looks upon us as her equal, and 
at least as her match in everything· except in the number of " wooden walls " -
is it probable or possible that, with such a power for an enemy now, anything 
like siege or invasion from the sea would be attempted or thought of 1 
With a home squadron comprised chiefly of steamers, it would be difficult to 
conceive how an enemy should so threaten as to make it necessary to establish 
a garriRon of 17,000 or even 10,000 men for six months at Uharleston or any 
one of the ten places named in the report. · 
The operations of these twenty-five steamers would be mostly confined to our 
own waters in war, for with want of depots of coal abroad they would be required 
to return into port at the end of every two or three weeks at least for a fresh 
supply of fuel. 
Now bearing in mind my answer to your first question, and always suppo..,ing 
that one of the principal features in the system of national defence hereafter to 
be provided for this country is naval supremacy for it in its own waters, my 
an wer to your second quc$tion is, with the modifications already propo eel, that 
all neecfful "reliance" for coast defence can be placed on vessels-of-war and of 
commerce, upon open shore batteries, steam, railroads, and telegraph, o R FREE 
IX "TIT TION , and such like " ubs6tute, for permanent fortification ." 
Iu r ply to your third and last que tion, a to the expediency of continuing 
th pr nt sy tern of fortification on the shores of the north rn lake", I ha·rn 
to r mark that. in my judgment, it i neither nece ru·y nor expedient ._,o to do. 
A .., for inva ion from that quarter, the difference in political condition between 
auad· and th nited , 'tat i an ample fortification for us. 
Large bodi . of th p oplc there n w are known to be in favor either of 
paration from th moth r c untry or of ann xation to th United tat :- . 
11 i. mcrican fil'lllY, th r for , oino- over int Canada in a war with Eno-land 
w ul 1 L, I k d u1 11 by a laro- numb r of the people there a friend ' and 
d liv r ·r not a. n mi . and ppr . , or . 
'l h he t war on th wat r f th lak wa a war of hip-buildinO'. 
H who ulcl mu:-t r th · tr 110- • t naval fore th y h, cl o 
r ·at · -h l th· . upr ma ·y. ncl if, in ca f wru· now, England . h uld 
u · cl in a tin"' , h a 1 f u with h r naval fi r · u th lake .J1 cou) l 
infli · ,rn injury. .i fi·w cla • f uuint rrupt d c ntr 1th r by a fi w nnn 
, . ·l-, in ignifi nt alt g th r · . t ab lute fore , would mak dreadful }m·oe 
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npon our lake shipping, our lake commerce, and our lake towns, if no precautions 
ere taken to guard against it. 
The commerce of the lakes will soon be worth to us as much or more than 
the commerce of the Atlantic. 
During the season of lake navigation there is put afloat up_on those waters 
every week, on the average, millions of American property, besides vessels and 
the lives of American citizens. , 
In no part of the world, except in the offings and harbors of the great com-
mercial emporiums, is there to be found such a concentration of merchandise afloat. 
Xor is there, in case of our naval inferiority upon the lakes, any part of the 
world that affords such an abundant harvest of prizes to tempt the cupidity of 
Eeamen. 
It is the policy of this country never to be the aggressor; it loves peace and 
hates war, and therefore it is not likely ever to be the party to strike the first 
blow in war. That is an advantage at which Great Britain generally aims, and 
that she fully understands and appreciates the importance of striking quickly 
upon the lakes in case of war with this country we have evidence conclusive. 
Before she sent her minister plenipotentiary here with his ultimatum, when 
the friendly relations between the two countries a few years ago seemed to be so 
much in danger, she first assembled a fleet of fifty-odd sail in our waters, and 
upon our frontiers one-third of the whole British army, notwithstanding that 
she was at that time engaged in two distant and expensive foreign wars. 
No one who, calling to mind those times, will examine her military journals 
of that day can fail to be impressed with the fact that her forces were especially 
arranged with a view to Canada and the lakes, and that there the first blow, or 
a blow synchronous with the first, was to be struck. Her intentions then were 
too manifest to be forgotten or disregarded even now. 
It is true the war might commence during the season when the navigation of 
the lakes is annually closed, and when, consequently, all naval forces would be 
~ed up. In that case we should have nothing to fear. But it might commence 
tn the height of the commercial season ; and the war might be commenced on 
her par t by first admitting from the sea a fleet of small-class vessels, passing 
them up through the Canadian ship-canals into the lakes, and there letting the 
declaration of her intentions consist in an attack upon Buffalo, Chicago, and 
other lake towns with their shipping. 
These interests are too valuable and important to be left at the mercy of an 
enemy even for a day. Therefore it would be advisable, ·so long as Canada is 
an. English colony, to provide against a naval surprise on the lakes. 
For this purpose it is only necessary to look to the means of assembling 
quickly a small naval force on the lakes, and, in the meantime, to place at the 
several cities and towns, and at the termini of the various railroads and canals 
along the lake shores, a few pieces of ordnance, according to the plan suggested 
for the towns generally along the Atlantic seaboard. 
The forts which are already on the lakes need not be garrisoned in war only 
Until we acquire the naval supremacy there. 
-We have canals and railroads by which we could send the frames of vessels 
and alI requisite naval means to the lakes at short notice and in time to re-enforce 
\\>hat we might suddenly assemble there. 
It ~eems, therefore, that, acting upon the policy of so shaping our system of 
nation.al defence as to secure the naval supremacy in our own waters, we should 
proceed to build the engines, provide the armaments, and get out at the navy 
Jard of 1Iemphis and New York the frames of a few small men-of-war steamers 
for th lake . The engines and the armaments might be placed upon the lake 
shore at once. The frames, on the first appearance of the war cloud, could be 
ent there by the Erie and the Michigan canals, put together, and be ready for 
launching at a moment's warning. 
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The Mediterranean is an inland sea, so are our lakes and rivers. Eminently 
continental in its proportions and maritime in its features, our country looks out 
upon blue water to the east, the south, and the west; the ocean front of the 
United States alone is greater in extent than the ocean front of the whole of 
Europe. Therefore, like action to the orator, a navy to us is the first, second, 
and third chief requisite to any effective system of national defence. 
Respectfully, &c., 
Hon. CHARLES M. CONRAD, 
Secretary ef War. 
No. 7. 
M. F. MAURY, 
Lieutenant United States :Navy. 
Report ef Lieutenant J. A. Dahlgren. 
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materially affecting the power of forts. For whether it be use~ as a chief mot~ve 
power or as an auxiliary, it gives great facility in ~oncentratm~ and a~pearrng 
:uddenly on given points, and in assuring a certam and rapid transit when 
required to pass the fire of a fort. . . . . . 
In the defence of nearly every one of the large commercial cities, it w~Jl be 
observed that the chief reliance to prevent the approach of an enemy 1s. by 
'ortifying some approach to it; the naval question mere!Y. tou:hes the practica-
bility of passing the fire of these works, and not of sustammg it any longer than 
may be necessary in the most rapid movement that the ship is capable of. 
To illustrate this practically let us turn to the mode proposed in the engineer's 
report* for excluding an enemy from the lower bay of New York by a fort on 
~andy Hook, with floating batteries and bomb ketches inside. 
'rhe ordnance commonly mounted in the coast fortifications are 32-pounders, 
42-pounders, and eight-inch howitzers. 'l'he effective fire of the 32-pounder can 
hardly be said to extend beyond a mile where heavy ships are concerned . 
.At that distance the penetration will not exceed fourteen inches when the 
~hot strikes the surface fairly and directly. If the impact be oblique or on 
ricochet, the penetration is decreased accordingly. The effect of the fire is 
further decreased by the unavoidable deviation of shot at the distance of a mile, 
and by the movement of the object which is changing its position in direction 
and distance. It would be difficult to estimate correctly the number of shot 
which would have a maximum penetration under these circumstances, but 
perhaps not more than one in ten. 'rhe forty-two pounder and army eight-inch 
howitzer will not vary this capacity considerably, and it seems reasonable to 
as umc that, if the distance be greater than a mile no material injury will be 
experienced from such pieces by a heavy ship when under way. 
The sketch annexed represents the localities in question as given by the chart 
of the Coast Survey. The track at mean low water allowed to the heaviest 
~teamerst is shown by the coloring. 
The effective fire for the proposed fort as indicated by the circle, evidently 
covers no considerable part of the passage, and if a steamer chose to take the 
main channel she would, by keeping its extreme right, be under fire about six 
or seven minutes, and never approach the guns of the fort nearer than fourteen 
hundred yards, thus rendering the chances of any damage exceedingly slight. 
But the swash channel offers sufficient depth for her draught, and by using it 
the teamer would pass entirely out of reach of the fort. The sole reliance, 
then, to exclude the fleet becomes the floating batteries and bomb ketches ; 
whether they may be trusted or not will be cons;dered subsequently; the present 
object is merely to inquire if the fort has the power of itself to exclude shipping. 
It seems evident, therefore, that while it is very doubtful whether forts have 
gained any advantage from the use of shells, it is certain their efficacy has been 
con. ·iderably diminished by the application of steam to the vessels-of-war, 
which by their decreased draught are enabled to enter channels not accessible 
to ...,hips-of-the-line, and when obliged to pass the fire of permanent works are 
enabled to do ,·o in so little time as hardly to afford the batteries an opportunity 
to effect any e. Rcntial damage. 
Query 2.-·what reliance could be placed on vessels of war or of commerce, 
fl ating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent forti-
fications 1 
In proceeding to an wer this query, I find the ground already occupied by 
c e rtain propositions contained in an official document drawn up in 1840 in rela-
ti Jll to the defence. of the coast. 'l.1110 source from which these views emanate 
and th<.'ir official character entitle them to full consideration, so that I do not 
o To War D partment, 1840. 
t Su quchanna, full loaded, draws nineteen feet eleven inches. 
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Sketch of Hook with fort-Its fire and channel way. 
llJOO 0 ~000 ,2000 8000 5000 
Sc.AL]; 80000 
The eff<-ctive fire of the fort is sho"n by the circle. 
propo51-
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To the first proposition there lies a reasonable demurrer, because, unde~ t~e 
eircumstances likely to attend the defence of any harbor or roadstead which 1s 
pproached by a channel, great disadvantage must acc~mpany t?-e at'.te~pt, 
micularly when the passage lies among the shoals, of which there 1s no _md1ca-
cion, save by artificial marks or the lead. Where the moveme_nts of ~h1ps are 
nly limited by bold shores there can be little embarrassT?e~t m k eepmg them 
rrom danger; but where the keenest eye can detect notl:mg on the surfac~ of 
· e water to give warning of the risk, and a slight erro~· m the course or a t1~e-
dy may ground a ship directly under fire, it is evident that the attent10n 
requisite to clear these obstacles successfully will prevent the officers o~ a fleet 
il'Om giving full directions to its offensive powers, though at the very time the 
pposing ship may be concentrating a deliberate and destructive fire on ~he 
a.ding ship attempting to enter, or the assailants may be compelled by wmd 
a.nd weather to postpone essaying the entrance, even under these disadvantages; 
hile thus detained he must be exposed to the severe gales and to much damage, 
a consideration not to be overlooked on our coast, even in the summer months. 
In 1778 the Engli;h and French fleets, then off Rhode Island, were separated 
from each other while manamvring for the weather gauge during the month of 
August, and many of the heaviest ships dismasted on both sides. 
On the other hand, the defending force, fully cognizant of the difficulties 
· hich await the enemy, either take such position at anchor, or under way with 
team or sail, as will be best suited to annoy the enemy when most occupied in 
clearing the intricacies of unknown shoals, and increase the danger by concen-
trating a deliberate fire at a moment critical not only to the vessel most exposed 
to it, but to those which follow and are liable to be thrown into disorder by the 
least mishap. , 
Be it remembered that this capacity of transferring the power of its armament 
from one point to another is the essential quality in the present case which the 
fort does not possess. 
Under such circumstances the most cool and brave are apt to hasten too 
much, naturally desiring to shorten the time of inaction, and t0 make some 
return to the fire of the enemy ; hence the liability to lose the services of one or 
more . hips in the moment of greatest need. 
Well known instances of this may be cited. While standing in to attack the 
French at the Nile, Nelson lost the use of the Culloden, 74, which grounded on 
a ·hoal, though not even under fire at the time, and remained there useless 
during the whole action. At Copenhagen three of his line grounded on a shoal-
the .Agamemnon, 7 4, the Russell, 7 4, and Bellona, 7 4; and, in leaving their 
anchors during the suspension of hostilities, the Defiance and Nelson's own 
Ehip, the Elephant, with several others, grounded under the guns of the Three-
Oro-,vn battery. 
The defending force has, moreover, the advantage, if anchored, of being able 
to po t ome guns ashore so as to enfilade vessels taking the direction of its own 
line, and also prevent the weather ships from being doubled on by the enemy. 
Every naval man will comprehend the difficulties of navigating a fleet of 
h.eavy ships along channels skirted closely by shoals and commanded through-
out their extent by the guns of an enemy's line; and the advantages, on the 
other side, of being able deliberately to rake ships approaching in that way will 
he very apparent . 
.Among the events of the revolution may be found an apt illustration of this : 
I 1778 a large force wa. de patched from France with the view of surprising 
the En 001i. h fleet in the Delaware. Philadelphia had been evacuated, however. 
'r e 1ount de E taing followed to N cw York, and appeared off that harbor 
a ur the 10th of July. Lord Ilowe was by no means prepared for his arrival, 
1,u , n<.:verth 1 . , he proce dcd with energy and judgment to defend the entrance 
,v:t:h a f rec ya ·tly inferior to that of the enemy. 
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The French admiral, after deliberating some ten days, finally declined to 
attack, and on the 22d of July departed on another expedition. 
On this occasion there were strong motives for bring-ing the English fleet to 
action. Their army now occupied no other of the large cities than New York. 
The recent evacuation of Philadelphia was · not calculated to encourage the 
hopes of the royalists, and if "the men-of-war were defeated at this time, the 
fleet of transports and victuallers must have been destroyed, and the army of 
course fallen with them."-(Eakin, page 77.) The re-enforcements, too, arriving 
to succor the fleet, would have been cut off in detail. The consequence might 
have been immediately fatal to the hopes of the British, though favorable to the 
cause of humanity, by terminating a struggle which endured four years subse-
quently. 
The difference in force seemed sufficient to justify an engagement under any 
circumstances. rrhe French had twelve ships of the line, carrying eight hun-
dred and seventy-six guns. The English only nine ships that could be brought 
into line, and these mounting five hundred and thirty-four gup.s. The disparity 
was even greater than that expressed by these figures, as the French carried 
their guns in ships far superior in size and strength to those of the British. 
The main channel which the French were obliged to make use of was thus 
defended by Lord Howe: Five ships of fifty-four guns and one of fifty were 
anchored in line bearing about W.NW. from the easternmost vessel that lay 
near to a storeship which was armed with some guns, and anchored close in 
with the Hook. A battery of two howitzers and another of three 18-pounders 
were posted on the shore close to the weather-ship to prevent th1t end from 
being doubled on, and four regiments landed on the Hook to repel any attempt 
of the French to disembark troops and destroy the batteries. Three hips were 
placed near the bar to embarrass the passage, and a sixty-four, with frig·ates, 
lay inside of the line to be used as occasion might require. 
··when the French had pa sed the bar iu sufficient force, the three ships were 
to retire and take the rear of the line, "which would bring their broadsides to 
bear upon the direct line of approach in the narrowest part of it, when, by 
veering again, they would resume their situations, and continue to command the 
long line of course which the enemy must pursue as he advances, while the 
smaller vessels were so placed as to harass and distress him from inaccessible 
po itions."-(Eakin, page 86.) 
'l'he plan of defence was weJl conceived, and would no doubt have been care-
fully xccuted. 
'l'hc l:!"'rench admiral declined to attack under these circum tance , and in all 
probability would have suffered great damage, if not defoat, if he had made the 
att mpt. 
' h uperiority which a naval force derived from it mobility over the 
·trong 'Rt work i very apparent in thi ca e. 
The .Fr n ·h .,hip could not CY n pa!-< th bar at 1 i ur ; th y would have 
br.m umler fire from th firRt in v nturing to cl · o, and b xpo d to a rakinO' 
fire· in approa ·hino- th Br:it:i h lin which th y w •r not ev n at liberty to pa:----
a · tlu·: ·oul<l ha.v don , if thr atcn cl 1 y th• fire f a fort only but wouhl 
li v l · ·n ohlio- ·cl to uo-ag and to cl •:troy it a au indi. p n abl preliminary 
t an_· forth •r op r, tion . 
'l ou ·hi1w th · . · ·oncl propo:,;iti n, it may he , aid that th re i n doubt now 
f th · tim · that will r <1uir d t arry int •llio-en · fr m any on poin t r 
:moth •r nor of that which may L n • ·d d to trau f r aid fr m p int t poin 
al 11!? th ·aboard. 
Tlu., appc·aran · f an n mY hi~ for· ., 
·w rl an almo"t in taut]_· aft1·r it i ht wn at 13 ::t n and at an. · J ·ut 
h t \" ' ' Jl Ji . ·1t1 · , nd "hat \· r -.t1•Hm for • m; V hav h<• r n p -.t ,j} lh 
111-iu ·ip tl ntr, 11 • .m trnn f ·rrc<l fr Ill uc of th •m to an th r at a 
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Defence of New York harbor, by Lord Howe, against the French fleet,, July, 1778. 
1000 U 1040 1000 \DOD 
tH:::::t::±HI I '=====i 
Sea.le ioooo 
ratP of :speec1. Trn knot:-1 per hour i:-, not exccRRivr for a goocl ocean Rtrc rnn in 
any wr•n.tlier in which an c·n my wonlc.l be likely to operate in a matter so dcli-
c:atP as forcing a d.i. putcd. clwnnrl. 
H. Ex. Doc. 9.2--24 
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The question, tlwrefore, is not whether the inferior force stationed at a p01·t 
may be able to make good a final defence against an enemy appearing sud-
denly, bu~ wlietlier it may liave tlie power to delay kis movements until aid 
shall arrii:e from another quarter. 
'rhus, in thirteen hours after the first sight of an enemy from the Neversink 
h eights, a squadron from the Delaware would be off Sandy Hook; and twenty-
eight hours would bring up a force from the Chesapeake. . 
If the hostile fleet shall not be able to pass the channel, destroy the squadron 
that defends it, and still be in a state to attempt the passage of the Narrows in 
less than thirteen hours, it is very certain that a fresh squadron, even though 
somewhat inferior, will afford him good reason to look to his own defence, and 
think of retreating, instead of venturing to prosecute his operations. Finally, 
the Chesapeake vessels, arriving in fifteen hours after the D elaware steamers, 
will give more than a chance for capturing at lea[:\t every steamer of the enemy 
that has been crippled in the engagement with the New York squadron. 
The means requisite, therefore, at each port, are those that will insure the 
time needed to concentrate the other portions of the home squadron. 
The result of the preceding propositions, as announced in the third, has 
received its practical application in a preceding passage,* thus: "The prepara-
tion by the enemy of twenty team frigates would require the construction of 
two hundred of equal force on our part, supposing that we design to cover but 
ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy." 
The principal objection to the defensive position thus assumed to be imposed 
on the two hundred steamers, by the necessities of the first ancl second proposi-
tions, would be the impossibility of carrying it into execution. There is certainly 
110 precedent for such a sy tern of inaction; and if any naval officer were so 
dispot:icd, it is more than J_Jrobablc that public opinion would hardly permit the 
precedent to occur here. Novel it would be to sec two hundred steamers divided 
into squadrons at distant points, quietly awaiting the onset of one-tenth their 
whol number. The enemy him ·elf would probably be alarmed at ...,uch a 
p culiar demonstration, and rather be inclined to look upon it as a trap for bis 
twenty ships. 
Admitting, for an instant, that any necessity could exist for pur...,uing a plan 
so strictly defensive in it. character, would it not be b tter to send the ..;hip out 
to " ·a, ·where the public attention would not be enforced to the humiliating 
character of the operation, and cause them to form a cordon alonO' the coast, 
from l\laine to Florida 1 'l1hit:i di.-t:mce of fourteen hundred miles could be easily 
lin ·c1 by two hunch·ed ship , CY n mile ~rund •r; and being within the notice 
of any unu. ual signal from each other, the nemy's twenty hip , in attemptino-
to pa~:; th lin , would be · n and ov rhaulccl by the r ady concentration of an 
·qual m1mL •r from the cordon, b •fore h could reach th port to be a ... :-ailccl . 
.Uc· that a it may, no naYal fficer can doubt that if th "United 'tate. had 
fully available two lnmdr .cl war-.'t 'amcr. of th • laro·c ·t cla , or ~ailinO' --hip · of 
·q nal tomrng , the qu :-tion would be cntir •ly in r O'ard to the charact ·r of 
<t//'l'll, ·ire ope1ations. It would no longrr L an object to d fend our own ports, 
lm to ·aptur · ancl d :--troy th 'nern · ·hip. in cli:-t:mt :,,1c>a~ "hil protf'ctin!! 
hi: ·olonil·. and tra le -to intc•r 'C'pt hi commPrCP 'V r ·whrr -to li--pnt<' th 
·ommarnl of the: high , c·:1. with hi miO'hti :-t fl • ·t ·, and l,lockatl cn:ry n:l\', I 
t:ition nf hi: i:-:1:mcl c·mpir . 
t i. nnt n 'CC'", ary to pro: ·utC' forth r ohjc tion. to the:-• propo,iti 11, . 
• ·aYal nwn, with harclly an c·.· cc ption, woulrl tak • tll<' y r · onnr. c of th fir, 
, lHl . · ·oncl prop :itiou-. :md uttnfr prot • 't ng·ain:t th, 011 e Jlll nt cont in _d_ in 
tlw thircl. , tron!!<'l" n•n ·1111,. ha,·<· Y ·t tn 1, • adclu · cl to mal·c croocl th· p ,1 l 
that cl ti•nc-c 1, · m nn. 1·.·cl u. fr ·IY ;m,·al i:-: im1mt ·ti ·abh• for ~he na OJ !!fr .,. 
n tla tl,r ·c propo itio" . 
OEoginc r' re 1t1 l age H. 
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The practical interpretation of the second query, however,_ has no reference 
:o the question of an exclusive defence by_ the forts or ships, so far as the 
l tlantic coast is coneerned, if I understand rightly. The answer must necessa-
rily be based upon the existing state of _things; and as a great part of !he con-
templatecl system of coast fortification has been completed, the expediency_ of 
~ubstituting ships, &c., has reference only to such of the system as remams 
unfinished. , 
The works for the protection of Boston and of the navy yard at Norfolk are 
already completed. At New York, likewise, excepting the fort on Sandy Hook. 
The approach to Philadelphia, however, and the anchorage at the breakwater 
are yet undefended, though the works have been planned and perhaps partly 
appropriated for. 
I have no doubt when these places, and some harbor on the southeast coast, 
have received whatever aid can be furnished by the art of the engineer, that a 
naval force of no immoderate extent will be fully competent to defend the 
Atlantic seacoast from any attempts which an enemy would find it advisable to 
make. · 
Under no circumstances, except of the most unquestionable superiority at sea, 
is it presumed that it would be well to resort to a defence exclm:\ively naval. 
The ship and the fort have each a particular province in every general system of 
well r egulated national defence, and if these can be ngreed on the result will be 
reliable and economical. I do not mean to apply the latter word to the least 
po~sible outlay of means, but to the judicious expenditure of whatever may be 
required to effect the end proposed. 
It is not needful here to enter into any statement of the part properly allotted 
to forts ; this has been ably and frequently expounded by the chief engineer. 
Admitting them fully, and the necessity also for the works in the principal 
points above alluded to, as the base for the naval operations that are to guard 
the intermediate points, it may be well to examine whether even the great har-
bor s and watercourses are fully defensible by fortifications, when of the most 
ext e n s ive character. 
L e t u s again revert to the defences of New York. 
The first object is to prevent the occupation of the lower harbor by a hostile 
[eet, for if able to effect this the enemy would obtain the following advantages, 
acc o rding to the report of the board of engineers, (page 54:) 
"~t\._n enemy's squadron being in the bay, into which entrance is very easy, 
would set a seal upon this outlet of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or 
depart at any season of the year. And it would also intercept the water com-
tn.u n ica tion, by way of the Raritan, between New York and Philadelphia. 
H The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, (the 
place o f the landing of the British, which brought on the battle of Long Island, 
in t he r evolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its 
c0Il]JI1a nding heights, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any 
Sort. 
H Thi · danger ·is imminent, and it would not fai], in the event of war, to be as 
fully r cafo~ed a. it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedi-
tion. being in preparation in England, 27,000 militia were assembled to cover 
the c i ty from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences near the 
c:ity and tho of the Narrows, indispensn.ble a:; they are for other purposes, 
tan -iot h e made to prevent this enterprise." 
,.-There can be no doubt of the great damage that would be wrought to the 
teve.nue of the government, and to the immense interesLs of various sections, by 
the pre::, nee of an enemy's force in the lower harbor. A heavy-expenditure 
,,,0 u_Jd b · well laid out in e tabli hing the means of prevention, a~1d · this should 
c:ertsinly be looked to in time. 
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What fortifications, then, can be applied to the purpose, and how far will they 
be efficacious in excluding a fleet 1 
A glance at the chart will show a wide extent of water between the outer 
extremes of land that form the harbor from Sandy Hook to Coney island; 
the distance is about seven miles. Large ships, however, are not at liberty to 
pass over any part of this entrance. Their course is confined to two channels, 
the principal one of which is near the Hook, and another somewhat to the north-
ward of it, (the swash.) Line-of-battle ships can use the first only, but the 
heaviest steam frigate in our service, when loaded for a long cruise, only draws 
twenty feet, (the Susquehanna,) and therefore has sufficiBnt water to pass in by 
the swash channel. 
According to their report the board of engineei·s propose to fortify tlie east 
brancli and middle ground, under the belief that the bottom was sufficiently 
permanent to receive such works. Recent surveys, however, have so far shaken 
such opinion as to induce them to forego the project. 
The report goes on to state, (page 55 :) "This may, however, be said with 
certainty, namely: that, all other means failing, works may be erected on Sandy 
Hook which will have a good action upon the channel, and under cover of 
which bomb ketches or steam batteries, or both, may lie. With such an arrange-
ment there would be little probability of the lower bay being occupied as a 
blockading station." 
I have already endeavored to make it apparent that any works on the Hook 
would, of themselves, be insufficient to prevent the passage of ships into the 
lower harbor, and it will be perceived that this is also fairly inferable from the 
passage just quoted, as it includes other aid in the arrangement desjgned to pre-
vent the occupation of the lower harbor. 
Line-of-battle ships, in taking the main channel, would, however, sustain the 
fire of a fort without material detriment for the eight or ten minutes required to 
pass it, with a fo,ir wind and tide; and, if annoyed by the floating batteries and 
ketches, wonlcl not hesitate to run close to them and brush them with a few 
broadsides, which would probably leave them little more to do than to take care 
of themscl ves. 
The heaviest steamers, by taking the swash channel, would avoid the fire of 
the fort and floating batteries altogether, and afterward have leisure to destroy 
the latter from the anchorage of the lower harbor. 
So far, therefore, from believing that, "with such an arrangement, there would 
be little probability of the lower bay being occupied as a blockading station," 
it eems conchrnive that the occupa,tion of the lower harbor by a naval force 
would be liable to the least degree of 'interruption from the defences planned for 
that pm1>0 ·c. The report itself admits the nece ity of uRing floating batteries 
and bomb ketches as auxiliarie , which, of all the naval meanR, are certainlv 
the least worthy of reliance. With the limited preventive power· of a fort, ~ 
far a. pa:4Rag-e i · concerned, they have in no d<·gr e the least of its capacity to 
ndure battc·riucr, their material being a. vulnerable as that of a ship, without 
it. great aclvant:we of passing from one point to another, whether for or n ar. 
And a::: for hornh ketche. again t objects no larger than Rhip., aud tho;.e in rapid 
motion, it mny hr aid that the chanccH of even a sino-le bomb dropping- upon 
them arc too rc·m<>t to be taken into account as a mean of defence in the con-
dition· of thi ca: . 
1oncl·i,·i1w, tlu·refor , the entrance of an enemy into the lower harhor to be 
fairly fi a . .ihle, tl1e rn·.·t matter for con.·ideratiou i th capacity of the inner 
d ·frucc. to pr<'Vl'Ht ntranc into the upper hm·hor and th dr.:truction of :c:uch 
mr:m ~ 1f war :tll(l r .-cnne a. ma T he found in ancl about the city, ~uc:h n, t11c· 
v .. cl:---of-war lrnilt or huilclino- at thr navy ·arcl, of th timb r, ordnance, nnd 
tor .·, anc1, above all, of th xt n. iv<' privat ~tabfo,hm •nt. for manufoc:turin!!' 
t am- •ngin .: ; a purpo ·c which, if ·ffectccl, would crippl the nation iu c,·er:-
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enterprise of offence and defence, and probably could not be remedied in the 
course of a war. 
The levying of contributions might n?t ?e disregarded where_ means so ample 
1rere placed by the chances of war w1tlun the_ ~rasp of an mvader. These 
objects individually are sufficient to warrant a military attempt 0;1 a large scale. 
The number and character of the works arranged by the engmeers are best 
set forth in the language of the "Report," page 54: 
"At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passage becomes so 
contracted as to permit good disposition to be made for defence. On the Long 
Island side of the Narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong water battery, 
·tanding on a reef at some distance from the shore ; and immediately behind it, 
on the top of the bank, is a small but strong work called Fort Hamilton. 
Some repairs being applied to these works, this position may be regarded as 
well occupied. 
"On the west side or Staten Island side of the Narrows are the following 
works belonging to the State of New York, viz : Fort Richmond, which is a 
water battery; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water ; 
Battery Morton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill ; and Fort 
Tompkins, which is also on the top of the hill, and is the principal work. All 
these need great repairs, but, being once in proper order, would afford a very • 
important contribution to the defence of the passage, nothing further indeed 
being contemplated for this position except the construction of a small redoubt 
on a commanding hill a little to the southwest. The repairs of these works 
cannot too soon be taken in hand, and it is hoped some arrangements may soon 
be made with the State authorities to that end. . 
"With the Narrows thus defended, and the works near the city in perfect 
order, New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against any attack 
by water through this passage." 
That these works are themselves perfectly capable of resisting the attack of 
~ny fleet there is no doubt, but that they are able to interdict the passage to a 
like _naval force is very far from being certain; on the contrary, the chances o_f 
passmg, without suffering to any material extent, are reasonable enough to 
warrant the attempt in view of the great results to be derived therefrom. 
'l'he distance between the nearest batteries is seventeen hundred yards. The 
water is deep to the very shore of Staten Island, and the edge of the reef well 
marked, on the Long Island side, by the water battery. The largest ship, 
therefore, may choose the course likely to be most advantageous in receiving 
the least weight of metal. 
If the officer in command run mid-channel he will be under the fire of both 
sides at a most effective distance ( eight hundred yards) when rjght abreast of 
them, but by taking one side or the other he will recede from one fire, and in 
approaching the other be exposed to no great increase of effect. 
~uppose h_e choose to keep the left shore and 1·isk the fire of these batteries, 
w~Ile, by domg so, he will place fourteen or fifteen hundred yards between his 
ships and the Long Island batteries. 
. 'rhe sketch annexed shows the course within the scope of effective fire, which 
1s about two statute miles. It will hardly be questioned that a decent sea 
steamer should run ten knots hourly (sea miles) in smooth water; these are 
equal to eleven and a half statute miles. Of course, she takes the strength of a 
flood tide and spreads every stitch of canvas to a fair wind, which ought ·to add 
another mile, making the total speed twelve and a half statute miles per hour, 
(three hundred and sixty-seven yards per minute,) at which rate she will pass 
over a mile in four and three-fourth minutes. 
Tracing the assigned course through the scope of the guns on both sides, 
marked by the circles, it will be found that the distance run is about two miles; 
that is, the steamer will not be more than ten minutes under fire. 
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The 3~-pounders and the 42-pounders of the Long Island water battery will 
require an elevation of about three degrees to reach the enemy, the 8-inch sea-
coast howitzers about four degrees-both unfavorable to ricochet; for the pro-
jectiles will bound high in rising, and with a power much diminished even when 
the weather is e-mooth; but with the ripple occasioned by the moderate breeze, 
which is supposed to be taken advantage of, the ricochet could not be depended 
on for direction or force, and therefore the direct firing only will be available on 
the right hand, especially from Fort Hamilton, which is five hundred yards in 
rear of the water battery, and the guns there mounted would need at least five 
degrees; their shot could have no ricochet whatever, and would genemlly sink 
where they strike the water. 
Taking into consideration the deviation of the projectiles and the rapid move-
ment of the steamers, the chances of oblique impact from the incurvation of the 
trajectory, the variety of curved surfaces forming a ship's side, and the constant 
change in their manner of presentation to the direction of the ball, it is probable 
that not more than one shot or shell in ten can be relied on at this distance to 
produce a maximum penetration. 
The principal work on the left, Fort Tompkins, is situated on a high hiJl, and 
two other batteries (Hudson and Morton) are in elevated positions.=li< Their fire 
is therefore not so efficacious for short distances. 
To an enemy which should thus attempt to escape the fire of Fort Lafayette, 
by steering in with the Staten Island shore, the guns of the water battery (Fort 
Richmond) would be very formidable. 
1'his work mounts twenty-seven 42-pounders,* of which it is probable that 
not more than a third can be made to bear on any one point. 
At tvrn hundred yards, which is to be the nearest approach of the ships in 
pas ing, the maximum penetration of 42-pounder shot in oak will not exceed 
fifty iuches. 
'l'he time of exposure to the fire of the fort would be about fifteen minutes for 
a sailing hip at the rate of eight knots, and about ten minutes for a steamer 
going elev n knots. 
Would the damage received in that time be likely to injure so many vessels 
as to prevent the design on the city entirely, in consequence of the reduction of 
the force 1 
In attempting to arrive at some satisfactory response to this query, one is 
bound to avoid possible contingencies, and to adhere to those which experience 
ha indicated a probable. 
A hell properly placed will sink a ship ; a hot shot will set her on fire ; but 
it would b very unwise thence to infer that this would necessarily be the effect 
of vc·ry shot fired at the ship. 
1'he Horn t ank the Peacock in fifteen minutes; but no naval offic r would 
int r from the fact that a sloop-of-.war could generally obtain a like re:;ult. So 
far from that, it i unprecedeuted and may hardly occur again. 
ucntainty a to the distance, change of po ition, interposition of the i::moke 
in a ov r d batt ry, lack of delib ration, will cause the failure of many hot to 
"trik th • ol~jc• ·t at all. 
'l'he <·.·a ·tly fatal ,·pot i limited to a few inche of urface near the water 
line; in ther place a hip will , u tain a large numb r of h 11, . 
' h • pro lig-iou, nclurauc of line-of-battle hips will appear to any one who 
will look ov r th r c rd of a fighti-. Ilour after hour th y have been known 
to u:-itain an unc a.-in fir at each other, with very gun on th whol broad-
or two c . of inking during a fight will be found. 
0 See report of Board of Engineers. 
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I'assage through the Narr,ws, NPw York harbor. 
1aoo o .f. ooa :iooo aoao 
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Let us note a few instances of endurance that have occurred in well known 
engagf'ments : 
In 1770 the Sandwich, ninety-eight, received seventy shot holes, seventeen 
of them between wind and Vi'ater, (Rodney and DcGuichen.) She continncd to 
fonn part of the English fleet, and cruised actively, as the flag-ship, until Rodney 
went home, eighteen months afterwards. 
At Copenhagen, N clson anchored his ships about three hundred yards from 
the Danish line, and received its fire £or more than three hours. Of the fleet 
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not one was Rufficiently injured to interfere with the active operations against 
SwPden and Russia that followed. 
More recently, in an affair ill calculated to maintain the prestige of ships in 
attackjng batteries, it will be seen that a line-of-battle ship received the fire of 
two batteries, of four g·uns each, during seven hours. The deliberate operation 
of one of these witli lwt shot, through the whole afternoon, was entirely unmo-
}c<::ted by the fire from the ship, as it appears hardly more than half a dozen 
shots from her struck near the battery; yet she did not take :fire until six in the 
evening. I allude to the action of the Danish ship Christiana VIII, of eighty-
four guns, Eckenfjorde, 1849 . 
. At Alg·iers (1816) the Impregnable received two hundred and sixty-eight 
shots in her hull, of which fifty penetrated below the lower deck, and three, of 
68-pounders, six feet below the water line. 
Even frigates will endure severe service. The lVIacedonian received one hun-
dred shots in her hull in the engagement with the frig·ate United States, and was 
brought E-lafely into port. After receiving repairs in her topworks she was used 
in the United States navy for sixteen years, after which she ·was broken up and 
rclmilt entirely. 
In 1810 the Galatea, a small thirty-two gun frigate of eight hundred tons, 
rec ·ived seventy-eight shots in her hull,* many between wind and water. She 
continued to cruise, however. 
A fleet of line-of-battle ships, then, would have little to dread, it is believed, 
from Fort Richmond in attempting to pass it, and could probably do so without 
material damage. If the enemy should deem it advisable to allow the leading 
hiJ_J to anchor abreast the battery during the thirty minutes occupied by the 
line in passing, the other ships would be insured against the severest of the fire, 
and the entire loss devolved on one which certainly ought to endure this without 
being disabled. 
Steamers have the additional liability of injury to the machinery or boilers, 
thereby suspending the action of the engine. But if their sides are lined, as 
they should be, with the coal bunkers, their contents would suffice to arrest the 
JH'0O'ress of the shot or shells, and prevent damage to the machinery; the explo-
F<ion of the latter might be rendered comparatively harmless in the loose masses 
of coal, unless it were bituminous, and on that account susceptible of being 
ignitrd. 
The fire of the ships would, of course, be kept up, though probably with very 
littl r damage to casemated works. 'l'he smoke enveloping the hulls would, 
J10wrv •r, tend to increase the di:fficultie of dii-;tinguishing from the fort su:ffi-
cimtly, and would embarrass the aim, while the entrance of an occasional 8hot 
jnto an ·mbra<::ure might di8mount a gun ancl fracture the cast iron cas mate 
carriag into atoms, thereby doing· infinite mischief. · 
It ha· b en as urned that the enemy attempts tlrn pa . age of the Narrows in 
!>r<ilHl clay. But upposc he choose a dark night and mid-channel. 'l'he strait 
1i- more than thre -fourth· of a mile wide, without a ·hoaJ nearer than the :;hore. 
'l'l1rr<· i. 11 •ith •r difficulty nor dangrr, .,o far a· the navigation is concerned; and 
th · random fir of gun at eight hundred yards, from both ·ide of the shore, 
wonlcl h a ,·mall matt •r. 
Th bri ·f utlin of th probable re. ult of a ·w 11 designed and w 11 conducted 
ncl ·avor t pa th arrow may perbap. fail to . hake the faith of military 
mc·n in th capa ·ity of the work to exclude .,hip . But would it be wi, to 
tru:-t th fa.t of th city v n to a chanc , r mote a: it may b 7 For if ·ucc ,~-
fol ,. u th board of 1win' r. would hardly r ly ou the work about th city 
0 In quaclron that apturcd the French frig-nte Rcnommec, afrerward, named thP .r v:1. 
and 01ken by the nitccl tatc hip Coa titution. 
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-~ a means of further prevention. Speaking of them, (Fort Columbus, &r:,,) t~e 
report says, (page 53:) . . . . . . 
"It is a disadvantage of their pos1t10ns, h~wever, that the destrnct10n of the 
city might be going on simultaneously with the contest between these forts and 
the fleet." 
If the Narrows are forced certain it is that in less tl1an half an hour the 
,team frigates will be. within' range of the batteries 9f Governor's island and 
1he "mall forts about the city. What now will intervene to prevent the ~estr~c-
rion of the public works 1 Should the enemy choose to pass some of his slups 
round to the northward of Governor's island, every shot from our own guns 
that misses his hulls will tell on the devoted city, and effect more damage than 
the enemy himself would, in cold blood, be willing to inflict. A force now may 
abo be detached to the navy yard and other places. Ro~kets, carcasses, ::u~d 
~hell put in operation, and in a few hours the flamrs will stnp us of the pubhc 
and private resources. If a detachment be landed, meanwhile, to aid, the work 
will be done effectually; and the ebbing tide convey the fleet to the lower 
harbor, there to intercept the commerce and to blockade. Two or three steamers 
of the attacking force may be destroyed, the detachment on shore cut off; but 
what would such losses be in comparison to those inflicted 1 . 
In the conclusion from certain premises, then, the views here entcrtamed 
accord with that of the engineer's report, as thus expressed: 
"If the mere passing under sail, with a leading wind and tide, one or even 
two sets of batteries, and then carrying on operations out of the reach of these 
or any other, were all, the enemy might perhaps aceomplish it." 
At the same time there can be no doubt that the defence of a port may be 
made good, when its shore line permits of the condition prescribed by the report 
as sufficient, thus: 
"Batteries should succeed each other along the channel, so that the enemy 
may nowhere find shelter from the effective range of shot and shells while within 
the harbor, even should he succeed in passing the first batteries. Provided the 
shor es admit this disposition, and the defences be supplied with an armament, 
numerous, heavy, and selected with reference to the effects on shipping, the facts 
we have quoted from history show that these defences may be relied on." 
'rhe only question will be as to the certainty of so disposing the land works. 
Other p_assages which occur in the report of the board of engineers seem far 
more applicable to the case under consideration, aud I cheerfully avail myself 
of them as folly expressing all that I desire to add on this head. 
"There are, doubtless, situations where it may be necessary for us to present 
a defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be 
impracticable; and it is not, therefore, prejudging the question we are about to 
exa1nine; it is neither unc1erratin o· fortifications, nor overrating these floating 
defeuces, to say that these last ar;, some or all of them, indispensable 'in such 
position. 
"Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance 
from the shores greater than effective gun-range, and where no insular spot, 
natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of ships, will present 
such a situation, and we may take some of our great bays as examples. 
" Broad sounds and wide roac1steads, affording secure anchorage beyond good 
gun-range from the shores, will afford examples of another sort; and harbors 
with very wide entrances and large surfaces exhibit examples of still another 
kind. 
'' As in all such cases fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and, nevertheless, 
recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a 
reco1nmcndation in the several reports on the defence of the coast since 1818, 
that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate floating 
defences. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution 
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in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be 
resorted to; not, however, because they are means intrinsically good, or suitable 
under other circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable." 
Admitting, then, that "any very broad water, where deep soundings may be 
carried at a distance from the shores greater than effective gun-range, and where 
no insular spots, natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of 
ships, will present such a situation; and we may take some of our great bays as 
examples," as a premise to the second query, then what auxiliaries shall be 
resorted to 1 Of all those which, in connexion with permanent works, might be 
selected to control effectually the channels of our principal watercourses and 
harbors, none are less reliable than floating batteries and gunboats. 
In the well-constructed fort, the chief merit is a capacity of endurance almost 
impregnable to the aseiaults of shipping. 
In the ship, a mobility which gives the facility of transferring the great power 
of her battery to any part of the channel that may need it. The disadvantage 
of one is its immobility, which restricts it to a fixed point, whence it can control 
nothing beyond gun range; of the other, a vulnerable material very susceptible 
of damage from protracted battering. 
The floating battery unites the weak points of both fort and ship. It is 
neither spear nor shield, and is altogether objectionable, as inefficient, costly, and 
unsuited to the character and resources of a great nation. Its worthlessness as 
a defence is well manifested by the affair at Copenhagen in 1800, under circum-
stauces when, of all others, it would have been most gratifying to every sense 
of justice that it should have protected the neutral rights of a brave but feeble 
nation. On that occasion there were six hundred and twenty-eight guns mounted 
on a line of floating defences, supported, as well as the urgency of the case ad-
mitted, by several forts and a reserve of heavy ships. 
Nine English line-of-battle ships entered the channel skirted by the .Danish 
line; commenced action at distances varying two hundred to four hundred yards, 
captured and destroyed the Danish floating batteries in three or four hours, and 
sustained no damage sufficient to interfere with their proceeding against the 
other parties to "armed neutrality "-Sweden and Russia. 
The report of the board of engineers, previously referred to, embodies many 
interesting details of this event, to which the only material objection is the 
mocle of stating the force. 
1st. The Bellona, 7 4, and Russell, 7 4, grounded on the edge of the shoal, having 
their own liue directly between them and the Danes, so that their fire could be 
of littl a.vail, though themselves might be much damaged by the shot from the 
enemy which missed the EngliRh line. 
2d. 'l'he frigates and sloops had been directed to take the stations of these 
hip oppo. ite the tick rouer battery, so that of the twelve line-of-battle ships 
onl nine w re opposed to the floating batteries, being about.fifty guns stronger 
than th Dani h line, aud not tliree /iundred and eigl,,ty-two, as the report infers. 
11<' of th' board of engineers' deductions from this engagement is so conclu-
ivc that it may be quoted without further comment. It is thus (page 20 :) 
"'I hat it illu trate strikingly the advantages that a fleet possesse over a 
stationary line of floating defences. Lord N cl on was uperior to the whole of 
hi aclver ·:u· ,, floating fore ; but not being dispo,' ecl to run any unnecc ~ary 
hazard h clir t d all hi force upon a part of the Danioc h line, which wa of 
cour:-i c1<>fi·at c1 ; and hacl there been no other than a floating force pre ent, 1-0 of 
coun'I would haYe b n the r maind r, had it b en twice the streno-th it was. 
'Ihi .· . ampl fully confirm what we have before urged on th:i topic." 
'omc id a of th xp n of large floating batter:i may be gathered from 
th pap r of neral 1ain n coa t defence. Tho c propo ed by him were to 
carry on<.: hundred and tw nty to two hundred c nnon. The e0 timatc<l cu t by 
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:he chief naval architect was $1,400,000, for each of the batteries with its tow 
.-Oat ; which sum would build three line-of-battle ships or two war st~ame~s. 
It is further to be urged, that any such passive system of defence is _entirely 
·t ,ariance with the tone and temper of our people, and the reputation of a 
poweiful nation. The national policy may be strictly defensive, but w!1en _co:11-
~ed to resort to war, its system of operations should be rather offensive m its 
Jiaracter, if it were only to enforce the sound maxim of preserving its own soil 
J'Om the desolating presence of an enemy. . 
If the floating battery is the most use~ess of all the stationary defences, t!ie 
::unboat may be considered as the most nuserable of all the war craft that sail ; 
;othing more effectual could possibly be devised to render skill ai~d bravery 
Eavailing. The experience which we have already had has sufficiently con-
:irmed opinion in the navy as to the dependence that may be placed on the per-
;ormance of these pigmy warriors, and renders it needless to occupy time in any 
:abored exposition of their worthlessness. In reciting the events of past days, 
,u.r own naval historian (Cooper) has very distinctly given his estimate of their 
demerits, which, by the way, he does not altogether confine to the question now 
at issue, of capacity for offence and defence, if we may judge from the following 
pithy pa~agraph: 
"'I,his was the development of the much condemned' gunboat syf.4tem,' which 
for a short time threatened destruction to the pride, discipline, tone, and even 
morals of the service." 
It is singular, however, that two distinguished statesmen should, about the 
same time, have given their faith to the efficacy of the gunboat-one in England, 
and the other here. Mr. William Pitt, about the year 1803, in a motion cen-
mring the ministry, found a strong reason in their neglect to provide more gun-
( 
boats. Admiral Sir E. Pellow, then in Parliament, was unable to sustain his 
political friends in the measure, and in a short and characteristic speech used 
these words : 
".As to the gunboats which have been so strongly recommended, this mosquito 
fleet, they are the most contemptible force that can be employed." . 
About thirteen years later it fell to his lot to verify this opinion. In his 
memorable attack. on Algiers, it is stated that "soon after the battle began the 
enemy~ flotilla of gunboats advanced, with a daring which deserved a better 
fate, to board the Queen Charlotte and Leander. 'rhe smoke covered them at 
firt , but as soon as they were seen, a few guns, chiefly from the Leander, sent 
thirty-three out of thirty-seven to the bottom." 
Dispensing, then, with such inefficient aids, there remains for consideration 
the n avy proper, which, it may be asserted, is indeed not only a sure reliance, 
if it b e properly constituted, but is indispensable to any degree of security along 
our line of coast, now washed for thousands of miles by the two great oceans ; 
and also to maintain the communication by water and the isthmus between the 
A..tlan tic and Pacific States, where forts, floating batteries, and gunboats can no 
longer enter into the question, even were they a perfect defence for every other 
intere t covered by our flag. 
In the first place, it is believed to be susceptible of proof that a naval force, 
i=:omew h at greater than the attacking force, may be relied on in connexion with 
the present or proposed works at Boston, New York, Delaware, Chesapeake, 
and some southeast port, to protect the coast from Florida to Maine, and (as 
corollary to this proposition,) will destroy or capture the enemy that may com-
mit it..,elf seriously against either of these ports. 
To illustrate this, I will assume the attacking force to be tlz.c twenty steam 
frigate. of the engineer's report of 1840. To New York harbor, to D elaware 
and Chesapeake bays, would be assigned a certain number of ships, varying 
with the peculiar circumstances of the time ; for the present, let us assume the 
fofonding force to be stationed thus: New York ten ships, Delaware eight, and 
/ 
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Chesapeake seven; and to avoid the recounting of local details, I again recur 
to New York as the object selected by the enemy. 
The stationary :floating defence to be used will be the old sailing frigates and. 
line-of-battle ships of the navy, having heavy batteries on the gun-decks, and. 
pivot pieces of tho largest calibre on the upper deck. Every spar taken out, 
even to the lower masts, and the ships well secured with several chains to their 
moorings; one at A, to bear on the ships in crossing the bar; three at B, C, and 
D, to close the swash channel; and one at E, inside of the southwest spit; 
which, with the fort on the Hook, is to assist in defending the main channel. 
'l'he enemy's twenty ships are signalled from the Neversink heights, and in 
half an hour the Delaware and Chesapeake squadrons are at sea steering north. 
It is obvious that any loss of time from irresolution or from want of informa-
tion which is to be obtained by reconnoitring, must be to the disadvantage of 
the enemy. 
Suppose him well supplied with pilots, which, in a war, the Cunard line can 
furnish abundantly, and aware that reinforcements are on the way, it is probable 
that the attack will be commenced without delay. 
The first point of defence is at the bar ; the deep water here is so narrow 
that the enemy will hardly risk his ships in any one channel, even ip. two col-
umns, and his line is therefore exposed to the concentrated fire of our ten ships, 
and of the line-of-battle ship at A. 
After crossing, the van will endeavor to form the line abreast, as far as the 
channel admits, in order to relieve the leading ships ; but our own ships recede 
before them, and by this time the guns of the line-of-battle ships B and C are 
beginning to tell. Following our steamers, the enemy soon comes within the 
fire of the fort, and adv"ancing onward, the line-of-battle-ship at E is brought 
into play. The headmost of his ships have now for more than half an hour 
been under the concentrated fire of four hundred pieces of the heaviest calibre; 
and it is hardly possible that they should not be incapacitated for moving with 
any rapidity. Even if their offensive powers be undisabled, they must there-
fore be soon dropped astern by their main body moving with full speed, and 
their force be lost in the rest of the day's operations. On the other hand, our 
own ships have felt the fire of the enemy's leading ships only, and if any one 
be damag d, can anchor near the fort or line-of-battle ships, and do good ser-
vice on the passing ships. 
It is probable that in rounding the southwest spit, the number of the hostile 
fleet will be reduced to fifteen or sixteen ships, capable of full motive power, if 
an av rage degree of success have attended the defending force. And these I 
mu the Lrought to action before reaching the city. 
·without pr tending to indicate the precise time and place most proper for 
thil'l, . uppo. e that it be decided to mnke a stand before entering the Narrows. 1· 
1Vhru it i evident that the enemy will not attempt to force the a,va h, and 
lia f 1low d the main channel, the line-of-battle hips A, B, C may ·lip their 
mooriug and be towed by river steamers on each side up the swa:::h, their 
dran~ht having b en adapted to that purpo. e, and take in moorings pre-viou..Jy 
proYHl ·cl at thr dehouclie of the chann 1 into the main course below the .... arrowe. 
)nr own . t < m r will here prepare to receive the attack, or to mak it if 
d_ clin ·cl by th en my, who may adhere to the main purpo e of reaching the 
CitY. 
1.'h a tion will, of cour e, terminate in the d feat of the-weaker pm·ty, thoull"h 
not 11 • • •• arily in th cle truction or captur of hi hip . But in what condition 
will th· ·ncmy find hi. hip:-.? How many of hi teamer will there remain to 
att ·mp the pa. ~acre, and what will be their capacity to do it after th roull"h 
han<lli11 "' that ha l, .en XJ ri n d? 
t 111 v be that not on f hi, v :4 ·l h, truck it fl C'I' or i .. di~ahled but the 
}JOw ·r of moYinrr with c rtainty and ;p di cripple , and their xpo urc the 
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Proposed defence of New York har~or. 
fire of the forts therefore so much increased in time as to render the attempt 
hazard ous. Pieces of heavy ordnance can also be mounted. on stout merchant 
&hips and. steamers, forming a reserve to be placed along the passage where the 
guns of the forts do not command, so as to sustain a steady cannonade on what-
ever s hips of the enemy may remain in a condition to proceed. Meanwhile a 
few h ours will bring up a fresh squadron, and soon after this will be reinforced, 
so that fifteen steamers in perfect order will enter the bay. 'l'he result must be 
the capture and destruction of the invading force. 
,.._['his is the view which I consider fairly presentable of the favorite case so 
ft-equf>ntly urged, wherein the advantage is enjoyed by the assailing party of 
selP.cting time and place without warning to the defending force. 
I t seems highly probable that the defence of any important point, with some 
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exception as it regards the southeast and Gulf coasts, can be made g?o~ with no 
greater additional force in the aggregate than above mentioned, adm1ttmg every 
advantage that can be claimed for this arrangement of the enemy. . 
That advantage is limited to a space in time that admits of no accident to 
force, speed, or any of the multifarious details of a fleet. Its operations must 
be as precise and perfect as those of the machine that moves each steamer. 
From the moment that the hostile fleet comes in sight there is a sure concen-
tration of a superior force, and in a few hours there will no longer be the power 
to choose. An action is inevitable ; and whatever be the result to our own 
squadron, that of the enemy will certainly be unable to prosecute any enterprise 
. against harbors or coasts for the time. 
It is, however, out of the question for any such fleet to hazard itself on a 
coast where the certain superiority, no matter how small, exists ; and the entire 
line of shore northward would therefore be fully secured against an enemy's vessel. 
South ward of Hatteras the necessity of naval means for defence is even more 
stringent than to the northward. 
The objects of attack differ as widely also from those just under consideration 
as the manner in which shipping must be applied to defence in order to be 
available. 
The resources of private enterprise are no longer aggregated so densely, but 
are scattered along the country bordering on the coast in a manner that renders 
it difficult for the most eager marauder to do much in his line. 
The commercial cities are pretty well defended from the extensive movements 
of large fleets by the bars _which border the channel-ways to their harbors. 
The interior lines of communication formed by the long downs of sand that 
skirt the Atlantic shore are, however, accessible to vessels of inferior force, and 
the command of these would give the control of all the trade that by its light 
draught finds convenience in the smoother waters of the inlet. The most im-
portant debouch, however, for the resources of the country is the outlet of the 
JHi , issippi, through which is poured, in a never-failing tide, the rich products 
of the great valley of the river. To check this, to impede it, to harass in the 
lea t degree, would be an evil of the greatest magnitud.e, and be felt in the re-
motest regions of the west. 
The general character of the southern shore of itself prevents the operations 
of vessels of heavy draught; hence the defence must be nearly the reverse of 
that r commended for the shores north of Hatteras. 'There heavy ships will lie 
inshore, and light crui ers be thrown out seaward to watch the motion of the 
main force of the enemy, and coastwise to check small marauders or parties for 
wood and water. On the southeast and Gulf coast the light steamers and vessels 
of th third cla s would k eep the inlets and their approaches and the various 
av mH'H contiguou to the Mississippi. "While seaward the heaviest sl1ips must 
ahicl' the fir. t brunt of the attack and defence at all risk, so as to cripple the 
forces of the as ailant should be be strong enough to close with the inshore 
qu:u1ron. 
'I lH· tru and only key, however, to the defence of these shores, a11d to the 
imrnens inter ·t there collected, is the Ifavana. The island to which it belono-' 
nt .r.· it: w •.-t rn xtreme into the Gulf, leaving but two pa, ages for -vc cl ... o 
narrow a: to be commanded with the gr at st facility; the e are the great 
thorou···hfare' of trade and the mail teamer· from ew Orleans to California 
and ~ w Tork. ll n e if the use of the llavana be ven at the di. po. al of an 
n ·my whil in th hand of a n utral power, each and all of the:;c intere t ' 
oulcl 1, · with difficulty le£ nded, v n by a uperior naval force, and never 
gu 1rant<·c•d arrain.-t n·re lo~. :'I. '\Vhilc from it a~ a T nited tatc' port :1. 
:-qu, dr 11 of mor1natc .-i:w would coYcr tlw .-rmtlH'ast and ¾ulf coa::-t:-, pro t •c t the 
for i•rn mul iu. lwrc trac1er::-, and ; cnr tli • linrs from ... T w rl anr-: or ... T •w York 
t tl1 · >acilic 'tate · 1,y way f tlic I. thmu ·, it::1 occupation would nee --~:uily 
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; the object of every expedition, military or naval, preliminary to any attempt 
~ the southern trade or territory. . 
lt present the force of large vessels for the southeast coast would be obl_1ged 
use the harbor of Brunswick as their depot, refuge, and centre of operat10ns. 
JJe report of the commissioners has already decided this to be the best south 
f the Chesapeake. With the command afloat, Key West and the Tortugas 
)ght be used, but not otherwise, as no supplies are to be had at either, and no 
ater at the latter. Pensacola would have to answer for the Gulf shore. 
The coast of the Pacific States differs in many respe~ts from th~t of the At-
..mtic in formation as well as in condition. 
The circumstances of settlement, product, and trade have yet to determine· 
::Juch that will govern in the extent and application of the elements of defence. 
At present there can be no doubt that the two great harbors at San :Francisco 
md the Columbia river will require immediate measures for their protection. 
The sites of land works have probably been vindicated by the eng·ineers sent 
or that purpose, though some time must elapse before these can be completed. 
It seems, therefore, that the naval force in these regions should be of the 
mo t effective character in power and number, singly and collectively, inasmuch 
aa it must for a while be the exclusive reliance for a defence of any kind of 
harbors, as well as of coasts. rrhe squadron should always be able to land at 
any point a force of two thousand seamen and :five hundred marines, which, 
with twenty or thirty of the boat howitzers on their field carriages, would be 
fo und an effective auxiliary in emergencies. 
The manner in which our own squadron operated along the coast of Califo1;nia 
while held by the Mexicans will best exhibit the character of the attempts 
likely to be made by an enemy against our own people now inhabiting that 
utate. If the views above expressed, in relation to the defence of the United 
tates harbors and coasts, be correct, it then remains to consider the species of 
naval force which will be required to perform the part assigned to it. 
By referring to the navy list it will be seen that the number of heavy ships 
·hat is available, or could be made so by necessary repairs, consists of nine line-
of-battle ships, twelve frigates, and five steamers . 
. This force is obviously too small for the objects for which a navy should be de-
·1gned. If the number already assumed to be required for the defence of the 
.~tlantic coast in war be applied to that purpose, it would leave a very insuffi-
cient force for the Pacific shores, for the protection of the line of communication 
by sea between the Atlantic and Pacific States, and for general cruising· to cover 
our own commerce, and annoy that of the enemy. 
Not only is the effective number of the present navy too small, but the char-
icter of the force has been depreciated to a very serious extent by the superior 
p~wers of offence that have been conferred on the large steamers that now con-
·trtute part of a navy here and elsewhere. The cannon carried usually as the 
main reliance of line-of-battle ships and frigates are thirty-two and forty-two-
pounders . In our service the latter calibre may be considered as except10nable, 
ruasmuch as it is not recognized by the regulations of 1845. 
'l'he war steamers carry sixty-four pounders. 1 tis true that the line-of-battle 
hip:; ma.y have one hundred of the thirty-two-pounders, while a steamer of the 
amc tonnage has but three of the sixty-four-pounders. 
But it will be admitted that if the constituent of one battery is deficient in 
any one element of power, which is possessed by that of another battery, that 
110 mere increase in the number will compensate for this defect. Thus, if the 
thirty-two-pounder shot fired with nine pounds of powder be inferior to a shot 
rJf sixty-four pounds fired with sixteen pounds of powder in the distance to 
d1ic:h it will range with sufficient force to do material damage, then it is plain 
that i;o long as that distance can be preserved it will matter little whether a 
~hip oppo:,e oue hunch ed or one thousand thirty-two-pounders to the three sixty-
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four-pounders: she will receive constant damage from the repeated efforts of the 
small number of large pieces without the power of inflicting any harm by her 
large number of small pieces. A similar relation, in effect, may be noted in the 
effects of other military projectiles. '.rhus, we know that grape from a thirty-
two-pounder would be harmless against the side of a ship, when the shot would 
pa;:;s through easily, and yet the ,c,tand of grape is composed of three-pound 
shot which, even if fired separately, would still be very little nearer the effect 
of the thirty-two-pounder shot. 
The important question is in relation to the capacity of the stcnmer to main-
tain the distance suited to her powers of annoyance-and of this there can be 
little doubt since the passage between the United States and England is made 
with ease and certainty in the severest winter weather by the steam packets, 
their averag·e speed being then seven to eig·ht knots with fair and foul winds, 
and they could in all probability go very little below their hig·hest rate in any 
weather in which cannon could be used. 
Those who have witnessed the performan..:e of the Mississippi in some of the 
lUexican "northers" know what can be done by a good steamer in a strong gale. 
Thus the twenty steam frigates would be very unequally matched in action, by 
our covering squadron of sailing ships with the thirty-two and forty-two-pounders, 
if it could be said that they were matched at all. The remedy for this is not 
difficult, and can readily be attained by a reorganization of our armament, 
though it would be more expensive to adapt the present sailing ships folly 
to the ordnance which experimental practice has indicated as preferable than to 
build new ships. Thus a two-deck er would carry the same weig·ht of metal, but 
not the same number of canno"n. Hence, it would become necessary to reduce 
the immbcr of ports, and to re-distribute them along the broadside; and to do 
this, the whole planking and frame, nearly to the water's edge, must be remowd 
and replaced to suit the changes required in piercing the side with the proper 
numLcr of ports-involving an expense equal to half the cost of a new s1i p . 
rl'l10y would still neecl an addition that could not be dispensed with, ·which 
is an auxiliary steam power sufficient to give a moderate rate in a calm, in 
man ceuvring or in getting out and in harbor. ~.,or thi::i purpose, greater length 
would. be required than any of our present frigates possess, as they now barely 
stow the provisions and water required for di::3tant crui.::ing. If these shivs be 
cut and lengthened, the cost in connexion with that necessary for heavier ord-
nance will be folly equal to the expense of building new ships with e,ery dis-
advantage that can attach to a sacrifice of unity of de ·ign in model; for no 
kill in the builder could possibly develop any one essential of form iu this 
piecr of patchwork, except by mere accident. 
'I'lw true policy, not only as regards economy, but iu reference al. o to accom-
pli:--hi1w th oLjcct in view, is to commence without d fay the reorganization of 
our naval power by the gradual addition of ship Luilt upon the IDOl-<t r~cent 
mod<·l.·, and to carry heavy ordnance a, well as an auxiliary steam power. 
The (•,·prrimcntal practice at the naYy yard ha developed ome point of 
int('l'c·.~t ill rdation to the piece likely to combine th everal csseutiab of ac-
curnc-y, m11cr , and force, and the bearing of all the rcKult:- ha~ incluct•d me to 
propo. e th ' ·on:truction of a claK:-i of .. hip · defli 0 ·ned to unite a higher dPgn·<> of 
fficic·ncy than any frigate or He,·enty-four mounting the 1>res nt armament, &c. 
ln t-tc:ul of tw ·nty-. i.· thirty-two-pounder.., and four •i 0 ·ht-iuch p}i('}l gun.-; on 
th crun c1Pck, the new fricrate i. to carry t,Ycnty-six uin -inch r-hell gun:-. The 
comp· ratiYc: pcnctrati1w power of th · two pieces is :-1hown in the r-kNth an-
nexed: 'l h thirty-two-pound ·r . hot pa::.;e cl twc•nty-on iuche into an 0 .1k 
. tar•.,.r.t, thrc -fourth · of a mil• di~tcmt. Th nine-inch :-1h •11, m1charcrecl lirok~ 
through the whol thicknc:; · of thirty inch ·s. 
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Fig. 1. 
9wt,from a lwg 32-pounder, charge 9 lbs.-I'enetration in oak, distant 1,300 yards, thickness 30 in. 
H. Ex. Doc. 92--25 
The diminution of force which both would 
undergo at greater distances would lesson 
the power of the thirty-two-pounder shot 
yet more, while the nine-inch shell would 
still retain every advantage arising from its 
explosive power. The only pieces of the 
present force that would approach it being 
the two eight-inch shell guns, which, in num-
ber -and intensity of effect, are not compar-
able to the thirteen nine-inch shell guns. 
If the distance were lessened, the broad-
side of nine-inch shell guns would in weight 
of metal alone be nearly double that of the 
thirty-two-pounder and eight-inch shell 
guns. 
On the spar deck are to be no broadside 
guns, but, in lieu thereof, seven shell guns, 
of ten or eleven-inch calibre, on pivots, and 
capable of being pointed around the circle in 
every direction. . 
An auxiliary propeller power will be placed 
astern, for which purpose the length of the 
< ship must be adapted to its convenient re-·f ception. -
~ The points of this ship will be: 
~ 
-s - 1st. Cost ef Construction.-This ought 
-f not to exceed the cost of an ordinary sailing 
~ frigate, with the additional expense of steam 
equipment. 
'.rhe St. Lawrence cost about $350,000; 
and the cost of a suitable engine, boilers, 
&c., as furnished by Kemble~ would be about 
$70,000 ;-total, $420,000. 
The Susquehanna steam frigate cost very 
little less than $700,000. 
2d. Force. - 'l'he broadside weight of 
metal of the new frigate would be about 
1,800 pounds. The Pennsylvanian, three 
decker, present armament, 2,100 pounds. 
The Ohio, two decker, 1,500 pounds. 
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Comparing tlie long range with that of the steamfrigate. 
New ship, seven pivot guns, 11-inch ....................... . 
Susquehanna, three 64-pounders ........................... . 
940 pounds. 
192 " 
3d. Cost in commission.-Only greater than that of a sailing frigate when 
steam is used, the crew not exceeding six hundred men, which is about that of 
the Congress frigate. 
Comparing such a frigate with the heaviest steam frigate, it will be seen that 
the advantages are, far greater superiority in range and force, as the propeller 
frigate opposes seven 11-incb shell guns to three 64-pounders, the relations of which 
arc about those of the 9-inch to the 32-pounders; and though her speed by steam 
is not equal, yet if the steam frigate once commit herself to the chances of a com-
bat she will be beaten, for her motive power is far more vulnerable in nearly every 
point, and if deranged in the least by any of the contingencies of an engagement, 
she is at once exposed to the nearer approach of the propeller, and consequently 
to the full effect of the broadside guns, while her opponent loses but an auxiliary 
power, if any of her machinery be touched, her defence being made good against 
the steamer at any distance or position which the latter may select. 
If opposed by the ordinary line-of-battle-ship with the present armament of 
32-pounders and 42-pound-crs, the propeller frigate may, at a long range, play 
her seven pivot guns with comparative impunity, or she may close and bring into 
action the whole broadside. 
Of course it is not designed to assert that the navy would be constituted of 
this force exclusively, but only that on such a class of ships reliance might safely 
be placed for defence of the coasts and harbors against any of the heaviest ships 
in foreign service. In time of peace they would cruise as flag-ships, while the infe-
rior cla ses might receive pieces of such calibre and number as would be suitable. 
'l1he second class would be ships with a light deck over the battery and a pivot 
gun on the to'gallant forecastle and poop. 
The third class, ships with a light deck over a broadside battery, or else neither 
light deck nor broadside pieces, but heavy pivot guns to the extent of the accom-
modation. 
All the vessels of lower rate to be steamers of five hundred to one thousand 
tons, mounti11g two pivot guns. 
Query 3. I. it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications 
on the shores of the northern lakes 1 
It would be a loss of expenditure already incurred not to finish the works which 
lrnv h en commenc d on the northern frontier, and these would certainly be use-
fnl in the initial operation, of a war; though there can be but little doubt that if 
it Y<:r bPcomC' nece . ..,ary to direct the military operations of the United States 
to tha quarter, the population of the i tnte that border thereon would fm·nish a 
force fully Hnffici nt to n. prompt and :final i. sue again. t any army that could be 
~f'nt fr m l~ngland. It may indeed be questioned wh tlrnr any decent opportu-
nity for . eYeting a connexion o expC'm,iv-e and unprodllctive would not Le very 
acccptahl to the o-overnm0nt of reat Britain. 
I hnYe the: honur to be, very re:--pectfully, your ohedi nt servant, 
Hon. . L CoXRAD, i' cretary ef JVar. 
JN . .A. DAHLGREN, 
Lieutenant United States .. .Yary. 
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F. 
Order to the Chief Engineer. 
WAR DEPARTMENT, April 17, 1851. 
The chief engineer will please prepare and report to ~he department the infor-
::iation called for by the second of the enclo~ed resolut10~s. . 
He will also, at as early a period as practicable, submit to the depar~ment his 
iews and opinions on the subject embraced in the first of these resolutions, and 
v-i.11 request Colonel Thayer, Lieutenant Colonel De Russy, Major Delafield, and 
.llajor Chase to submit to the department their views and opinions in relation to 
:his subject. 
It is desired that the chief engineer and the above-named officers should direct 
:heir inquiries particularly to the following points: 
1st. How far the invention and extension of railroads have superseded or dimin-
iEhed the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard. 
2d. In what manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by steam, 
and particularly the application of steam to vessels-of-war, and recent improve-
ments in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries, affect this 
question. 
3d. How far vessels-of-war, steam batteries, ordinary merchant ships and 
steamers, and other temporary expedients, can be relied upon as a substitute for 
permanent fortifications for the defence of our seaports. 
4th. How far the increase of populatio.n on the northern frontier, and of the 
mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates or diminishes the necessity of 
continuing the system of fortifications on these lakes. 
The CHIEF ENGINEER. 
0. M. CONRAD, Secretary of War. 
No. 8. 
Report of Lieutenant Colonel R. E. De Russy. 
FORT 1\foNROE, VIRGINIA, July 26, 1851. 
SIR: Being called upon by the instructions of the Hon. the Secretary of War 
to present my views and opinions on certain points specified in his letter to the 
engineer department of April 17, 1851, I beg leave to place before you the fol-
lowing observations upon the subject, which I request you will lay before the 
Secretary of War. 
Fortifications had their origin with the Greeks, and have been adopted, im-
proved, and perfected by all civilized nations from that time to this. They long 
since have become a combination of sciences, involving _mathematics, pyrotechny, 
strategy, and the art of war. The objects of fortifications are to make strong by 
art what otherwise would need an accumulation of active physical means, as also 
to protect exposed positions from sudden assaults of an enemy. In producing 
the first rc1mlt, they leave at the disposal of the country invaded or attacked an 
aetive force which otherwise might be kept in check by an equal or superior one. 
!o-ain, they secure in a great degree, within certain distances, positions rendered 
i~portant either by their location or the magnitude of their commerce and 
resource ; hence all important seaports should, in my opinion, be protected by 
Sri.table fortifications. • 
1;:;t. Because otherwise an enemy's fleet might for a time with impunity ride 
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in safety in our harbors, and harass or even destroy the commerce and property 
in those harbors. 
2d. Because they become dangerous barriers, which an enemy is seldom dis-
posed to leave behind him, the custom of war being to attack fortifications when 
offensive operations are intended to be carried on by an enemy beyond their 
localities ; and finally, a fortification is the usual depot for all munitions of war, 
both in implements and provisions. The heavy ordnance, so essential to our 
present system of defence, could hardly be stored in safety elsewhere, unless at 
such distances from the seaboard as to render their transportation tardy and per-
haps hazardous to the several points where they might be immediately needed. 
I will close these preliminary remarks by adding, that fortifications give confi-
dence at home and mistrust to an enemy, and compel him to make additional 
and costly preparations, both in money and time, when he expects to come in 
contact with them. 
I will now proceed to give my views and opinions on the several points enume-
rated in the Secretary's letter to the chief engineer, and will discuss these in the 
order in which they are presented. · 
. 1st. I look upon the invention and extension of railroads as of important advan-
tage during a state of war, so far as the rapid transit of both troops and munitions 
are concerned, but that advantage might be too much depended upon. 
Railroads are so easily impaired or destroyed that it would be dangerous to 
depend entirely upon their use. An enemy would naturally weigh the value or 
importance of such conveyances, and would offer such high rewards for their 
destruction as would be likely to meet with success. It is well known that our 
railroads are generally constructed through the most uninhabited portions of our 
country, and are in consequence liable to be approached and destroyed by mer-
cenaries, who would run many risks to obtain rewards commensurate with the 
importance of the undertaking. 
I have already remarked that without fortifications our harbors and seaports 
would be exposed to an enemy's fleet, and I now give it as my opinion that all 
the facilities afforded by the railroads that centre, for instance, in and about the 
city of New York would not prevent an enemy's fleet from destroying that city, 
were it not protected by suitable fortifications. The same result would undoubt-
edly attend any other of our important commercial cities on the seaboard; this 
opinion is based upon the supposition that an active and competent naval force 
would be employed by the enemy to attain these important results by a sudden 
attack, and that, too, combined with an adequate number of troops in case it 
would be found necessary to make a simultaneous one. 
We have had during the late war with Great Britain many instances to wan-ant 
this opinion. I will cite a few of them to show the necessity of fortifications in 
our harbors. 
The defence of Fort McHenry saved the city of Baltimore. The defence of 
ran y i, land saved Norfolk and the navy yard at Gosport. The temporary 
dct nc •s at andy Hook, New York, prevented the blockadiug squadron from 
ent rino- ·within the waters of the Lay, and compelled the ships every evening to 
mak an offing, ther by giving an opportunity to our merchant ves · ls to lip 
out of th harbor. The e latter defonc , were in ignificant in them elve._, but 
th y act d in conjunction with some fift en or twenty gunboat , each mounting 
one gun, which were g nerally anchor d in the cove, and ready at any time to 
co-op rat with the fort and block-hou e erected on the Hook; and had Fort 
1 a hinc,,t n n defend d in t ad of b hw de troyed, it i my opinion that the 
a11itol of the nion woul l have r main d unmole ted durinO' that war. 
2d. Th navig, ti n f the oc an y team, and th application of . tP-am to 
v · ·l. - ,f-war, would rn, in my opinion, to incr a e tl1 ne e. 0 ity of fortit~·inr, 
a-coa t.. The gr at , dv ntan- f t am pow r li mor in tl1c c ·rt: inty 
mpli ·hing an obj ct in a giv ·n tim than in incr iug the ,.trength and 
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i)i)wer of an enemy. In other words, an exp~dition planned for a particular 
:•jint on our sea-coast by a transatlantic power can be calculated to a day wh~n 
-ieam vessels are being employed for the purpose ; but those steam _v~ssels, m 
·be presence of or passing our fortifications, are more exposed to be lllJUred by 
,nr forts than ships-of-war would be. The machinery of the one cannot be well 
. rotected, consequently is easily impaired, and when impaired, the ?teamer's 
'!!!Otive power is either retarded ,or entirely suspended, whilst the other 1s so con-
m-ucted as to be at times crippled in her hull and even her spars by sho_ts, 
irithout losing much, if any, of her way in passing a battery. , 
I have just said that the certainty of arriving at a particular point at an ap-
pointed time is the advantage obtained by the use of steam in vessels-of-war; 
ihat advantage is a great one, and the only means to counteract it is ~o have 
permanent defences where it is likely an enemy would endeavor to surprise any 
one or more of our seaports. 
I believe it to be demonstrable that, with our present system of fortifications, 
provided, as they are intended to be, with the heaviest mortars, howitzers, and 
col~mbiads, the advantage on our side would be increased had we to contend 
agamst war steamers instead of ships-of-the-line . 
. 'rhe difference of speed between the two kinds of vessels when within shot 
distance from our forts is more than counterbalanced by the greater surface 
offered in the length and breadth of the deck of a steamer, and the constant 
exposure of her machinery to curved fires. 
The machinery of these war steamers is supposed to occupy about one-fifth 
o_f the length of the vessel; one single shell or shot passing through that por-
tion of her bull would in all probability injure some part of that machinery, and 
il~lay or stay her progress. With our heavy guns we may calculate to reach 
with certainty and effect an enemy's vessel at the distance of two miles. If 
that vessel is compelled to pass under our guns, she will, sailing at the rate of 
twelve miles per hour, be within reach of our pieces, say twenty minutes; in 
those twenty minutes each gun will, upon an average, discharge twelve shots, 
eonsequently a battery of say forty guns will discharge four hundred and eighty 
shots and shells, which, when directed with skill, will, in most instances, have 
their effect against passing vessels. 
In answering the third point in the Secretary's letter to the chief engineer, I 
would say that vessels-of-war would at all times afford important services in 
the defence of our seaports ; and could they be so multiplied as to be found at 
each port in sufficient numbers to cope, with the assistance of auxiliary means 
obtained on the spur of the moment, with a powerful naval force, then they 
would in a measure remove the necessity of creating another species of defence; 
but this state of things cannot well take place. Our navy can never attain such 
pre-eminence, and consequently must, while subdivided along the coast, as it 
irill be in time of war, be found in the minority by an invading force, and thereby 
be compelled to seek for protection under our fortifications. Their co-operating 
with the _defences in our harbors, they will become extremely important and of 
~eat ass1stance. · 
Steam batteries have often been spoken of, and might, perhaps, be of service 
where the channel-way is narrow, and can afford them protection from the 
shores; but in open roadsteads I would not rely much upon them; they neces-
1:arily must be slow and unwieldly, and in consequence liable to be turned and 
even avoided by an active naval force. All other temporary expedients, such 
as arming merchant ships, steamers, &c., might, perhaps, be made useful for a 
ehort time, and upon a particular emergency, but no reliance could be placed 
upon them. 'l'he immense expense attending the transformation of these ves-
sels, together with the cost of their impeifect armament, would hardly warmnt 
tl e introduction of such a doubtful system of casual defence in our large sea-
ports. The havoc which would naturally result to these light vessels, when 
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engaged with heavy ships-of-the-line and war steamers, would, I am inclined to 
believe, be extremely disastrous. 'rhe expense, moreover, for such temporary 
means would, I believe, exceed the cost of the permanent fortifications con-
structed for the same object. 
Permit me for a moment to digress, by stating that there is one consideration 
attending our expenditures for fortifications which, in my opinion, is far from 
being· unimportant to the general welfare of the country, aside from the impor-
tance I attach to fortifications as national defences, and which but few, perhaps, 
have considered; it is, that every article used for our defences is found in a 
crude state in our country, and generally in the neighborhood of our important 
works. The manipulation of these materials gives employment to a large and 
useful class of our citizens, and creates, as it were, a sort of revenue which 
benefits both the laborer and the government, first by rewarding industry, 
and that industry, by the natural course of things, bringing back to the aid of 
the general government portions of the revenue which that industry enables the 
laborer to obtain from abroad through our custom-houses. For instance, a 
quarry, when worked, requires many hands; these hands, devoting all their 
time to their arduous labor, -find it necessary to exchange the price of that labor 
for the necessaries of life, hence imported goods of many kinds must find a 
market with them. The manufacturers of bricks, cement, lime, lumber, iron, 
and other materials used in the construction of our fortifications come under the 
same rule, and, independent of the mechanics and laborers employed in our 
public works, form a large and useful class of our citizens, all returning to the 
general fund a portion of revenue created, in fact, only by their industry. 
I name this fact to show that, although many look upon our system of defence 
as costly, yet the advantages of it, independent of the security it affords to the 
country in a military point of view, are substantial and important to the commu-
nity at large, inasmuch as they create a revenue by bringing out the latent 
resources of the country. 
The fourth point relates to our northern frontier and its defences. I can but 
look upon that frontier as an exposed one, and consequently requiring the watch-
ful eye and fostering care of the government. Our neighbors have been dili-
gently employed since the war of 1814 in strengthening her borders, and many 
va t improvements have been made by them to keep pace with our increa ing 
strength in population on the lakes. Their population, too, is increa. inc:r, and 
the 1'V elland canal has removed obstacles which g·ives them now the advantage 
of an inland navigation from the St. Lawrence through to all the lake.:. If there 
ever was a time when a system of defence planned and executed for the pro-
tection of our exten ive northern frontier, it i8 the present one, when we C.'ln 
~v igh the advantage. that could be deriv d from the great improvem •ut:, already 
m cvidmce on the opposite sid of th lake . If reat Britain houlcl CY r her-
aft ·r b . found at war with us, a portion of the naval force ,vould b found on 
th lake , and interforino- with our frontier town· and citic and om· inland m-
n~<·rc . 'l'he r clundancy of her population at horn· would natur, Hy pl.1c · at her 
d1~po. al th<: m an of incr a,.ing h r fore in tho~c inland ea:, and b)· a ,y,-
tem of lo omotiY w:ufnr, di tnrh and mmo_ · a population uu 1crically much 
,tr 11w,·r than th fore· ,:h would oppo~ • to th ·rn. 
'1 o m t tlii~ tat· of thing it would c•rm incli~p 1L·ablc to fortif)- p nnan n 1y 
·. rtain point in our llOrth rn frontier, not only for the prot ctiou f h , I , ·. 
t1 11 and n. ,lc•pot for provi ion· and munition · of wnr, hut !!'I' • 
J int for ti militi. and oth ·r troop . 
'1 h r1 mark I hav nlrt>·tdy made upon th ul~j ct , f na i n 1 d 
h b . rd, in onn • i n ,·ith an. ·iliary m •·m , will uppl • t t • 1 • 
for H th Jl1 f nnmu 111lllill i ' llCC'rll C • th • • mi•rht b 0111 f ll 
rt r pr t ct h 'p rrnun #nt fortifi ·a io1; but 1, ~ t tJ1 m " t 
JJ_, b J> ct d co1>c with v I -of-, •ar. 
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In the war of 1812 and 1814 the ascendancy on the lakes between the British 
navy and ours fluctuated according to the number of vessels constructed ancl 
the time they took their element ;· one single vessel added to the one or the 
other would give, for the time being, the preponderance to that side; but the 
time is past when we ought to think of adopting the same system, since, by the 
vigilance of Great Britain, she has opened the way for any number of armed 
vessels she may be able to spare from her own coast. These circumstances 
would, of themselves, seem to indicate the neces:3ity of fortifying the vulnerable 
as well as the important points on the lakes. 
'l'he few defences temporarily erected during that war on the northern frontier 
bore testimony of their great usefulness in checking the. enemy's ingress. At 
Plattsburg, for instance, when our navy, protected under the guns of the forts, 
gained a brilliant victory over the enemy; Sir George Prevost, with an army of 
fourteen thousand men, found there an opposition which compelled him to retreat 
precipitately, leaving his sick and wounded at the mercy of the American 
general commanding. 'I'hus a garrison of fourteen hundred men, which was the 
force of General Macomb, within well planned defences, protected our navy on 
Lake Champlain, and taking the offensive as well as the defensive, compelled 
an army of fourteen thousand men to abandon the project of invading the 
country, which was understood to be the avowed intention of the British com-
mander. 
Many other instances of the kind occurred during that war w)1ich could be 
mentioned to show the importance of works of defence on our inland borders . 
. In conclusion, permit me to say that to protect the lives of its citizens is a 
high consideration with every government, but with none can it be so important 
as with ours, when it is considered that our population is yet too thin and sparse 
to furnish large masses for war services. We must, in consequence, use all 
~e~ns at our disposal to reduce the number of troops required for active service 
m time of war, and these should, so far as practicable, be protected by these 
means; I know of none more effectual for this important object than permanent 
fortifications. By multiplying them you relieve a portion of your useful citizens 
from the perils and hardships incident to the fields of battle, and leave them at 
home to pursue their useful avocations. 
In presenting this feeble view of the subject, could I persuacle myself that 
any portion of it would be acceptable or useful to the honorable the Secretary 
of \Var, it would be most gratifying to me; as imperfect as it is, I submit it 
with all respect. 
Brigadier General Jos. G. 'l'oTTEN, 
R. E. DE RUSSY, 
Lieutenant Colonel Eng£neers. 
Clt,ief Engineer ef tlie United States, vVasliington. 
No. 9. 
Report ef Major w: H Chase. 
OIIASEFIELD, NEAR PE~. AC0LA, April 17, 1 ~: 1. 
The undersigned, in compliance with the orders of the Secret.try of War, 
communicated through the chief engineer, ha .the honor to submit to the \Var 
Departmmt the following vi ws and opinions of the subject embraced in the 
fir t resolution of the series adopted by the House of Representatives of the 
United States during its ·ession on the 3d of .i..\larch, 185 l. 
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In viewing "the general system adopted after the war with Great Britain, 
and since pursued in regard to the permanent fortifications then deemed neces-
sary for the national defence," it will be relevant to the subject to allude to the 
condition of that defence when the United States declared themselves indepen-
dent of Great Britain, and prepared to sustain that declaration by force of arms 
during the period of peace from 1783 to 1812, and during the war of 1812-'15. 
In the first period the defences on the seaboard of the colonies, extending 
from Nova Scotia to Florida, were confined to a few points. England having 
driven the French from their North American colonies, ha<} little fear of any 
future attempt on the part of France either to regain her lost possessions or to 
attack the other possessions of England in America. 
In the course of the war of independence the English were driven in succes-
sion from Boston, New York., Yorktown, and other places, and finally from the 
whole country, by which the power of the United States, even in its incipiency 
to resist aggression from the most powerful of nations, was favorably exhibited. 
:Few or no additional sea-coast defences were constructed during the war, 
yet the public and private armed ships, issuing from the ports of the United 
Stntes, did immense injury to British commerce, and even kept the whole 
western coasts of England and Scotland in constant alarm. Some hastily raised 
redoubts on Dorchester heights, compelled the English to retreat from Boston 
with their fleet and army; and the castle defending the entrance to the harbor, 
falling into tlie hands of the Americans, together with some temporary erections 
of earth on the surrounding heights and islands, secured Boston from again 
b ing occupied by the enemy. Charleston was successfully defended by the 
Palmetto fort against a squadron of ships ; and the success generally of the 
Amercan arms up to the surrender of Yorktown, demonstrated, if not the 
impossfoility of reducing the colonies to suLjection, at least the enormous expen-
diture of life and money attendant on the attempt. 
This truth led, with other things, to a change of policy in England in regard 
to the united States. The new administration made peace · with the colonies; 
and the 1vise statemen of Englaud saw that an intimate commercial intercourse 
with the United States as an independent power would probably be more 
advantageous to the interests of their country than the po se sion of colonies 
that would require much blood and treasure to regain and l}.old; whilst the tra~e 
with the same would be interrupted and precarious. The foundation of th1s 
poli y \Va. the preservation for the fntur of uninterrupted friendly relatio~n 
1,ctwC'en England and America; ancl it was the determination of the party m 
1Jower to .Jccnrc at all hazards and at all times peace with the United tate ·. 
]{ut tmfortnnatcJy for a i;trict adherence to these views, the great wars groWlllg 
ont of the :E rench revolution placecl England in position to tru o-le for 
lier vr, -y ·xi:--tenc a. an independent power; and in the cour e of the con-
t ':'t prin ·iple:'l h1 relation to n ·utrality 1rcre adopted, and so rigidly adhered to, 
that th· int •rc., ts and honor of neutral nation.:, and of the Uuiteu tate~ in 
p:utic-nlar, w< ·re cornpromi. ed. In pcr;-;i. tino- to a::crt her arroo-ant pr ·ten--ion;; 
the gc,nrnnwut f England wa, d1;ceiYccl by it, diplomatic agent and friend 
a · t tl11 fliet produced iu America. Tb·.·c,jud,ring of th• ..,tr ngth of the 
p· rtY i 01,pn. itiun to 3fr. i\Iadi.-:011':- aclmini. tration, ancl of the talent and 
inll11Pt1 ·r• of the principn] m<·n f that part·, con. tantl r pr ·· ut · 1 to the 
1-:ug-li,h g-,,v m1111·11t thnt th , Pr·. iclcut woulu uot recomm ·ml to I ng-r " a 
,1 · ·larati n f w, r :F•ai11.-:t Lnglancl ju the foC'c of the pow rful part. - pp • d 
to . u ·h a m : ,urc. -\ ·r ·tan· of 11 ", ti n in 1Va ·hiJJ<rton wa.: th onlv c --
11 Jl(l ·nt ut th· Lng-li h mini ti:.,. wh~: und •r:-toocl th· ·.·act . t, te o tJ1u1!!', in 
th -nit, <l • tat··. l · r I ·at 1. · :t Yi:- •<1 tlr rnini,ter of for ·i!!'Il • ffair, h 
the I I t r, ·:• 11 t · lT<· tly in , 1111l'U , f tl1 f f'lin~ iii Am •ri ·a: anrl Jm uni " 
li r "1 in uu ·il , · r" r Yvl· d nu, oth ·r olm ·i:nt 111 a: ur - ncl 
nlJ t \· r · uld · rtninl • b cl ·lnr · ao-aiu t Euglaud b • th 
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.At last the secretary was listened to, and the orders in council were repealed; 
but before the news reached the United States war had been declared . . The 
messengers bearing respectively the declaration of war and the order removing 
the principal cause which led to the declaration, passed each other on the ocean. 
Thus was the war of 1812-'15, or, as it has been termed, "the second war 
of independence," a blunder which England lost no tin:;te in remedying, by seek-
ing for and concluding a peace with the United States as soon as she could do 
so with honor to herself. \ 
At the time peace was made England was never more powerful. Triumphant 
over all her enemies in Europe by sea and land, she w!1s left by the ~ener~l 
peace of 1814 in possession of vast means, ready organized and practiced m 
Wal', with which she might have given the United States ~ome severe thoug!1 
not fatal blows. But however much her pride of power might have been grati-
fied by can·ying her triumphant arms to America, she preferred at once to resume 
peaceful and intimate relations with the United States, and to secure all the 
ad,antages flowing therefrom, then and forever. Her far-seeing statesmen knew 
that the true policy to be followed in respect to the United States in 1815 was, 
with increased reasons for its adoption, that indicated by the statesmen of 1783; 
and they resolved that no future blunder should lead to a war between the 
L"nited States and England so far as the latter could prevent it. In this favor-
able state of the political atmosphere, the clouds that lowered over the north-
eastern boundary, over Canada during the patriot demonstration, and over Oregon, 
were soon cleared away. It is true that the United States yielded in these 
instances something more than was due to England's just claims; but it was 
rather the graceful yielding of a daughter to a mother's solicitation than the 
acknowledgment of any power of coercion possessed by England. If the 
peaceful views of England were not then generally acknowledged, they are now 
made manifest. England is not only at this time to a great degree dependent 
on the United States in commercial matters, but signs are significant that she 
considers her future fate depends on maintaining the most friendly relations with 
the United States, so that they would, from interest in commercial matters, and 
perhaps from a better feeling for their noble mother, look with disfavor on any 
combination ef the European powers to liumble and crush lier. 
Frnnce also gave evidence how much importance she attached to the main-
tenance of the most intimate relations in trade with this country, and how 
reluctantly, if at all, she would resort to hostilities with the United States. The 
King of the French, supported by public opinion, was enabled to overcome the 
opposition of the chambers to the payment of the amount stipulated by treaty 
to be paid for spoliations on our commerce. This public opinion was especially 
expressed by numerous petitions, coming up from the great commercial and 
manufacturing districts of the kingdom, praying that the difficulties with 
America might be settled and peace preserved. 
During the period extending from 1783 to 1812, considerable expenditures 
were made from time to time on the forts and batteries at the principal seaports, 
in anticipation of possible war growing out of the l!.,rench revolution, and more 
recently in consequence of the continued aggression on our commerce by English 
crui ers; , o that .when war actually broke out in 1812 there was not a town of 
any magnitude that was not supplied with one or more batteries. Nevertheless, 
there were a great many small towns exposed without defence to the enemy, and 
were left unmolc .. ted Ly him, seeing that their destruction or injury could in no-
wi..e facHitate his operationH, whilst such acts of vandalism would serve only to 
hold him up to the execration of the civilized world. 
n the c~ur e of the war of 1812-'15 the defences of the country were con-
~id ·rably increased in value hy the construction of field-works; and in no 
in tance w re ·uch clcfeuccs, supported by well-trained and patriotic volunteers, 
ever overcome. Attacks were made on l!'ort Boyer at Mobile, on l!.,ort Mcllenry 
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forces operating on the rear and flanks. Works were th~s constructe~, to s1:1stain 
a siege from ten to fifty days, in the midst of a population from which r~hef to 
the invested work could be drawn in twenty-four hours. The expensive ar-
ranirement of these land defences have greatly increased the cost of the works, 
alre~dy from their nature very costly; and at this day excite the surprise of the 
professional examiner, acquainted with the vast means of collateral defe1:ce pos-
sessed by the United States, that anything more should have been reqmred for 
most of the works, than security against assault by escalade. 
'l'he report to be made by the chief engineer of the United States, on the 
second resolution of the series before mentioned, will exhibit the exact condition 
of the works composing "the third system of defence," the number and strength 
of the works; the first estimates of cost; their extent, capacity, armament, and 
actual cost; and an estimate of the sums necessary to complete them. 
This exhibition will prove what has been herein stated, tliat tlie Uni'.ted States, 
at tltis time, possess the best fortified sea-coast in tll.e world. 
Whilst the defence of the coast has been gradually accomplished in the course 
of thirty-five years by the construction of permanent, extensive, and expensive 
fortifications, new and important elements in the national defence and security 
have been rapidly, almost magically, developed. Our population has increased 
from 8,000,000 to 23,000,000. The progress of improvement in agriculture, 
manufactures and commerce, and in the facile lines of intercommunication neces-
sary to meet the demands of the growing prosperity of the country, has 
advanced in a ratio even greater than that of the population. 
'I,he lines of communication, in combination with the electric telegraph, whilst 
they impart new life and vigor to the country, bring distant sections of it in 
easy correspondence with the centre, at once affording security against foreign 
aggression, and making the people more interested in preserving those glori-
ous institutions under which, for seventy years, they have happily lived and 
prospered. 
The interior and exterior commerce of the country have advanced with sur-
pri _ing strides. the latter has become so necessary to the leading commercial 
nat10ns of the world, that its intenuption would produce disastrous results to 
t~o~e nations. The stoppage of the supply of cotton following a war with the 
United States, would be attended in England by the most serious consequences 
to her trade and finances-consequences deemed by many as being fatal to the 
political institutions of that country. 
In this brief review we have passed through three epochs: that of the rev-
olutionary war ; that of the war of 1812-' 15 ; and that of the elapsed time from 
1816 to 1851. 
ID: the first epoch it has been shown that the power of England, although 
relatively greater than it is now in respect to this country, aided also as it was 
?Y a considerable portion 0f the inhabitants remaining loyal to England, was 
madequate to subdue our people, or to retain any portion of our soil. 
In the ccond epoch it bas also been shown that though the national defence 
by permanent fortifications was weak in comparison with the present one, and 
he mean for the operation of the mobile forces were limited and difficult in 
their use, the mo t formidal1le demonstrations of the enemy were easily defeated 
and the country preserved from any injurious attacks of the enemy, except in 
one or two instance . 
~ nd in the third poch it is shown that, in the several international difficulties 
hich have arisen with :B ranee and England, those powerful nations gave evidence 
hroughout the pending neg,Jtiations, of their desire to maintain that pacific policy 
· :-:<·ntial to the pro ecutio1 1 of the commercial and manufacturiug pursuit 3 which 
have be ·n extended so rapidly in their respective countries during the last thirty 
year-. 
'Ihi epoch, now of thirty-five years duration, is distinguished for the profound 
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peace which has been maintained throughout the civilized world without inter-
ruption, except in the instances of the Mexican war, and of some unimportant . 
conflicts in Europe; and that whilst it has thus been distinguished, it is no less 
so on account of the wonderful progress made in the arts and sciences, by whose 
influence the character of nations and of their governments have been greatly 
changed for the better, affording new guarantees that the pacific policy, so loug 
and profitably maintained by the leading commercial nations, will continue to 
be cherished toward all countries and toward ours in particular. 
In view, then, of all these things, and especially of the new elements, moral, 
political, and physical, claimed to have been developed and to have greatly in-
creased the power of the United States, and whicli must be considered in relation 
to tlie future arrangement ef tlie national defence, the undersigned thinks that 
the general plan adopted thirty-five years ago should be essentially modified, 
by reducing the number and size of the works proposed to be constructed, and 
by abandoning some of the defences now in progress of construction, or which 
are about to be co11structed under existing appropriations made by Congress. 
The undersigned is also of the opiniou that the best inte1~sts of the country 
require that the subject of modification should be submitted to a board composed 
of artillery and engineer officers, and some eminent civiliami. That no new 
work should be commenced, even if it has been appropriated for by Congress; 
and that no appropriation should be made by Congress for the completion and 
repairs of existing works, until the whole subject of the national defence has 
been considered and reported by the said board. 
The Secretary of War desires "that the chief engineer and the above-named 
officers (Colonel 'l,hayer, Lieutenant Colonel De Russy, Major Delafield, and 
Major Chase) should direct their inquiries particularly to the following points: 
"1st. How far the invention and extension of railways have superseded or 
diminished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard 1 
"2d. In what manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by 
steam, and particularly the application of steam to vessels-of-war, and recent 
improvements in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries, affect 
the quc tion 1 
"3d. How far vessels-of-war, steam batterie , ordinary merchant ships and 
teamers, and oth~r temporary expedients can be relied upon as sub. titutes for 
p rm.anent fortification for the d fonce of the large seaport 1 
"4th. How far the increase of the population on the northern fronti<'r, and_ of 
th m ·rcantile marine on the northern lakes, can obviate or dimini h the neces 1ty 
of continuing the sy tern of fortification· on those lakes 1" 
Th r '" ult of the inquiries made by the undersigned in the premise , are 
cxprc· d a follows : 
1 t. ~l'h • inn?ntiou and exten ·ion of railway. and of the lectric tclccrraph, i~ 
conn x1011 with th gr at increa:- in the number and ize of steam v ~-.:el~ mm-
gati11: t_hP. river , ba • , fak s, and ocean, lrn.v, added greatly to the "tr('l1crth o! 
th mou Ly bringing th mo t di. taut cctions within a few a~ y ' travel ot 
th c ·~tr , and do thu contribute to pr erve tranquillity at home and repel 
' C'l'!!l' • • 10n mm abr ad. 
' h lin of railway., a . mning the radiating point at ... cw York, will lio~ly 
< .·tcrnl 11 t mo. of th impnrta11t . •aboard and inland town in th m c 
ti··. 'l h t •I "Taph lin · following th rail-1, and al o divcrgin"' fr m th m. 
b rriunin"' to int ·la· th onntry in v ·ry clir tion. y the"' m nn _and 
rapid incr ·n. of our opulntim1 iudig •nouJy and by immi..,.ration, a-:rncul-
tur ancl 111 mnfn ·tur , hnv · h n nrp1i~ingl • <·xt ncl cl throu 0 ·hout ur 
d mnin : n i nn in •mal mm re l1 •. ari. ·n L ·th, int r ·hang' f th J> 
art au of ur Yariou ·Jim t • which i. ·on ·id •r •cl t lJ • of ar , t •r 
·t rior comm re of th ·ou try. \Yith the .xc 1>tion of a 
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onr artificial and natural productions embrace everything that can be produced 
in any part of the world. 
These are immense elements of strength to a nation, and insure its power and 
prosperity. This is the moral effect. . . . 
The existence of these railways and telegraphs contribute directly and physi-
cally to the defence of the country, by enabling men and mil~tar.y supplies to ?e 
collected promptly and moved rapidly to points threatened with mvas1on. Rml-
ways extend already along the coast, in some instances, in double l~nes, from 
Portland to Savannah, connecting all the intermediate cities and other important 
points with the canals and rivers and the naval and military arsenals and depots. 
From this great base line, other lines convergent and divergent, have _reached 
lakes Erie, Ontario, and Champlain, and they are rapidly approachmg and 
crossing the great lakes and rivers of the west. And it is hoped that Congress 
will not long delay, in conjunction with the State of Texas, in making such a 
d~nation of _lands as will enable private enterprise to com~ence and complete a 
railway leadmgfrom some point between the mouth of Red river and New Orleans, 
through Louisiana and 'rexas to El Paso, and thence through the valley of the 
Gila to San Diego, in California. 
. A single example of the pervading extent of the railway system will at once 
illustrate the subject, and exhibit in a favorable light these new means for the 
national defence. The completion of the railway now in course of completion, 
from Wilmington, in North Carolina, to Manchester, in South Carolina, will 
enable troops to be transported continuously, by railway, from the valley of the 
Tennessee to Norfolk in two days, to Washington in two and a lialf days, and 
to . Charleston and Savannah in one day. The extension of the railway now 
bemg made from Chattanooga, on the Tennessee river, to Nashville, will enable 
the volunteers from the superb military population of 'Tennessee to be carried to 
the most distant points of the north and south Atlantic, almost at a moment's 
warning, and in the course of three or four days ; whilst the speedy completion 
of the road from Atlanta, in Georgia, to Montgomery, in .Alabama, and the 
pr?bable construction of a road from Montgomery to Mobile and Pensacola, will 
;,_mng the Gulf of Mexico within a day's travel of the same great State of 'Ten-
nessee. 
At the north the system of railways is much more extended. The New 
York and Erie road, now complete, is proposed to be extended along the shore 
of Lake Erie to Cleveland, and thence to Detroit, from whence a road has been 
carried to Chicago, on Lake Michigan. 'rhe seaboard base of rail ways will 
thu,..: be 1:~:ought within easy communicatioig_ of the most distant lake frontier. 
The Massachusetts, Vermont, St. Lawrence, and Montreal railways will bring 
the whole Canada frontier, extending from Lake Ontario down to Montreal, 
·ithin twenty-four hours' travel, on an average, of Boston, Portland, and New 
York. 
The transportation of troops on railways may be effected with great prompt-
ness . The first regiment of P ennsylvania, raised in Philadelphia, the most dis-
tant point from the scene of action, were transported so rapidly to New Orleans, 
?:ia Pittsburg and the P ennsylvania railways, that the regiment, one thousand 
rong, Wa!'I placed in the van of the volunteer forces, raised for the campaign 
a.gaiu. t Mexico, under General Scott. 
'ufficient has been said to show that railways and the electric telegraph con-
d 1te largely to the national defence ; that the works covering our large sea-
l ort..'3 and other important points, placed in connexion with the railw:ays and 
-le,rraph, if they were now to be constructed, might be much reduced in si,zc 
and co. t, if not in number ; that the facility with which these works could be 
r "li ·v ·d, in ca e of an attempted siege, would have rendered it only necessary 
£ r them to be made s cure against a coup-de-main. 
• nder thcoe viewi:; of the subject, it is at once perceived that, whilst the ex-
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tension and invention of railways and the electric telegraph do not supersede, 
they gTeatly diminish the necessity of adding to the number and cost of the 
fortifications on the seaboard ; or, in other words, that the future prosecution of 
the system of defence by permanent fortifications should be on a very reduced 
scale in comparison with the magnificent one adopted thirty-five years ago. 
2d. The navigation of the ocean by steam, and the application of steam to 
vessels-of-war, have certainly added to the facilities of naval operations in 
making attacks and transporting troops. But such operations are necessarily 
confined to short lines, like those between Fi·ance and England, in the Mediter-
ranean, or on the lakes between Canada and the United States. 
Attacks by steamers can only be formidable when they are numerous and 
filled with troops destined for a grand attack; but when they are thus filled 
with troops, munitions of war, provil:lions, armament, and their regular crews, 
little room is left for the fuel necessary to propel them to the scene of action 
and in retreat. Such steamers cannot be propelled either conveniently or rapidly 
until the propelling power can be produced at a less outlay for fuel. At the 
rate supposed to be the maximum of speed of war-steamers, lines of operations 
over one thousand miles (five hundred in advance and five hundred in retreat) 
cannot be occupied advantageously, or with the efficiency necessary to a great 
movement of a strategic or direct attack. Numerous transports would be neces-
Rary to convey supplies of coal to convenient places on the coast, where depots 
for the same would have to be established and defended at great cost, for they 
would be constantly in danger of attack by sea and land from enterprising as-
sailants. Besides, the great loads of men, munitions, armaments, provisions, 
and fuel that war and transport steamers would be obliged to cany, multiply 
the dangers of navigation. 
Certainly steamers could make sudden and brief attempts to enter harbors 
and destroy towns, but fast-sailing ships with favorable winds could do the same, 
if this kind of marauding and piratical warfare was carried on by any Christian 
nation calling itself civilized, and if not opposed by the same machines of war 
a tho e used by the enemy and by acts of retaliation. 
8uch attempts might be succes~ful in attack and retreat, if made in the night, 
even if the harbor was strongly fortified, if the fortifications were unaided by 
rafts and hulks lying· across the channels. 
But a demonstration on a large ..,calc against the important ports and arsenal.., 
for the purpose of taking pos cs ion and levying contributions, require con-
i::id mble land forces, even again t such point as were not defended by batterie:s, 
for at ench points, in time of war, earth erections would be made and ca ily up-
pli 1 d with cannon of heavy calibre, that would do great damage, Ly direct an<l 
YPrti al cannonade, to the n my's ve. scls and forces afloat after they had cut rc<l 
tl11 1 harbor, and probably comp 1 them to leave it, and force him to t- ·lcct a more 
distant point for th initiative of attack. 
If th1· n my, . trong in hip· and solcli r,, could be cfrivcn from Bo.,ton by 
th' r ction of t-om r doubts in the cour,e of one night, it i · hardly to b ·np-
po. eel that h would att ·mpt to r captur the po ition, or to attack any other 
po:-ition irni1ar1y ;itu t cl. ., 
. ..\ny . u h dcrnon tration at th pre. nt day would he checked by th m n 
ju~t mun ·rat Pel, arnl b met on it flank. and in front Ly the mobil • fi re •, rnJ. 
Ii d by th t 1 "mph t > th" point of att: ·k. 
'.rl1 · irn roY<'mc11t i_1 : rtill ry, a r '",ll'<l~ siz • nd cffici •ncy, h. · h H f L 
y · r. Y ry ~'T t, but 1t mur ' mor t th • hen ·fit of th d ·f 11 • • th n th 
In tl1 J . am ~·ny t]i. t, ~f t •run ppli ·cl to ,·hip~-of-war ff rel nn T n h· nt: !! t 
tl1 · t ·k, t · m appli 1 on nnlw t • , ombin <l with th •1 ·tri t zr.i h. 
aff rd r • t r . clrnut " to t11 • ctPti·n • 1,y r n of th • !!T t r fi ili • · ·th 
w}1i h for • m, y b mo,·<·<1 b • th latt r m an:-t. 
} m nll which it IO y b ·ly rt th t th naYi • ti n of th . Y 
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i!eam, the application of steam to vessels-of-war,_ ~nd recent improvement in 
millery and other military inventions, do not exhibit the attack of _forts ?n the 
aboard superior to the defence, where those forts are connected with railways 
md are brought within succor of the surrounding population, nor do they render 
.dditions to the present fortifications in number, size, or cost in anywise neces-
' ry. But, on the contrary, the improvement in artillery, if those fortifications 
:iad now to be built, would enable their plans to be reduced one-half in size and 
e annament onefourth, in amount. 
The substitution of the 10-inch columbiad for the mixed and most inefficient 
:mnaments with which our fortifications have been garnished at great expense, 
·, already forced upon us by the introduction of those superb guns · on board of 
-e~sels-of-war. It would be ridiculous, if it be intended to adhere in any degree 
·o the present system of sea-coast defence, to retain the present armaments, 
Cl}mposed principally as they are of 12, 18, 24, 32, and 42-pounders. It is the 
~pinion of many persons, entertained for years past, that but one class of guns 
hould be generally used in our batteries on the coast, and that these guns 
:.Jould be of the largest calibre which experiment has demonstrated could be 
efficiently used. ., 
Fort McKee, in the harbor of Pensacola, is supplied with one hundred and 
b-enty guns, composed of about equal numbers of 24, 32, and 42-pounders. 
The average effective range of these guns may be stated at 1,100 yards, and 
the weight of metal that may be projected from the entire battery at 3,920 
pounds. Now thirty 10-inch columbiads would throw the same weight of solid 
.. hot and strike an object with precision at 2,200 yards distant; so that whilst 
the number of guns at Fort McKee might be reduced seventy-five in one hun-
dred, the effective range by solid and hollow shot would be increased one hun-
dred i1: one hundred, and the efficiency of the batteries greatly increased, at the 
same time the size of that work might be reduced at least one-half. 
3d. Our large seaports and naval depots being already covered by extensive 
works, and requiring but small additional defences, the discussion of the question 
as ~o the superiority of those defences over vessels-of-war, floating batteries, 
ordinary merchant vessels and steamers, and other temporary expedients, would 
ee~ to be unnecessary All experience, however, has shown that any kind of 
floatrng defences is inferior, on every score, to land batteries where the localities 
will permit the latter to be used. This subject has been ably discussed and 
illustrated in the report made by a board of officers to the Secretary of War in 
1 40, on the national defences. Other temporary expedients, such as rafts, 
h~k~ sunk in c_hannels, and riages of stone thrown across the same, could be 
relied upon, in most instances, only as auxiliary defence to land batteries. 
4th. In considering how far the increase of population on the northern frontier, 
and of the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates the necessity of con-
tinuing the system of fortifications on those lakes, it will be necessary to bring 
into view some of the elements of strength, moral, physical, and political 
possessed by the United States, and which have already been alluded to in this 
report. 
The chief moral and political element is the aversion to war with the United 
Stat s felt by Great Britain, whose present superiority in naval means of attack 
makes her, of all nations, alone formidable to us. This aversion arises from the 
intimate and entangling relations in commerce with this country, and from the 
d pendencc of England upon the United States for the chief supply of cotton to 
t e leading branch of her manufactures. And this aversion to the slightest 
a proach of international hostility is not abated by the consideration that the 
toward event of war with the United States would prompt Russia and France 
carry out their long-cherished designs of aggrandizement in Turkey, Syria, 
and India. 
~I h principal physical clements are: first, the facility with which, by means 
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of existing railways, we could approach Montreal with a large force, and drive 
thence the British forces to seek shelter under the walls of Quebec, and finally 
from all Canada; by which simple and rapid movement the two provinces would · 
fall without a strug·gle into our possession, with one-half of its population, at 
least, inclined to a change of sovereignty; and second, the superiority of our 
mercantile marine, affording convertible means for a naval force, giving· us the 
mastery of the lakes, and enabling us to crush any partizan attempts coming 
from the Canada shore; and third, the superiority of our advantages on the 
score of a military population lying along the whole northern and lake frontier. 
These great moral, physical, and political advantages being undeniable, the 
continuation of the system of fortifications on the northern and lake frontier 
would involve a useless wast~ of public money. 
The large sums of money expended and proposed to be expended on the 
defensive works extending from Rouse's Point to the Sault of St. Marie would 
have been, and will be more beneficially applied to the improvement of the lake 
harbors and dependent rivers, thus promoting the interests of commerce in time 
of peace, and affording depots for our naval forces in time of war. 
By demonstrating that sucli an application ef tlw public money would dfrectly 
promote the national defence, not only on the lakes, i·n substitution qf fortifica-
tions, but on the seaboard, in aiding tlie defence by fortifications, muclz, ef the 
opposition entertained, 0n constitutional grounds, towards internal improvements, 
would be removed. 
Under these views, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the whole system 
of fortifications for the defence of the northern and lake frontiers should at once 
be abandoned, and that no more money be applied even for the ·repairs or com-
pletion of the existing works. 
The undersigned, in conclusion, would express his opinion in repetition, that 
a board of artillery and engineer officers and civilians should be formed to take 
into consideration the whole subject of the national defences, as called for by the 
resolutions of the House of Representatives, passed in the e sion of March 3, 
1 51, and as particularly and earchingly alluded to by the Secretary of '\V ai·, 
in his order of April 17, 1 51, with a view to the changes nece sary to be made 
in "the third system of defence," commenced thirty-five years ago; and of the 
adaptation of the same, in·versely, to the increased power, political, pl1y ·ical, and 
moral, of the United States. 
The composition of such a board being well calculated to have the whole 
subj •ct opened fairly and di cuHftecl freely, by which error of opinion , par-
ticularly tho e ari ing from profo. ional prejudice and interest , would be 
e. po cd and corrected, the trnth in the premise. made mauifest, and the good 
of th commonwealth ecurccl. 
'ivili, n vcr cd in national and international policy, and officer known to be 
ppoi::cd to the y tern of defence on it present , cale, a well a tho .. c who he Ye 
cl ·clar ·d in it · favor, would cau. c the pour and contre to be fairly l-.t·lted, and 
nll ·ophi try and fa]~ prin ·ipl · · to be cl ·tcct cl and di carded. 
In th ' v nt of uch a board being form d, it i uglJ'c:-;tcrl. that the (1 ye. and 
nor. on ull important quc tions hould Le ordered to be tak n and r corded. 
H '"P · tfully , ubrnitt d, 
W:M.H. OH., E, 
1llajor of Engi 1'. • 
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No.10. 
Report of Major R. D elafield . 
Views and opinions of Major Richard Delafield, of the corps of engineers! on: 
the following points connected with the defence of the coasts of the Umted 
tates, called for by the Secretary of War in his communication of the 17th of' 
April, 1851: 
1st. How far the invention and extension of railr'oads have superseded or 
diminished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard 1 
No member of the ,corps of engineers, so far as I am acquainted, has ever 
considered it expedient to construct permanent fortifications along our seaboard, 
to defend it against armies operating on the land. The art of fortification, in 
such an emergency, is principally confined to temporary field-works, thrown up 
after the enemy has_ effected a landing, and selected his route of approach. 
Such fortifications ai·e only needed to oppose infantry and field artillery, 
requiring little less than earth for their construction, and executed. by the troops 
in the field, and with a few days' labor. 
To the more speedy accomplishment of this particular, in the defence of the 
nation, railroads have contributed greatly. . 
Fortifications of a permanent character, requiring a long time to construct and 
perfect, are, however, considered indispensably necessary to prevent the ingress 
of the powerful floating batteries that can sail or steam into our harbors, against 
which railroads can oppose, neither directly nor indirectly, ~n efficient resistance. 
The city of New York, for example, is within three hours' sail of the ocean. 
Ships-of-war of the heaviest class, and war steamers with troops, can come to 
the docks of this city, or lay at anchor in the East and North rivers, and do as 
much injury and destruction as may suit an enemy's purpose. Now, afthough 
several railroads centre in this city from distant and most populous sections of 
our country, they can bring nothing to prevent the entrance of a maritime force. 
No number of men that can be concentrated in New York, or along the shores 
ot: the water approaches, however well disciplined they may be, can oppose, 
with any probability of success, the passage of a hostile fleet from the sea to 
the city, or prevent its destroying its mercantile marine and real estate. Field 
artillery, infantry, cavalry, and riflemen can have no effect upon ships-of-the-
line ; and the increase of numbers would but swell the loss of our citizens by 
uselessly exposing them to a ship's broadsides. 
The many thousands of uniformed militia that could, within forty-eight hours, 
be concentrated by railroad and river steamers in New York and its vicinity, 
could do positively nothing in arresting a hostile fleet from destroying the city. , 
It will be asked, then, are railroads of no value or use in the defence of the 
ea-coast1 :Most certainly, they are a valuable auxiliary; economizing time 
and trea,·ure, and preventing many a predatory expedition that an enemy might 
otherwi e undertake. 
L andings for supplies of provisions, water, or for any hostile purpose against 
all the cities and towns of the Union, are rendered much more difficult and haz-
ardous to an enemy. Ere he can effect a landing, march to the city, and destroy 
or lay it under contribution, the railroads and river steamers could transport 
from hundreds of miles the uniform militia of the country in far greater num-
l er ~ than any fleet can be expected to bring across the ocean; provided, we can 
cau:e such landings to be made at such a distance from the cities as to give time 
for th e railroads an d steamers to transport the militia after they are assembled. 
In all such landings an enemy can have J:\O other description of force than we 
can bring to oppo e him. H e has, in such case, been compelled to leave his 
heavy battering, hip . 
H . E x. Doc. 92--26 • 
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ments in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries affect this 
question 1 
The navigation of the ocean by steam has had a great influence upon the 
defence of our seaboard. "The heavy ar,mament of war steamers, their ample 
i!orage and accommodation for troops, the rapidity of their evolutions and facility 
of transport, altogether constitute them convenient and formidable instruments 
for offensive waif are, particularly for making a descent upon any line of coast 
with a powerful army. Since 1815 it has enabled seamen to set the elements 
at defiance, and this would lead hostile powers to consider us more open to 
invasion." 
B_efore its introduction, it required an immense marine and lon~ time for :Rr~p-
aration ere an enemy could effect an invasion of our shores. . 1 he exped1t10n 
fitted out by England against New Orleans was known by us to be in prepara-
tion, for some part of our coast, six months before its arrival. After sailing, it 
~ad to rendezvous at Jamaica, (from whence, also, we heard of its concentra-
tion,) and again at Ship island, before commencing to disembark. This gave 
~uch time for us to prepare. At that date we may be considered as having had 
ix months' notice of an intended expedition. 
At the present time, with the aid of steam, the notice comes with the blow; 
~ few days now suffices to invade either Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Bal-
timore, Norfolk, Charleston, or Savannah, from Bermuda. It is the introduc-
ti~n of steam navigation that has given such an advantage over us, compared 
w1th the sailing vessels of 1815. 
In 1812 Great Britain considered Halifax a ·suitable place for her naval 
depot, and stores for her fleet on our coast. It so continued until a recent date, 
:When they discovered that our proximity by land enabled us to reach and destroy 
it, _beyond their power to prevent it. The consequence has been, that a central 
p~mt o.l'posite our Atlantic .seaboard (Bermuda) has been selected, fortified, and 
till bemg fortified with great care and strength, and fitted as a naval depot. 
To it, already, have all the naval stores been removed from Halifax. It is 
ecure against the power or force we can most readily command, (an army,) and, 
by fortifications, is secure against any naval armament we are likely to possess. 
From this point an army can embark in steamers, and in three days be 
anchored in our harbors, without any other notice than their coming in sight of 
our headland, but not long enough to enable us to draw together militia to 
oppose them. Hence it is that we are comparatively weaker, at this time, by 
the introduction of steam navigation. 
Another important facility to an enemy, and to our disadvantage, is gained 
by the steamship. Fifteen such vessels as have lately been built will carry au 
army of ten thousarnl men, with their munitions, to any point on our Atlantic 
coabt in a given space of time, ancl without any necessity for other rendezvous 
than the point of attack. Whereas, some hundred sailing transports would be 
required for the same army, and no calculation made of their arriving at their 
de tination within days of each other. 
The de£ nces of the coast of }trance and England, on the channel, forcibly 
illu._trate the change effected by ocean steam navigation. England considered 
Ler.·elf safe from inva ion, by the strength of her cliannel fleet. France con-
idered herself equally safe, by the fortification of her harbors. For a long 
period n •ither power could injure each othrr, guarded a. they were. 'l'he fleets 
of En°·land mad many demon, tration upon the coasts of France, but never 
ffe ·t d anything of importance, and N apo1eon made a powerful combined dem-
on tration with hi, army and fl t, and failed by the superiority of the English 
eet. 
But · inc team ha. rir< n to its pre, cut importance, these two nations are 
con~id ·r d a. having mat ·rially changed their relations of defence. 
ranc ', with her pr ponderating land force, transported by steamers, can 
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readily invade England. The channel fleet of old would no longer be a pro 
tection. The statesmen of England, fully aware of this state of things, hav, 
for some time past been endeavoring to restore their ascendency. 
A channel fleet combined with the aid of fortification, '' which experience ii 
war and science can suggest," (Duke of Wellington to the chief engineers,) i 
now their reliance, but it is a fleet of steam ships-of-war. Several of ther 
ships-of-the-line have been fitted with screw propelling engines, as an auxiliarJ 
power, retaining the sails and their powe1ful broadsides. The first ship buil 
in the English dock yards of this class is the Sanspareil of eighty-one guns 
2,'235 tons; carrying on her lower deck thirty 32-pounders of fifty-six hundred-
weight, nine feet six inches long; main deck, thirty eight-inch guns of fifty-twc 
hundredweight, eight feet long; quarter deck and forecastle, twenty 32-pound-
ers of twenty-five hundredweight, six feet long, one ten-inch gun of eighty-
four hundredweight, nine feet four inches long, with a three hundred and fifty 
horse-power engine, launched at Davenport in April, 1851. With vessels of 
this description they hope to retain their ascendency on the water, and protect 
their ports, in the absence of the fleet, against sudden attacks of an enemy's 
steamers, by fortifications. 
In relation to the application of steam to ships-of-war, up to the building of 
the above vessel, the problem had not been solved. Not a single steamship 
had been built calculated to contend with a land battery, or a broadside of a 
ship-of-the-line. We have not, to this day, an instance of steamers having 
exposed themselves succes fully or for any determined purpose to hostile guns, 
with the exception of the little English iron steamer Nemesis in the Chinese 
war, where she accomplished much, but against batteries of no value. 
As transports and tow-boats, they have contributed greatly to the success of 
fleets on the invasion of Algiers by the French under Beaumont; the fleet was 
towed into position abreast the Algerine batteries by their war steamers. At 
Vera Cruz they made the ame use of their steamers- at Beyrout, on the coast 
of Syria, although the English had the best of their war steamers, they were 
only u, ed as tow-boats- taking distant stations in the latter part of the action 
and shelling the fortification. 
The French army that recently operated against Rome was transported from 
Toulon by steamers, carrying artillery, cavah·y, and infantry. 
The result, then, of the navigation of the ocean by steam goes to prove a 
greater necessity than ever for defending our cities, harbors and dock yards by 
ome efficient mean , whether by fortifications, steam vessels-of-war, or other 
means, is yet to be consid red. 
'.fhe next branch of .inquiry under thi second head if'I : "In what manner and 
to what extent has the rec nt improvements in artillery and other military 
iuv nti n and discoveries affected thi que tion 1" 
Th r cent improvement in artillery, I a1Jpr hend, are rather the re~ult of 
calling Id thing by new nam , and thu bringing them afre h into notice. 
than any ub tantial advantag . 
Th u of what i g nerally call d the Paixhan gun is uppo"ed to lia,e 
pr due d a gr at r volution in the a-coa t d fcnc . It i no more nor 1 ,, 
than firino- h 11 w h t horizon lly, a practice tlrnt ha pr vail d a Iona- a., th 
howitz r ha. b n kn wn (about 1693.) The only diffi rence between tJ1 Ii ·ld 
• and i g howitz r nnd ol n 1 Pai lian': gun i , that he ake his ~un lo11g 
and y hi writin"' , ha au l th m to be introcluc d a aain on board .. hip - -
w r, and probabl mor u l f r · a- a t batt ri, . 
In our o,vn nri w h d m d u e of uch ]on howitz rti for 
d f. nc y ar · ef r o] n_ I i.· h n anything to th public on th 
1 call d th m col um 1ad., many of which ar now to b non T ,. 
i land in thi harbor that w r in u from 1 12 to 1 15. 
n th · an th u .. • of h 11 w b t fir d horizontally wa made by 
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De Grasse, off the Chesapeake, during our revolutionary war, and abandoned in 
eonsequence of the serious injury caused by the accidental explosion of the 
iliells about the decks. 
Since their re-introduction similar results have occurred. The steamer Medea, 
111e of Admiral Stopford's fleet, operating against the Egyptians in 1840, when 
,,if Alexandria, was seriously injured by the bursting of a shell that, with five 
1iliers, had been got on deck for examination; one beam was split asunder, the 
hole deck raised, and every buckhead in the captain's cabin, ward, and gun-
rooms torn to shreds, and the vessel set on fire . 
.About the same period (December, 1840,) a similar accident occurred on board 
the Excellent, the gunnery ship at Portsmouth, on trying some shells after hearing 
of the accident on board of the Medea. The fuses, in both cases, were metal 
( nith screw caps, supposecl to be a secure preventive against accidents on board 
,e~sels. The use, therefore, of this improvement in artillery, for steamers, and 
on board ships-of-war is, I conceive, quite problematical, while, on the other 
hand, its value in the sea-coast batteries is increased by the greater ranges, 
pr~~ision of fire, and facility of causing the explosion about the intend_ed and 
cnt1cal moment. 
While such shells fired from ships against stone walls and earthen parapets 
are harmless, breaking to pieces in the one case, and throwing up a few yards of 
earth only in the other, the injury to the steamer or ship is far greater than from 
any other artillery in use. 
~t may not be amiss, under this head, to show the effect of this species of 
artillery upon vessels, proving, as I think, very conclusively, the safe reliance 
we may have in defending our harbors by them if mounted in favorable positions. 
The effect of hot shot and shells from these columbiads (I must be permitted 
to use_ the American name as of prior invention) against shipping was shown by 
Cap tam Hastings, in the service of the Greeks, who, at Salona, in 1826-'7, fired 
not only hot shells, which he substituted for hot shot, as by their weight they 
broke through both sides of small vessels, but he fired carcasses and shells from 
68-pounder guns. During tlle affair ~t Salona, he says, by the time he had fired 
tmce, a brig-of-war blew up, owing to a shell exploding in her magazine. An 
armed transport brig sank forward owing to a shell exploding in her bow, and 
was set on fire aft by a hot shell. At 'l1rickere he burnt a brig-of-war with hot 
sho~- During an attack of the Greeks against a monastery at Pirn:{ms, within the 
straits between Salonis and Megara, and for the relief of A.thens, the 'l,urkish 
pacha opened a battery of five guns upon the Greek steamer Perseverance, two_ 
of them long five-inch howitzers, producing considerable effect. One shot struck 
the caniage of a long 68-pounder and exploded there, another exploded in the 
wunter of the P erseverance and tore out two streaks for a length of six feet, 
a.:nd tarted out the planking from two adjacent streaks, when the steamer 
retreated from this dangerous position. 
In the attack on the harbor of Tolo, the Greeks directed the fire of 68-pounders' 
shell on a brig-a shell struck her, exploding in her hull and blew her foremast 
int:o th water. They afterwards made an attack upon a Turkish squadron of 
lline v s. el ·, and opened a fire upon the Turkish admiral's ship, distant about 
five hundred yards, with hot shells. The second fire of two hot shells from the 
loner gun. and two carcas. es from carronad~s, one lodo·ed in the hull of the 
Turki h commodore, and, reaching the magazine, blew h~r up. A. carcase shell 
exploded in the bow of a brig next to the commodore; she sank fo1 ward, while 
a hot h ·11 tii.king her stern, which stood up in shallow water, soon enveloped 
h.er -n flam . In a £ w minute another vessel was on fire, and an A.lgeii.ne 
\"" -,_ 1 having r c ived a shell, which exploded between decks, was abandoned 
!)3~ b r er w. In th harbor of Patra, , the Greek made an attack upon an Austrian bii.g 
load d for the 'rurki. h army, by opening upon her a fire of shelh; from 68-
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pounders; one of them exploded in her hull near the water's edge, tore out a 
great part of her side, when she sank almost immediately. 
All these results arc calculated to show the effect of hollow shot fired horizon-
tally from what is generally called Paixhan guns against shipping, and proves 
the efficacy of sea-coast defences armed with such artillery. 
Of the effect of such a fire against forts, from ships or steamers, I recall to 
mind that of the French fleet under J oumanville, against the castle of St. Juan 
d'Ulloa, when a shell entering an embrasure, passed into a magazine through 
an unprotected door, and blew it up. 
In 1840, the steam frigates Phrenix, Stranbole, Gorgon, and Vesuvius, were 
of the fleet that made an attack upon St. Jean d' Acre. They shelled tke town 
with long guns, from positi0ns beyond gun-range of the batteries, during the 
attack by the ships-of-the-line, keeping beyond the range of the shore batteries . 
During the Carlist war, in Spain, several English steamers presented them-
selves against the land batteries, but retired on receiving the first :fire from the 
land. 
Other than the several instances herein referred to I can recall to mind now, 
and they all go to show that the u e of columbiads is a most reliable means of 
protecting our harbors against ships or steamers. 
Another improvement having a bearing on this subject is that of submarine 
artillery. Fulton's efforts with torpedoes were of little avail during his lifetime. 
The attempts upon the Engli h ship Plantagenet, in Lynnhaven bay, and upon 
Admiral W arrcn's fleet, off New London, during the war of 1812 to 1815, which 
proved abortive, are the only instances I am aware of with these machines. 
Since his death, however, a new ag nt-that of electro-galvanism-has come 
into use, enabling us to explode a hell or magazine of powder under water at 
any particular in, tant of time. 'rhi ' power may be made auxiliary in the defence 
of our coa t, in the channels over which hostile vessels must pa, s in approaching 
our cities; but it can only be of u, e in connexion with forts, from ·which the 
electro-agent is ·worked, and from whence to protect the torpedoes until the 
proper moment of u ing them, as well a, from whence to a certain the exact 
instant of time in firing them. An undefended position will not admit of their 
ucces ful application. It is an unc 'rtain auxiliary in the defence of our :-hip 
channel , yet one that would b re ort d to by officers acquainted with i 
advantage . Gutta-percha 'la tic tube , within which the wires may be !ro-
tected, i another modc•rn inv ·ntion, facilitating· th u; of the electro-galvanic 
mod of in tantaneou, <>xplor-;ion. 
The cffi ct of the railroad j., to economiz<> greatly the military resource:- oft~ 
nation, by relying upon a much c:mallcr di, ciplin •d forc:r to act ao-aim;t ho~tile 
land in r:4. :F or xam pl , th 14am troop, that would op rate acrain t a 110-:til 
anny moving on Bo. ton, would :-:uffice to act against the rune force that .., bould 
af't,rwarcl. attempt to march upon ..1..:r w York, I)hilad<'lphia, or Baltimor . 
1Va. hintrton. Bc·forc~ their tran14port.' could paRs from one to the oth<-r, the rml-
road could tr:m:-;port th army to oppo. r thc·m. 
It i. a know} clgc of an ·n my'· movcrnmt.' only that i n c ,-ary to C'Illl I 
u.: to tak · aclv:rnta,,.e of the railroad :-pPNl of trnn>1portation; and h rc them 
r c ·nt di..;co,,. ·ry of th<' l<· tr -tel g-raph eomc• · into valuabl u. . But th re 
L nothincr in tlw, inv •ntion. or irnprov ·ment: that l •, ·nt th importune• an 
n c ·.it' of opp,. i1w tlw p ,wnful floating armam nt. that can b l,r u!!h 
again~t u b • 1·11tia1ly pownfol hatt ·ri<· · for I •t me acrain r p at that a mJ·ri:I 
of m n, with riti a)l(l oth ·r . maJJ a11n , i. nothino- ao-ain,·t hip:: Lrona-id . 
On · othc·r ·lurn"<' in mod ·rn artill r • dl'...:crvc~ t Le noti cl: urincr th I • 
half · ·ntury th calibr of tlw ·~m mount :cl n board hip~- f-, ·ar ha: !!'ft • 
in r >a:- d, and made it 11 c._· • nry t in ·r ·a:- , th pow •r of th , batt ri , .. th 
I • n .. truct d t oppo · tlinn. j · ·ti 11 ~ hav mc·tim · b n tak u t 
110w •r f our ,ea-coa,t batt ri · ; n littl r fl cti 11 wm, I d ubt not ho 
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necessity of their being made equal, in all respects, to the batteries by which 
tliey can be assailed. . . 
From 1776 to 1783 frio-ates of thirty-two, twenty-e1ght, and twenty-four 
run mounted twelve-pounders on their main deck. 
e In 1800 most of the English friga'.tes mounted twelve _and e_ighteen-pounders. 
In February of that year the admiralty ordere~ all sh1ps of twenty-four a1:d 
twenty guns to be :fitted on the main deck for thirty-two pounder carronades, m 
lieu of the long NINE-POUNDERS hitherto carried. 
The Danish forty-gun ship Freya mounted eighteen-pounders. 'l'he Danish 
vessels at Copenhagen, attacked by Nelson, mounted-
Forty-eight thirty-six-pounders. 





One hundred and forty thirty-two-pounders. 
Seventy-four twenty-four-pounders. 
One hundred and ninety-two eighteen-pounders. 
Twenty-two twelve-pounders. 
One hundred and fourteen nine-pounders. 
Six six-pounders; together with carronades. 
1805. The Victory, Nelson's flagship at Trafalgar, mounted on her first deck, 
long thirty-two-pounders; second deck, long twenty-four-pounders; third deck, 
long twelve-pounders; quarter deck and forecastle, twelve-pounders, and two 
1-ixty-eight-pounders, carronades. · The French admiral's ship, in the s~me 
action, mounted thirty-two and eighteen-pounders; thirty of the eighteen-
pounders on her upper deck. The 'l'arinant, of ninety guns, mounted eighteen-
pounders on her main deck. The Belle Isle has twenty-four-pounders on her 
main deck. The San Ildefonsa had :fifty-eight long twenty-four-pounders on 
the :first and second decks; four long eight-pounders and ten thirty-six-pound-
ers, carronades, on the quarter deck and forecastle. 
1808. 'J.1he Caledonia, English ship of one hundred and twenty-two guns, 
launched this year, mounted on first deck, thirty-two-pounders; second deck, 
twenty-four-pounders; third deck, eighteen-pounders; quarter deck, twelve-
pounders and thirty-two-pounders, carronades, and the same calibre on the fore-
ca tle; on the roundhouse she carried eighteen-pounders. 
1811. France had no frigate, and England only four that carried long twenty-
four-pounders, at this date. 
1820. At this date France ordered tliirty and thirty-two-pounders for all 
tlteir ships-of-war. 
1839. Finally, the English, on the 20th of :February of this year, ordered 
all her ships-of-war to be armed with thirty-two and sixty-eight-pounders. 
1 51. By referring to ari-0ther part of this memoir, it will be seen that an 
ighty-one-gun ship-of-the-line is now mounted with the tremendous battery of 
thirty-two-pounders and eight-inch guns. 
Thi. regular increase demands, on our part, a like armament, and that we 
r,~lax nothing in the artillery for the defence of the coast, requiring more time 
t, buHd, and stronger works to receive and resist such artillery. 
3 . How far vessels-of-war, ~team batteries, ordinary merchant ships, and 
. teamer:-, and other temporary expedients, can be relied upon as a substitute for 
permanent fortification, for the defence of our large seaports 1 
It follow , from what ha been said under the two previous heads, that a 
nation may rely upon a navy a. a substitute for fortifications, in a great meas-
ure, for the defence of not only her large seaports, but for her coasts generally. 
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The two cases of France and England exemplifying that either a fleet or forti-
fications have heretofore sufficed. 
The great question that arises, in adapting the one or the other exclusively, 
will be the cost, the efficiency a1f'the eventful moment, and the consequences, in 
a political point of view, of directing such immense resources as dependence 
upon a fleet would require to a system that has its advantage in throwirfg the 
evils of war from our shores at the same time that its success brings a spirit of 
conquest and aggrandizement, limited only by the extent to which the nation 
may be led by the glory its arms shall achieve. 
My opinion is, that sound policy calls upon us to adopt the mixed system of 
pem1anent batteries in conjunction with ships-of-the-line and war steamers. 
If we adopt a floating system, we must make ourselves superior afloat to our 
enemy. Every seaport and dock yard must be provided with its own floating 
batteries, available for its waters and adjacent shoals. The great estuaries 
leading into the heart of the country must each be watched and protected. 
The floating defences that will protect Boston cannot secure the Hudson, Dela-
ware, Chesapeake, southern coa t, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific, at one and the 
same time. Nor can we place reliance upon our superior fleet blockading our 
enemy in his ports. The fallacy of this reliance is exemplified by the sailing 
of the Yavlau fleet and transports no less than three times without being per-
ceived, and being afloat in the narrow sea of the Mediterranean fifty-two days, 
notwith, tanding all the watchfulnes, of the English fleet; a ingle detachment 
of the en my's fleet escaping the blockade, sails for any of our harbors, where 
it must be met either by floating or land batteries. Hence, we have no alterna-
tive but a decided superiority, if we place reliance upon floating batteries . 
'l'heRc floating defence, arc of th most pcri, hable character, and cnormou ly 
cxpen ivc in first cost and r pair.., , compared with land batteries. 'ro have some 
id ·a of the co, t of fleets, let u.· look to the hi tory of Europ ·. 
The French estimate that a , hip will last but twelve year8 ; and to have forty 
ship -of-the-line and fifty frigate in commi ion, it is necessary to have fifty-
thr e "hips-of-the-line and ixty frigates, so great and cou8taut are the necessary 
r pair, . The fact was tated to the ] r nch Chamber by 0. Du pin, a, deduced 
from their own expcri nc . 
The cost of maintaining th French fie t annually, from 1689 to 17 9, wa. 
av ra()'rd. _ .. __ ....... _ .. __ . ____ . __ . __ . ____ . ____ . _ ... _ _ _ $7, 0 ,000 
From 1776 to 17 3 was av rao- d ______ . ____ ......... _ . _ _ _ _ 19,400,000 
1783 to 1786 it wa , __ ... ______ . _ . __ .. __ . __ ..... _ . _ _ 12,600,000 
For th y ar 1797 __ do .. _ .. _. _. __________ . ___ .. __ ... __ . . 16,'i00,000 
l 05 . . do .. _ . _ .. _ . ___________ . __ . _ ..... _ . _ . 2 ,000,000 
1 0 _ . do ___ . _ ... ____ ... ______ .. _ . ____ . _ _ _ _ 22,000,000 
1 14 .. do __ . _ . _____ .... _ ... _ .. __ .. __ .. __ . _ . 10,200,000 
1 16 _ . do __ ... __ ...... __ . _ . __________ .. _ . . . 9,600,000 
1 1 _ . do .... __ . ___ .. _________ . _ .. _ . ___ .. _ _ 640,000 
In 1 7 th<· hamb r. vot d ..... ____ ..... __ . _ .. _ .. __ .. _ _ _ 10, 00,000 
In 1 4 7 .... - .. do .. _ ..... _ . __ ... _ . _ .... _ ... _ ... ___ ... _ . 1 .0.53,90 
Tli o t of main inino- th ' 111n· • ,f 
(no in ·ltt inn· 1 11 t 1 U, , p ·ri d f fort ·- n y , r,., 
urn of ... __ .. _ .... - . - ... - · - - · · - - - - . - - - - .. - ... - - .. - . 
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The annual average being (forty-nine years). - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
From 1799 to 1815, fifteen years of war. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The annual average being .......... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
From 1816 to 1851, not including 1841 to 1844 - - - - - - - . - - -







These enormous sums enable us to form some judgment of the gradual 
increase in the annual expenses of maintaining a navy, and the expenses in 
periods of peace, compared with war. Now let us examin into the magnitude 
of the fleets of Europe, at different points, to form some idea of the number of 
5hips we must have to secure that superiority that will justify our reliance upon 
:Hoating defences. 
The French fleet, by no means the strongest w.e are likely to contend with, 
consists of the following number of large ships at the period . tated: 
In 1789 ... _ .... 81 ships-of-the-line, and 69 frigates . 
.llarch, 1791. .. __ . __ 73 __ ._ .. _.do ___ .. __ .67 _ .. do. 
Dec., 1791 .. __ .. _ . 86 .... _ . __ do ________ 78 _ .. do. 
1792 .....• _ . 82 _ ... __ . _do ....... _ 68 __ . do. 
Feb., 1793 ...... __ 7 5. __ . _ ... do __ ... _ .. 59 __ . do. 
1801. ....... 39 ... __ ... do .. _ ... _ .35 ... do . 
.June, 1814 ... __ ... 73 __ . __ ._.do .. _. ___ .41. .. do. 
1817 ...... _. 68 _ .. __ .. _do. _____ .. 38 _. _ do. 
1827 ..... __ .59. _._ .... do. __ ..... 51. .. do. 
1828 ........ 59 ........ do ........ 51. .. do. 
July, f829 ........ 33 ..... _ .. do ....... .41. .. do. only. 
At this date she was building eighty ships to restore her navy and replace 
the rotten and decayed ships. 
In 1837 she had one hundred and fifty-three ships afloat, and in 1847 she . 
had two hundredj,nd sixteen ships afloat, sixty-six of wMch were steamers. 
The study of tiie above shows the losses that the vanquished have to sustain 
from time to time-an item to be more particularly stated hereafter. 
The following table gives a more enlarged view of the strength of the differ-
ent naval powers: 
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Ships of fifty guns •••.. 
Frigates··---·_·-···· 
Ships-of-war .••• _ ••.. 
Smaller vessels •.••••. 
1793. 
Shi pa-of-the-line._ • _ •. 
Frigates ••••.••. _·-·· 
mailer vessels .. . .••. 
1829 . 
Shi ps-of-th.e-li n e _ ..... 
Frigates ••...•.. _ . - .. 
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411 246 204 
13] 33 6 
149 41 12 
336 14~ 94 
615 222 102 
32 ·----· ····-· ------ ------ ------
28 ·--··· -----· ----- - ·----· ------
13 ··---· ----- ··---- ------ ------
6 ------ ·----- ·----· -----· ·-----
79 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
49 30 60 39 ------ ------
38 11 57 21 ------ -----· 
32 60 3 140 .. -- -- .. ------
119 101 120 200 . _.. • . . - - - • -
12 32 2 
0 25 6 
63 24 15 
105 ------ 8 1 ------ 23 ..•••• 
hips-of-the-line. ..... 120 J 49 3 11 11 50 15 .••• •• 11 
Frigates .••. ..... .•.. 141 I 62 4 21 ~ 25 15 ______ 30 
:ma.lier ve sels ..••••. 317 242 9 32 14 40 18 .••••. 16 
578 353 16 1 54 33 J 15 48 ------ , 57 









otal ................................... 31 
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Loss of the English fleet during the war from May, 1803, to July, 1815~ 
Captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and burnt: 
Ships-of-the-line ............................... - 13 
Under the line._ .......... ...... .. .. - . . . . . . . . . . 304 
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 
Loss of the enemy's fleet during the same wars, namely, French, Dutch,, 
Spanish, Danish, Russian, Turkish, and American. Same causes as above: 
Ships-of-the-line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 
Under the Hne ................................. 108 
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 
. In our statements of the cost of maintaining fleets, the total expenditure has. 
?een given, including wages of seamen, ordnance, &c. To make some com~ar-· 
ison between the cost of building fortifications and building ships, the followmg· 
facts may be useful: 
The wear and tear of ships of the English fleet, 1799 to 1819, 
inclusive, was . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . $322,849,296 
The cost of building and repairing ships during the same period, 
was . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70,789,070' 
Total cost of wear and tear and building in 21 years ......... . 
Or, an average per annum of ............................. . 
The cost of building the ships afloat, comprising the na;y of the 
United States in 1842, was ............................ . 
The cost of repairs upon the same vessels from time to time, was 







Here we have the repairs to first cost in the ratio of five and a half to nine. 
This cost was for fifty vessels, or for five ships-of-the-line, eleven frigates,. 
including two steameri:\, and thirty-four smaller vessels, mounting in all 1,440• 
gun . The average cost per gun, repairs included, is $10,161. The average-
co t per gun, omitting repairs, is $6,286. . 
But cost of an exclusive reliance upon floating defences is far greater than 
appears by this statement. To it should be added the cost and repairs put upon 
the Constellation, Java, Guerriere, two steamers ]folton, and all the other ves-
-~el · lo t, broken up, foundered, &c., of which I can find no account, and which 
of them. elves (the cost) would go far towards building lasting and permanent 
defences for some of the harbors on our coast. 
I would wi. h to prc~ent the cost of the several fortifications on our coast and 
the repair from time to time, but have no data therefor. The only fortifica-
tion with which I can make the comparison is Fort Schuyler, the cost of which 
to this date is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $843, 187· 
r_ro thi add for completion, (it is now ready to receive its entire ar-
mament, and i a.~ defen ible as can be made ; the work remaining 
to be don con i t in conveniences for the garrison,) say...... . . 50, 000 
Making th um of; ............... _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893, 187 
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This work is to be armed wHh one hundred and eighty-four guns, producing 
an average of $4,855 per gun. This single fort, calculated to endure for ages, 
is consicler~d an equivalent in defence to an enemy's fleet, and a substitute for a 
fleet of floating batteries, otherwise necessary. 
If we look to permanent land batteries for the defence of our harbors, we 
have at all times a suitable disciplined force in the uniform militia of our cities 
and to!vns for their garrisons, ready at short notice to man the guns. On the 
contrary, for floating defences ·we must look to the more limited number of 
sailors, unaccustomed to guns, and to be disciplined for the purpose. 
There is no room for doubt, in my mind, that we cannot, wit:1 due reg·ard to 
the safety of our cities, towns, and dock yards, rely upon vessels-of-war and 
steam batteries, and that economy demands a dependence to be placed in heavy 
land batterie::i built in the most permanent manner. 'I1he reliance upon ordi-
nary merchant ships and steamers, as well as any other temporary expedient, I 
consider as no dependence whatever. Let us imagine a small fleet only of such 
STEAMSHIPS OF THE LINE as that elsewhere described, mounting thirty-two 
pound r. and eight and ten-inch columbiadR, and what chance is there against 
such broadsides for anything that can be made of merchant ships and mercan-
tile steamers 1 Such vessels are in no manner suited for heavy armaments, and 
would, in a measure, have to be rebuilt to fit them for defence. Against a single 
ship-of-the-line, becalmed or anchored in smooth water, we might hope to inter-
poi:;e a formidable r ::iist:mce with temporary batteries on merchant ships' decks, 
towed by mercantile Rteamen,; but against several, mutually acting either on the 
offen::iive or defensive, and with auxiliary steam power, ( or even without,1capable 
of flanking each other's position, no defence whatever could be placed in them. 
There is no part of our coa t where beneficial results might be better calcu-
lated upon from temporary xp client of this character than Loui iana. Tlie 
ports being built to keep off the enemy'. heavy batterie., he must take to bfr 
boats. These, when transporting troop , could readily be run down and de-
troyecl by merchant steamer . A ho · tile army that might have gained the dry 
land of the :Mis issippi would be exc edingly annoy d by floating batterie on 
the decks of ships towed by teamer ; but as a dcfon ive, no reliance could be 
plac d upon them. 'I1he facility with which field-gun and howitzer could et 
fir to and de troy such floating exp di nt i exemplified by the de truction of 
ve. s l · used by u: in the d £ nee of Loni iana in 1 14-'15. Where uch expe-
di nt. are unexpected, and no uitabl force at hand to contend with them, th y 
ar of o-reat value; but 1 t our en my knO"\f that uch i. our only defence, and 
h r adily commands them an of d troying them. 
4th. How far the increa e of population on the northern fronti r, and of th 
m re ntil and marin on the north rn lak , , obviat or climini he the nf'C :--
·ity of continuino- th , y t m of fortification. on th . e lake. ? 
pon thi. point I am not o w 11 pr par d to pr ent my view fully, havin" 
· n hut littl of th ountry and po,:. .. ino- fi w . tafrtical fact. upon which to 
r Iv. • 
• n th lakr.., a~ on th an, w. 
movrm nt: f invading armi<',. It i ao-ain.t th op<'ration, of floatino- batt ri ., 
· in th· f rn r a. that w lmilcl fort,'. in thi, . ·ction of ur c tmtry. Had 
ur nr.io-hb rB no v . . I r m an. f procurin th m w would hav no ne d ot 
£ rt · but w know th .·Io. , ... b th a naval an am rcantil marin, of st am 
aad . ailincY v ·. ·r. l , ancl hi v • f rtifi d po ·itiou. .·up •rior in tr •nrrth to ur o, ·n 
, ithin whi h t prot ct thc·ir mc•r ·antil<! marinr. and, when o ·cu i n otfrr , t 
cp1ip th m ·ith r a tl,m p rt , 1• ann .d v .... ·I:. 
In the v nt f a war , d •-.p ·rat , c·ffort w nl h, madr. to ,· iz upon •v ry· 
thin,,. • Aoat in ur port . r h ! am , ffor w woulcl cloubtl • .. makt to u 
th fl , tin...,. p w r f our n i1rh kn w how v r, that Yin
0 
n h ., 
or .r nr pa--t b n fortifi cl an b Jiev ·till in p - · 
MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES. 413-
for the land and water defences of that harbor. So long as they hold it, we 
rannot gain the important point of capturing the only means in their possession 
to annoy us. An invasion into the heart ~f our country _i s not like~y to . be 
thought of; and if undertaken, must result m the destruct10n of the mvadmg 
force by the vast increase and present density of our population. 
It would not be possible for an invading army to leave the lake shores beyond 
a few days' march. With the command of the lakes, our shores and all the 
towns and important lines of canals and railroads would be at the mercy of an 
enemy to lay under contribution, or burn and destroy, as might be their policy-
Without heavy batteries to combat their fleet, we can offer no successful oppo--
sition by our superiority of numbers to such predatory naval expeditions. 
With a naval superiority we could blockade their ports and have the mean& 
of pursuing any vessels that might escape the blockade. To protect ourselves 
in this way our force must be decidedly superior ; and our resources would enable· 
ua to do so if we can in the commencemeet of a war save even our mercantile 
marine and capture that of our enemy. Without fortified harbors I cannot see 
how we can gain such results and advantages with an enemy possessing safe 
harbors, offering effectual seeurity to his vessels. 
Nor could we at once calculate upon reducing Kingston. The fortification& 
at that place cannot be taken by assault or destroyed by bombardment. It is 
only by the operations of a systematic siege that they can be arrested from the 
hands of an enemy. Some time must elapse after the breaking out of the war 
before we could hope to take so important a place. 
The command of the wider parts of the St. Lawrence is in the hands of the· 
power possessing the naval superiority. We could not cross that river, where 
it ' banks are beyond gunshot from our shores without such naval ascendency> , 
thereby prolonging the time necessary for reducing Kingston. 
The commercial ports, in which self-interest now draws our numerous mer-
chant steamers and ships, should therefore be provided with such heavy land 
~atteries as will effectually secure the shipping in the commencement of hostili-
he and during any temporary check to our operations on land and water . 
. The same protection should be given to inlets, by which vessels could cut the 
Imes of our railroads and canal communications. 
Such batteries or fortifications , are our only certain security. No increase of 
population or of mercantile marine can give us that protection (with the means 
our neighbors have at command) in the commencement of hostilities; nor can 
we gain the ascendency on the lakes without some fortified harbor, under cover 
of ·which to build and eq_uip a fleet. The subjugation of the Oanadas, if 
the result of a war, will not be accomplished before Quebec and Kingston are 
reduced. · 
'These two places, if defended in proportion to their artificial strength, will 
call for harder fighting and more prolonged than any battle we have yet fought. 
They certainly can be taken, and we believe we know enough of their con-
stn1ction to fit out the necessary armaments, but it will require time, and large 
military resource , during which the lake coast should not be left unguarded 
and unprotected. 
The reduction of these two fortresses cuts off in the one case all further relief 
from the northern country, and all means of further annoyance~by water in the 
other; but the entire subjugation and annexation of the country to ours depends 
roore upon the people. Unless they see fit to govern themselves, as a part of 
our conf cl racy, we cannot make them. We may hold it by military power, 
b ut with the p •opl opposed, the struggle will not cease with the fall of Quebec 
and King ton. 
11 of which i r '>'pectfully ubrnitted. 
RICHARD DELAFIELD, 
Major of Engineers. 
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Letterftom Charles Stewart, United States navy. 
BORDENTOWN, NEW JERSEY, 
November 11, 1851. 
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as far as reasonably practicable, all the important positions essential to commer-
cial purposes and naval preparations for the lakes. In this direction there is 
but one power with whom we may be brought into collision, and that is Great 
Britain. She is, however, a power who, on a probability of hostilities with the 
United States, would readily throw on to our border and on the lakes a power-
ful re-enforcement of military and naval annoyance to our lake frontier. 
Very respectfully, I have the honor to remain your obedient servant, 
CHARLES STEW AR'r. 
Hon. C. M. CONRAD, 
Secretary ef War, Wasliington, D. C. 
, 
